


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


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HISTORY
OF THE
CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE
OF
FRANCE UNDER NAPOLEON.

FORMING A SEQUEL TO
"THE HISTORY OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION."

BY
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HISTORY
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BOOK XIX.

THE EMPIRE.

THE effect which the sanguinary catastrophe of Vincennes produced in France, was undoubtedly great; it was still greater in the rest of Europe. We do not depart from the strict truth in saying, that that catastrophe became the principal cause of a third general war. The conspiracy of the French princes, and the consequent death of the duc d'Enghien, were reciprocal blows by which the revolution and the counter revolution goaded each other into a new and violent contest, which speedily extended itself from the Alps and the Rhine as far as the banks of the Niemen.

We have delineated the respective situations of France and the various courts, setting out from the renewal of the war with Great Britain; the pretensions of Russia to a supreme arbitration, received coldly by England, courteously by the First Consul, but speedily repulsed by him, as soon as he perceived the partial disposition of the Russian cabinet; the apprehensions of Austria, fearing to see the war become general again, and seeking to escape from its anxieties, by excesses of power in the Empire; the perplexities of Prussia, by turns agitated by the suggestions of Russia, or attracted by the caresses of the First

Consul, nearly seduced by his language to M. Lombard, and ready at length to terminate its long vacillations, by throwing itself into the arms of France.

Such was the state of things a little previous to the deplorable conspiracy of which we have related the tragical phases. M. Lombard had returned to Berlin quite charmed with what he had heard at Brussels, and, in communicating his own impressions to the youthful Frederick William, had determined him definitively to coalesce with us. Another circumstance had greatly contributed towards producing this happy result. Russia had shown herself unfavourable to the policy of Prussia, which consisted in a sort of continental neutrality, founded upon the ancient Prussian neutrality, and had endeavoured to substitute for that policy a project of a European triple league, which, under the pretext of restraining the belligerent powers, would speedily have terminated in a new coalition, directed against France and subsidised by England. Frederick William, stung by the reception that had been given to his proposals, and by the evident consequences that might result from the Russian project, feeling that strength was on the side of the First Consul, offered him, no longer a barren friendship, as he had done since 1800, through the enigmatical M. d'Haugwitz, but a genuine alliance. At first he had proposed, to France as to Russia, an extension of the Prussian neutrality, which should comprehend all the states of Germany, and be purchased by the evacuation of Hanover, which would infallibly have had the effect, as to us, of reopening the continent to English commerce, and closing against us the route to Vienna. The First Consul in conferring at Brussels with M. Lombard, would not listen to this. Since the return of M. Lombard to Berlin, and the recent conduct of Russia, the king of Prussia made quite different proposals to us. By this new scheme, the two powers, France and Prussia, were to guarantee to each other the *status presens*; comprehending for Prussia, all that she had acquired in Germany and in Poland since 1789; for France, the Rhine, the Alps, the annexation of Piedmont, the presidency of the Italian Republic, the acquisition of Parma and Plaisance, the maintenance of the kingdom of Etruria, and the temporary occupation of Taranto. Should peace be disturbed on account of either of these interests, that one of the two powers which should not be immediately threatened was to intervene to prevent war. Should its good offices prove ineffectual, the two powers engaged to unite their forces, and maintain the struggle in common. As the price of this serious engagement, Prussia demanded the evacuation of the banks of the Elbe and the Weser, the reduction of the French army in Hanover to the number of men necessary for the collection of the revenues of the country, that is to say, to 6000; and, finally, if on the return of peace, the successes of France should have been sufficiently great to allow of her dictating her own

terms, the cabinet of Berlin required that the fate of Hanover should be determined in accordance with the views of Prussia. This was indirectly stipulating that Hanover should be given to her.

What determined Frederick William to enter thus far into the policy of the First Consul, was the maintenance of the peace of the Continent, which depended, in his opinion, upon a solid alliance between Prussia and France. He perceived, with a sagacity creditable to himself, and especially creditable to M. d'Haugwitz, by whose counsels he was here guided, that, if Prussia and France were strongly united, no continental power would dare to disturb the general peace. He, at the same time, said that in enchaining the Continent he would also enchain the First Consul; for the guarantee of the existing situation of the two powers was a means of fixing that situation, and of interdicting the First Consul from any new enterprises. If Prussia had only adhered to such views, and if she had been encouraged to do so, the destinies of the world would have been changed.

The same reasons which had determined Prussia to make the proposal that we have recited, should have determined the First Consul to accept it. What he definitively desired, at least at that period, was the Rhine and the Alps as the boundaries of France, besides an absolute domination in Italy, and a preponderating influence in Spain: in a word, the supremacy of the West. He would have secured all this in obtaining the guarantee of Prussia, and he would have secured it with a degree of certainty all but infallible. Doubtless, the Continent would have been reopened to the English by the evacuation of the banks of the Elbe and the Weser; but those facilities restored to their commerce would not have afforded them benefit at all proportionate to the injury they would have experienced from the immobility of the Continent, thenceforward secured by the union of Prussia with France. And, the Continent at peace, the First Consul was certain, by applying his genius to the subject for some years, sooner or later to strike some grand blow against England.

True it is, that in the proposition of Prussia the title of *alliance* was wanting; the substance was unquestionably there, but the word was designedly left out by the policy of the young king.

That prince, in fact, had determined not to insert the word; he had even endeavoured to diminish the apparent importance of the treaty by terming it a convention. But of what consequence was the form when the substance was secured; when the engagement to join his forces to ours was formally stipulated; when that engagement, taken by a king, honest and faithful to his word, was one to be depended upon? This is the place in which to note one of the errors of judgment of not only the court of Prussia, but of all the courts of Europe of that day. They admired the new government of France, since it had been directed by a great man; they loved his principles as much as they respected his glory; and

yet they wilfully held themselves aloof from him. Even when some object of importance compelled them to make advances to him, they were unwilling to meet him except upon terms of official formality; not that they either felt, or would have ventured to show, towards him, the aristocratic contempt of old dynasties towards new ones; the First Consul had not as yet exposed himself to comparisons of that sort by constituting himself the chief of a dynasty, and the military glory, which was his chief title, was one of those merits before which disdain must ever prostrate itself. But each power feared, in proclaiming itself his ally, to pass in the eyes of Europe as a deserter of the cause of kingcraft. Frederick William would have felt himself embarrassed in presence of his young friend Alexander, and even in presence of his enemy the emperor Francis. The young and lovely queen, surrounded by a coterie brim-full of the passions and prejudices of the *ancien régime*, a coterie in which M. Lombard was satirised, because he had returned from Brussels an enthusiastic admirer of the First Consul, and in which M. d'Haugwitz was detested because he was the champion of the French alliance; the young and lovely queen and her circle would have cried aloud and overwhelmed the king with their censure. That, to be sure, was a mere domestic annoyance, such as Frederick William was by no means unaccustomed to. But he would not have been able to reconcile a formal treaty of alliance with the equivocal language, destitute of frankness, which he habitually used with the other courts. He wished to be able to hold up the engagements entered into with the First Consul, as a sacrifice that he had made, in spite of his own wishes, to the most urgent wants of his subjects. The evacuation of Hanover was, indeed, an object of the highest importance to his subjects, inasmuch as the Elbe and the Weser would thereby be reopened to their trade. To obtain from France the evacuation of Hanover, it was indispensable, he would have said, to yield her something, and he had found himself compelled to guarantee to her that which, moreover, all the powers, and especially Austria, had guaranteed to her either by treaties or by secret conventions. At this price, without any new concession, he had delivered Germany from foreign troops and re-established her commerce. Add the word alliance to the proposed convention, and this representation would become impossible. It is true that the stipulation relative to Hanover was as compromising as the word alliance would have been, but it was consigned to an article which it was promised, on word of honour, should be kept secret. That court, as has been shown, was as weak as it was ambitious; but its promise, once written, could be relied upon. It was advisable, then, to deal with her such as she was, to make allowance for her weaknesses, and to hasten to profit by this rare opportunity of binding her to France.

In our time, since the breaking up of the old Germanic Empire, there remain but few subjects of rivalry between Prussia and

Austria, and a very important one exists between Prussia and France, in the Rhenish provinces. But in 1804, Prussia, thrown at a considerable distance from the Rhine, had only congenial interests with France, and antagonistic interests with Austria. The mutual hatred between Frederick the Great and Austria was still in full force. The reform of the Germanic Constitution, the secularisation of the ecclesiastical territories, the suppression of the immediate nobility, the partition of votes between the Catholic and the Protestant princes, were so many questions resolved or to be resolved, which animated the two courts with retrospective and anticipative resentment. Prussia, enriched with church property, representing the revolutionary principles of Germany, and thus possessing in the eyes of the old monarchies almost the bad odour of the Revolution, as well as its interests, was our natural ally; and, unless we were desirous of having no friend in Europe, it was evidently with her that we should make common cause.

In fact, as an ally, Spain was not worthy of the name, and to regenerate her was to run the risk of being plunged at a future day into immense difficulties. Italy, torn into fragments, of which we possessed nearly the whole, could add nothing substantial to our strength; she could give us, at the most, some soldiers, capable, indeed, of being rendered good, but requiring, for that purpose, to have served for a long time with our own. Austria, abler and more astute than all the other courts combined, cherished the resolution, concealed from every one else and almost from herself, to spring upon us at the first opportunity, in order to recover what she had lost. Nor was there any thing astonishing or reprehensible even in that resolution; all who have been vanquished seek to regain their place, and have a right to do so. Inasmuch as Prussia was, so to speak, the France of Germany, insomuch was Austria all that we can imagine of the opposite, for she was the perfect picture of the *ancien régime*. Moreover, there was a special reason for her being irreconcilable with France; Italy—the object of her liveliest desire, and of a no less lively desire on the part of the First Consul. From the moment that he aspired to the dominion of Italy, he could only hope for truces, of longer or shorter duration, with Austria. Between the two constantly opposed courts of Germany, then, it was impossible to choose that of Vienna. As for Russia, to pretend to the dominion of the Continent was necessarily to have her for an enemy. The last ten years had abundantly proved that, even without having any interest in the war which we sustained against Germany, with an interest identical to our own in the war which we had sustained against England, she had, under Catherine, taken a hostile attitude; under Paul I. had sent forth her Suwarrow; and, under Alexander, had ended, under the pretext of protecting the lesser powers, by aiming at a continental protectorate incompatible with the continental influence that we sought to exercise. Continental jealousy made her our enemy, as maritime

jealousy made us an enemy of England. Thus, then, Spain, in its abasement, having no strength to offer to us; Austria being implacable on account of Italy; Russia being our rival on the Continent, as England was our rival upon the Ocean; Prussia, on the contrary, having interests congenial to our own, and playing the part of an intruder and upstart among the old governments, Prussia was our natural and inevitable ally. To neglect her was to consent to be wholly isolated. To remain isolated permanently, and under whatever circumstances, was to invoke destruction as the consequence of our first reverse of fortune.

When alliances were in question, the First Consul was ill-advised by M. de Talleyrand. That minister, influenced by taste rather than by calculation, had a decided predilection for Austria. Filled with reminiscences of the old cabinet of Versailles, in which the Great Frederick was detested on account of his sarcasms, and in which the court of Vienna was beloved on account of its cajoleries, he fancied himself at the Versailles of bygone days, when all went smoothly with Austria. For such insufficient cause he was cool, satirical, contemptuous towards Prussia, and dissuaded the First Consul from putting trust in her. His advice, however, had but little weight in the matter. The First Consul, from the time of his attaining power, had judged with his usual sagacity as to the quarters in which alliance was desirable, or not, and he had leaned towards Prussia. At the same time, confident in his strength, he was in no hurry to choose his friends. He saw all the utility of having friends, and he appreciated all at their true respective value, but he believed that he would always have time to choose them, and he determined to do so at his leisure.

When M. de Lucchesini, in consequence of the interviews at Brussels, presented a letter from the king himself, and the project of alliance, wanting only the title, the First Consul was deeply stung. He, rightly enough, considered the connexion with France to be honourable enough, and, more especially, profitable enough to be publicly avowed by Prussia. "I accept," said he, "the proposed basis, but I wish the word alliance to be inserted in the treaty. It is only Prussia's public profession of friendship with us which can intimidate Europe, and enable me to direct all our resources against England. Such a treaty once signed, I will reduce our land force and increase our marine, and devote myself wholly to maritime warfare. Without such a formal and public alliance, I could not, without danger, effect this modification of our forces, and I should sacrifice the blockade of the rivers without any adequate advantage."

There was much correctness in this reasoning. The complete avowal of our alliance would have given us a moral power, which a half avowal could not have secured to us. But still the bare fact of a union of our strength was of immense consequence, and the substance should in this case have been preferred to the mere

form. Prussia, allied with us merely to the extent of being bound to take up arms with us under certain circumstances, would speedily have been compromised in the eyes of Europe, exposed to the sneers and reproaches of the other cabinets, and thereby irritated till at length she would have thrown herself, even despite herself, into our arms. A first step towards us would have rendered the second step inevitable. It was an error, therefore, not to meet her cordially. The First Consul, independent of the word alliance, upon which he laid the utmost stress, disputed some of the conditions demanded by Prussia. As respected Hanover he was inclined to be very accommodating, and made no difficulty as to ceding it, should the opportunity offer, to Prussia, knowing that he would thus sow the seeds of perpetual discord between her and England. Nevertheless, he was still impracticable as to the opening of the rivers. He revolted at the idea of opening part of the Continent to the English, to those English who blockaded every sea. He went so far as to say to the Prussian minister:

“What! for a mere pecuniary consideration, would you have me sacrifice one of the most effective means of annoying Great Britain? You have aided the cloth-merchants of Silesia with three or four millions of crowns; you ought to aid them with as much more. Make your calculation: how much will it cost you? Six or eight millions of crowns? I am ready to supply you with that amount privately, provided that you give up the opening of the rivers.”

This proposition was not to the taste of Prussia, who wished to be able to say to the European courts, that she had only gone thus far with the First Consul in order to secure the withdrawal of the French troops from the Elbe and the Weser.

When the proposal, thus modified, was returned to Berlin, the king was alarmed at the idea of an avowed and definite alliance. The emperor Alexander, and the German courts, were incessantly present to his mind, making him a thousand reproaches for his perfidy. He was also apprehensive of the enterprising nature of the First Consul, and feared that in binding himself too completely to him, he should be drawn into war, which was precisely that which he was most anxious to avoid. The court itself was divided and excited upon this question. Although the cabinet was secret to the utmost, some inklings got abroad of the matter which so gravely occupied it; and the court was loud in its wrath against M. d'Haugwitz, whom it accused of being the parent of such a policy. This eminent statesman, whom a certain seeming duplicity, springing rather from his position than from his nature, caused to be ill spoken of in the courts of Europe, but who at that period understood better than any Prussian—nay, we would freely add, better than any Frenchman—the mutual interests of the two powers, made every effort to revive the courage of his alarmed sovereign, and, at the same time, to prevail on the First

Consul not to be too excessive in his demands. But his efforts were unavailing, and in his disgust he formed the resolution of retiring from office, a resolution which he shortly afterwards put into execution. The Russian minister at Berlin, M. d'Alopeus, a Russian, as fiery and arrogant as M. de Markoff, disturbed all Potsdam with his outcry. The Austrian diplomatists filled it with their intrigues. Every passion was aroused against the idea of an alliance with France. Nevertheless, this interior agitation extended no further than the immediate circle of the court, and had not become the public rumour of Berlin.

Such was the state of affairs when the news arrived of the seizure of the duc d'Enghien upon the Germanic territory. It produced an immense effect. The excitement of the anti-French party overstepped all bounds. The embarrassment of the opposite party was extreme. The prediction of the consul Lebrun, that that act would cause immense excitement in Europe, was now fully justified. However, to extenuate in some degree the effect of this intelligence, it was affirmed that this was purely a measure of precaution; that the First Consul had desired to secure a hostage, but that it had never entered his mind to destroy a young prince of a race so illustrious, and who, besides, was unacquainted with what had been plotted at Paris. Scarcely were these apologies made when the intelligence arrived of the sad event at Vincennes. Thenceforth the French party was compelled to be silent—it could not even proffer apologies. The French minister, Laforest, though he enjoyed a high personal reputation, suddenly found himself deserted by the society of Potsdam, and he even mentioned in his despatches that no one would speak to him. In one of his daily reports he repeats these actual words of a lady who, nevertheless, was extremely well disposed towards the French legation. “If we may judge of the exasperation of minds from the violence of language, I have no doubt that every thing that is connected with the French government would be insulted—to say no worse—did not Prussia still possess protecting laws, and a king whose principles are well known.”

M. de Laforest, at the same date, added that these *yelpers*, after having, externally at least, displayed a lively sensibility, *could not conceal a sort of insulting joy, and congratulated each other, as though they had achieved an important victory.*

In point of fact, this terrible event was an important advantage to the enemies of France, for it everywhere threw the French party into the background, and cemented alliances which could only be broken up at the cannon's mouth.

The blunders of a foe are but a sorry compensation for our own. England, however, had provided that compensation for us. She had committed an act not easily to be characterised, in furnishing pecuniary aid to a conspiracy, and in ordering, or permitting three of her diplomatic servants, at Cassel, at Stuttgard, and at Munich, to engage in the most criminal in-

trigues. The First Consul despatched a thoroughly trustworthy officer, who, disguised, and giving himself out to be an agent of the conspiracy, wormed himself into the confidence of Messrs. Drake, and Spencer Smith. He received from them, for transmission to the conspirators, and by way of a slight instalment—seeing the difficulty of raising on the instant a sufficient amount in specie—upwards of a hundred thousand francs in gold, which he immediately handed over to the French police. The report of that officer, and the autograph letters of Messrs. Drake and Spencer Smith, were placed together, and exhibited to the diplomatic corps, that their authenticity might be established. The fact was beyond denial. The report and the documents in question, inserted in the *Moniteur*, and forwarded to the courts of Europe, caused a severe censure of England to succeed to that passionate blame of which France had for some time been the exclusive object. It was quite evident to all impartial men, that the First Consul had been provoked by detestable conduct, and it occasioned them regret, for the sake of his glory, that he had not contented himself with the legal punishment of Georges and his accomplices, and the disgrace which must have attached to the misconduct of the English diplomatic agents. Messrs. Drake and Smith, indignantly dismissed from Munich and from Stuttgart, passed hastily across Germany, not daring to show themselves anywhere. Mr. Drake, especially, on reaching Berlin, received orders from the Prussian police not to stop there even for a single day. He merely passed through that capital, and hastened to embark for England, bearing with him the stigma which attaches to the profanation of the most sacred of functions.

The conduct of Mr. Drake and his colleague furnished something of counterpoise to the death of the duc d'Enghien. Nevertheless, the Prussian cabinet, though perfectly civil in its tone, suddenly became cool, silent, and reserved towards M. de Laforest; no more mention was now made by it of alliance or of business affairs: not a word did it utter about the sad event which was everywhere so deeply deplored. It was known that Messrs. d'Haugwitz and Lombard were in despair about the occurrence which was so ruinous to their policy; M. d'Haugwitz was known to have taken the resolution of quitting the helm of state, and retiring to his estates in Silesia, much impoverished by the war. But these personages preserved unbroken silence. M. de Laforest having endeavoured to bring about an explanation, M. d'Haugwitz listened attentively to him, and replied in these grave terms: "Be assured, sir, that throughout this affair the king has been especially anxious about all that concerns the glory of the First Consul. As to the alliance, that is no longer to be thought of. Too much was required of the king; moreover, a total change has suddenly taken place in his ideas, in consequence of an unforeseen event, the effects of which neither you nor I can prevent."

In fact, the dispositions of the king of Prussia were completely

altered. He was now disposed to connect himself with Russia, and hoped to find in that power the support which he had formerly anticipated from France. He had desired to obtain from the First Consul some reduction in the army of Hanover, and the evacuation of the banks of the Elbe and the Weser, by undertaking to share whatever dangers might menace France. Now, determined to have nothing in common with France, he made up his mind to endure the occupation of Hanover, and the consequent closing of the rivers; and sought, in a closer connexion with Russia, the means of preventing, or, at the least, limiting the inconveniences which might arise from the presence of the French in Germany. He therefore without delay made overtures to the Russian ambassador. It was an easy matter to conduct such a negotiation to a successful termination, for it was wholly congenial to the wishes of the Russian court.

While the effect of the tragical event which occupied the attention of all Europe grew weaker at Berlin, it developed itself at St. Petersburg. It was still greater there than elsewhere. At the court of a young, mercurial, and rash sovereign, freed by its remote locality from the necessity of being prudent, no restraint was put upon the manifestation of feelings. It was on a Saturday that the courier arrived at St. Petersburg. The following day, Sunday, was the diplomatic levee day. The emperor, annoyed by the hauteur of the First Consul, and little inclined to restrain himself in order to please him, listened, on this occasion, only to his resentment, and the outcries of an impassioned mother. He caused all his household to go into mourning, without even consulting his cabinet. When the hour for the levee arrived, the emperor and his court made their appearance in mourning, to the great astonishment even of the ministers, who had not been made aware of that intention. The representatives of all the courts of Europe joyfully beheld this testimony of grief, which was a virtual insult to France. Our ambassador, general Hédouville, present, in common with the other foreign ministers at this levée, was for some instants placed in a most painful situation. But he displayed a coolness and dignity which had a striking effect upon all the witnesses of this strange scene. The emperor passed by without addressing a single word to him. The general proved himself to be neither embarrassed nor disturbed, but with a look of the utmost tranquillity, inspired, by his dignified bearing, respect for the French nation, compromised though it was by a great misfortune.

After this imprudent display, the emperor deliberated with his minister as to the course to be pursued. This young monarch, sensible indeed, but no less vain than sensible, was impatient to play a conspicuous part. He had already played a part in German affairs; but he had speedily perceived that he had rather been permitted to play that part by the policy of the First Consul, than conquered it for himself. He had interceded for Naples and

Hanover, without being attended to; and he had been mortified by the lofty tone in which the First Consul had reproved the conduct of M. de Markoff, although he himself disapproved of that conduct. In such a temper, the slightest opportunity would have sufficed to provoke him to an outbreak; and in yielding to wounded vanity, he imagined that he only obeyed the most honourable feelings of humanity. If to this we add a temper to the utmost degree susceptible, and an utter want of experience, we shall fully explain his sudden resolutions.

To the affront of which we have spoken he wished to add a political step, which was somewhat more serious than a court demonstration. After having vainly opposed his wishes, his ministers imagined a very hazardous means of gratifying him—that of protesting, in quality of guarantee of the Germanic empire, against the invasion of the territory of Baden. This, as we shall presently see, was an extremely rash step.

The quality of guarantee of the Germanic empire, which was here assumed by the court of Russia, was very disputable, for the recent mediation, exercised in conjunction with France, had not been followed by a formal act of guarantee. And so necessary was this act to the existence of the guarantee, that the ministers of France and Russia had frequently consulted with the German ministers upon the necessity for drawing up such a document, and upon the form which it would be expedient to give to it. The act, however, had not been drawn up. In its absence, there remained whatever claim could be founded upon the treaty of Teschen, by which, in 1779, France and Russia had guaranteed the arrangement entered into by Prussia and Austria, relative to the succession of Bavaria. Did that engagement, limited to a special object, confer the right of interfering in a question of the domestic police of the empire. The point was doubtful. At all events, if the empire had occasion to complain of a violation of its territory, it was for the injured sovereign, that is to say, for the grand-duke of Baden, or at most for a German power, but assuredly not for a foreign power to complain. In raising this question, therefore, Russia acted wholly without title. She was about to embarrass Germany, even to do her a disservice, for, notwithstanding that she was affronted, she had no inclination to commence a quarrel, of which the issue was easy to foresee. Finally, it was the greatest of levities to make this disturbance. Scarcely four years had elapsed since the commission of a crime, which calumniators called a parricide, which had stained St. Petersburg with blood, and raised the young monarch to the throne. The assassins of the father still surrounded the son, and not one of them had been punished. Was not this, then, to provoke a crushing reply from the most hardy of adversaries? M. de Woronzow was ill, and replaced by the young prince Czartoryski, and it must be mentioned to the praise of the latter, that, young as he was, he made strong objections. But the aged ministers showed no more pru-

dence in this conjuncture than the youthful monarch himself; for, as regards prudence, the passions level all ages. The cabinet of St. Petersburg, then, determined that a note should be addressed to the Germanic Diet, to arouse its anxiety, and to provoke its consideration of the violation of territory recently committed in the Grand Duchy of Baden. A corresponding note was to be addressed to the French government.

The manifestations inspired by this affair did not end here. It was resolved to evince to the court of Rome an emphatic disapprobation of the condescension it had recently manifested to France in delivering up to her the emigrant Vernègues. The Russian minister at Rome was recalled on the instant. The Pope's nuncio was dismissed from St. Petersburg. There could not be a more misplaced or more affronting censure of the proceedings of a foreign court, however blameable they might be. Saxony, alarmed at the displeasure felt by the First Consul at the presence of M. d'Entraigues at Dresden, had solicited the cabinet of St. Petersburg to recall him. The cabinet of St. Petersburg replied that M. d'Entraigues should remain at Dresden, as Russia needed not to consult the convenience of other courts in the selection of her agents.

After taking these very imprudent steps, they busied themselves in providing against the consequences by forming alliances. A willing and favourable ear was naturally lent to the language of Prussia, who, after having abandoned Russia for France, had now abandoned France for Russia, and sought to unite herself to the north. It would have gratified Russia to induce Frederick William to join in a sort of Continental coalition, independent of England, but inclining towards her. However, it was necessary to be contented with what was offered by the king of Prussia. That prince, obliged to leave Hanover in the hands of the French, since he had broken off negotiations with them, sought to provide against the ill consequences of their presence by means of an understanding with Russia. He wished no more than this, and it was impossible to lead him further.

Consequently, each party having endeavoured to bring about the result which it preferred, they agreed upon a sort of engagement, consisting of a reciprocal declaration of Prussia and Russia, drawn up in varied terms and impressed with the spirit of the two courts. The purport of this engagement was as follows:—As long as the French should confine themselves to the occupation of Hanover, and their forces should not exceed the number of thirty thousand men in that part of Germany, the two courts were to remain passive and maintain the *status quo*. But should the French troops be augmented in number, or should other states of Germany be invaded, the two powers were to combine and resist such fresh invasion; and should their resistance to that progress of the French towards the north, lead to a war, they were to unite their forces, and sustain the struggle in

common. The emperor, in such a contingency, placed all the resources of his empire unreservedly at the disposal of Prussia. This deplorable engagement, signed by Prussia on the 24th of May, 1804, was accompanied, however, by a multitude of restrictions on the part of that power. The king, in his declaration, said that he did not intend to be lightly led into a war, that consequently it would not be merely the addition of some hundreds of men to the French army in Hanover, sent for the annual and regular recruiting of that army, nor would it be a chance collision with one of the small German powers, which would lead him to risk a rupture with France, but her design, formally manifested by a real and considerable augmentation of her forces in Hanover, to aggrandise herself in Germany. The young emperor, on his part, laid no such restriction upon his engagement. He bound himself unconditionally to join his troops to those of Prussia, in the event of war.*

* This treaty, in the form of a mutual declaration, must not be confounded with the secret treaty of Potsdam concluded on the 3rd of November, 1805, while Napoleon was on his march from Ulm to Austerlitz, and which was wrung from Prussia in consequence of the violation of the territory of Anspach and of Bareuth. The treaty of which we here speak has never appeared in any published collection of diplomatic documents; it has even remained unknown in France. Having procured a copy of it, I here publish it, to throw a light upon an important fact, the abandonment of the French alliance by Prussia.

Declaration of the Court of Prussia.

WE, Frederick William III., &c. &c.

The war which is rekindled between England and France having exposed the north of Germany to foreign invasion, the consequences which have already resulted from it to our monarchy and to our neighbours, have excited our utmost anxiety; but above all, the further consequences which may result from it have required us to devise and to mature a timely remedy for them.

However much the occupation of Hanover, and its indirect consequence, the closing of the rivers, are to be deplored, we have resolved, after making every effort short of war with a view to the cessation of this state of things, to make to peace the sacrifice of not challenging that which has been already consummated, and of abstaining from active measures so long as no fresh usurpations shall oblige us to adopt them.

But if, notwithstanding the solemn promises given by the French government, it should extend beyond the *status quo* of the present time, its enterprises against the safety of any Northern State, we are resolved to oppose it with the forces which Providence has placed in our hands.

We have made a solemn declaration to this effect to France, and France has accepted it; but it was especially towards his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, that confidence and friendship rendered it our duty to explain ourselves, and we have had the satisfaction of ascertaining that our resolutions were in precise conformity with the principles of our august ally, and that he himself was resolved to join us in maintaining them. We have accordingly agreed with his Imperial Majesty upon the following points:

1stly. We shall make common cause against any new encroachment by the French government upon the Northern States unconcerned in her war with England.

2ndly. To this end, we shall bestow a rigorous and sustained attention upon the preparations of the Republic. A vigilant eye will be kept upon her

This treaty, so unusual in form, was to remain secret, and, in fact, did remain unknown to us. Scarcely was it concluded when the king of Prussia, continually oscillating from side to side, to ward off all danger of war, feared, after making himself safe on the side

troops stationed in Germany; and if their number should be augmented, we shall, without loss of time, put ourselves into an attitude to uphold and give effect to the protection intended to be bestowed upon the weaker states.

3rdly. Should a new usurpation actually take place, we feel that half measures against so dangerous an adversary would be worse than useless. It would, consequently, be with forces proportioned to the vast power of the Republic, that we should march against it. Accordingly, while we accept with gratitude the offer of our august ally instantly to support our troops with an army of forty or fifty thousand men, we do not the less reckon upon the previous stipulations of the treaty of alliance between Russia and Prussia; stipulations which so closely connect the destinies of the two empires, that when the existence of one of them is in peril, the duties and sacrifices of the other should have no bounds.

4thly. To determine when a *casus fœderis* will exist, events and circumstances must be looked at in their true spirit and full scope. The small states of the Empire, situated beyond the Weser, may temporarily present scenes revolting to principle, whether from their being perpetually traversed by French troops, or from their sovereigns being sold to France, like the comte de Bentheim, or dependent upon her, from other causes, like the comte d'Areberg. There the insignificant deviations that a representation suffices, as in the case of Meppen, to redress, and that do not endanger the safety of any state, are foreign to a compact formed solely with a view to safety. It is upon the banks of the Weser that our interests begin to be essentially affected, because from that line Denmark, Mecklenburg, the Hanseatic towns, &c., are exposed, and, consequently, the *casus fœderis* will arise at the first attempt of the French upon a state of the Empire situated on the right of the Weser, and especially upon the Danish provinces or Mecklenburg, anticipating, as we justly may, that the king of Denmark will then make common cause with us against the enemy.

5thly. The immense marches which the Russian troops would have to make in order to join ours, and the difficulty of their arriving in time to bear their part in decisive operations, make us deem it expedient that a different mode of transport be adopted for the different arms of the service. Thus, while the Russian cavalry and artillery horses will march through our provinces, it would seem preferable that the infantry and the guns should be transported by sea, and disembarked in some part of Pomerania, of Mecklenburg, or of Holstein, according to the operations of the enemy.

6thly. Immediately after the commencement of hostilities, or earlier still if the two contracting courts see fit, Denmark and Saxony will be invited to give their adhesion to the compact, to lend their co-operation, and furnish means proportionate to their power, as also will the other princes and states of the north of Germany who, from the proximity of their territories, must participate in the benefits of this arrangement.

7thly. Thenceforth, we bind ourselves not to lay down our arms, or enter into any accommodation with the enemy, unless with the consent and agreement previously obtained of his Imperial Majesty, relying with confidence upon our august ally, who has taken the like engagements towards us.

8thly. After the proposed end shall be attained, we reserve to ourselves to concert with his Imperial Majesty as to the ulterior measures to be taken for entirely freeing the north of Germany from the presence of foreign troops, and for solidly and permanently securing this happy result, by devising such an order of things as shall prevent Germany from being again exposed to the inconveniences she has suffered since the commencement of the present war.

This declaration is to be exchanged against one of similar purport, signed

of Russia, that he had laid himself too open on the side of France. The suddenness with which he had ceased to speak of alliance with us, the grave and stern silence preserved about the affair of the duc d'Enghien, seemed to him to put peace in peril. He, there-

by his majesty the emperor of Russia, and we pledge our royal troth and word faithfully to fulfil the engagement we have herein taken.

In witness whereof, we have signed these presents with our hand, and have caused our royal seal to be affixed thereto.

Done at Berlin this 24th of May, in the year of Our Lord 1804, and the eighth year of our reign.

(Signed)

(Countersigned)

FREDERICK WILLIAM.

HARDENBERG.

Counter-declaration on the part of Russia.

The critical situation of the north of Germany, and the impediments to which its commerce, as well as that of the whole of the north of Europe, is subjected by the presence of the French troops in the electorate of Hanover; further, the imminent danger which may be anticipated to the peace of the states in that part of the Continent, which have not as yet been subjected to the yoke of France, having excited our utmost anxiety, we have applied ourselves to the discovery of means calculated to calm our apprehensions upon this subject.

As the invasion of the electorate of Hanover could not be foreseen, and as circumstances unfortunately prevented its deliverance at the time from the presence of the French troops, we have deemed it expedient for the moment, not to take any active measures, so long as the French government shall confine itself to the occupation of his Britannic majesty's German possessions; but at the same time, not to suffer the French to overstep in Germany the line behind which they at present remain.

His majesty the king of Prussia, whom in full confidence we have made acquainted with our alarms, and with the measures which seemed to us to be indispensable to the warding off of the dangers that we anticipated, having expressed his concurrence in our views, as well as his desire to aid in precautions so salutary, and to oppose all further encroachments of the French government upon the other states of the Empire unconcerned in its quarrel with England, we have agreed with his said majesty upon the following points:—

1stly. As the well-known audacity and activity of the French government enables it to undertake and to execute its plans on the instant, it is absolutely necessary to keep watch over the preparations it may make for furthering its designs upon the north of Germany. A vigilant eye, therefore, will be kept upon the French troops stationed in those parts, and in the event of their number being increased, we shall lose no time in assuming a position calculated to give full effect to the protection proposed to be extended to those states which, from their weakness, are unable to protect themselves from the dangers which threaten them.

2ndly. To obviate all uncertainty as to the period at which shall commence the active employment of the means before specified and destined on either side for preserving the north of Germany from all foreign invasion, it is agreed, at the outset, between us and his Prussian majesty, to define the *casus fœderis* of the present engagement. Accordingly, we have agreed to consider it to exist at the first encroachment which the French troops, stationed in the electoral territories of his Britannic majesty, shall make upon the adjacent states.

3rdly. Should the *casus fœderis* occur, his majesty the king of Prussia being nearer to the scene of action, will not wait for the junction of the respective forces hereinafter specified, but will cause operations to be commenced imme-

fore, ordered M. d'Haugwitz to make to the French minister a solemn declaration of neutrality, an absolute neutrality on the part of Prussia, so long as the French troops occupying Hanover should not be augmented. Accordingly, M. d'Haugwitz, suddenly quitting his reserved silence towards M. de Laforest, declared to him that his sovereign had pledged his word of honour that he would remain neuter under all circumstances if the number of French troops in Hanover should not exceed 30,000. He added, that this was almost equal to the alliance that had been broken off, as the inactivity of Prussia, assured upon the condition she thus set upon it, secured the inactivity of the Continent. The earnestness of this declaration, which seemed so uncalled for at that juncture, surprised M. de Laforest, but revealed nothing to him; nevertheless, it appeared very singular to him. Frederick William supposed that he had now safely regulated his position with every one. Nothing is more pitiable to look upon than weak incapacity, plunging into political perplexities, and com-

diately on receiving tidings that the French troops have overstepped the line they at present occupy in the north of Germany.

4thly. All the means which we ourselves propose to employ to the same end being by that time ready for active employment, we engage, in the most formal manner, to march to the assistance of his Prussian majesty at the first warning, and with the greatest possible despatch.

5thly. The forces which we shall employ in the defence of the rest of the north of Germany, will amount to forty thousand regular troops, and will be augmented, if need be, to fifty thousand. His majesty, the king of Prussia, on his part, engages to employ for the same object an equal number of regular troops. Military operations once commenced, we undertake not to lay down our arms, nor come to any terms with the common enemy, except with the consent of his Prussian majesty, and after preliminary agreement with him; it being distinctly understood that his majesty the king of Prussia equally obliges himself not to lay down his arms, nor come to any terms with the common enemy, except with our consent, and after preliminary agreement with us.

6thly. Immediately after the commencement of hostilities, or earlier if it shall seem expedient to the two contracting courts, the king of Denmark and the elector of Saxony will be invited to give their adhesion to this compact, and to co-operate with it by means proportioned to their power, as will also be invited all the other princes and states of the north of Germany, who, from the proximity of their territories, will participate in the benefits of the present arrangement.

7thly. After the proposed end shall be attained, we reserve to ourselves to concert with his Prussian majesty as to the ulterior measures to be taken for entirely freeing the soil of the Germanic empire from the presence of foreign troops, and for solidly and permanently securing this happy result, by devising such an order of things as shall prevent Germany from being again exposed to the inconveniences which she has suffered since the commencement of the present war.

This declaration is to be exchanged against one of similar purport, signed by his majesty the king of Prussia, and we pledge our imperial troth and word faithfully to fulfil the engagements we have herein taken. In witness whereof we have signed these presents with our own hand, and have caused the seal of our Empire to be affixed thereto. Given at St. Petersburg, on this

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1804, and fourth year of our reign.

promising itself by aiming at too much, as the weak bird fastens itself in the fowler's net by the very struggles that it makes to regain its liberty.

Thus, by the double policy of the king of Prussia, and under the deep impression made by the event of Vincennes, the foundation was laid of the third coalition. Russia, delighted at having secured Prussia, now began to direct her efforts towards Austria, and laid herself out rather more than she had previously done to ingratiate herself with that power. She had a ready means of doing this in opposing France, and siding with the court of Vienna on the still undecided questions of the Germanic empire.

We must now show what effect had been produced at Vienna by the event which had so deeply disturbed the courts of Berlin and St. Petersburg. If there was any one court more than another to which the seizure of the duc d'Enghien upon the Germanic soil might naturally occasion concern, that one, most assuredly, was the court of Vienna. Nevertheless, the only ministers who evinced moderation on that occasion, were the ministers of the emperor. They uttered not a word that could wound the French government, took not a step of which it could complain. And yet the head of the Empire, the natural guardian of the safety and dignity of the German territory, was bound, or no one was, to complain of the act committed in the grand-duchy of Baden. In truth, it must even be remarked, that every thing would have been right and consistent, if the affected indifference of the court of Austria had been displayed at St. Petersburg, and the Russian promptitude in complaining had been manifested at Vienna. No one could have been surprised if the emperor had temperately, but firmly demanded explanations from the First Consul in respect of a violation of territory, which must necessarily cause great anxiety in Germany. But nothing of the sort occurred; precisely the contrary was the case. At St. Petersburg they were young, inexperienced, and, above all, they were far from France; at Vienna they were prudent, dissimulating, and, above all, very close to the conqueror of Marengo. They were silent. M. de Cobenzel, urged by M. de Champagny, rather than urging him, to explanation, said that he understood the hard necessities of policy, that he certainly regretted an event that was calculated to give rise to new perplexities in Europe, but that, as far as he was concerned, the cabinet of Vienna would only guard, even more anxiously than ever, against the disturbance of the Continental peace.

Fully to appreciate the conduct of the cabinet of Vienna on this occasion, it must be known, that while awaiting a favourable opportunity to regain what she had lost, an opportunity which she did not wish imprudently to create, that cabinet watched with eager curiosity what was passing at Boulogne, cherishing very naturally the hope that the French armies might be overwhelmed by the ocean, but by no means wishing to attract their

irresistible superiority towards the banks of the Danube. In the interval, the cabinet of Vienna availed itself of the occupation afforded to France by the maritime war, to settle in its own way, the questions which had been left unsettled by the recess of 1803. These questions, left unsettled for want of time, it will be remembered, were the following:—The proportion to be established between the Catholic and the Protestant votes in the College of Princes; the maintenance or the suppression of the immediate nobility; the new division of the territory into circles for the police, and preservation of order in Germany; the reorganisation of the Germanic Church; the sequestration of real and personal property belonging to the secularised ecclesiastical principalities, and other matters of minor consequence. The gravest of these questions in its results, was the delay made in the new organisation of the circles, as it produced an absence of police, which left every thing in the power of the stronger party. France being at this time wholly bent upon maritime war, and moreover, separated from Russia, there was no longer any foreign influence capable of aiding the oppressed states, and the whole Empire was a prey to anarchy.

At the close of the negotiation of 1803, Austria had sequestered those dependencies of the secularised principalities which were within her grasp. It will be remembered, that some of these ancient ecclesiastical principalities possessed funds deposited in the bank of Vienna; others territories surrounded by various German states. These funds and territorial possessions naturally belonged to the indemnified princes. Austria, alleging some obscure maxim of the feudal law, had sequestered upwards of thirty millions of capital, which was lodged in the bank of Vienna, or invested in the public funds. The heaviest loss had fallen on Bavaria and the house of Orange. Austria did not stop here in her aggressions. She treated with a number of the petty princes to wring from them certain possessions which they held in Suabia, for the purpose of securing to herself a position on the lake of Constance. She had purchased the town of Lindau from the prince of Bretzenheim, having ceded to him, in exchange, certain territories in Bohemia, with the promise of a vote in the diet as formerly. She had treated with the house of Kœnigseck, with the view of obtaining on similar terms, other lands situated in that country. Finally, Austria had advocated in the diet the creation of new Catholic votes, so as to equalise the strength of the Catholic and Protestant parties. The majority of the diet not appearing disposed to gratify her, she threatened to put an end to all deliberation until this question of the proportion of votes should be decided in conformity to her wishes.

The Germanic princes, injured by the violences of Austria, avenged themselves by committing similar violences upon states weaker than their own. Hesse and Wurtemberg had caused the states of the nobility to be invaded, making no secret of their

designs of incorporation. The immediate nobility of Franconia having addressed the imperial chamber of Wetzlar, to obtain an inhibition against the usurpations with which they were threatened, the Hessian government everywhere caused the placard of the decision of the imperial chamber to be torn down, thus showing an example of signal contempt for the tribunals of the Empire. Their violences did not end here; they refused to pay the pensions of the clergy, who had been despoiled of their property by the secularisations. The duke of Wurtemberg would not pay any of them. Amidst this reciprocity of violence, each was silent as to the proceedings of others, in the hope of thus securing impunity for his own conduct. They did not complain of the sequestrations of Austria, in order that she might wink at the wrongs done to the immediate nobility, and to the unfortunate pensioners who were deprived of their bread. Bavaria, the worst treated by Austria, avenged herself upon the Prince arch-chancellor, whose electorate had been transferred from Mayence to Ratisbon. Annoyed at seeing him upon the territory of Ratisbon, which she had long coveted, she pursued him with her threats, took from him a quantity of lands that were surrounded by her own, and caused him to feel a thousand anxieties for his existence. Prussia followed a like course of action in Westphalia, and was not behindhand with either Bavaria or Austria, in the way of usurpation.

Only two states conducted themselves honestly: firstly, the Prince arch-chancellor, who, owing his existence to the arrangements of 1803, endeavoured to make them respected by the members of the confederation; secondly, the Elector of Saxony, who, disinterested amidst these various pretensions, remained unmoved in his ancient principality, had neither lost nor gained any thing, and voted uselessly in favour of the rights of each, in sheer prudence and honesty.

All the culpable concessions that had been made to Austria, in permitting her to oppress some in order that she might tolerate the oppression of others, failed to disarm her, especially as regarded Bavaria. Believing herself strong enough to be able to act openly as she pleased, she took up the cause of the immediate nobility, of which she was the natural and interested protectress, for the sake of the recruiting of her armies.

We have already seen that the immediate nobility, holding from the emperor, and not from the territorial princes by whom their possessions were wedged in, did not owe military contingent to these latter. Those inhabitants who were of a military turn enrolled themselves in the Austrian corps, and Franconia alone thus supplied more than two thousand recruits annually, who were still more valuable for their quality than for their number. They were, in fact, true Germans, far superior to other Austrian soldiers as to intelligence, courage, and all warlike qualities. They furnished all the sub-officers of the imperial armies, and formed

in some sort the German *cadre* into which Austria drafted the subjects of all sorts that she possessed in her vast dominions. In consequence, she was resolved to brave every thing except a war with France rather than yield. Without troubling herself about the reproaches that might be made her for excess of power, she brought before the aulic council, as an act of violence cognizable exclusively by the police of the emperor, the encroachments committed upon the immediate nobility; and with a promptitude very uncommon in Germanic proceedings, had an interlocutory decision pronounced, called *conservatorium* in the constitutional language of the Empire, and intrusted its execution to four confederated states—Saxony, Baden, Bohemia, and Ratisbon. By Bohemia on the one side, by the Tyrol on the other, she put eighteen battalions in motion, and threatened Bavaria with an immediate invasion should she not withdraw her troops from the various lordships which she had invaded. It will easily be understood that Austria, thus situated, was extremely anxious to conciliate the First Consul, for though much occupied towards the ocean, he was not the man to recoil in any point. Moreover, the irritation to which he had been roused, rendered him more susceptible and more redoubtable than ever. This it is that explains the reserve of the Austrian diplomatists upon the death of the duc d'Enghien, and the real or affected unconcern which they displayed at the occurrence of so grave an event.

We have already described the effect produced upon the First Consul by the attacks directed against his person. The benefits which he had taken a pleasure in heaping upon the emigrants had not disarmed their hatred. The consideration which he had shown to Europe had not calmed its jealousy. Irritated to the highest degree at being so ill requited, he felt a sudden revolution take place in his soul, and he was more inclined to ill-treat all whom previously he had the most caressed. The reply to the manifestations of which we have spoken had not to be waited for; and after having deplored his having been misled by his passions, we shall again have occasion to admire the grandeur of his character.

The court of Prussia had become reserved, and no longer spoke of alliance. The First Consul was silent, too, towards her; but sharply reprimanded M. de Laforest, for having in his despatches too faithfully reported the public impression at Berlin. As regarded the court of Russia, the reply was instantaneous and merciless. General Hédouville had orders to quit St. Petersburg within eight-and-forty hours, without alleging any other reason for his departure than the state of his health; the customary reason by which diplomatists leave room for guessing at what they do not care to say. He was to leave it unknown, too, whether he left only for a short time or for good and all. M. de Rayneval alone was to remain in quality of *chargé-d'affaires*. Since the dismissal of M. de Markoff, only an agent of that rank, M. d'Oubril, had remained

at Paris. The First Consul then returned to the despatch of the Russian cabinet, a reply which must have been bitter indeed to the emperor. He was reminded in that note, that France, after behaving in the handsomest manner towards Russia, and after conceding to her a half voice in all the great affairs of the Continent had met with no good return; that she had found the Russian diplomatic agents, without an exception, hostile and malevolent; that, in contravention of the late treaty which bound the two courts not to embarrass each other, the cabinet of St. Petersburg had accredited French emigrants to foreign courts and covered conspirators with the pretext of Russian nationality to shelter them from the police of France; that this was violating alike the letter and spirit of treaties; that if they wished for war, they had only frankly to express that wish; that though the First Consul did not wish for war, he assuredly did not fear it; for there was nothing alarming in his reminiscences of the last campaign (allusion was here made to Suwarrow's disaster); that, as regarded what had taken place at Baden, Russia showed great officiousness in constituting herself the guarantee of the Germanic soil, as her titles to interfere were extremely disputable; that, at all events, France had exercised a legitimate right of defence against plots carried on upon her frontiers, under the eyes and with the knowledge of certain German governments, upon whom she had heaped benefits which had been repaid only with the blackest ingratitude; that she, moreover, had explained to them, and would explain to them only, and that Russia, similarly circumstanced, would have acted as France had acted, for had she been informed that the assassins of Paul I. were assembled at a march from her frontier, would she not have seized them there?

This was pitiless irony to address to a prince, who was reproached with not having punished any one of the murderers of his father, and who was therefore accused, though unjustly enough, of complicity in that horrible crime. It must have convinced the emperor Alexander of his extreme imprudence in interfering in the affair of the duc d'Enghien, when the tragical death of Paul I. rendered the retort so easy and so terrible.

Relatively to Germany, Russia having recently approved the conduct of Austria, and the pretension publicly avowed by that power to refer constitutional questions to the aulic council, the First Consul plainly declared, that France thenceforth separated herself from Russian policy, as regarded the future regulation of Germanic affairs; that she did not admit that questions left in suspense were to be settled by the aulic council, a simple tribunal of the emperor, rather than by the empire; that these questions, like all others, ought to be decided in the Diet, the supreme body, the sole depositary of the German sovereignty. The breach, then, was complete in all points, the resolutions as decisive as the language was plain.

As to Austria, the First Consul could not but congratulate himself upon the indifference which she had manifested for the victim of Ettenheim. But he plainly perceived that advantage was taken at Vienna, of the difficulties which the maritime war seemed to cause him. He wished Austria to be thoroughly undeceived upon that point. There were two ways in which he could combat England, the one by actually grappling with her in the strait of Calais, the other by crushing her allies upon the continent. All things considered, the second plan was both more easy and more certain than the first, and though less direct, would not fail to be effective. Should Austria provoke him, he was determined, without the loss of an instant, to raise his camp at Boulogne, and to enter Germany, as he was unwilling to cross the sea until he should have disarmed all the allies, open or concealed, of Great-Britain. He caused it to be intimated to the two Cobenzels, as well to the one who was ambassador at Paris, as to him who was minister at Vienna, that Bavaria had for ages been the ally of France, and that he would not sacrifice her to the ill-will of Austria; that if she had done wrong in too roughly dealing with the property of the immediate nobility, Austria, by her unjust sequestrations had forced all the German princes to indemnify themselves by violence, for the violences to which they had been subjected; that Bavaria might have acted wrongly, but that he would not allow her to be crushed with impunity, and that unless Austria recalled the battalions which she had despatched into Bohemia and the Tyrol, he was resolved to march an army of forty thousand men upon Munich, where they should keep garrison until the retreat of the imperial troops.

This precise and positive declaration threw the De Cobenzels and the cabinet of Vienna into unspeakable embarrassment. They endeavoured to escape from it by new complaints of the incessant enmity of France to Austria, and of the deep despair to which the latter would be reduced. However, M. de Talleyrand and M. de Champagny were firm, and it was agreed on both sides that Bavaria should evacuate the territories of the immediate nobility, but that the Austrian troops, halting at first in their then positions, should afterwards retrograde, so as not to compromise the dignity of the emperor by too precipitate a retreat. The cabinet of Vienna again made known, that if its wishes were gratified with regard to the proportion of Protestant and Catholic votes in the Diet, the support of Austria might be reckoned upon under all circumstances, and especially in the question which was about to present itself on account of the note addressed by Russia to the Germanic Diet.

That note had arrived at Ratisbon by the same courier who took to Paris the despatches of St. Petersburg. It painfully embarrassed the German princes, for it was a foreign court that invited them to mark their sensitiveness to a violation of the Germanic territory, and should they display that sensitiveness, they

would to the highest degree incur the resentment of France. There had not been time to send instructions to the ministers at the Diet, but they, anticipating the dispositions of their respective courts, had appeared inclined rather to neglect the note than to attach any great importance to it. The Prussian minister, M. de Goërtz, already conspicuous in Germanic negotiations, was in favour of hushing the business up altogether. But, owing to the proximity of Vienna, the Austrian ministers had already received their instructions, and playing, as was their custom, a double part, disapproving of the note when they were in presence of the French agents, and promising to secure its reception when they were in presence of the Russian agents, hit upon a middle course. The note was taken into consideration, but each minister was to refer it to his court, ultimately to decide upon its contents. "You see," said M. de Hugel to the Russian minister, "that we have got your note admitted." "You see," said he to the French minister, "that by adjourning the discussion for two months, we have rendered it harmless, for in two months the proceeding of the emperor Alexander will no longer be remembered."

Such, in fact, was to be the fate of that rash and inconsiderate proceeding. But to secure that result, more than one embarrassment still remained to be surmounted. The German governments were unwilling to offend either France, whom they feared, or Russia, of whom they might eventually have need. Their ministers, therefore, exerted themselves at Paris to find the solution of the difficulty. "Settle the matter as you find most convenient to you," said the First Consul to them; "if the discussion take place in two months, so as to be officially brought to the consideration of France, my reply will be so lofty and so harsh, that the Germanic dignity will be cruelly humiliated. You will have no choice but to endure that reply, or to take up arms, for I am resolved, if need be, to commence on the Continent my war with Great Britain."

M. de Talleyrand, faithful to his habitual love of peace, endeavoured to find expedients for preventing the rupture. The foreign ministers, fearing the First Consul, and finding in M. de Talleyrand, on the contrary, extreme courtesy, an affability not, however, destitute of dignity, diligently courted him. Among the most assiduous and intelligent of them was M. le duc de Dalberg, nephew of the Prince arch-chancellor, and at that time minister of Baden at Paris. M. de Talleyrand made use of him to influence the court of Baden. After reminding that court of all that it owed to France, who had so greatly aggrandised its territories in the arrangements of 1803, it was also reminded of how much it had to fear, should the war break out again. It was urged to declare at Ratisbon that it had received satisfactory explanations from the French government, and that it, consequently, wished that no proceedings should be taken upon the Russian note. While M. de Talleyrand required it to give

a written note to this effect, the cabinet of St. Petersburg, relying upon the relationship between the house of Baden and the imperial family of Russia, endeavoured to modify this declaration, so far as to render it ineffective. But France was both nearer and more powerful, and could not but prevail. Moreover, two months were to elapse before the opening of the discussion; from Paris to Carlsruhe, and from Carlsruhe to Paris, drafts of the proposed note were exchanged and incessantly modified, and it was impossible to fail in hitting at last upon a solution of the difficulty.

The First Consul gave himself but little concern about these goings and comings, and left the matter to his minister for foreign affairs. He had affronted Russia, and had compelled Austria to remain quiet. He had alarmed Prussia by his coldness, and as for the Diet of Ratisbon, he treated it as the representative of an institution falling into decrepitude, in spite of all the efforts he had made to give it a new youth; and he was prepared to remain utterly silent towards it, or to return it some humiliating reply. All these questions, to which the catastrophe of Vincennes had given birth abroad, scarcely sufficed to turn his attention from affairs at home, which had now reached an actual crisis.

Although, in a few days, the impression produced by the death of the duc d'Enghien underwent that diminution which the weakening power of time effects upon all impressions, however vivid, there still remained a permanent cause of excitement in the proceedings against Georges, Moreau, and Pichegru. In truth, it was a sad though inevitable necessity, that of putting upon their trial so many persons of so different a caste; some, as Messrs. de Rivière and de Polignac, dear to the ancient French aristocracy; others, as Moreau, dear to all who loved the glory of France; nothing could be more untoward and embarrassing while public curiosity was highly excited, and while the malevolent, ever ready to put the most subtle or the most absurd constructions upon the smallest circumstance, were in an unusual state of exasperation. But it was absolutely necessary that justice should be done, and this trial was still for a month or two more to disturb the usual calm of the First Consul's government.

An accident, wholly unforeseen, occurred to add to the dark and sinister aspect of that situation. Pichegru, prisoner of the First Consul, at first suspecting his generosity, and putting but little faith in the offers of clemency conveyed to him by M. Réal, had soon become reassured, and had given himself up with confidence to the idea of preserving his life, and of recovering his honour by founding a grand colony at Cayenne. The offers of the First Consul were sincere, for in resolving to strike none but royalists, he wished to pardon Moreau and Pichegru. M. Réal, incapable of a bad feeling, experienced in the progress of this important prosecution, a second misfortune. He had arrived too late at Vincennes, he went too rarely to the cell of Pichegru, where the interests of the prosecution but little required his presence, seeing that

nothing was likely to be drawn from a man so firm and self-possessed as that ex-general of the Republic. Absorbed by a thousand cares, M. Réal neglected Pichegru, who, hearing no further mention of the First Consul's proposals, and being informed of the sanguinary execution of Vincennes, supposed that he could not rely upon the clemency which had been offered and promised to him. Death would have been of comparatively little consequence to this warrior, it was the almost inevitable *dénouement* of the culpable intrigues in which he had been engaged since his first lapse from the straight path in 1797; but he would have to appear between Moreau and Georges, the one of whom he had compromised, and to the other of whom he had delivered up his honour by joining in a royalist conspiracy. All the denunciations to which he had been exposed at the epoch of the 18th Fructidor, and which he had repulsed with a feigned indignation, were now about to be justified. With his life he would lose the poor remnants of his already compromised honour. The unfortunate man preferred instant death, but death free from the disgrace which must result from his public trial. This sentiment proves that he was somewhat better than his recent conduct indicated. He had borrowed from M. Réal the works of Seneca. One night, after reading for several hours, and leaving the book open at a passage treating of suicide, he strangled himself by means of his silk cravat and a wooden peg, of which he made a sort of tourniquet. Towards morning, the keepers, hearing some noise in his chamber, entered, and found him suffocated, his face being red, as though he had been seized with apoplexy. The medical men and magistrates who were called in left no doubt as to the cause of his death, and made it abundantly evident for all candid men.

But no proof is sufficiently clear for partisans who are resolved to believe a calumny, or to propagate without believing it. On the instant it was believed among the royalists, who were naturally well pleased to attribute all sorts of crimes to the government, and among idlers who, without malice, are yet delighted to discover in all events more complications than really exist, it was believed that Pichegru had been strangled by the hirelings of the First Consul. This catastrophe, termed that of the Temple, was the completion of the catastrophe termed that of Vincennes; the one was the sequel of the other. The character of the new Nero was thus rapidly developed. After the example of the Roman prince, he passed from good to evil, from virtue to crime, almost without interval. And as those who took the trouble to argue their falsehoods, required some ostensible motive for such a crime, they said that despairing of convicting Pichegru, they assassinated him that his presence might not aid his fellow-prisoners on their trial.

This was at once the most absurd and most odious of inventions. If there was any one of the accused whose presence at the trial was peculiarly necessary to the interests of the First Con-

sul, that one was Pichegru. Pichegru, personally, could not be considered a rival of any moment, since his proven affiliation to the royalist party had destroyed him in the public opinion; moreover, the depositions of the accused of all parties alike overwhelmed him. The man to be feared, if there was one, on account of his still intact glory, and of the difficulty of convicting him, was Moreau; and if any one of the accused could be serviceable against him, it was Pichegru, who had been the connecting link between the royalists and the republicans. Pichegru, in fact, brought to trial, unable to deny either his connexion with Georges or his connexion with Moreau, and being as unable to explain away as to deny those connexions, would inevitably have served to connect Moreau with the royalists—in other words, to cover him with merited confusion. Pichegru, then, was an immense loss to the accusation. In a word, if a crime was to be committed in order to get rid of a dangerous rivalry, it was Moreau and not Pichegru who should thus have been kept from public trial. The supposition, then, was as stupid as it was atrocious. But it was none the less assumed by the gossips of the royalist coteries that the First Consul, to disembarass himself of Pichegru, had caused him to be strangled. This unworthy accusation could not but speedily fall to the ground; but in the meantime it caused much excitement, and the hawkers of false news, by repeating it, aided the perfidy of the inventors. This new misfortune renewed for some days the sad impressions already produced by the conspiracy of the emigrant princes. Those impressions, however, could not be durable. If enlightened men, friends of the First Consul, and jealous of his glory, could not but feel in the depths of their hearts inconsolable regret, the multitude were well convinced that they could fearlessly repose under the protection of a firm and a just hand. No one seriously feared the renewal of executions, exiles, and spoliations. It must even be confessed that the men personally concerned in the Revolution, whether they had acquired public property, public functions, or an embarrassing celebrity, were secretly well pleased to see general Bonaparte separated from the Bourbons by a *fossé* stained with royal blood.

However, the sensations produced by political events were then confined to a small number of persons which every day became more and more limited. The extraordinary participation of the people in public affairs during the Revolution, had given place to a sort of inattention, partaking at once of lassitude and of confidence. In the earlier days of the Consulate, the government was still watched with some degree of anxiety; but soon, perceiving it to be at once so able and so fortunate, men gave themselves up to security and repose, and directed their attention to private affairs, long neglected during a stormy revolution, which had thrown property, commerce, and industry, alike into confusion. Of those aroused masses there now only remained attentive to passing events those classes which possess sufficient leisure and en-

lightenment to concern themselves with state affairs; and interested men of all parties, emigrants, priests, acquirers of national property, soldiers, and placemen.

Now in the circles thus composed, opinions were divided. If some termed the death of the duc d'Enghien an abominable crime, others considered that the plots incessantly renewed against the person of the First Consul were no less abominable. These latter argued that in order to repossess themselves of power, the royalists risked the destruction of all government in France; that supposing the First Consul killed, there would remain no one who could hold the reins of power with a sufficiently strong hand; that anarchy and bloodshed would resume their ascendancy; that, after all, it had been wisely done to act sternly, in order that villains and dupes should be discouraged; that the royalists were incorrigible; that though the First Consul had heaped kindness upon them, they were incapable of being grateful or even resigned; and that to deal efficiently with them, it had been necessary to make them tremble, at least once. These were the arguments which were repeated in the circles formed around the government, and consisting of the chiefs of the army, of the magistracy, of the administration, the members of the Senate, the Tribunate, and the Legislative Body. And as the impression made by the death of the duc d'Enghien abated, nearly the same things were repeated even among those peaceful and disinterested men who demanded that they should at length be left in repose, under the protection of the powerful arm that now governed France.

From that conflict of spirits there suddenly sprang up an idea, which was soon propagated with the rapidity of lightning. The royalists, considering the First Consul to be the sole obstacle to their projects, had desired to strike at him, in the hope that the whole government would perish with him. Well! it was now exclaimed, their criminal hopes must be baffled. This man whom they would fain destroy must be made king or emperor, that hereditary right being added to his power he may be provided with natural and immediate successors, and that, crime against his person thus becoming useless, there might be the less temptation to commit it. As we have seen, the reaction towards monarchical principles had been rapid during some years. For five directors named for five years, there had been substituted the scheme of three consuls named for ten years; then the scheme of three consuls had been followed by that of one consul, holding power for life. Having entered upon such a course there was no stopping short of taking the last step; in other words, returning to hereditary power. The slightest impulse given to the public mind sufficed for that. This impulse the royalists had taken it upon themselves to give, in wishing to assassinate the First Consul; and in acting thus they only presented a very ordinary spectacle, for it most frequently occurs that it is the enemies of a government, who, by their imprudent attacks, enable it to make its most rapid progress.

All at once, alike in the Senate, in the Legislative Body, in the Tribune; not only in Paris, but in the principal towns of the departments where the electoral colleges were assembled, in the camps distributed along the coasts, everywhere and almost simultaneously, monarchy and hereditary succession were extolled. This movement of opinion was natural; it was also in some degree excited by the manifestations of assemblies desirous of paying their court, by prefects who wished to display their zeal, by the generals who wished to attract the notice of an all-powerful master; all well knowing that in advocating monarchy they were in accord with that master's as yet unspoken thought, and that they assuredly would not offend him should they perchance anticipate the moment fixed by his ambition.

Though undictated, the language was everywhere uniform. It was high time, it was said, to put an end to hesitations and to false scruples, and adopt the only stable institution, that is to say, hereditary monarchy. As long as the royalists could hope to destroy the government and the Revolution at a single blow, they would renew their crimes, and perhaps would at length be successful. They would not recommence, or at least they would be the less tempted to do so, should they see beside the First Consul his children, or his brothers, ready to succeed him, and the new government, like the old one, thus possessed of the property of surviving itself. To place a crown upon that precious and sacred head on which reposed the destinies of France, was to furnish it with a buckler which would protect it against the blows of assassins. To protect it was to protect all the interests of the Revolution, to save from a sanguinary reaction the men who were compromised by their errors; it was also to preserve to the acquirers of the national domains their property, to the military their rank, to all the members of the government their position, to France, that government of equality, justice, and grandeur, which she had secured. Moreover, every one, it was added, had returned to sound ideas. Every one now wondered how senseless theorists had persuaded the nation into making of that vast and antique France a republic like that of Sparta and of Athens. Every one now perceived that in replacing the monarchy by a republic, the destroyers had exceeded the original and legitimate objects of the Revolution, which contemplated only the reform of abuses, the abolition of the feudal system, the modification of the royal authority but not its destruction; that if, in 1802, at the institution of the Consulate for life, a false shame restrained the legislators of France, now, that this false shame had passed away, now that the crimes of the royalists had completely opened all eyes, it was necessary to come to a determination, and settle the form of government by a complete and definitive act; that, after all, this would be

merely adding the *de jure* to the *de facto*, as in reality general Bonaparte was king, and an absolute king; while in decreeing him royalty, under its real form, they could treat with him, could limit that royalty, and thus, at one stroke, give durability to the government and guarantees to liberty.

Such was the general language a few days after the painful scenes of which we have spoken above.

What a spectacle was here presented by that nation which, after essaying a sanguinary republic under the Convention, a moderate but inert republic under the Directory, suddenly disgusted with this collective and civil government, loudly demanded to be governed by the hand of a soldier, and was so eager to have one, as to be on the point of selecting the unfortunate Joubert in the absence of general Bonaparte; hailed the latter on his return from Egypt, and entreated him to accept of a power which he was only too impatient to seize, made him Consul for ten years, then for life, and finally hereditary monarch, and all this that it might be guaranteed by the strong arm of a warrior against that anarchy whose frightful spectre incessantly pursued it! What a lesson for the theorists who, in the delirium of their conceit, thought to make France a republic because circumstances had made her a democracy! What had been required to dissipate these ideas? Merely four years, and an abortive conspiracy against an extraordinary man, the object of the love of some, of the hatred of others, and of the intense attention of all! And admire, too, the profundity of this lesson! That man had been the object of a criminal attempt, but he, in his turn, had committed a sanguinary act; and at that very moment men feared not to raise him on the buckler to the throne, so necessary did they feel him to be! They accepted him not less glorious, but less pure. They accepted him with his genius, they would have selected him without it; they would have taken him whatever he was, provided he was powerful; so precious was mere strength so soon after such great disorders! Have we not in our own day seen alarmed nations throw themselves into the arms of indifferent soldiers, because they presented at least the appearances of strength?

In Rome, that old republic, it required the want, long felt, of a single chief, the inconvenience often repeated of the elective transmission of power, it required many generations, Cæsar first, then Augustus after Cæsar, and even Tiberius after Augustus, to habituate the Romans to the idea of monarchical and hereditary power. It did not require so many precautions in France for a people fashioned to monarchy during twelve centuries, and only during ten years to a republic. It required only a simple accident to return from the dream of some generous but mistaken spirits, to the living and indestructible souvenirs of a whole nation.

In every country torn by factions or threatened by an external enemy, the necessity of being governed and defended will sooner or later lead to the triumph of a powerful personage, powerful as Cæsar at Rome, rich as the Medicis at Florence. If such a country has for a long time been a republic; it will require many generations to fashion it to monarchy; but if that country has always been a monarchy, and the follies of factions have for an instant wrenched it from its natural condition to convert it into an ephemeral republic, it will require some years of troubles to inspire it with a horror of anarchy, fewer years still to find the soldier capable of putting an end to that anarchy, and the wish of that soldier, or a dagger-thrust of his enemies, to make him king or emperor, and thus restore the country to its habits, and dissipate the dream of those who supposed it possible to alter human nature by vain decrees and by still vainer oaths. Rome and Florence, after having long been republics, tended the one towards the Cæsars and the other towards the Medicis, and were more than half a century in giving themselves to them. England and France, republics of ten years, tended in three or four years to their Cromwell and Napoleon.

Thus the Revolution in those days of rapid reaction, was obliged in the face of Heaven to confess its errors one after the other, and exhibit the most startling contradictions. Let us discriminate, however: when it sought the abolition of the feudal system, equality in the eyes of the law, uniformity of justice, administration and taxation, and the regular intervention of the nation in the state-government, it did not deceive itself; on these points it had exhibited no inconsistency, no contradiction, and it had no errors to confess. When, on the contrary, it aimed at a barbarous and chimerical equality, the absence of all social hierarchy, the continual and tumultuous presence of the multitude in the government, the Republic in a monarchy of twelve centuries, and the abolition of all worship, it was at once senseless and guilty, and could not but have one day to confess its errors before the whole world! But of what consequence are some fleeting errors compared to the immortal truths which, at the expense of its blood, it bequeathed to the human race! Even those errors themselves contained useful and grave lessons given with an incomparable grandeur. If France, in her return to monarchy, obeyed the immutable laws of human society, perhaps her course was too rapid, as is the custom of revolutions. A dictatorship, under the title of protector, sufficed Cromwell. The dictatorship, under the form of a perpetual Consulate, with a power extensive as his genius, and durable as his life, should have sufficed general Bonaparte for the accomplishment of all the good that he meditated, to reconstruct that annihilated ancient society, to transmit it, after having reorganised it, either to his heirs, if he were to have such, or to those who, more fortunate, were some day to enjoy

the fruit of his toils. In sooth, it was decreed in the councils of Providence, that the Revolution, in retrograding, should go beyond the re-establishment of the monarchical form to the re-establishment of the ancient dynasty itself. To accomplish the noble task of general Bonaparte, the dictatorship, under the form of the Consulate for life, should, in our opinion, have sufficed, and in making him an hereditary monarch, that was attempted which was hurtful alike to his moral greatness and to the grandeur of France. Not that they were without full right who wished to convert a soldier into a king or an emperor: the nation incontestably, could transmit to whom it chose, and to a sublime soldier still more than to any one else, the sceptre of Charlemagne and of Louis XIV. But that soldier, in his natural and proper position of the first magistrate of the French Republic, had no earthly equal, even upon the loftiest thrones. In becoming an hereditary monarch, he was to be put in comparison with kings, little or great, and ranked as their inferior in one point—that of blood. Even though it were only to the eyes of prejudice, he was to be below them in something. Received among them and flattered, because feared by them, he would in secret be disdained by the puniest among them. But, what is graver still, when he should have become king or emperor, what would he not attempt in order to become king of kings, chief of a dynasty of monarchs, holding from his new throne! What stimulants for an ambition already too much excited, and which could perish only by its own excesses.

In our humble opinion, at least, the institution of the Consulate for life was a wise and politic measure, and the indispensable completion of the dictatorship, which had become necessary: the re-establishment of the monarchy in the person of Napoleon Bonaparte was not a usurpation (a word borrowed from the language of the emigrants), but an act of vanity on the part of him who too readily lent himself to it, and of imprudent avidity on the part of new convertites, eager to devour that reign of an instant. If it be only considered as a lesson to mankind, we must confess that of all the lessons that Providence bestows upon nations, the most instructive and the most profound was given by this heroic soldier, and by these republicans recently converted to monarchy, all alike eager to invest themselves in the purple upon the ruins of that Republic of ten years, to which they had taken a thousand oaths. Unhappily France, who had paid with her blood for their republican delirium, was to pay with her grandeur for their new-born monarchical zeal; for it is for the sake of having French kings in Westphalia, in Naples, and in Spain, that France has lost the Rhine and the Aips. Thus, in all things France was destined to instruct the universe: what glory and yet what calamity for a nation!

At every change there are needed men to realise the ideas which are in all minds; in other words, instruments. For the

revolution that approached there was a man very singularly fitted for the purpose. Hitherto M. Fouché, with a remnant of sincerity, had blamed the rapidity of the reaction which reconducted France towards the past; he had even obtained the good opinion of Madame Bonaparte by appearing to partake her perplexed fears; but he had, on the same account, incurred the censure of her husband. By playing this unthankful part of a secret disapprover, M. Fouché had lost his post, and he was not the man to play so losing a part much longer. Accordingly, he chose the very opposite course. Spontaneously directing the police in the inquiry into the recent conspiracy he had restored himself to office. Seeing that the First Consul was much embittered against the royalists, he had humoured his anger, and had urged him on to the immolation of the duc d'Enghien. If the idea, which has often been attributed to the First Consul, of making a sanguinary compact with the revolutionists, and of thus obtaining the crown at the price of a frightful gage, if this idea ever entered the mind of any man of that day, assuredly it entered the mind of M. Fouché. Approving the death of the duc d'Enghien, he also was among the most ardent of the new partisans of hereditary succession. In his zeal for monarchy he surpassed Messrs. de Talleyrand, Rœderer, and Fontanes.

Doubtless, the First Consul needed no encouragement to aspire to the throne. He wished for the supreme rank, but without it having been, as the mere herd of narrators have supposed, his constant aim, from the time of his campaigns in Italy, or even from the 18th Brumaire; no, he had not conceived such desires at once. His ambition, like his fortune, had grown up by degrees. Arrived at the command of armies, he from that lofty position perceived loftier positions still in the government of the Republic, and aspired to them. Having gained those, he saw still above him that of the perpetual Consulate, and similarly aspired to that. From that eminence he saw the throne, and aspired to mount it. Such is the march of human ambition, nor was that to be called a crime. But to clear-seeing minds this incessantly excited and never satisfied ambition was a danger; for still to gratify was still to excite it.

But at the moment of seizing upon a power which does not naturally belong to him, even the most daring genius hesitates, if he does not tremble. In such situations, an involuntary shame seizes upon the most ardent ambition, and prevents it from avowing its whole desire. The First Consul, who consulted but little with his brothers upon state affairs, found in them, when his personal grandeur was in question, confidants to whom he loved to open his whole thought, and confidants more ardent than he himself was, for they burned to become princes. It will be remembered, that they looked upon the Consulate for life with no pleased eye, considering it an abortive attempt. At the period to which we now refer,

Lucien was absent, and Joseph was about to quit Paris. Lucien, in one of his headstrong fits of indiscretion, had married a widow, handsome indeed, but very inferior in position to the Bonaparte family. Having quarrelled with his brother on account of this marriage, Lucien had retired to Rome, playing the part of an exile, and seeking in the enjoyments of the arts, consolation for fraternal ingratitude. Madame Lætitia Bonaparte, who, beneath the humility of a woman born poor, and affecting to remember that fact, concealed some of the passions of an empress-mother, constantly and unjustly complained of Napoleon, and showed a marked preference to her son Lucien, whom she had followed to Rome. The First Consul, full of affection for his relatives, even when he had reason to be displeased with them, had accompanied his mother and brother with his all-powerful protection, and had recommended them to the kindness of Pius VII.; stating that his brother went to Rome to indulge his taste for the arts, and his mother for the benefit of a mild climate. Pius VII. paid his illustrious guests the most delicate and anxious attentions.

Joseph, also, was discontented, but wherefore one would never guess, did not history take the trouble to relate it. He was offended because the First Consul had wished to name him president of the Senate, and he had refused that high office in the tone of an insulted man, when it was offered to him by M. Cambacérès, on the part of the First Consul. The latter, who detested idleness, then caused him to be told to go and seek greatness where he himself had found it, in the army. Joseph, named colonel of the fourth regiment of the line, set out for Boulogne at the moment the great question of the re-establishment of monarchy was mooted. The First Consul, therefore, was deprived of two confidants to whom he would gladly have unbosomed himself on what concerned his personal grandeur. M. de Cambacérès, to whom he usually spoke out upon all subjects whether general or personal—M. Cambacérès at the epoch of the institution of the Consulate for life, had spared him the embarrassment of avowing his wishes, by taking the initiative, and becoming the instrument of a change which was universally approved. But, now, M. Cambacérès was silent for two reasons, one of them good, the other bad. The good reason was, that, with his rare sagacity, he feared the flights of an unlimited ambition. He had heard mention made of the Empire of the Gauls, of the Empire of Charlemagne, and he trembled to see the solid grandeur of the treaty of Lunéville sacrificed to gigantic enterprises in consequence of the elevation of General Bonaparte to the imperial throne. The less worthy reason was his clashing interest, for he was about to find himself separated by all the height of the throne from the First Consul, and from being a co-partner in the sovereignty, small as might be his share in it, to become the simple subject of the

future monarch. The third consul, Lebrun, perfectly devoted, but never interfering in any thing but the administration, could not be of any use.

M. Fouché, in the ardour of his zeal, made himself the spontaneous instrument of the approaching change. He approached the First Consul, whose secret desires he had discerned, represented to him the necessity for taking a prompt and decisive step, the urgency of putting an end to the anxieties of France, by placing the crown upon his head, and thus definitively consolidating the work of the Revolution. He described all classes of the nation as being animated by the same sentiments, and impatient to proclaim Napoleon Emperor of the Gauls, or Emperor of the French, as might best suit his policy or his taste. He returned often to the charge, endeavouring to enforce the advantages of the opportunity now presented, when all France, alarmed for the life of the First Consul, was disposed to grant whatever he might ask. He passed from exhortations almost to reproaches, and sharply twitted the hesitations of general Bonaparte. The latter had not quitted his retreat at Malmaison since the affair of Vincennes. M. Fouché repaired incessantly to Malmaison, and when he could not join the First Consul while walking out, he seized upon his private secretary, M. de Menneval, and demonstrated to him at full length, all the advantages of hereditary monarchy, and not only of monarchy but of aristocracy, as the support and ornament of the throne; adding, that if the Consul would re-establish it, he was ready to defend the wisdom of that new creation, and, if necessary, even to become a noble himself.

Such was the zeal of this ex-republican, so completely convinced of his past errors. His restless activity, more excited on this occasion than was usual, led him to move even further than there was need. He bustled about, like those people who would fain have the merit of urging forward that which goes by itself.

In fact, there was no one who was not disposed to second the wishes of the First Consul. France, having long witnessed the rise of a master, who, moreover, had heaped benefits and glory upon her, would not refuse him whatever title might be most agreeable to his ambition. The bodies of the state, the chiefs of the army, who knew how impossible all resistance had become, and who, in the ruin of Moreau, had seen the danger of an ill-timed opposition, threw themselves eagerly before the new Cæsar, that they might at least be distinguished for their zeal, and profit by an elevation which there was no longer time to prevent. It is the common disposition of mankind to profit by the ambition which they cannot combat with success, and to console their envy by their avidity. There was but one embarrassment felt by all, namely, to resume the use of words which had been proscribed, and to repudiate others which had been adopted with enthusiasm. A slight precaution in the choice of a title for the

future monarch could facilitate the object. Thus, in calling him emperor, and not king, the difficulty was much diminished. Moreover, no one was better fitted to relieve the existing generation from such an embarrassment, than an ex-Jacobin like M. Fouché, taking upon himself the task of giving an example to all, master and subjects, and hastening to be the first to speak words which others, as yet, dared not have on their lips.

M. Fouché arranged every thing with some leaders of the Senate; the First Consul seeing and approving all that he did, but feigning to have no hand in any thing. They feared to take the initiative in the French journals, for their absolute dependence upon the police would have given their opinion the character of a forced one. We had secret agents in England, and they contrived to have it stated in certain English journals, that since the last conspiracy Bonaparte was anxious, gloomy, and threatening; that every one in Paris was in a state of anxiety; that it was the natural consequence of a government in which every thing depended upon one head; and that, consequently, all peaceable men wished that hereditary succession, established in the Bonaparte family, should give the existing order of things that stability of which it was destitute. Thus the English press, usually employed in calumniating the First Consul, was now employed in serving his ambition. These articles, copied and commented upon, caused a very lively sensation, and gave the signal that was waited for. At this period there were several electoral colleges assembled in L'Yonne, the Var, the Upper Pyrenees, the Nord, and the Röer. It was easy to obtain addresses from them. Addresses were also suggested to the municipal councils of the great towns, such as Lyons, Marseilles, Bordeaux, and Paris. Finally, the camps scattered along the coast were in their turn thrown into fermentation. Military men, in general, were of all classes the most devoted to the First Consul. With the exception of a certain number of officers and generals, some of whom were sincere republicans, and others animated by the old rivalry which divided the armies of the Rhine and of Italy, most of the chiefs of the army saw their own personal elevation, in the elevation of a warrior to the throne of France. They were consequently quite ready to take the initiative, and, as had often been done in the Roman empire, to make an emperor themselves. General Soult wrote to the First Consul, that he had heard generals and colonels demanding the establishment of a new form of government, and expressing their readiness to give the First Consul the title of Emperor of the Gauls. The general asked for orders on this point. Petitions were circulated in the divisions of dragoons that were encamped at Compiègne; these petitions were covered with signatures, and were about to arrive in Paris.

On Sunday, 4 Germinal (25th of March), some days after the death of the duc d'Enghien, numerous addresses from the

electoral colleges were presented to the First Consul. Admiral Ganteaume, one of his most devoted friends, himself presented the address of the college of the Var, of which he was president. It said, in formal terms, that it was not sufficient to *seize* and to *punish* conspirators, but that it was necessary by a large system of institutions which should consolidate and perpetuate power in the hands of the First Consul and his family, to secure the repose of France, and terminate its long anxieties. Other addresses were read at the same reception, and immediately after these manifestations came one of a more elevated order. M. Fontanes had received the presidency of the Legislative Body, and thus, by the favour of the Bonaparte family, had obtained a place that he had merited by his talents alone. It devolved on him to congratulate the First Consul upon the completion of an immortal work, the Civil Code. That code, the fruit of so many studious vigils, a monument of the strong will and comprehensive intellect of the chief of the Republic, had been terminated in the present session, and the grateful Legislative Body had determined to consecrate that souvenir by placing in its hall a marble bust of the First Consul. It was this determination that M. de Fontanes announced at this reception, and certainly, of all the services of the man whom it was intended to honour, there was not one that more merited remembrance, at the moment when he was about to be made hereditary sovereign of a country organised by his genius. M. de Fontanes expressed himself as follows:—

“CITIZEN FIRST CONSUL:

“For four years an immense empire has reposed under the shelter of your powerful administration. The wise uniformity of your laws is about still more to unite all its inhabitants. The Legislative Body wishes to consecrate this memorable epoch: it has decreed that your bust, placed in the centre of its hall of deliberations, shall eternally remind it of your services, and of the duties and the hopes of the French people. The double right of conqueror and legislator has always imposed silence on all others; you have seen it confirmed in your person by the national suffrage. Who could again nourish the criminal hope of dividing France against France? Will she divide herself for some reminiscences of the past, when she is united by all the interests of the present? She has but one chief, yourself; she has but one enemy, England.

“Political tempests may perhaps have thrown even some wise men into unforeseen routes. But as soon as your hand raised the standard of the country, all good Frenchmen recognised and followed it; all passed over to the side of your glory. Those who conspire in the bosom of a hostile country, irrevocably renounce their natural soil; and what can they oppose to your ascendancy? You have invincible armies, they have only libels and assassins; and while the voice of religion is raised in your favour at the foot of those altars which you have

restored, they cause you to be insulted by some obscure organs of rebellion and superstition. The impotence of their plottings is proven. They daily render destiny more severe by struggling against its decrees. Let them yield at length to that irresistible movement which sways the universe, and meditate in silence on the causes of the ruin and elevation of empires."

That abjuration of the Bourbons, made in presence of the designated new monarch, and with that solemnity of language, was, though indirect, the most significant of all the manifestations. However, it was determined to publish nothing until the most elevated body in the State, the Senate, charged by the Constitution with taking the initiative, had made a first movement.

In order to provoke this movement it was necessary to come to an understanding with M. Cambacérès, who presided over the Senate. For this purpose it was necessary to confer with him, and secure his co-operation; not that any resistance on his part was to be feared, but his mere disapproval, even if a silent one, would have been a real inconvenience in a case in which it was necessary that the impulse should seem to be universal.

The First Consul sent for Messrs. Lebrun and Cambacérès at Malmaison. M. Lebrun, as being the easier to persuade, was the first sent for. No effort was necessary in his case, for he was a decided partisan of monarchy, and more especially under the sovereignty of general Bonaparte than of any one else. M. Cambacérès, discontented with what was in progress, arrived when the conference with his colleague Lebrun was already far advanced. The First Consul, after having spoken of the movement which had arisen in the public mind, asked the opinion of the Second Consul upon the question, then so much canvassed, of the re-establishment of monarchy.

"I shrewdly suspected," replied M. Cambacérès, "that that was what was to be spoken of. I see that every thing tends to that end, and I am very sorry for it." Then ill concealing the personal vexation which mingled with his prudent views, M. Cambacérès stated to the First Consul the grounds of his opinion. He depicted the republicans as being discontented that they were to be deprived of even the name of the phantom which they had pursued; the royalists revolted at seeing the throne re-erected without a Bourbon being seated upon it; he pointed out the danger of pushing the return to the old system so far, that very soon it would only require the substitution of one person for another to re-establish the old monarchy. He repeated the remarks of the royalists themselves, who boasted that in general Bonaparte they had a precursor charged with paving the way for the return of the Bourbons. He pointed out the inconveniences of a new change, productive of no advantage beyond a vain title, for the power of the First Consul was already unlimited; and he observed that frequently it was

more perilous to change the name of things than to change the things themselves. He alleged the difficulty of obtaining from Europe the recognition of the monarchy that it was proposed to found, and the still greater difficulty of obtaining from France the effort of a third war, in order to wring the recognition from the old monarchies; in short, he put forth a variety of reasons, some good, some middling, and tinged with an ill-temper by no means usual to so staid a personage. But he dared not mention the best, though he well knew them; namely, that if this new gratification of an immense ambition were granted, there was no point at which they could stop short, for in decreeing to general Bonaparte the title of Emperor of the French, they would prepare him to desire that of Emperor of the West, to which he secretly aspired, and which was by no means the least of the causes which urged him to go beyond all the limits of the possible, and to perish in so doing. Like every annoyed and constrained man, M. Cambacérès did not put forth his best arguments, and was beaten by his interlocutor. The First Consul, so dissimulating at the time of the institution of the Consulate for life, now made that step which was not made towards him. He frankly confessed to his colleague that he wished to take the crown, and he declared why. He maintained that France desired a king; that this was evident to any one capable of observation; that she daily receded from the follies which had been put into her head, and that of all those follies the Republic was the most signal; that the eyes of France were so completely opened to her defects, that she would take a Bourbon if they would not give her a Bonaparte; that the return of the Bourbons would be a calamity, for that would be a pure counter-revolution, and that, for himself, without wishing for more power than he already possessed, he yielded on this occasion to the public will and to the interests of the Revolution itself; that, for the rest, it was necessary to come to a resolution, for the excitement was such in the army, that they would probably proclaim him Emperor in the camps, and that then his elevation to the throne would resemble the act of Prætorians, which was above all things to be avoided.

These reasonings had but little weight with M. Cambacérès, who had no inclination to allow himself to be convinced, and each remained of his own opinion, vexed at having advanced too far. This unforeseen opposition of M. Cambacérès embarrassed the First Consul, who, feigning to feel less impatience than he really did feel, told his two colleagues that he would not interfere at all, but leave the public excitement to take its own course. They parted in mutual discontent, and M. Cambacérès returning to Paris with M. Lebrun, towards the middle of the night, addressed these words to him: "All is finished, the monarchy is re-established, but I have a presentiment that what is being plastered up will not be durable. We have made war

upon Europe to give her republics, daughters of the French republic; henceforth we shall make war to give her monarchies, sons or brothers of our own, and exhausted France will end by sinking beneath those silly enterprises.”

But this disapprobation of M. Cambacères was the most silent and inactive of all resistances. He allowed M. Fouché and his assistants to act as they pleased. An excellent opportunity presented itself to them. According to the custom of addressing to the Senate communications upon important events, there had been presented to it a report of the Grand-juge, relative to the intrigues of the English diplomatic agents, Drake, Spencer Smith, and Taylor. It was necessary to reply to this communication of the government. The Senate had named a committee to prepare the draft of a reply. The leaders, seeing a favourable occasion, exerted themselves to persuade the senators that the time had arrived for taking the initiative on the subject of re-establishing monarchy; that the First Consul hesitated, but that it was necessary to overcome his hesitations by denouncing to him the gaps in the existing institutions, and by indicating to him how they could be filled up. They hinted cautiously at the unpleasantness to which, two years previously, the Senate was exposed through halting behind the wishes of general Bonaparte. They plainly advanced a very specious reason for the Senate not allowing itself to be outstripped. The army, argued they, excited to the highest pitch in favour of their chief, was ready to proclaim him Emperor, and then the Empire, as at Rome, would be the gift of the Prætorians. It was necessary to make haste, that France might be spared such a scandal. They would only imitate in this the example of the Roman Senate, which, more than once, hastened to proclaim certain emperors, in order to avoid receiving them from the hands of the legions. Then came a reason which needed not to be spoken aloud or whispered; it was, that there still remained for distribution a great part of the senatorships instituted at the same time as the Consulate for life, which procured an endowment of land, in addition to the pecuniary salary allowed to each senator. There would also be a profusion of new places to distribute. It was necessary, therefore, as they could not resist the elevation of a new master, not to run the risk of displeasing him. It must be added, that to these baser reasonings some better ones were joined. Except a by no means numerous opposition, of which M. Sieyès was the original founder, but with which, as with every thing else, he had become disgusted, and which he had abandoned to subaltern leaders; with the exception of this opposition, the mass saw in monarchy the port in which the revolution must seek its safety.

These reasons, so various in character, gained over the majority of the senate, and it was determined to make a

significant reply to the message of the First Consul. The following is the substance of that reply.

The institutions of France are incomplete in two respects. Firstly, there is no tribunal for great crimes against the state, which must be referred to an insufficient and weak jurisdiction. (What passed at the tribunal of the Seine, during the proceedings against Georges and Moreau, inspired every one with this opinion.) Secondly, the government of France rests upon a single head, which is a continual temptation to conspirators, who imagine that by striking at that head, they can destroy every thing. Here is a double gap which it is necessary to point out to the wisdom of the First Consul, to awaken his solicitude, and induce him, if need be, to take the initiative.

On the 6th Germinal (27th March), the second day after the audiences reported above, the Senate was summoned to deliberate upon this draft of reply. M. Fouché and his friends had prepared every thing, without giving notice to M. Cambacérès, who usually presided in the Senate. It appeared that they had not even apprised the First Consul, in order that they might give him an agreeable surprise. That surprise was by no means so agreeable to M. Cambacérès, who was stupified on hearing the draft of the committee read. However, he preserved an unruffled countenance, and allowed nothing to be perceived by the numerous eyes that were fixed upon him, for it was desired to know how far all this was agreeable to the First Consul, whose confidant and accessory Cambacérès was supposed to be. During the reading of the draft of the committee, a very slight but still perceptible murmuring was heard in a part of the Senate; nevertheless, the draft was adopted by an immense majority, and it was determined that it should be communicated to the First Consul on the very next day.

Scarcely had M. Cambacérès left this sitting of the Senate when, offended at not having been advertised, he wrote to the First Consul at Malmaison instead of going thither in person, and, in a very cool letter, communicated to him all that had taken place. The First Consul returned on the following day to receive the Senate, and wished to have a previous explanation with his two colleagues. He appeared astonished at the precipitation of the procedure, and in some sort taken by surprise. "I have not sufficiently reflected," said he to M. Cambacérès; "I need to consult farther with you, and many others before I determine. I will reply to the Senate that I will deliberate. But I will neither receive it publicly, nor publish its message. I will not let any thing be noised abroad until my resolution shall be definitively taken." This was what was agreed upon, and executed that same day.

The First Consul received the Senate as he had announced, and replied verbally to its members, that he thanked them for their testimonies of devotion, but that he must maturely delibe-

rate upon the subject submitted to his attention, previous to making a public and definitive reply.

Although he witnessed, and was a silent accessory to all that had taken place, the First Consul was almost outstripped in his wishes. The impatience of his partisans had surpassed his own, and he evidently was not ready. The address of the Senate, therefore, was not published, for although absolute secrecy was impossible, yet as long as no official and avowed proceedings were taken, it was always possible to recede, should any unforeseen obstacle be encountered.

Previous to advancing too far to retrograde, the First Consul wished to be secure of the army and of Europe. In the main, he did not doubt either, for he was dear to the first, and dreaded by the second. But it was a severe sacrifice to impose upon his companions in arms, who had poured out their blood for France, and not for one man; it was a severe sacrifice to impose upon them, to wish them to accept him for their sovereign. And, considering the effect produced on Europe by the death of the duc d'Enghien, it was a singular act of condescension to ask of all the legitimate princes, to ask them to recognise as their equal a soldier who, but a few days before, had imbued his hands in the blood of the Bourbons. However much ground there might be to expect that the power of the soldier would extort assent, it was wise to be assured of it beforehand.

The First Consul wrote to general Soult, and to those of the generals in whom he had the most confidence, to ask their opinion as to the proposed change. He said that he had not come to any fixed determination, sought nothing but that which was best for France, and wished, previous to coming to any decision, to have the opinion of the chiefs of the army. Assuredly the reply was not doubtful; but to ask it was, at the least, to fish for protestations of devotion, which would serve for example, and urge forward lukewarm or refractory spirits.

As regarded Europe, the complaisance, though probable in the main, yet presented some doubt. We were at war with Great Britain; in that quarter, therefore, nothing needed to be done, the consent of that power being wholly out of the question. The recent relations with Russia rendered it a point of dignity not to address her. There remained Spain, Austria, Prussia, and the smaller powers. Spain was too weak to refuse anything, but the outpoured blood of a Bourbon made it imperative to allow some weeks to pass before having recourse to her. Austria had appeared the least sensible of all the powers to the violation of the Germanic territory, and in her profound indifference to every thing but her own interest, there was nothing that might not be expected from her. But in matters of etiquette she was rigid, punctilious, sensitive, as that court might well be whose antiquity and whose titles were unequalled. An emperor (for that title was decided upon as at once newer,

greater, and more military than that of king), an emperor to add to the list of sovereigns was not a very easy thing to make acceptable to the head of the Holy Roman Empire.

Prussia, notwithstanding her recent coolness, was still the power most easy to render favourable. A courier, therefore, was immediately despatched to Berlin, with an order to M. de Laforest to see M. d'Haugwitz, to learn from him whether the First Consul might hope to be recognised by the king of Prussia in quality of hereditary Emperor of the French. This was to be asked in such wise as to place the young king between a lively gratitude or a bitter resentment on the part of France. M. de Laforest was ordered to leave no trace of this step in the archives of the legation. As for Austria, without writing to M. de Champagny, and without risking a direct overture, means of acting were at hand, namely, to sound M. de Cobentzel, who professed to M. de Talleyrand an immoderate desire to gratify the First Consul. M. de Talleyrand was the very minister for such a negotiation. He obtained very gratifying assurances from M. Cobentzel, the most satisfactory language, but nothing positive. It was necessary to refer to Vienna for positive instructions.

The First Consul was, therefore, obliged to wait for a fortnight before he could reply to the Senate, and allow the architects of his new grandeur to pursue their work. However, addresses were still allowed to arrive from the great towns, and the principal authorities. They were not, however, inserted in the *Moniteur*.

The king of Prussia was found in the best possible dispositions. That prince, after having reverted towards Russia, and secretly allied himself to her, feared that he had gone too far in that direction, and that he had too plainly manifested his censure of what had taken place at Ettenheim. He wished, therefore, for nothing better than an opportunity of doing something personally agreeable to the First Consul. M. de Laforest had scarcely begun to broach the subject to M. de Haugwitz, when the latter, preventing him from concluding, hastened to declare that the king of Prussia would not hesitate to acknowledge the new Emperor of the French. Frederick William fully expected to encounter new censure from the restless coterie that surrounded the queen, but he knew how to brave that censure for the interests of his kingdom, and he considered a good understanding with the First Consul to be the first among those interests. It must be added, that he experienced a feeling which all the other courts were equally to experience, that of satisfaction at seeing the Republic abolished in France. Monarchy alone could render them secure, and the Bourbons appearing for the time being impossible, general Bonaparte was the new monarch whom all the princes expected to behold on the throne of France. This is a new proof, among a thousand

others, of the brief duration that certain impressions have among men, especially when they have an interest in effacing them from their hearts. All the courts were about to recognise as emperor that personage whom, in their wrath, they had but a fortnight before called an assassin and a regicide.

The king of Prussia himself wrote to M. de Lucchesini a letter, which was communicated to the First Consul, and which contained the most friendly expressions.

“I unhesitatingly authorize you,” said the king, “to seize the earliest possible opportunity to make known to M. de Talleyrand, that after having seen the supreme power conferred for life upon the First Consul, I should see with still greater interest the public order, established by his wisdom and his great actions, consolidated by the hereditary establishment of his family, and that I should not hesitate to acknowledge it. You will add, that I indulge the hope that this unequivocal testimony of my sentiments will be equivalent, in his opinion, to all the securities and guarantees that could be offered to him by a formal treaty, of which the bases substantially exist: and that I hope that I, in my turn, may reckon upon his freely reciprocating that friendship and confidence which I should wish to see constantly maintained between the two governments.” (23d of April, 1804.)

This language, though sincere in the main, was not, however, altogether consistent with the spirit of the treaty signed with Russia, but the immoderate desire of peace led this prince into equivocations most unworthy of his character.

Matters proceeded differently at Vienna. There no engagement had been entered into with Russia; they did not wish to redeem concession made to one party by concession made to another; they were guided solely by the closest calculations of their own interest. The death of the duc d'Enghien, and the violation of the Germanic territory, were considered to be of minor importance. The only subject of consideration was the return to be exacted for the sacrifice that was to be made in recognising the new emperor. In the first place, notwithstanding the inconvenience of disobliging Russia by conceding a point so eminently agreeable to the French government, it was necessary to make up their minds to recognise Napoleon, for to refuse would be to cause war, or nearly so, with France, and that, at least for the moment, was above all things to be avoided. But it was requisite to derive advantage from the recognition in question, to defer it for a short time, to sell it for certain advantages, and to represent to Russia as the effect of ill-will towards France, the delay employed in negotiating the advantages desired. Such was the Austrian policy, and it must be confessed that it was natural enough among powers which were in a state of perpetual suspicion of each other.

The Austrian party in the Empire being so much weakened, it might happen that at the next election the house of Austria

would lose the imperial crown. There was a means of warding off this inconvenience, by securing to the house of Austria itself, for its hereditary states, not a royal but an imperial crown, in such wise, that the head of that house would remain emperor of Austria in the event of any future election causing him to cease to be emperor of Germany. This is what M. de Champagny, at Vienna, and M. de Cobenzel, at Paris, were charged with demanding from the First Consul as the price of what he demanded for himself. For the rest they were to assure him that, saving the discussion of conditions, the principle of the recognition was at once admitted by the emperor Francis.

Although the First Consul had entertained but little doubts as to the dispositions of these powers, their replies filled him with satisfaction. He lavished testimonies of gratitude and friendship upon the court of Prussia. He no less warmly thanked the court of Vienna, and added, that he consented without hesitation to recognise the title of emperor, when assumed by the head of the house of Austria. Only, he would not wish to publish that declaration immediately, lest he should appear to purchase the recognition of his own title at any price whatever. He preferred to engage himself, by a secret treaty, to recognise at a future time, the successor of Francis II., as emperor of Austria, should he lose the quality of emperor of Germany. Further, if the court of Vienna insisted, he was ready to give way upon this difficulty, which was not one in fact, as all these titles had ceased to have any real importance. From Charlemagne down to the eighteenth century, there was but one single sovereign who bore the title of emperor, at least in the west. Since the eighteenth century, there were two, the Czar of Russia having taken that qualification. In consequence of what was passing in France, there were going to be three. Some day there would be four, if at a future Germanic election any other prince than the head of the house of Austria should be chosen as emperor. It was even supposed that the king of England, having called the united Parliament of England, Scotland, and Ireland the IMPERIAL PARLIAMENT, might be tempted to style himself emperor. In that case there would be five. All this did not merit to be paused upon. They were mere appellations which no longer had the value which attached to them when Francis I. and Charles V. disputed for the suffrages of the Germanic electors.

Independently of these tranquillising assurances of the principal courts, the First Consul had received the strongest testimonials of adhesion from the army. General Soult especially had written him a letter full of the most satisfactory declarations, and during the fifteen or twenty days which had been devoted to corresponding with Vienna and Berlin, the important cities of Lyons, Marseilles, Bordeaux, and Paris, had sent energetic

addresses in favour of the re-establishment of monarchy. The impulse was general, the *éclat* as public as it could be; it was necessary, therefore, to proceed to official steps, and explain to the Senate the posture of affairs.

The First Consul, as has been seen, had not publicly received the Senate, and had made only a verbal reply to the message of the 6th Germinal. He had deferred his official answer for nearly a month. He made it on the 5th Floréal (25th April, 1804), and it brought about the expected *dénouement*.

“Your address of the 6th Germinal,” said the First Consul, “has not ceased to occupy my attention. . . . You have judged the right of inheritance of the supreme magistracy necessary to shelter the French people from the plots of our enemies, and from the agitations which might spring from rival ambitions; many of our institutions have also seemed to you to need perfecting, in order to secure, undecayingly, the triumph of equality and of public liberty, and to afford to the nation and to the government the double guarantee of which they stand in need. In proportion as I have fixed my attention upon these grave objects, I have felt more and more deeply how important to me are the counsels of your wisdom and experience under circumstances at once so novel and so important. I therefore invite you fully to explain your views and wishes.”

This message was not yet published any more than that to which it served as a reply. The Senate immediately assembled to deliberate. The deliberation was smooth, and the conclusion known beforehand: it was the proposal to convert the Consular Republic into an hereditary Empire.

However, it was not advisable that every thing should pass in silence; it was requisite that there should be a debate somewhere, in a body whose discussion was public, of the grand resolution that was contemplated. The Senate did not discuss. The Legislative Body heard official orators, and voted in silence. The Tribunate, though narrowed and converted into a section of the Council of State, still preserved the right of speech. It was resolved to make use of it, that there might be heard, in the only Tribune which had preserved the privilege of expressing its opposition aloud, some speeches having the appearance of being independent.

The Tribunate was then presided over by M. Fabre de l’Aude, a personage devoted to the Bonaparte family. It was agreed with him to choose a tribune, whose anterior opinions had been frankly Republican, and to charge him to open the proceedings. The tribune Curée, the compatriot and personal enemy of M. Cambacérès, was selected to play this part.

It was publicly believed that this personage, the supposed creature of the Second Consul, had been named and put forward by him. Such was not the case. It was without his knowledge, and rather in opposition to him, that M. Curée had

been named. The latter, formerly an ardent republican, and now, like many others, completely reconciled to monarchical ideas, submitted a motion in which he proposed the re-establishment of hereditary succession in favour of the Bonaparte family. M. Fabre de l'Aude carried the motion to St. Cloud, to submit it to the approbation of the First Consul. He seemed not to be very fully satisfied with it, and thought the language of the converted republican neither sufficiently dexterous nor sufficiently elevated. However, it would have been inconvenient to choose another member of the Tribunate: He had the copy that was submitted to him retouched, and returned it immediately to M. Fabre de l'Aude. The text had undergone a singular alteration at St. Cloud. Instead of the words *hereditary succession in the Bonaparte family*, were inserted the words *hereditary succession in the descendants of Napoleon Bonaparte*. M. Fabre de l'Aude was a particular friend of Joseph, and one of the members of his private circle. Evidently, the First Consul, displeased with his brothers, would not take any constitutional engagement towards them. The sycophants of Joseph busied themselves around M. Fabre de l'Aude, and the draft of the motion was taken back to St. Cloud, to have the words *Bonaparte family* replaced instead of the words *descendants of Napoleon Bonaparte*. The draft was returned with the word *descendants* retained without any explanation.

M. Fabre resolved not to make any stir about this circumstance, and to give M. Curée the text of the motion as it had come from the hands of the First Consul, but after inserting the version preferred by Joseph. He imagined that if the motion were once presented and copied into the *Moniteur*, no one would venture to alter it again, and he prepared himself, if need should be, to have a painful explanation with the First Consul. It was a proof that the party surrounding the Consul's brothers were strongly enough combined to brave, in their interest, even the displeasure of the head of the family. All these proceedings were communicated day by day to Joseph, who had already proceeded to the camp of Boulogne.

On Saturday, the 8th Floréal (28th of April, 1804), the motion of M. Curée was deposited at the Tribunate, and the discussion of it adjourned to Monday, the 10th Floréal. A crowd of orators pressed forward to the Tribune to support it, and vied with each other for the opportunity of distinguishing themselves by a dissertation upon the advantages of monarchy. The substance, which, moreover, was correct, was as follows:

The Revolution of 1789 sought the abolition of feudality, the reform of our social state, the reform of abuses introduced under an arbitrary rule, and the diminution of the absolute power of royalty, by the intervention of the nation in the government. Those were its real objects. All which exceeded that limit had gone beyond the mark, and produced nothing

but misfortunes. France had been taught this by bitter experience. It was necessary to profit by that experience, and to undo what had been overdone. Monarchy, then, was to be re-established upon the new bases of constitutional liberty and civil equality. Re-establishing the monarchy there was but one monarch possible, Napoleon Bonaparte, with remainder to the members of his family.

The most zealous orators of the Tribunate seasoned their harangues with invectives against the Bourbons, and the solemn declaration that the restoration of those princes to France was for ever impossible; that it was the duty of every Frenchman, at the cost of his blood, to oppose their return. It would appear that the inconsistency which these orators now exhibited in advocating monarchy after having taken so many oaths to the Republic, indivisible and imperishable, should have been a lesson to teach them to speak less positively as to the future. But there is no lesson which can prevent ordinary men from plunging into the torrent which rushes before them: all go readily with it, especially when they hope to find honours and fortune in its course.

In the number of these zealots the most zealous were the men who had formerly been distinguished for their republican spirit, or those who at a later period were to distinguish themselves by their zeal for the Bourbons. One personage alone, in the midst of this outburst of abject adulation, displayed real dignity. He was the tribune Carnot. Undoubtedly, he deceived himself in his general theories, for, after what had occurred during ten years, it was difficult to conceive that, for a country like France, the Republic was preferable to monarchy, but the champion of error was more noble in his attitude than the champions of truth, because he had the advantage over them of a courageous and disinterested conviction. What renders his courage the more honourable to him is, that he expressed himself not as a demagogue, but, on the contrary, as a wise and moderate citizen and a lover of order. He declared that he would on the next day submit docilely to the sovereign whom the law should have instituted, but that while it was under discussion, and until it had passed, he would express his opinion upon it.

He commenced by speaking in noble terms of the First Consul, and of the services that he had rendered to the Republic. If, to secure order and a reasonable liberty in France, an hereditary ruler were necessary, it would be madness, said he, to choose any other than Napoleon Bonaparte. No one had dealt more terrible blows to the enemies of the country; no one had done so much for its civil organisation. Had he conferred nothing else on the nation but the Civil Code, his name would deservedly descend to posterity. It could not, then,

be doubted that if it was necessary to raise up the throne again, it was he who ought to be set upon it, and not that blind and vindictive race, who would re-enter France only to shed the blood of the best citizens, and to re-establish the reign of the narrowest prejudices. But since, in fact, Napoleon Bonaparte had rendered such great services, was there no other recompense that could be offered to him than the sacrifice of the liberty of France?

The tribune Carnot, without plunging into endless dissertations upon the advantages and disadvantages attached to different forms of government, endeavoured to show that at Rome the times of the Empire had been as much disturbed as those of the Republic, and that the former had less of masculine virtues and heroism; that the ten centuries of the French monarchy had not been less stormy than those of all the known republics; that under the monarchy the people attached themselves to families, identified themselves with their passions, their rivalries, and their hatreds, and agitated themselves as much for those causes as for any others; that if the French Republic had had its days of bloodshed, such troubles were inseparable from its origin; that this, at the utmost, only proved the necessity for a temporary dictatorship, as at Rome; that that dictatorship had been conferred on Napoleon Bonaparte; that no one disputed it with him; that it depended upon himself to make the noblest and most glorious use of it, in preserving it only during the time necessary to prepare France for liberty; but that if he would convert it into a perpetual and hereditary power, he would renounce a matchless and immortal glory; that the new states founded twenty years since on the other side of the Atlantic, were a proof that repose and happiness were to be found under Republican institutions; and that, as regarded himself, he should for ever regret that the First Consul would not employ his power in securing such a felicity for his country. Examining the often used argument that there would be more chance of a durable peace by assimilating the form of government to that generally received in Europe, he demanded whether the recognition of the new emperor would be so easy as was imagined; whether they would resort to arms in case of a refusal; whether France, converted into an Empire, would not be as likely as France maintained as a Republic, to offend Europe, excite its jealousies; in a word, provoke war?

Glancing backward, and bidding a noble adieu to the past, the tribune Carnot exclaimed:

“Was liberty, then, shown to man that he might never enjoy her? Was she incessantly presented to his wishes as a fruit to which he could not stretch out his hand but to be stricken with death? No; I cannot consent to look upon this benefit so universally preferable to all others, and without which all others become valueless—I cannot consent to look

upon it as a mere illusion. My heart tells me that liberty is possible, that its régime is easy, and more stable than any arbitrary or oligarchical government."

He concluded with these words, worthy of a good citizen :

"Ever ready to sacrifice my dearest affections to the interests of our common country, I shall content myself with having this one more time raised the accents of a free soul, and my respect for the law will be all the more secured, because it is the fruit of long convulsions and of that reason which imperatively commands us now to unite firmly against the common enemy, that enemy who is ever ready to foment discords, and to whom all measures are legitimate that will aid him towards his end of universal oppression and the dominion of the seas."

The tribune Carnot evidently confounded liberty with the Republic, and that is the common error of those who reason as he did. The Republic is not necessarily liberty, any more than monarchy is necessarily order. Oppression is to be met with under a republic, as disorder is to be met with under a monarchy. But for good laws, both the one and the other would be met with under all governments. But the question to be decided was whether, with wise laws, a monarchy would not give, in a higher degree than any other form of government, the utmost possible liberty, and, besides, the force of action necessary to great military states; and especially whether the habitudes of twelve centuries had not rendered it inevitable, and thence desirable, in a country like ours. If that were the case, would it not have been better to admit it and to organise it wisely, than to flounder about in a false position which harmonised neither with the ancient manners of France nor with the want which was then experienced of a stable and permanent government? The illustrious tribune was right, in our opinion, only upon one point: perhaps a temporary dictatorship was all that was necessary to enable Napoleon to pave the way at a future time, to the Republic, according to M. Carnot; to a representative monarchy, according to us. Napoleon was marvellously chosen by Providence to prepare France for a new régime, and to deliver her up, aggrandised and regenerated, to those, be they whom they might, who were to govern her after him.

The tribune Carim de Nisas undertook to reply to M. Carnot, and acquitted himself of that task to the great satisfaction of the new monarchists, but with a mediocrity of language equal to the mediocrity of his ideas. However, it was a mere pretence of discussion. Fatigue and the conviction of its profound inutility speedily put an end to it. A committee of thirteen members was appointed to examine the motion of the tribune Curée, and convert it into a definitive resolution.

In the sitting of the 13th Floréal (3rd of May), that is to say, on the Tuesday, M. Jard-Pauvillier, the reporter of that committee, proposed to the Tribunate to pass a vote, which, by the consti-

tutional rules then in force, would have to be addressed to the Senate, and carried to that body by a deputation.

The vote was as follows:—

First, That Napoleon Bonaparte, now Consul for life, be named Emperor, and in that capacity invested with the government of the French Republic.

Secondly, That the title of emperor and the imperial power be made hereditary in his family, in the male line, according to the order of primogeniture.

Thirdly, That in introducing into the organisation of the constituted authorities the modifications rendered necessary by the establishment of hereditary power, equality, liberty, and the rights of the people shall be preserved in all their integrity.

This vote, adopted by an immense majority, was carried to the Senate on the following day, 14th Floréal (4th of May, 1804). It was M. François de Neufchateau who, as vice-president, occupied the chair at that sitting. After hearing the deputation, and having officially registered the vote it had brought up, he said to the tribunes: "I cannot remove the veil which conceals for a time the proceedings of the Senate. I may inform you, however, that since the 6th Germinal we have directed the attention of the chief magistrate to the same subject as you have. But observe your advantages: that which we for two months have meditated in silence, your constitution has enabled you to discuss in presence of the people. The happy developments that you have given to a grand idea, have procured for the Senate, which opened the Tribune to you, the gratification of congratulating itself on its choice, and applauding your labour.

"In your public discourses we have recognised the substance of all our opinions. Like you, citizen tribunes, we do not wish the return of the Bourbons, because we do not wish counter-revolution, the only present that could be made to us by those unfortunate exiles, who have carried away with them despotism, nobility, feudal tyranny, slavery, and ignorance.

"Like you, citizen tribunes, we wish to raise up a new dynasty, because we wish to secure to the French people all the rights which they have reconquered. Like you, we wish that liberty, equality, and enlightenment, may be prevented from retrograding. I speak not of the great man called by his glory to give his name to the age in which he lives. It is not to himself, but to us, that he devotes his energies and genius. What you propose in the ardour of enthusiasm, the Senate will consider with cool deliberation."

It is evident from these words of the vice-president, that the Senate wished to take the lead, and not to expose itself this time to be anticipated or surpassed in the matter of devotion to the new master. The secret directors of the change that was in progress had well foreseen the influence which the discussion of the Tribunate would exercise upon that body. They had made use of it to hasten the resolution of the Senate,

urging that that resolution ought to be pronounced on the very day when the vote of the Tribunate should be communicated to the Senate, so that the two assemblies should appear to agree together, but the more considerable of the two should not seem to follow the other; and, consequently, the greatest haste was made to bring all to a conclusion. The mode was hit upon, of a memorial addressed to the First Consul, a memorial in which the Senate should express its views, and should propose the bases of a new organic *Senatus Consultum*. This memorial, in fact, was already cut and dried, at the moment when the deputation from the Tribunate was introduced. Its form and style were approved of, and the presentation to the First Consul immediately resolved. It was determined that that presentation should take place the same day, 14th Floréal. Accordingly, a deputation composed of the bureau, and of the members of the committee which had prepared the work, waited on the First Consul, and presented him with the message of the Senate, together with the memorial containing its ideas upon the new monarchical organisation of France.

It was now necessary to put those ideas into the shape of constitutional articles. A committee was named, consisting of several senators, of the ministers, and of the three consuls, which committee was charged with the drawing up of the new *Senatus Consultum*. As no further precaution was needed as to publicity, they on the following day inserted in the *Moniteur* all the proceedings of the Senate, the communications it had made to the First Consul, those which it had received from him, and all the addresses which, for some time past, had demanded the re-establishment of monarchy.

The committee named proceeded to the work on the instant. It assembled at St. Cloud, in the presence of the First Consul and his two colleagues. It examined and resolved in succession, all the questions to which the establishment of hereditary power had given birth. The first which presented itself was the title of the new monarch. Should he be called king or emperor? The same reason which in ancient Rome induced the Cæsars not to revive the title of king, and to take the wholly military title of *Imperator*—this same reason decided the framers of the new constitution to prefer the title of emperor? It presented at once more novelty and more grandeur; it avoided, to a certain extent, the *souvenirs* of a past which they wished to restore in part, but not entirely. Moreover, in this qualification, there was something of the unlimited which suited the ambition of Napoleon. His numerous enemies in Europe, daily attributing to him designs which he had not at all, or not as yet, by repeating in a host of journals that he contemplated the reconstitution of the Empire of the West, or at least that of the Gauls—his enemies had prepared all minds, and even his own, for the title of emperor. This

title was in the mouths of all, whether friends or foes, before it had been adopted. It was chosen without opposition. Accordingly, it was decided that the First Consul should be proclaimed Emperor of the French.

The hereditary succession, the object of the new revolution, was naturally established upon the principles of the salic law, that is to say, from male to male, in the order of primogeniture. Napoleon having no children, and not seeming destined to have any, it was proposed to give him the faculty of adoption, such as it existed in the Roman institutions, with its conditions and its solemn forms. In default of adoptive descent, the transmission of the crown was permitted in the collateral line, not to all the brothers of the Emperor, but exclusively to Joseph and Louis. They were the only two who had acquired real public consideration. Lucien, through his habits of life, and by his recent marriage, had rendered himself improper to succeed. Jerome, but little more than a youth, had married an American, without the consent of his family. Only Joseph and Louis, therefore, were admitted to the succession. In order to prevent the inconveniences which might result from misconduct in a numerous family, so recently raised to the throne, an absolute power over the members of the imperial family was attributed to the Emperor. It was settled that the marriage of a French prince, contracted without the consent of the head of the Empire, should deprive both the prince and his children of all right to succession. Nothing short of the dissolution of the marriage so contracted, could enable him to recover the rights lost by it.

The brothers and sisters of the Emperor received the rank of princes and princesses, as well as the honours attached to that title. It was resolved that the civil list should be established on the same principles as that of 1791: that is to say, that it should be voted for the whole reign; that it should consist of the still existent royal palaces; of the produce of the domains of the crown, and of an annual revenue of twenty-five millions. The allowances of the French princes were fixed at a million francs per annum for each. The Emperor had the right of fixing by imperial decrees (corresponding to what we call *ordonnances*) the interior government of the household, and the court etiquette suitable to his imperial dignity.

On entering so completely into monarchical ideas, it was necessary to surround this new throne with grand dignities, which should serve it both for ornament and support. It was further necessary to remember those secondary ambitions which had voluntarily ranked themselves below a superior ambition, had aided it to obtain its grandeurs, and were entitled, in their turn, to receive from it the price of their private and public services. All had their eyes upon the two consuls, Cambacérès and Lebrun, who, though far inferior to their colleague in every re-

spect, had nevertheless shared the supreme power, and rendered incontestable services by the wisdom of their counsels. Both of them were members of the senatorial committee, which drew up at St. Cloud the new monarchical constitution. The consul Cambacérès, probably for the first time in his life, unable to conceal a displeasure, showed himself cold and little communicative. He was as reserved on this occasion as M. Fouché was the contrary, and was no longer able to disguise his vexation, and the contempt that he felt for the constructors of the new monarchy. This state of affairs produced several quarrels, which were speedily terminated by the authority of Napoleon. There was a general feeling of the necessity of satisfying the two consuls who were going out of office, and especially M. Cambacérès, who, in spite of certain failings, enjoyed an immense political consideration. It had at first been proposed, in order to render the imitation of the Roman Empire complete, to allow the two consuls to remain beside the Emperor. Every one is aware that, after the elevation of the Cæsars to the empire, they preserved the institution of the consuls, that one of the mad members of the family gave that title to his horse, that others gave it to their slaves, or their eunuchs, and that, in the Empire of the East, very near the time of its fall, there were still two annual consuls, charged with the regulation of the calendar. It was this any thing but flattering remembrance that inspired otherwise well-meaning friends with the idea of preserving the two consuls in the new French Empire. M. Fouché, repelling this proposal, urged that there was but little need to care about those who might lose somewhat by the new organisation; the mainly important point was to do away with every trace of a régime so decried as that of the Republic had now become.

"Those who are superseded by the new régime," replied M. Cambacérès, "can console themselves, for they will carry with them what men do not always carry out of office, the public esteem."

This allusion to M. Fouché, and to his first retirement from office, caused the First Consul to smile an approval of the retort, but he hastened to put an end to these disputes, which had become painful. The second and third Consuls were not summoned any more to the sitting of the committee.

M. de Talleyrand, the most ingenious of inventors, when the object was to gratify ambition, proposed to borrow from the Germanic Empire certain of its grand dignities. In that ancient empire, each of the seven electors was marshal, cup-bearer, treasurer, or chancellor of the kingdom of Arles, or of Italy, &c. &c. With the idea, but vague as yet, of the possible future re-establishment of the Empire of the West in favour of France, it was to prepare the way for that measure, to surround the Emperor with grand dignitaries, chosen for the nonce from the French princes or the great personages of the Republic, and destined at a future time to be kings themselves,

and to form a cortège of vassal monarchs around the throne of the modern Charlemagne.

M. de Talleyrand, in concert with the First Consul, devised six grand officers, corresponding not to so many offices of the imperial household, but to so many departments of the government. In that constitution, in which there still remained many elective functions, in which the members of the Senate, of the Legislative Body, and of the Tribunate were to be elected, and in which the Emperor himself was to be elected in the event of a failure of collateral issue, a grand elector, entrusted with certain honorific duties relating to elections, might be conceived. A grand elector then was proposed as the first grand dignitary. For the second, an arch-chancellor of the Empire was proposed, charged with duties of pure pomp, of general surveillance with reference to the judicial order. For the third, an arch-chancellor of State, charged with similar duties with reference to the diplomatic service; for the fourth, an arch-treasurer; for the fifth, a constable; for the sixth, a high-admiral. The title of each of the latter sufficiently indicates to what part of the government his dignity related.

The titularies of these grand officers were, as we have said, dignitaries and not functionaries, for they were intended to be irresponsible and irremovable. They were to have purely honorific privileges, and only the general surveillance of the department of government to which, respectively, their titles had reference. Thus, the grand elector convoked the Legislative Body; the Senate, and the electoral colleges, administered the oath to the members elected to the various assemblies, and took part in all the formalities attendant upon the convocation or the dissolution of the electoral colleges. The arch-chancellor of the Empire received the oath of magistrates, or presented them when sworn before the Emperor, attended to the promulgation of laws and *Senatus Consulta*, presided over the Council of State and the High Imperial Court (of which we shall speak by and by), suggested desirable reforms of the laws, and finally, exercised the functions of civil officer of state for the births, marriages, and deaths of the members of the imperial family. The arch-chancellor of State received the ambassadors, introduced them to the Emperor, and signed and promulgated treaties. The arch-treasurer was custodian of the great book of the national debt, gave the guarantee of his signature to all the papers delivered to the creditors of the State, audited the accounts of the accountant-general's office, previous to submitting them to the Emperor, and gave his advice as to the management of the finances. The constable, with reference to the war administration, and the high-admiral with reference to that of the marine, had precisely similar duties. But Napoleon laid it down as a fixed principle, that a grand dignitary should never be a minister, in order that the depart-

ment of display might be kept distinct from the real function. There were in each department of government, dignities modelled upon royalty itself, inactive, irresponsible, and honorific as it, but, like it, charged with a general and superior superintendence.

The titularies of these dignities could supply the place of the Emperor in his absence, whether in the Senate, in the councils, or at the army. They formed with the Emperor the grand council of the Empire. Finally, in case of the extinction of the natural and legitimate heirs, they elected the Emperor, and in case of minority they watched over the future sovereign, and formed the council of regency.

The idea of these grand dignitaries was accepted by all the framers of the new constitution. Each titulary, provided that he was not at once a grand dignitary and an imperial prince, was to receive a salary equal to one-third of that of the princes, that is to say, the third of a million (13,333*l.* sterling). Here were the means of providing for the two brothers of the Emperor, his superseded colleagues, and the eminent personages who had rendered important services, military or civil. After the two brothers, Joseph and Louis, every one thought of the consuls Cambacérès and Lebrun, Eugène Beauharnois, the adopted son of the First Consul, Murat, his brother-in-law, Berthier, his faithful and invaluable companion in arms, and M. de Talleyrand, his medium of communication with the European powers. To his own will alone was left the distribution of these high favours.

It was natural, at the same time, to create in the army elevated posts, to re-establish that dignity of marshal which existed in the old monarchy, and which is adopted by all Europe as the most brilliant sign of military command. It was settled that there should be sixteen marshals, besides four honorary marshals, selected from veteran generals, become senators, and, therefore, precluded from active functions. The posts of inspectors-general of artillery, of engineers, and of cavalry, were also re-established. To the grand military officers were added grand civil officers, such as chamberlains, masters of the ceremonies, &c., and of both was composed a second class of dignitaries, under the title of grand officers of the Empire, holding their appointments for life, like the grand dignitaries themselves. To give them all a sort of root in the soil, they were charged with the presidencies of the electoral colleges. The presidency of each electoral college was permanently assigned to one of the grand dignitaries and to one of the class of civil or military grand officers. Thus the grand elector was to preside over the electoral college of Bruxelles; the arch-chancellor over that of Bordeaux; the arch-chancellor of State over that of Nantes; the arch-treasurer over that of Lyons; the constable over that of Turin; the high-admiral over that of Marseilles. The grand officers, civil or military, were to preside over the electoral col-

leges of minor importance. Human artifice could invent nothing more skilful to imitate an aristocracy with a democracy; for this hierarchy of six grand dignitaries, and of forty or fifty grand officers placed upon the steps of the throne, was at once an aristocracy and a democracy: an aristocracy by the position and the honors which, thanks to our conquests, it was to have; a democracy by origin, as it consisted of lawyers, soldiers of fortune, and sometimes of peasants, become marshals, and was to remain constantly open to any man who could rise by his genius or by his courage. These creations have disappeared with their creator, with the vast Empire which served as their base; but it is possible that they would finally have succeeded had time sanctified them with that dust of antiquity which engenders respect.

While raising the throne and ornamenting its steps with this social pomp, it was indispensably necessary to secure some guarantees to the citizens, and to compensate them by some little real liberty for that apparent liberty of which they were deprived by the abolition of the Republic. For some time past it had been emphatically argued that under a well-regulated monarchy the government would be stronger, and the citizens at the same time more free. It was necessary to keep a part of these promises, if one of the kind could be kept, at a time when every one putting forward his wishes for an energetic power would, for want of using it, allow liberty to perish, how strongly soever written in the laws. It was proposed, then, to give to the Senate and to the Legislative Body some prerogatives of which they were destitute, and which were calculated to become useful guarantees to the citizens.

The Senate, composed in the first place of eighty members elected by itself, then of citizens whom the Emperor judged worthy of that elevated position, and finally of the six grand dignitaries and the princes, having attained the age of eighteen, was still the first body in the State. It formed the others by the faculty of election which it had preserved; it could annul any unconstitutional law or decree, and could reform the constitution by means of an organic *Senatus Consultum*. Amidst the successive transformations to which it had been subjected within four years, it had remained quite as powerful as M. Sieyès had desired it to be. The restorers of monarchy, deliberating at St. Cloud, proposed to add two new prerogatives of the highest importance. They confided to it the guardianship of personal liberty and of the liberty of the press. By Article XLVI. of the first Consular constitution, the government could not detain an individual in prison without bringing him, within ten days, before his natural judges. By the second Consular constitution, that which established the Consulate for life, the Senate, in the case of conspiracy against the safety of the State, had the power to decide whether the government should exceed the delay of ten days, and

if so, by how long a period. It was now determined to regulate in a popular manner, the arbitrary power thus given to the government over the liberty of the citizens. A senatorial commission was formed, consisting of seven members chosen by ballot, and to be continually renewed by the retirement of one of the members every four months. It was to receive the petitions and complaints of prisoners or their families, and to declare whether the detention was just and required by the interest of the state. When such was not the case, if, after having addressed a first, second, and third request to the minister who had ordered the arrest, that minister did not cause the claimed individual to be released, the minister could himself be cited before the imperial high court for violation of personal liberty.

A similar commission, organised in the same manner, was charged to watch over the liberty of the press. It was the first time of this liberty being named in the Consular constitutions, so little was it thought of so shortly after the saturnalia of the press during the Directory. As for the periodical press, it was left under the authority of the police. It was not for it that any interest was expressed. It was only for books that any concern was evinced, they alone being deemed worthy of the liberty that was refused to the journals. They were not to be subjected, as they were before 1789, to the arbitrary power of the police. Every printer or bookseller, having any publication restrained by public authority, had the power to apply to the senatorial commission, charged with this duty; and if, after examining the interdicted or mutilated book, the senatorial committee disapproved of the rigour of the public authority, it made a first, second, and third application to the minister, and after the third, in case of refusal to yield to its repeated opinion, it could cite the minister before the high imperial court.

Thus, besides the powers which we have already enumerated, the Senate had the duty of watching over personal liberty, and the liberty of the press. These two last guarantees were not without their value. Nothing, it is true, had any instant efficiency, under a despotism which was accepted by all. But under the successors of the depository of this despotism, should there be any such, such guarantees could not fail to acquire a real power.

Something in the same direction was done for the organisation of the Legislative Body. The Tribunate, as we have observed several times, alone discussed the laws, and, after having formed its opinion, deputed three orators to sustain it against three councillors of State, before the mute Legislative Body. This dumbness, corrected, in the opinion of M. Sieyès, by the loquacity of the Tribunate, had speedily become absurd in the eyes of a satirical nation, which, though fearing oratory and its excesses, laughed nevertheless at the compulsory silence of its legislators. The dumbness of the Legislative Body had become

more ridiculous than ever, since the *Tribunate*, deprived of all vigour, had also become silent. It was determined that the *Legislative Body*, after having heard the councillors of State and the members of the *Tribunate*, should retire and discuss, in secret committee, the bills which had been submitted to it; that there each member could speak, and that then the *Legislative Body* would resume its public sitting, and vote in the ordinary way, by ballot.

The right of speech, then, was restored to the *Legislative Body*—in secret committee.

The *Tribunate* had become, since the institution of the *Consulate* for life, a sort of council of State; reduced from that epoch to fifty members, and having acquired the habit of only examining bills in private conference with the councillors of State, who approved those bills, it received in the new constitution an organisation conformable to the habits it had adopted. It was divided into three sections, the first of legislation, the second of home affairs, the third of finance. It was only to discuss laws in the sections, and never in general assembly. Three orators were to go, in the name of the section, to support its opinion before the *Legislative Body*. This was definitively to perpetuate, by a constitutional regulation, the new form which the body had only imposed upon itself in deference.

The term of service of its members was extended from five to ten years, a favour to the individual members, but a restriction of the power of the body itself, by less frequently renewing its spirit.

Finally, to all this was added an institution, necessary alike for the safety of the government and that of the citizens; it was that of a high court, which in England, and now in France, exists in the *House of Peers*. The want of such a court had been felt in the prosecution of those implicated in the *Georges* conspiracy, and in the lamentable execution of *Vincennes*. It would be still more felt under a dictatorial government, whose agents offered only a nominal responsibility, since they could not be summoned before any body of the State. There was not then, as now, the means of summoning them before one of the two chambers. It was very requisite, therefore, to furnish the government with a guarantee against conspiracies, and the citizens against the agents of public authority.

It was desired to give to the institution of this high court the outward advantage which was sought for all the new monarchical institutions, that of adding as much to the liberty of the citizens as to the power of the government. Accordingly, its seat was placed in the *Senate*, without, however, its being entirely and solely composed of senators. It was to consist of sixty senators, out of a hundred and twenty; of six presidents of the council of State; of fourteen councillors of State; of twenty members of the *Court of Cassation*; of grand officers of the Empire; of six grand dignitaries, and of princes having

acquired deliberative votes. Its president was to be the high chancellor. It was charged with taking cognizance of plots formed against the security of the State and the person of the Emperor; of arbitrary acts imputed to the ministers and their agents; of magisterial derelictions or extortions; of errors imputed to land and sea generals in their commands; of offences committed by members of the imperial family, by grand dignitaries, grand officers, senators, councillors of State, &c., &c. It thus was not only a court of justice charged with the repression of great crimes, but also a political jurisdiction as to the ministers and the agents of the public authority; a tribunal of marshals as to generals and admirals; and a court of peers as to the great personages of State. A procureur-general, permanently attached to this extraordinary jurisdiction, had the duty of prosecuting, *ex officio*, in the event of complainants not themselves commencing proceedings.

The only modification made in the ordinary form of justice, was the title of *Court* being substituted for that of Tribunal, for the tribunals of high rank. The Tribunal of Cassation was to take the title of *Court* of Cassation, and the Tribunals of Appeal were to be called Imperial Courts.

It was determined that an act of deference should once more be made towards the national sovereignty, and that registers in the usual manner should be opened to receive the suffrages of the citizens as to the establishment of the imperial hereditary succession in the male line of Napoleon Bonaparte, and his two brothers Joseph and Louis.

The Emperor was, within the space of two years, to take a solemn oath to the constitutions of the Empire, in presence of the grand dignitaries, the grand officers, the ministers, the Council State, the Senate, the Legislative Body, the Tribunate, the Court of Cassation, the archbishops, the bishops, the presidents of the courts of justice, the presidents of electoral colleges, and the mayors of thirty-six principal towns of the Republic. This oath was to be taken, said the text of the new constitutional act, to the French people, upon the testament. It was conceived in the following terms: "I swear to maintain the integrity of the territory of the Empire, to respect and to cause to be respected the laws of the Concordat, and of the liberty of worship; to respect and to cause to be respected the equality of rights, political and civil liberty, and the irrevocability of the national property; to raise no impost and to establish no tax except by virtue of the law; to maintain the institution of the Legion of Honour, and to govern solely with the view to the interest, the happiness, and the glory of the French people."

Such were the conditions adopted for the new monarchy in a draft of a *Senatus Consultum*, written, like all the laws of that period, in a clear, simple, and precise manner.

This was the third and last transformation undergone by the celebrated constitution of M. Sieyès. We have elsewhere explained what was the idea of that legislator of the French Revolution. The aristocratic system is the haven in which those Republics have found shelter which have not ended in despotism. M. Sieyès, perhaps without suspecting it, had sought to pilot into the same port the French Republic, as much disgusted with agitations after ten years, as the Republics of antiquity and of the middle age were after many centuries; and he had composed his aristocracy of the leading and experienced men of the Revolution. To this end he had invented a Senate, inactive, but armed with immense influence, electing its own members and those of all the State bodies out of the rarely-renewed lists of notables, naming the heads of the government, revoking them, ostracising them at will, taking no part in the making of laws, but having the power to annul them on account of unconstitutionality; in a word, not exercising power, and yet conferring it, and having always the faculty of arresting it. To this he added an equally inactive Legislative Body, which silently admitted or rejected the laws which the Council of State was entrusted to make and the Tribunate to discuss; and, lastly, a supreme representative of the executive power, called grand elector, elective, and for life, like a doge, and inactive as a king of England, named by the Senate, and, in his turn, naming the ministers who alone were active and responsible. In this manner M. Sieyès had everywhere separated influence and action; influence, which delegates power, then controls, and arrests it; action, which receives and exercises it. He had given the former to an aristocracy indolent and exalted, the latter to elective and responsible agents. He had thus approached a sort of aristocratic monarchy, but still without hereditary succession, resembling Venice rather than Great Britain, and adapted rather to an exhausted country than to a free one.

Unfortunately for the labour of M. Sieyès, beside this aristocracy without root, composed of disabused and unpopularised revolutionists, was a man of genius whom France and Europe called a saviour. There was but small chance of this aristocracy defending itself like that of Venice against usurpation, and still less that in a time of rapid revolutions the struggle could be very long. At the outset, previous to accepting this constitution of M. Sieyès, general Bonaparte arranged his own place in it by making himself First Consul instead of grand elector. Scarcely had he begun to govern, when the ill-timed resistances of the Tribunate restraining him from the good that he wished to accomplish, he had crushed them, amid the loud applause of the public, wearied with revolutions, and had himself made Consul for life by the Senate. On the same opportunity he had added the constituent power to the previous powers of the Senate, not fearing to render all-powerful a body

that he dominated; he had annihilated the Tribunate by reducing it to fifty members, and by dividing it into sections, which discussed the laws proposed, *tête-à-tête* with the sections of the council of State. Such was the second transformation of the constitution of M. Sieyès, that which took place in 1802, at the epoch of the Consulate for life. A vigorous hand had thus in two years caused that aristocratic Republic to terminate in a sort of aristocratic monarchy, to which nothing more was needed than hereditary succession. Consequently, many had asked themselves, in 1802, why all was not finished at once, and why hereditary succession was not given to this so evident monarch? A conspiracy directed against his life awakening in greater force than ever the desire of more stable institutions, had at length brought about the last transformation, and the definitive conversion of the Constitution of the year VIII. into a monarchy, representative in form, absolute in fact. There were almost as many remains of republicanism beside a despotic power, as in the empire founded by the Cæsars. It was not representative monarchy such as we now understand it. That Senate, with the faculty of electing all the bodies of the State out of the electoral lists, with its constituent power, with its faculty of annulling the law—that Senate with so much power and yet subject to a master, did not resemble an Upper Chamber. That silent Legislative Body, although speech was restored to it in secret committee, did not resemble a Chamber of Deputies. And yet that Senate, that Legislative Body, that Emperor, all might one day have become a representative monarchy. We must not, then, judge of the constitution of M. Sieyès, altered by Napoleon, by the mute obedience which reigned under the Empire. Our Constitution of 1830, with the press and the chambers, would probably not have produced results sensibly different, for the spirit of the times does more than written laws. It would have been necessary to judge of the Imperial Constitution under the following reign. Then opposition, the inevitable sequel of a long submission, would have sprung up even in the Senate, for a long time so docile, but armed with an immense power. It would probably have come to an understanding with the electoral colleges to make choices conformable to the new spirit; it would have broken the fetters of the press; it would have opened the doors and windows of the palace of the Legislative Body, that the voices of its members might be heard afar off. It would have been representative monarchy as we now have it, with this difference, that the resistance would have come from above instead of from below. That is no proof that it would have been less enlightened, less constant, or less courageous. This, however, is a problem which time] has borne away without solving, as it has borne away so many others. But those institutions were far from deserving the contempt which has so often been

expressed for them. They composed an aristocratic Republic, diverted from its end by a powerful chief, temporarily converted into an absolute monarchy, and destined, at a later day, to become a constitutional monarchy, strongly aristocratical, it is true, but founded upon the basis of equality; for under it every fortunate soldier might become constable, every able juriconsult might become arch-chancellor, after the example of its founder, who became, from a simple officer of artillery, hereditary Emperor and Ruler of the world.

Such was the work of the constituent committee assembled at St. Cloud. During the last days of its sitting Messieurs Cambacérès and Lebrun had not attended. The altercations that had been provoked by the monarchical zeal of M. Fouché on the one hand, and by the ill-humour of M. Cambacérès on the other, were the cause of the Second and Third Consuls ceasing to be summoned. The wisest and the most prudent of the senators who were included in the committee regretted their absence, and pointed out to Napoleon how important it was to gratify his colleagues by treating them handsomely. He did not require to be advertised of that, for he well knew the value of the Second Consul, Cambacérès, appreciated his unostentatious devotedness, and was anxious to attach him to the new monarchy. He therefore sent for him to St. Cloud, entered into a new explanation with him upon the last change, listened to his opinions, stated his own, and terminated the debate by the expression of his will, thenceforth irrevocable. He had determined upon the crown, and he did not conceal it. Moreover, he had a splendid compensation to offer to Messrs. Cambacérès and Lebrun. To the first he destined the dignity of arch-chancellor of the Empire, to the second that of arch-treasurer. He treated them precisely as his own brothers, who were to be comprised in the number of the six grand dignitaries. He announced this resolution to M. Cambacérès; to that announcement he added that seductive language, which no one at that time resisted, and succeeded in entirely regaining him.

“I am,” said he to M. Cambacérès, “and I shall be, more than ever surrounded by intrigues, and by false or interested counsels; you alone will have the judgment and the sincerity to tell me the truth. I wish, then, to bring you closer than ever to my person and to my ear. You will remain with me to possess all my confidence, and to justify it.” These compliments were well merited. M. Cambacérès, having nothing more to desire or to fear in that elevated position, would be, and in fact was, the truest and the most influential of the counsellors of the new Emperor.

Joseph Bonaparte was named grand elector, Louis Bonaparte, constable. The nomination to the two dignities of arch-chancellor of State and high-admiral were deferred. Napoleon still hesitated among the various members of his family. He had thought of

Lucien, who was absent and in disgrace, but whose recent marriage there was some hope of dissolving; of Eugene Beauharnois, who solicited nothing, but with a perfect submission awaited all from the tenderness of his adoptive father; of Murat, who solicited, not personally, but through his wife, who young, lovely, ambitious, and very dear to Napoleon, availed herself most skilfully of the tenderness he felt for her.

M. de Talleyrand, the principal inventor of the new dignities, experienced on this occasion a first disappointment, which had a very mischievous influence on his disposition, and threw him at a later period into an opposition which was ruinous to himself, and troublesome to Napoleon. The post of arch chancellor of the Empire, which had reference to judicial functions, having fallen to the Second Consul Cambacérès, M. de Talleyrand had hoped that the post of arch chancellor of State, which had reference to the diplomatic functions, would naturally have devolved upon him. But the new Emperor expressed himself quite resolutely upon that point. He did not admit the possibility of grand dignitaries being ministers: he would have for the latter only removable and responsible agents, whom he could revoke and punish at will. General Berthier was an instrument fully as valuable to him as M. de Talleyrand. He chose, nevertheless, to leave him minister, like M. de Talleyrand, compensating them both with grand endowments. The pride of M. de Talleyrand was singularly wounded, and, though a courtier, still he displayed somewhat of that attitude of a discontented courtier, which he then kept much in control, but which he subsequently kept far less so, thereby incurring some bitter disgraces.

There still remained both in the army and at court, posts fitted to satisfy all ambitions. There were four posts of honorary marshals to give to generals who were enjoying repose in the Senate, and sixteen for those who, still full of youth, were still figured at the head of our soldiers. Napoleon reserved the four-first named for Kellerman, in remembrance of Valmy; Lefebvre, for his tried bravery and a devotion which dated from the 18th Brumaire; and Periguin and Serrurier for the respect in which they were deservedly held by the army. Of the sixteen posts of marshals destined for generals in active service, he determined to confer fourteen immediately, and to reserve two as the reward of future merits. These fourteen batons were given to general Jourdan for the splendid achievement at Fleurus; to general Berthier for his eminent and sustained services on the staff; to general Masséna for Rivoli, Zurich, and Genoa; to generals Lannes and Ney for a long series of heroic deeds; to general Augereau for Castiglione; to general Brune for the Helder; to Murat for his chivalric valour at the head of the French cavalry; to general Bessières for the command of the guard which he had had since Marengo,

and of which he was worthy; to generals Moncey and Mortier for their warlike merits; to general Soult for his services in Switzerland, at Genoa, and in the Camp of Boulogne; to general Davoust for his conduct in Egypt, and for a firmness of character of which he shortly afterwards gave brilliant proofs; and, finally, to general Bernadotte for a certain renown acquired in the armies of the Sambre and Meuse, and of the Rhine, and especially for his relationship, and in spite of an envious hatred that Napoleon had discerned in the heart of that officer, and which already inspired him with a presentiment, often plainly expressed, of a future treason.

A general who had not as yet commanded in chief, but who, like generals Lannes, Ney, and Soult, had directed considerable corps, and who merited the marshal's baton as much as the officers just mentioned, was not included in the list of the new marshals. The general in question was Gouvion St. Cyr. If he did not equal the warrior's nature and the battle-field glance of Masséna, he surpassed him in science and military combinations. Since Moreau had been lost to France by his misconduct, and since Kléber and Desaix were dead, he, or Masséna, was the man most capable of commanding an army; Napoleon, be it understood, being above parallel with any one. But the jealous and unsociable character of St. Cyr had begun to procure him the frowns of the supreme dispenser of favour. With sovereign power came its foibles; and Napoleon who had pardoned Bernadotte his petty treacheries, the presage of a greater one, knew not how to forgive general St. Cyr his disparaging spirit. Nevertheless, general St. Cyr was ranked among the colonels-general, and became colonel-general of the cuirassiers. Junot and Marmont, the faithful aides-de-camp of general Bonaparte, were named colonels-general of hussars and chasseurs, and Baraguay d'Hilliers of dragoons. General Marescot received the post of inspector-general of engineers, and general Sougis that of inspector-general of artillery. In the navy, vice-admiral Bruix, the chief and the organiser of the flotilla, obtained the baton of admiral, and was made inspector-general of the coasts of the ocean; and vice-admiral Decrès was named inspector-general of the coasts of the Mediterranean.

The court also furnished grand posts for distribution. It was formed with all the pomp of the ancient French monarchy, and with more *éclat* than the imperial court of Germany. It was to have a grand almoner, a grand chamberlain, a grand huntsman, a grand equerry, a grand master of the ceremonies, and a grand marshal of the palace. The post of grand almoner was given to cardinal Fesch, uncle of Napoleon, the post of grand chamberlain to M. de Talleyrand, and that of grand huntsman to general Berthier. The court posts bestowed upon the two last-named were intended as a compensation for not having obtained two grand dignities of the Empire. The post of grand equerry

was granted to M. de Caulaincourt, to avenge him for the calumnies of the royalists, who had been outrageous against him since the death of the duc d'Enghien. M. de Ségur, formerly ambassador from Louis XVI. to Catherine, a man eminently calculated to teach the new court the usages of the old one, was named grand master of the ceremonies. Duroc, who had governed the consular, now become the imperial, household, was still to govern it, under the title of grand marshal of the palace.

We shall not mention either the inferior posts, or the subaltern aspirants who disputed for them. History has nobler matters to deal with. She only descends to such details when they are important to a faithful painting of manners. We shall only say that the emigrants who, previous to the death of the duc d'Enghien, tended towards a reconciliation, and after his death had again withdrawn for an instant, but who, forgetful like the rest of the world, already began to think less of a catastrophe two months old, began to figure among the number of aspirants who were eager to find berths at the imperial court. Some of them were admitted. A lady of very old family, Madame de la Rochefoucauld, destitute of beauty but not of wit, distinguished for her education and her manners, formerly a zealous royalist, but who now laughed gracefully enough at her departed opinions, was destined to be principal lady of honour to Josephine.

All these appointments were known before they were announced in the *Moniteur*, published from mouth to mouth amidst the inexhaustible gossip of those who approved and those who disapproved, who had enough to do to express all that they felt at witnessing so singular a spectacle, each applauding or censuring according to his friendships or his enmities, or his pretensions gratified or disappointed, and scarcely any one according to his political opinions; for there were no political opinions then, except among hot-headed royalists, or implacable republicans.

To these nominations there was added another, and a far more serious one, that of M. Fouché, who was called to the ministry of police, re-established on his account, to recompense him for his services during the recent events.

It was necessary to give to these choices, and to the greatest of them all, that which made a general of the Republic an hereditary monarchy, the character of official acts. The *Senatus Consultum* was agreed upon and drawn up. It was arranged to present it on the 26th Floréal (16th of May, 1804), to the Senate, that it might be there decreed in the accustomed form. That presentation having taken place, a commission was immediately appointed to make its report. The drawing up of the report was intrusted to M. de Lacepède, the savant and the senator most devoted to Napoleon. He had completed it in forty-eight hours, and presented it to the Senate on the 28th

Floréal (18th of May). That day was appointed for the solemn proclamation of Napoleon as Emperor. It had been decided that the consul Cambacérès should preside over the sitting of the Senate, that his adhesion to the new monarchical establishment might be the more striking. M. de Lacedépède had scarcely finished his report, when the senators without a single apparent dissent, and by a sort of unanimous acclamation, adopted the *Senatus Consultum* in its entirety. They even evinced a visible impatience during the formalities indispensable to such an act, so eager were they to depart for St. Cloud. It was agreed that the Senate should go in a body to that residence to present its decree to the First Consul, and to salute him as Emperor. Scarcely was the adoption of the *Senatus Consultum* terminated, ere the senators tumultuously put an end to their sitting and hurried to their carriages, each striving who should be earliest at St. Cloud.

Arrangements had been made at the palace of the Senate, upon the roads, and also at St. Cloud, for this unheard of scene. A long line of carriages, escorted by the cavalry of the guard, conveyed the senators to the residence of the First Consul, on a lovely spring day. Napoleon and Josephine, pre-informed, expected this solemn visit. Napoleon, standing in military costume, calm as he well knew how to be when men's gaze was fixed upon him, and his wife at once gratified and agitated, received the Senate, with Cambacérès at its head. He, respectful as a colleague, still more respectful as a subject, bowed low and addressed the following speech to the soldier whom he was about to proclaim Emperor.

“SIRE.—Four years ago the affection and the gratitude of the French people intrusted the reins of government to your majesty, and the constitutions of the State had already left to you the choice of a successor. The more imposing title which is now decreed to you, therefore, is but a tribute that the nation pays to its own dignity, and to the necessity it experiences of daily offering you new proofs of its daily increasing respect and attachment.

“How, indeed, can the French people reflect without enthusiasm upon the happiness it has experienced since Providence prompted it to throw itself into your arms?

“Our armies were vanquished, the finances in disorder; public credit was annihilated; the remnants of our ancient splendour were disputed by factions; the ideas of religion, and even of morality were obscured; the habit of giving and resuming power left the magistrates without consideration.

“Your majesty appeared. You recalled victory to our standards, you restored order and economy in the public expenditure; the nation, encouraged by the use that you made of them, took confidence in its own resources; your wisdom calmed down the fury of parties; religion saw her altars raised

again; finally, and that is doubtless the greatest of the miracles worked by your genius, that people whom civil ferments had rendered indocile to all restraint and inimical to all authority, have been by you taught to cherish and respect a power exercised only for its repose and glory.

“The French people does not pretend to set itself up as a judge of the constitutions of other states; it has no criticism to make, no examples to follow; experience henceforth becomes its lesson.

“For centuries it tasted of the advantages attached to the hereditary succession of power; it has had a short but painful experience of the contrary system; as the effect of a free and mature deliberation, it returns to a régime conformable to its spirit. It freely uses its rights to delegate to your imperial majesty a power that its interest forbids it to exercise for itself. It stipulates for generations yet unborn, and, by a solemn compact, it entrusts the happiness of its posterity to the scions of your race.

“Happy the nation which, after so many troubles, finds in its own bosom a man capable of stilling the storms of passion, of conciliating all interests, and of winning the suffrages of all ranks.

“If it be in the principles of our constitution to submit to the sanction of the people the part of the decree which concerns the establishment of an hereditary government, the Senate has deemed that it ought to beseech your imperial majesty to permit that the organic dispositions should forthwith be put in force, and for the glory as well as for the happiness of the Republic, at this very instant the Senate proclaims NAPOLEON EMPEROR OF THE FRENCH.”

Scarcely had the arch-chancellor pronounced these words, ere the cry of *Vive l'Empereur* resounded beneath the roofs of the palace of St. Cloud. Heard in the court and gardens, that cry was repeated joyfully and with loud cheers. Confidence and hope beamed in every countenance, and all present, carried away by the exciting scene, felt that they had for a long time secured their happiness and that of France. The arch-chancellor, Cambacérès, himself carried away, seemed always to have wished for that which at this moment was accomplished.

Silence being restored, the Emperor addressed the Senate in the following terms:—

“Every thing which can contribute to the weal of the country is essentially connected with my happiness.

“I accept the title, which you believe to be useful to the glory of the nation.

“I submit to the people the sanction of the law of hereditary succession. I hope that France will never repent of the honours with which she shall invest my family.

“At all events, my spirit will no longer be with my posterity,

on that day when it shall cease to merit the love and confidence of the Grand Nation."

Reiterated acclamations drowned these noble words; then the Senate, through its organ, M. Cambacérès, addressed a few words of congratulation to the Empress, who, according to her custom, listened to them with perfect gracefulness, but replied to them only by her deep emotion.

The Senate then retired, after having conferred on that man, born at so vast a distance from the throne, the title of emperor, which he never lost, even after his fall, and in exile. We shall designate him henceforth under that title, which was his from the day of which we speak. The will of the nation, so certain that there was something puerile in the care that was taken formally to establish it—the will of the nation was to decide if he should be hereditary Emperor. But, in the meantime, he was Emperor of the French, by the power of the Senate, acting within the limits of its prerogatives.

As the senators retired, Napoleon detained the high chancellor Cambacérès, and pressed him to remain to dine with the imperial family. The Emperor and the Empress overwhelmed him with attentions, and endeavoured to make him forget the distance which henceforth separated him from his former colleague. Sooth to say, the arch chancellor might readily console himself; in reality, he had not at all fallen; only, his master had ascended, and had made every one ascend with him.

The Emperor and the arch-chancellor, Cambacérès, had to converse on some important subjects connected with the events of the day. These were, the ceremony of the coronation, and the government to be given to Italy, which could not remain a republic beside France, that had now become a monarchy. Napoleon, who loved the marvellous, had conceived a bold idea, the accomplishment of which would strike men's minds, and render still more extraordinary his accession to the throne; this was, to have himself crowned by the Pope himself, brought from Rome for that purpose. The thing was without precedent in all the eighteen centuries of the Church. All the emperors of Germany, without an exception, had gone to Rome to be crowned. Charlemagne, proclaimed emperor of the West in the Basilick of St. Peter, in some sort by surprise, on Christmas-day, 800, had not seen the Pope leave his abode on his account. Pepin, it is true, was crowned in France by pope Stephen, but the latter had repaired to France to ask aid against the Lombards. It was for the first time that a pope was about to quit Rome, to consecrate the rights of a new monarch, in that monarch's own capital. What resembled the past was, the Church recompensing with the title of Emperor the successful warrior who had succoured her; a marvellous resemblance to Charlemagne, and one which abundantly supplied the place of that legitimacy which was so vainly boasted by the Bourbons, and

which their defeat, their misconduct, and their co-operation in shameful plots had sunk into disrepute.

Scarcely had Napoleon conceived this idea, ere he converted it into an irrevocable resolution, and he promised himself that he would bring Pius VII. to Paris by any means, persuasion, or fear. It was one of the most difficult of negotiations, and one in which no one but himself could succeed. He determined to make use of Cardinal Caprara, who had incessantly written to Rome, that but for Napoleon religion would have been lost in France, and perhaps even in Europe. He imparted his project to the arch-chancellor, Cambacérès, and planned with him the method of setting about making the first attack upon the prejudices, the scruples, and the indolence of the Roman court.

As regarded the Italian Republic, it would, for two years past, have been a scene of confusion but for the presidency of general Bonaparte. In the first place, M. de Melzi, an honourable and tolerably sensible man, but morose, a martyr to gout, constantly on the eve of giving in his resignation as vice-president, and destitute of the firmness to support the heavy cares of government, was a very inefficient representative of the public authority. Murat, commanding the French army in Italy, threw difficulties in the way of the Italian government, which greatly added to the chagrin of M. de Melzi. Napoleon was incessantly obliged to interfere to make the two authorities agree. To these personal difficulties were added those which arose out of the state of affairs itself. The Italians, but little moulded as yet to the constitutional régime, which allowed them to participate in their own government, were either of an entire indifference, or of an extreme vehemence. To govern, there were only the moderates, few in number, and embarrassed with their part, placed as they were among the nobles devoted to Austria, the liberals, inclined to Jacobinism, and the masses, sensible only to the weight of the imposts. These masses complained of the expences of the French occupation. *We are governed by foreigners—our money goes across the mountains*; this grief, so common in Italy, was still heard under the new Republic, as it had been under the house of Austria. There was only a small number of enlightened men who felt that, thanks to general Bonaparte, the greater part of Lombardy, united in a single state, governed in reality by natives, and placed only under an external and distant surveillance, was thus called into a real existence, the commencement of Italian unity; that if it were necessary to pay twenty millions per annum for the French army, that was a very moderate indemnity for the support of an army of thirty or forty thousand men, indispensable if Italy would not return to the yoke of the Austrians. However, notwithstanding the gloomy colours with which the distempered spirit of M. de Melzi charged the picture of Italian affairs, those affairs after

all went on peaceably enough, directed as they were by the hand of Napoleon.

To convert that Republic into a monarchy vassal to the Empire, and to give it to Joseph, for instance, was to commence that Empire of the West which Napoleon, in his henceforth boundless ambition, already dreamed of; it was to ensure to Italy a more fixed régime; it was probably to gratify her, for she would be delighted to have a prince of her own; and were it only a mere change, it was possible that upon that sole ground it would satisfy unquiet and restless imaginations. It was agreed that the arch-chancellor Cambacérès, who was closely connected with M. de Melzi, should write to him and make the fitting overtures upon this subject.

Napoleon, after having agreed with his former colleague upon all that was to be done, sent for the cardinal legate to St. Cloud, and spoke to him in an affectionate tone, but so positively, that it did not enter the mind of the cardinal to venture upon a single objection. Napoleon told him that he charged him expressly to request the pope to repair to Paris to officiate in the ceremony of the coronation; that he would make a formal demand to the same effect at a future time, when he should be assured that he would not be refused; that, moreover, he did not doubt of the success of his desires; that the Church owed him that success, and owed it also to herself, for nothing would be more serviceable to religion than the presence of the sovereign pontiff in Paris, and the union of religious pomps and civil pomps upon so solemn an occasion. Cardinal Caprara despatched a courier for Rome, and M. de Talleyrand on his side, wrote to cardinal Fesch, to inform him of this new project, and to engage him to support the negotiation:

It was spring. Napoleon would have wished the journey of the Pope to take place in autumn. He proposed, for that epoch, to add another marvel to that of a pope crowning at Paris the representative of the French Revolution, this was, the expedition to England, which he had postponed on account of the royalist conspiracy and of the institution of the Empire, but the preparations for which he had so perfected, that he no longer entertained a doubt of success. He required but a month at the most, for it was a lightning stroke that he wished to strike. He destined July or August for that grand operation. He hoped, therefore, to have returned victorious, secure of definitive peace, and possessed of European omnipotence, towards October, and to be able to be crowned at the commencement of winter, on the anniversary of the 18th Brumaire (9th of November, 1804). In his ardent imagination he revolved all these projects at once, and it will soon be perceived, by the latest combinations he arrived at, that all was not mere phantom here.

The arch-chancellor Cambacérès, on his part, wrote to the

vice-president Melzi about the affairs of the new kingdom of Italy. M. Marescalchi, minister from the Italian Republic at Paris, was also to support the overtures of M. Cambacérès to M. de Melzi.

The following days were employed in taking the oath to the new sovereign of France. All the members of the Senate, of the Legislative Body, and of the Tribunate, were introduced in succession. The arch-chancellor Cambacérès, standing beside the Emperor who was seated, read the form of the oath; the person admitted then swore, and the Emperor, half rising from his imperial chair, slightly saluted him whose homage he had received. This sudden difference introduced into the relations between subjects and a sovereign, who on the previous day was their equal, produced some sensation among the members of the State bodies. After having been in some sort hurried away to bestow the crown, they were surprised at seeing the first consequences of what they had done. The tribune Carnot, faithful to his promise to submit to the law when once enacted, took the oath with the other members of the Senate. He gave to that act the dignity of obedience to the laws, and even seemed less sensible than others to the changes that had taken place in the outward forms of power. But the senators, especially, perceived them, and more than one satirical dialogue was held upon the subject. One circumstance, especially, contributed to cause these remarks. Of the thirty and odd senatorial appanages instituted at the epoch of the Consulate for life, fifteen still remained to be given; those of Agen, Ajaccio, Angers, Besançon, Bourges, Colmar, Dijon, Limoges, Lyons, Montpellier, Nancy, Nismes, Paris, Pau, and Riom. They were given on the 2d Prairial (May 22nd). Messrs. Lacepède, Kellermann, François de Neufchâteau, and Berthollet, were among the favoured. But among a hundred senators, more than eighty of whom were still to be provided for, fifteen gratified did not form a sufficient majority. However, those who had failed in their pursuit of senatorial appanages had other positions in view, and as yet there was no cause to despair. But in the meantime some ill-humour discovered itself in the language held. The *Moniteur* was daily filled with nominations of chamberlains, equeries, ladies of honour, and ladies in waiting. If the personal greatness of the Emperor caused every thing that he did to be forgiven, it was not the same with those who rose in his *suite*. The eager activity of those republicans, impatient to become courtiers, of those royalists in haste to serve him whom they had called a usurper, presented a strange spectacle; and if we add to the natural effect of that spectacle, the hopes disappointed or deferred, which were avenged in evil speaking, we shall easily comprehend that they must have criticised, satirised, sneered—in a word, gossiped immensely. But the masses, delighted with a government as

glorious as it was benignant, struck with so unheard of a scene, of which they perceived the whole, but not the details, the result but not the process, neither knowing nor envying those fortunates of a day, who had succeeded in making their children pages, their wives ladies of honour, and themselves prefects of the palace, or chamberlains, the masses were attentive, and seized with a surprise, which ended by changing itself into admiration. Napoleon, from a sub-lieutenant of artillery, become Emperor, accepted and welcomed by all Europe, and borne upon the buckler to the throne amidst a profound calm, covered with the splendour of his fortune the littlenesses that were mingled with this prodigious event. There was not experienced, it is true, that sentiment of eagerness which, in 1799, had led the alarmed nation to rush towards a saviour; there was no longer experienced that sentiment of gratitude which, in 1802, led the delighted nation to decree to its benefactor a perpetuity of power; in a word, men were less eager to pay with gratitude a man who paid himself so largely with his own hands. But men judged him worthy of the hereditary sovereignty; they admired him for having dared to take it, they approved of its being re-established, because it was a more complete return to order; in a word, they were dazzled by the marvel which they looked upon. Accordingly, although with sentiments somewhat different from those which filled their breasts in 1799 and in 1802, the citizens eagerly flocked to all the places at which registers were opened, to record their votes. The affirmative suffrages were counted by millions, and scarcely were the few negative suffrages, placed there in proof of the liberty enjoyed, perceptible amidst the immense multitude of favourable votes.

Napoleon had but one last annoyance to encounter previous to being in full possession of his new title. It was necessary to finish the proceedings against Georges and Moreau, which had in the first instance been engaged in with an extreme confidence. As to Georges and his accomplices, and even as to Pichegru himself, had he lived, the difficulty was not great. The trial was sure to cover them with confusion, and prove the participation of the emigrant princes in their plots. But Moreau was included in the cause. It had been expected, at the commencement, to find more proofs than did in reality exist against him, and although his error was evident to men of good faith, yet the evil-minded were not without the means of disputing it. Moreover, there existed an involuntary sentiment of pity, at the aspect of this contrast between the two greatest generals of the Republic; one mounting the throne, the other in a dungeon, and destined, not to the scaffold, but to exile. All considerations, even of justice, are set aside on such occasions, and men more willingly pronounce the fortunate party in the wrong, even when he is in the right.

Those who were accused with Moreau, by the advice of

their defenders, had agreed together to exculpate him altogether. They were greatly irritated against him at the outset of the procedure ; but, interest overcoming passion, they had promised to save him, if possible. In the first place, it was the greatest moral check to give to Napoleon to set his rival free from prison, victorious against the accusation made against him, clad in the colours of innocence, aggrandized by persecution, and henceforth an implacable enemy. Moreover, if Moreau had not conspired, it could be maintained that there had been no conspiracy, if no conspiracy no crime, if no crime no criminals.

The bar, always partial towards the accused, the commonalty of Paris, always independent in its judgment, and willingly opposing when great events did not connect it with power, were impassioned on behalf of Moreau, and expressed their wishes in his favour. Even those who, without any ill will towards Napoleon, saw in Moreau only an illustrious and unfortunate warrior, whose services might still be useful, wished that he might come forth innocent from this ordeal, and be restored to the army and to France.

The trial opened on the 28th of May (8th Prairial, year XII.), before a crowded auditory. The accused were numerous, and were ranged on four rows of seats. The bearing of all was not alike. Georges and his band displayed an affected assurance: they felt at their ease, for after all they could call themselves devoted victims of their cause. However, the arrogance of some of them gained them no public favour. Georges, although exalted in the eyes of the crowd by the energy of his character, provoked some cries of indignation. But the unfortunate Moreau, overwhelmed by his very glory, deploring at that moment the celebrity which drew upon him the eager gaze of the multitude, was deprived of calm assurance, which formed his principal merit in the battle field. He evidently asked himself what he had to do among those royalists, he who was one of the heroes of the Revolution ; and, if he did himself justice, he could make but one reply, that he had merited his fate by having yielded to the deplorable vice of jealousy. Among those numerous accused, the public looked only for him. Some applauses, even, were heard from old soldiers hidden in the crowd, and despairing revolutionists, who imagined that they saw the Revolution itself seated upon that bench where the general-in-chief of the army of the Rhine was seated. That curiosity, those homages, embarrassed Moreau. While the others pronounced with emphasis their names, obscure, or sadly celebrated, he pronounced his glorious name in so low a tone that he was scarcely audible. Just punishment for having tarnished a splendid reputation !

The trial was tedious. The system of defence which it had been determined to adopt was exactly followed. Georges and Messrs.

de Polignac and de Rivière had only come to Paris because it had been represented to them that the new government had become wholly unpopular, and the public mind completely favourable to the Bourbons. They did not conceal their attachment to the cause of the legitimate princes, or their inclination to co-operate in a movement, if a movement had been possible; but, added they, Moreau, whom intriguers had represented as quite ready to receive the Bourbons, had no thought of doing so, and refused to listen to any of their proposals. From that time they had not even dreamed of conspiring. Georges, interrogated upon the grounds of the project, and confronted with his first declarations, in which he had avowed having come for the purpose of attacking the First Consul on the Malmaison road, with a French prince by his side, Georges, in confusion, replied, that would have been thought of afterwards, if an insurrectionary movement had appeared opportune, but that nothing being possible at the moment they had not even occupied themselves about a plan of attack. His attention was directed to the daggers, the uniforms intended for his Chouans, and those Chouans themselves seated beside him on the bench of the accused: he was not precisely disconcerted, but he then became silent, seeming to avow by his silence that the system invented for his co-accused and for Moreau was neither plausible nor dignified.

There was but one point upon which they all remained in conformity with their first declarations; the presence of a French prince in the midst of them. They felt, in fact, that, in order not to be classed among assassins it was necessary to be able to say that a prince was at their head. Little mattered it to them that they compromised the royal dignity; a Bourbon gave them the appearance of soldiers fighting for the legitimate dynasty. However, when these imprudent Bourbons saved their lives at London without troubling themselves about their unfortunate victims, those victims might well endeavour to save at Paris, if not their lives at least their honour.

As for Moreau, his system was more specious, for he had never varied. That system he had already exposed to the First Consul in a letter which was unfortunately written too late, a long time after the fruitless interrogatories of the grand juge, and when the government, engaged in the procedure, could not recede without seeming to be afraid of public debate. He admitted having seen Pichegru, but with a view to being reconciled with him, and procuring him the means of returning to France. After the civil troubles were appeased he had deemed that the conqueror of Holland was worth the pains of being restored to the Republic. He had not chosen to see him openly, nor directly to solicit his recall, owing to his own quarrel with the First Consul. The mystery of his proceedings had no other motive. It is true that advantage was taken of this

opportunity to speak to him about projects against the government, but he had repulsed them as absurdities. He had not denounced them because he believed them to be without danger, and moreover, because the occupation of an informer did not become a man like him.

This system, specious enough, if irrefragable evidence had not rendered it inadmissible, gave rise to very animated debates, in which Moreau displayed almost as true a presence of mind as was his wont when the fight was at the fiercest. He even made some noble replies, which were rapturously applauded by the auditory. "Pichegru," said the president to Moreau, "was a traitor, and was even denounced by you to the Directory. How, then, could you think of being reconciled with him, and of restoring him to France?" "At a time," replied Moreau, "at a time when the soldiers of Condé swarmed in the saloons of Paris, and of the First Consul, I might very well interest myself in restoring to France the conqueror of Holland." On this point he was asked, why, under the directory, he was so tardy in denouncing Pichegru, and some suspicion seemed to be raised even as to his past life. "I cut short," replied he, "the interviews of Pichegru and the prince of Condé in putting, by the victories of my army, eighty leagues of ground between that prince and the Rhine. The danger being past, I left to the Council of War the care of examining the papers that had been found, and of sending them to the government if it deemed it expedient to do so."

Moreau being questioned as to the nature of the plot to which it had been proposed to him to associate himself, persisted in affirming that he had repulsed it.

"Yes," it was replied, "you repulsed the proposal to replace the Bourbons upon the throne, but you consented to make use of Pichegru and of Georges to overthrow the Consular government, and you did so in the hope of receiving the dictatorship from their hands."

"That," replied Moreau, "is a ridiculous project to attribute to me, that of making use of the royalists in order to make myself dictator, and of supposing that if they were victorious, they would entrust the power to me. For ten years I made war, and I am not aware that in all those ten years I was guilty of absurdities."

That noble retort upon his past life was drowned with applause. But all the witnesses were not in the secret of the royalists; all were not prepared to give the lie to their first depositions, and there remained an individual named Roland, formerly in the army, who with grief, but with a persistence that nothing could shake, repeated what he had advanced from the first day. He said, that being the medium of communication between Pichegru and Moreau, the latter had directed him to declare that he would not have the Bourbons, but that if the

consuls were disposed of, he would use the power which would inevitably be conferred upon him to serve the conspirators, and to restore Pichegru to honours. Others still confirmed the evidence of Roland. Bouvet de Lozier, that officer of Georges who had escaped from suicide to hurl a terrible accusation against Moreau, could not retract it, but repeated it, though with some attempt at weakening it. In that accusation, made in writing, he had stated only the things that he had been told by Georges himself. The latter replied, that Bouvet had imperfectly heard, ill understood, and, consequently, made an incorrect report. But there remained that night interview near the Madeleine, in which Moreau, Pichegru, and Georges were all together, a circumstance irreconcilable with a simple project of restoring Pichegru to France. Why should he give a night meeting to the chief of the conspirators, a man whom no one, except a royalist, could innocently meet? Here the depositions were so precise, so consistent, and so numerous, that, with the best possible will to do it, the royalists could not contradict what they had formerly said, and when they attempted to do so, they were straightway confounded.

Moreau this time was overwhelmed, and the sympathy of the auditory at length became evidently diminished. However, the clumsy reproaches of the president somewhat awakened that sympathy just as it was becoming extinct. "You are, at least, guilty of concealment," said the president to Moreau; "and although you pretend that such a man as yourself could not become an informer, your first duty was to obey the law, which enjoins every citizen, whatsoever or whomsoever he may be, to denounce the plots of which he may have cognisance. You still further owed that to a government which has heaped benefits upon you. Have you not large salaries, a mansion, an estate?"

The reproach was an unworthy one to address to one of the most disinterested generals of the time. "Monsieur le President," replied Moreau, "do not weigh my services against my fortune; there is no possible comparison between such things. My pay amounts to forty thousand francs, I have a house, and an estate worth (to the best of my belief) three or four hundred thousand francs. I should be possessed of fifty millions if I had used victory as so many others have." Radstadt, Biberach, Engen, Mæsskirch, Hohenlinden, those glorious souvenirs, weighed against some paltry money, aroused the auditory, and called forth those applauses which the improbability of the defence had begun to render unfrequent.

The trial had lasted for twelve days, and the public excitement was very great. In our own time we have often seen a trial entirely absorb the attention of the public. The same thing now occurred, but under circumstances calculated to produce an emotion quite independent of curiosity. Opposed to a triumph-

ant and crowned general, another general in misfortune and in bondage, offering, by his defence, the last possible resistance to a power that was every day becoming more absolute; amidst the silence of the national assemblies, the voice of the bar resounding as in the most free land; illustrious heads in peril, some of them belonging to the emigration, others to the Republic; here, assuredly, were circumstances to stir men's hearts. People yielded to a just pity, perhaps also to that secret sentiment which wishes for checks to fortunate power; and even those who were not inimical to the government put up their wishes for Moreau. Napoleon, who felt himself exempt from that base jealousy of which he was accused, and who well knew that Moreau, without favouring the Bourbons, had wished for his death, that he might seize his position, believed and openly said that the condemnation of a general guilty of a state crime was due to him, Napoleon. He desired that condemnation as his own justification; he desired it, not to bring to the block the head of the victor of Hohenlinden, but to have the honour of pardoning him. The judges knew this, and the people also.

But the law, which enters not into political considerations, and which is right in not entering into them, since if policy is sometimes humane and wise, it sometimes is also cruel and imprudent, the law amidst that conflict of passions, the last which was to disturb the profound repose of the Empire, remained unmoved, and decided with equity.

The 21st Prairial (10th of June), after a trial of fourteen days, while the court had retired to deliberate, certain of the accused royalists perceiving that they had been deceived, and that their efforts to exculpate Moreau had been of no service to them, asked for the juge-instructeur, that they might at length make more explicit, declarations to him. They now no more spoke of three interviews with Moreau, but of five, and M. Réal being made aware of this hastened to the Emperor, who instantly wrote to the arch-chancellor Cambacérès to find some means of communicating with the judges. But that was difficult, and would have been useless, and without having received any new communications, they, on the same day, the 10th of June, gave a decision which no influence had dictated. They pronounced sentence of death upon Georges and nineteen of his accomplices. As for Moreau, finding his physical complicity insufficiently made out, but his moral conduct reprehensible, they inflicted disgrace upon him by sentencing him to two years' imprisonment. M. Armand de Polignac and M. de Rivière were condemned to death. M. Jules de Polignac and five others of the accused to two years' imprisonment. Twenty-two were acquitted.

This decision, approved of by all impartial men, gave deadly offence to the new Emperor, who flew into a violent passion at the weakness of that justice which others were accusing of bar-

barity. He even broke through that restraint which power should habitually impose upon itself, and especially in so grave a matter. In the state of exasperation into which he was thrown by the unjust reports of his enemies, it was difficult to obtain any acts of clemency from him. But he was so prompt in calming himself, and so clear-sighted, that access was very soon reopened to his reason and to his heart. In the few days employed in appealing to the Court of Cassation, he took proper resolutions, remitted Moreau's two years' imprisonment, as he would have remitted him the capital punishment, had it been awarded, and consented to his departure for America.

That unfortunate general wishing to sell his property, Napoleon gave orders for it to be immediately purchased at the highest price. As for the condemned royalists, always severe towards them since the last conspiracy, he at first would grant no mercy to any of them. Georges alone, by the energy of his courage, inspired him with some interest, but he looked upon him as an implacable enemy, whom it was necessary to destroy in order to secure public tranquillity. However, it was not for Georges that the emigrant party was anxious. It was greatly so for Messrs. de Polignac and de Rivière; it blamed the imprudence which had placed these personages of exalted rank and superior education in a society so unworthy of them; but it could not resign itself to see their heads fall; and it is true that the enthusiasm of party, rightly appreciated, might render their fault excusable, and themselves worthy the indulgence even of the head of the Empire.

The beneficence of Josephine was proverbial: it was known that, though lapped in unheard of grandeur, she had preserved a truly affecting benignity and kindness of heart. It was also known that she lived in continual terror of the daggers that were constantly raised against her husband. An introduction to her was obtained by means of Madame de Rémusat, who was in personal attendance upon her, and Madame de Polignac was conducted to her at St. Cloud, to bathe the imperial robe with her tears. She was affected, as with so impressionable a heart she could not fail to be, at the sight of a wife in tears nobly soliciting the life of her husband. She hastened to make a first attempt with Napoleon. He, according to his custom, concealing his emotion beneath a harsh and stern countenance, roughly repulsed her. Madame de Rémusat was present.

“You still interest yourselves for my enemies,” said he to them both; “they are all of them as imprudent as they are guilty. If I do not give them a lesson they will begin again, and will be the cause of there being new victims.”

Josephine being thus repulsed, knew not to what other means to have recourse. Napoleon would in a few moments leave the Council Chamber and pass along one of the galleries of the château. She determined to place Madame de Polignac in his way;

that she might throw herself at his feet as he appeared. And, in fact, at the moment when he was passing, Madame de Polignac presented herself to him, and, with tears, begged the life of her husband. Napoleon, surprised, darted a stern glance on Josephine, whose complicity he readily guessed. But subdued in the instant, he replied to Madame de Polignac, that he was surprised at finding in a plot against his person, M. Armand de Polignac, the companion of his boyhood at the military school; that, however, he would grant his pardon to the tears of a wife; and that he only trusted this weakness on his part might not have evil effects in encouraging fresh acts of imprudence. "They are deeply culpable, madame," added he, "those princes who thus compromise the lives of their most faithful servants, without partaking their perils."

Madame de Polignac, transported with joy and gratitude, flew to recount amidst her alarmed emigrant friends this scene of clemency, which procured a moment of justice to Napoleon and Josephine. The life of M. de Rivière was still in peril. Murat and his wife sought access to Napoleon, moved him to compassion, and wrung from him a second act of mercy. The pardon of M. de Polignac involved that of M. de Rivière. It was immediately granted. For the magnanimous Murat, eleven years afterwards, there were no such generous intercessors.

Such was the termination of that sad, detestable, but blundering scheme, which had for its object the annihilation of Napoleon, but resulted in elevating him to the throne; which procured a tragical death to a French prince, who had not conspired, and impunity to those who had, although certainly with signal disgrace as the chastisement of their faults; and, finally, exile to Moreau, the only general of that period, in whom, by exaggerating his glory and lowering that of Napoleon, a rival could be found for the latter. A striking lesson by which parties should profit! To employ criminal means against government, party, or man, is ever to aggrandise and not to destroy.

Thenceforth all resistance was vanquished. In 1802, Napoleon had surmounted civil resistance, by annulling the Tribunal; in 1804, he surmounted military resistance by baffling the conspiracy of the emigrants with the republican generals. While he ascended the steps of the throne, Moreau retired into exile. They were destined once more to catch a glimpse of each other within cannon-shot, under the walls of Dresden, both of them guilty, the one in returning from a foreign land to make war upon his native country; the other, in abusing his power so far as to provoke a universal reaction against France: there the one was to be laid low by a French bullet; the other to gain a last victory while tottering on the verge of that abyss which has swallowed up his prodigious destiny.

However, those great events were still distant. Napoleon seemed then all-powerful and for ever. Doubtless, he had recently felt some sorrows ; for, independently of great calamities, Providence ever alloys the joys of prosperity with some anticipative bitterness, as if to warn the human soul, and prepare it for startling misfortunes. That fortnight had been trying to him, but it was soon past. The clemency he had shown, threw a mild radiance upon his incipient reign. The death of Georges saddened no one, although his courage, worthy of a better fate, inspired some regret. Soon all were absorbed by that wondering curiosity attendant on an extraordinary spectacle.

Thus expired after twelve years duration, not the French Revolution, still vigorous and indestructible, but that Republic which had been styled imperishable. It expired beneath the hand of a victorious soldier, as all republics do, save those which slumber in the arms of oligarchy.

BOOK XX.

THE CORONATION.

Delay of the Descent on England—Causes and Advantages of that Delay—Redoubled Care in the Preparations—Financial Measures—Budgets for the Years XI., XII., and XIII.—Creation of indirect Taxes—Old Theory of a Tax solely on Land—Napoleon refutes that Theory, and causes the Adoption of a Tax upon Articles of Consumption—Original Organisation of the Administration of consolidated Taxes—Spain pays its Subsidy in Bills at long Dates—An Association of Capitalists offers to discount them—First Operations of the Company called *The Associated Merchants*—All the disposable Resources devoted to the Squadrons of Brest, Rochefort, and Toulon—Napoleon plans the Arrival of a French Fleet in the Channel in order to render the Passage of the Flotilla secure—First Combination on which he determines—Admiral Latouche-Tréville intrusted with the Execution of that Combination—That Admiral was to run out of Toulon, deceive the English by changing his Course, and make his Way to the Channel, after being joined by the Rochefort Squadron on the Passage—The Descent projected for July or August, previous to the Coronation—The Ministers of the Courts at Peace with France present their Credentials to Napoleon—The Austrian Ambassador alone delays to do so—Departure of Napoleon for Boulogne—General Inspection of the Flotilla Vessel by Vessel—The Dutch Flotilla—Imposing Ceremony on the Sea-Coast, and Distribution of Decorations of the Legion of Honour—Course of Events in England—Extreme public Agitation—Overthrow of the Addington Administration, by the Coalition of Fox and Pitt—Return of Mr. Pitt to the Ministry, and his first Measures for renewing a Coalition upon the Continent—Suspicious of Napoleon—He compels Austria to explain herself, by insisting that the Credentials of M. de Cobentzel should be delivered to him at Aix-la-Chapelle—He breaks off Diplomatic Relations with Russia, by allowing M. d'Oubril to depart—Death of Admiral Latouche-Tréville, and Postponement of the Descent till the Winter—Admiral Latouche-Tréville replaced by Admiral Villeneuve—Character of the latter—Progress of Napoleon on the Banks of the Rhine—Great Concourse at Aix-la-Chapelle—M. de Cobentzel there presents his Credentials to Napoleon—The Imperial Court repairs to Mayence—Return to Paris—Preparations for the Coronation—Difficult Negotiation to induce Pius VII. to proceed to Paris and crown Napoleon—The Cardinal Fesch despatched as Ambassador—Character and Conduct of that Personage—The Terror of Pius VII. at the Idea of going to France—He consults a Consistory of Cardinals—Five are against his going, and fifteen for it, but conditionally—Long Debate upon the Conditions—Final Consent—The Question of the Ceremonial left undecided—The Bishop Bernier and the Arch-chancellor Cambacérès, select from the Roman Ritual and from the French Ritual, the Ceremonies compatible with the Spirit of the Age—Napoleon refuses to allow the Crown to be placed on his Head—Pretensions of the Family—Departure of the Pope for France—His Arrival at Fontainebleau—His Joy and Confidence on witnessing the Reception which befalls him—Ecclesiastical Marriage of Josephine and Napoleon—Ceremony of the Coronation.

BOOK XX.

THE CORONATION.

THE conspiracy of Georges, the proceedings that resulted from it, and the change that it brought about in the form of government, occupied the whole winter of 1803-4, and postponed the grand enterprize of Napoleon against England. But it had not ceased to occupy his mind, and he now with redoubled care and activity, prepared for its execution, about the middle of the summer of 1804. In truth, this delay was by no means to be regretted, for in his impatience to achieve this vast design, Napoleon had greatly exaggerated the possibility of being ready at the close of 1803. The continual experiments daily discovered new precautions to be adopted, and new improvements to be introduced, and it was but of little consequence to strike six months later, if the postponement gave the means of striking a surer blow. It was not the army, be it distinctly understood, that caused this loss of time, for at that epoch the army was always ready for action; it was the flotilla and the naval squadrons. The construction of flat-bottomed boats, and their assemblage in the four channel ports, was all that had been effected. But the Batavian (Dutch) flotilla had not arrived: the Brest and Toulon squadrons, the aid of which was deemed indispensable, were not ready, eight months not having sufficed for their completion. The winter of 1803 had been devoted to completing them. Thus the time apparently lost, had been most profitably employed. Above all, the delay had permitted the adoption of financial arrangements, which are always closely connected with military measures, and were more so now than ever. If, in exposing oneself to great inconveniences, one can succeed in carrying on war on land with but little money, by quartering upon the enemy, maritime warfare is not to be carried on without money, for on the immense solitude of ocean nothing is to be had but what we take with us on leaving our own ports. The financial measures, then, were not the least important part of the immense preparations of Napoleon, and they deserve our attention for a moment.

We have related with what resources the struggle had been commenced after the rupture of the peace of Amiens. The

budget of the year XI. (1803) voted with a still uncertain foresight of events, had been fixed at 589 million francs (23,560,000*l.* sterling) (exclusive of the charges of collection), that is to say, at 89 million francs above the budget of the preceding year, which had been squared with 500 million francs. But the expenditure had naturally exceeded the amount sanctioned by the Legislative Body; it had exceeded it by 30 million francs, and had reached 619 million francs. Certainly the excess was not great, when we reflect upon the preparations of an expedition like that of Boulogne. This moderation in the increase of the budget is explained by the epoch which separated the financial years. The financial year XI. finished at the 21st of September, 1803, and the same day commenced the financial year XII. Accordingly, the principal expenses of the flotilla could not be included in the budget of the year XI. It was thus that they had been able to limit the amount to 619 million francs, which, with the charges of collection, amounted to about 710 million or 720 million francs. The budget of the year XII. would necessarily be much higher, for it would have to cover all the items which that of the year XI. had left unpaid. This last had been provided for with the ordinary contributions, the produce of which, notwithstanding the war, continued greatly to increase, so great was the security under the wise and vigorous government which then ruled France. The stamp and register duties had increased by 10 million francs, the customs by 6 million or 7 million francs; and notwithstanding an alleviation of 10 million francs in the land tax, the ordinary imposts had risen to 573 million francs. The balance had been found in the 22 million francs of the Italian subsidy, and 24 million francs borrowed from the extraordinary resources, which, as we have said, consisted of the Spanish subsidy, fixed at 4 million francs per month, and of the price of Louisiana, ceded to the United States. These resources, scarcely touched, remained almost entire for the year XII., which was a fortunate circumstance, for all the expenses of the war were about to press at once upon that financial year (September, 1803, to September, 1804). The expenditure of the year XII. could not be estimated at less than 700 million instead of 619 million francs; making, with the costs of collection, and some supplemental per centages not included in the estimates, a total of 800 million francs. Moreover, in that amount, the new civil list was not included. It will be seen that the budgets were rapidly progressing towards the figure which they have since reached.

It was necessary to be prepared for a slight falling off in the revenue of the domains, in consequence of the alienations of the national property, and of the landed endowments conferred on the Senate, the Legion of Honour, and the Sinking Fund. The ordinary contributions would but little exceed 560 million

francs, unless through increased production, which was probable enough, but, from a scrupulous regard to accuracy, this was not relied on. There was required, then, no less a sum than 140 million francs of extraordinary means to provide for the 700 million francs, the supposed amount of expenditure, exclusive of the charges of collection and some supplemental per centages. Italy contributed 22 million francs for the three states in which our army did protective duty. The 48 million francs of the Spanish subsidy, the 60 million francs of the American subsidy, reduced to 52 million francs by bankers' charges, made the extraordinary receipts amount in all to 122 million francs. There consequently remained 20 million francs still to be found. The funds deposited as securities by public officers, were, as on former occasions, to supply this amount. Securities in money had already been required from the receivers-general, paymasters, receivers of the registry dues, customs, &c. These sums had been paid into the Sinking Fund, which placed the same to the credit of the depositors. The Sinking Fund, in its turn, had handed over the sums to government, which had undertaken to refund them at the rate of 5 million francs per annum. It was a sort of borrowing from the officers of the revenue, perfectly legitimate, since the state was entitled to some security from these persons for their fidelity and good management. This system of securities was susceptible of extension, because there were still revenue officials who had not as yet been subjected to the common rule. In fact, there existed a second category of receivers of the public revenue, whose position required regulating: these were the receivers of the direct taxes. Hitherto, in the country and in the towns, instead of collectors appointed by the state for collecting the direct taxes, the collection was intrusted to the contractor bidding lowest. This system had been changed in the great towns, where receivers had been permanently appointed as public servants, and were allowed by the treasury a commission on the amount of their collections, by way of salary. This new system having answered well, it was proposed, for the year 1804, to establish in all the communes, whether urban or rural, receivers nominated by government, and to require from them securities estimated in the whole at 20 million francs. That sum, handed over to the treasury, was to be refunded by the government by instalments, as had been agreed upon for the previous deposits.

To this resource was added the sale of some national property, to be taken from what remained disposable, since endowments had been provided for the Senate, the Legion of Honour, Public Education, and the Sinking Fund. This afforded a fresh resource of 15 millions for the year XII., over and above the amount deemed to be necessary. This property was made over to the Sinking Fund, which, selling it little by little, procured

from day to day, better prices. It was agreed that the Sinking Fund should retain the proceeds, in order to repay itself the five million francs, which were annually due to it by the government, in reimbursement of the deposits lent for the public service.

Such were the financial means created for the year XII.: 560 million francs of ordinary contributions; 22 million francs of Italian subsidy, 48 million francs of Spanish subsidy, 52 million francs of the price of Louisiana; 20 million francs of moneys lodged as security, besides several millions from national property. The whole exceeded the 700 million francs deemed to be necessary for that financial year, September, 1803, to September, 1804.

But they were at the close of the financial year XII., as it was now the summer of 1804. It was necessary to make arrangements for the year XIII., (September, 1804 to September, 1805), which would not have the benefit of one very considerable item, the American subsidy, which was entirely appropriated to the year XIII. It was indispensably necessary to supply this deficiency without delay.

Napoleon had long been convinced that the Revolution, although it had created great resources, by equalising taxation, had nevertheless dealt too severely with landed property, in throwing upon it alone the burden of public charges, by the suppression of indirect taxes. What the Revolution had done is only too common in disturbed times. At the first outbreak, the populace, especially that of the towns, take advantage of it to refuse to pay the tax imposed upon articles of consumption, and particularly upon liquors, which constitute its chief enjoyment. This was the case in 1830, when the taxes of this sort were refused during more than six months; in 1815, when the deceptive promise of their suppression obtained for the Bourbons a momentary popularity; and in 1789, when the first popular attacks were directed against the barriers. But these imposts, the most detestable to the populace of the towns, are, nevertheless, those which characterise truly prosperous countries, which really bear more upon the rich than upon the poor, and are the least injurious to production; while taxation imposed upon the land deprives agriculture of capital, of cattle, and manure, impoverishes the soil, and thus dries up the most abundant source of wealth. In the eighteenth century a prejudice found favour, which, at the time, it must be confessed, rested on incontestable ground. Landed property, accumulated in the hands of the aristocracy and the clergy, and unequally taxed, according to the rank and quality of its possessor, was an object of aversion to those generous spirits who sought to relieve the poor. It was at that period that they devised the theory of an unique tax, bearing exclusively upon the land, and supplying the entire expenditure of the State. By this means they could suppress the excise and the gabelles, taxes which appeared to press upon the populace alone. But this theory,

generous in intention, false in practice, was to fall before experience. Subsequent to 1789, landed property divided among thousands of hands, and subjected to equal burdens, no longer deserved the animadversion which had formerly been bestowed upon it, and it was necessary, above all, to consider the paramount importance of agriculture. It was to be considered that in burdening it beyond measure, the country population was injured and deprived of the means of cultivation, to the profit of the sellers and consumers of spirituous liquors. It was to be considered that it was absolutely necessary that the revenues should equal the expenditure, as the only safeguard against a recurrence to paper money and bankruptcy, and that to equalise the revenues and the expenditure, it was indispensable to vary the sources of taxation in order not to exhaust them. It well became the man who had restored order in France, who had drawn the finance from chaos by re-establishing a regular collection of the direct taxes, to complete his work by reopening the closed source of the indirect taxes. But, for this it required great authority and great energy. Faithful to his character, Napoleon feared not, the very day on which he sought the throne, to re-establish, under the title of Consolidated Taxes, the most unpopular but the most useful of burdens.

He first proposed it to the Council of State, and he there supported the correct view of the question with a marvellous sagacity, as though finance had been the study of his life. To the theory of the unique tax, imposed exclusively upon the land; exacting from the farmer and the land-owner the total sum necessary for the wants of the State, or at the least, obliging them to advance it even upon the supposition most favourable to them, that of the increased price of agricultural productions compensating them for that advance; to this absurdly exaggerated theory, he opposed the true and simple theory of taxation skilfully diversified, resting at once upon all descriptions of property and industry, demanding from no one of them too considerable a portion of the public revenue, producing, consequently, no compulsory variation of prices, drawing wealth from every channel through which it abundantly flows, and drawing from each in such wise as to exhaust none. This system, the offspring of time and experience, is open only to one objection: that objection is, that the diversity of impost brings with it a diversity of collection, and consequently an augmentation of expenses; but it presents so many advantages, and the opposite system is so violent, that this slight augmentation of expense should not be a serious consideration. When he had caused his views to be adopted by the Council of State, Napoleon sent his project to the Legislative Body, where it was not the object of any serious difficulty, owing to the preliminary conferences between the corresponding sections of the Tribunate and of the

Council of State. The following were the arrangements. An establishment was created, under the title of the Board of Consolidated Taxes. That board was to levy the new taxes by means of revenue officers, as they alone were found to be efficient in seeking out taxable commodities in the places where they were grown or manufactured. These commodities consisted of wines, brandy, beer, cider, &c. A uniform and very moderate duty was laid upon their first sale, according to a tariff formed at the epochs of the harvest of manufacture. The amount of the duty was to be paid at the instant of the first removal. The principal commodity taxed, after beverages, was tobacco. There was already a customs' duty upon foreign manufactured tobacco, and a manufacture duty upon French tobaccos (for a government monopoly had not yet been devised); but the produce of this latter duty was lost to the treasury, in consequence of deficient inspection. The creation of a Board of Consolidated Taxes supplied the means of collecting the whole of this duty, trivial then, but destined to become considerable. Salt was not included in the taxed commodities, from fear of reviving the remembrance of the ancient *gabelles*. Nevertheless, in Piedmont a Board of Salt Tax was established, which was a measure at once of police and of finance. Piedmont, obtaining its salt at Genoa, or at the mouths of the Po, and being frequently exposed to cruelly high prices, by the interested speculations of merchants, had never been able to dispense with the intervention of government. By creating a Board of Salt Tax, charged with purchase and sale, at a moderate price, an end was put to the danger of scarcities and dearness, and at the same time there was secured a ready and certain means of collecting a tax which was tolerably productive in the aggregate, though very moderate with reference to the tariff.

These various combinations could not bring any thing into the exchequer during the year XII., the year of their creation (1803-1804), but they afforded ground for reckoning on 14 or 18 million francs in the year XIII., 30 or 40 million francs in the year XIV., and, for the following years, amounts difficult to estimate, but, nevertheless, presumeably sufficient for all the necessities of a war, even a prolonged one.

By means of these arrangements the expenditure of the year XII. (1803-1804) would be met by the 700 million francs of ordinary and extraordinary receipts, and certain resources were secured for future years. But still, at the commencement of the system some serious practical difficulties were experienced. The two chief existing resources consisted of the price of Louisiana, and the monthly subsidy furnished by Spain. The unavoidable delay occasioned by the vote of the American funds, had prevented the payment of that resource into the treasury. However, the firm of Hope and Co. had agreed to advance a portion of it

towards the end of 1804. As to Spain, upon the 44 million francs (1,760,000*l.*) due in Floréal for the eleven previous months, she had only discharged in sundry payments, about 22 million francs, that is to say, one-half the amount due. The finances of that unfortunate country were more than ever embarrassed, and although the seas were open to her galleons, thanks to the neutrality which France had allowed her, the specie that reached her from America was squandered in idle dissipations.

To supply the place of these deferred payments, recourse was had to paper. The English have exchequer bills, and we now possess *bons royaux* payable at three, six, or nine months, which, negotiated on 'Change, constitute a temporary loan, by the aid of which the State is enabled, during a longer or a shorter period, to anticipate the revenues in course of collection. Notwithstanding that Napoleon had laboured hard and successfully in the re-establishment of the finances, the treasury had not yet sufficiently gained the confidence of the commercial world successfully to issue any paper whatever in its own name. The bills of the receivers-general, bearing the acceptance of responsible parties, and repayable at the office of the Sinking Fund in case of protest, had alone obtained confidence. They were, as we have already said, subscribed at the commencement of the financial year, to the whole amount of the direct taxes, and successively payable from month to month. The latest were at fifteen or eighteen months' date. In order to realise the revenues of the State in advance, these were discounted in sums of 20 or 30 million francs, at the rate of a half per cent. per month (six per cent. per annum) during the short peace of Amiens, and, since the war, at three-quarters per cent. per month (nine per cent. per annum). Notwithstanding the confidence that was felt in the government, that confidence was so little shared by the treasury, that the most eminent banking houses declined this sort of operations. These discount transactions were gone into by adventurous speculators, former contractors to the Directory. M. de Marbois, wishing to emancipate himself from their co-operation, applied to the receivers-general themselves, who, having formed themselves into a committee at Paris, discounted their own paper, either with their own funds or with funds which at a lower interest, they procured from the hands of the capitalists. But these government officers were limited in their speculations, and possessed neither the requisite capital nor the requisite boldness to furnish the treasury with any great assistance. There were at that time in Paris, a banker who was much experienced in this kind of operation, M. Desprez; M. Vanlerberghe, an active contractor, very skilful in the art of provisioning armies; and, lastly, one of the most inventive and ingenious of speculators in enterprizes of every kind, M. Ouvrard, celebrated at that time for his immense fortune. All three had entered individually into

connexion with the government, M. Desprez for the discounting of treasury bills; M. Vanlerberghe, for the supply of provisions; and M. Ouvrard for all grand operations, whether of provisioning or banking. M. Ouvrard formed a co-partnership with Messrs. Desprez and Vanlerberghe, placed himself at the head of that association, and gradually became, as he had been under the Directory, the principal financial agent of the government. He succeeded in gaining the confidence of M. de Marbois, minister of the treasury, who, feeling his own incompetence, was glad to have the aid of an inventive spirit, capable of finding the expedients which he knew not how to find for himself. M. Ouvrard, on behalf of himself and partners, offered to undertake the discounting of the treasury bills. He entered into a first contract in Germinal, year XII. (April, 1804), by which he undertook to discount not only a considerable amount of the bills of the receivers-general, but even of the subsidy of Spain who, being unable to pay her subsidy in cash, paid it in bills at long dates. M. Ouvrard made no difficulty about taking these bills for money, and paying over the amount. M. Vanlerberghe and he had claims on the State for heavy sums on account of former contracts. They were now authorised, in discounting the bills of the receivers-general and of Spain, to reckon part of the sums due to them as so much cash. Thus in the very act of discounting, they paid themselves with their own hands. Under the firm of *Associated Merchants*, then, this association began to possess itself of the business of the State. Its origin is worthy of attention, for it soon took part in immense operations, and played a very considerable part in the financial world. To render the operation it had undertaken with the treasury good, and even excellent, it was only requisite that Spain should fulfil her engagements, for the bills of the receivers-general, composing part of the security, were in the highest degree safe. These bills had only the inconvenience of being long dated, as the treasury employed in its payments those of two or three months' date, and discounted those which were at six, twelve, and fifteen months. But excepting the length of time that they had to run, they were unexceptionably good. As for the bills signed by Spain, their value depended upon the conduct of a sadly imbecile court, and on the arrival of the galleons from America. On this basis M. Ouvrard constructed vast schemes, succeeded in dazzling the credulous mind of M. de Marbois, and set out for Madrid, in order to realise his bold conceptions. Napoleon looked with suspicion upon this fecund but rash spirit and had warned M. de Marbois also to be on his guard. But M. Ouvrard discounted through M. Desprez the treasury bills, and he himself discounted those of Spain, and provisioned the army through M. Vanlerberghe. Thanks to him all necessities were provided for at once, and the evil, if any existed, did not seem

likely to extend far, since, after all, M. Ouvrard seemed always in advance to the treasury, and never the treasury to him.

Such were the means employed immediately to provide for all the expenses of the war, without having recourse to loans. The speculators were required to anticipate, by means of discounts, the receipt of the state revenues, and that of 122 million francs, furnished by the allied countries, Italy, America, and Spain. As regarded the future, the long announced creation of indirect taxes, at length decreed this year, would completely provide for it.

Napoleon had resolved very speedily to execute his grand enterprize. He wished to cross the Straits towards the month of July or August, 1804; and if the incredulous who have questioned the reality of his project, could read his private correspondence with the minister of marine, the infinite number of his orders, and the secret communication of his hopes to the arch-chancellor Cambacères, they would no longer entertain any doubt as to the reality of that extraordinary resolution. All the vessels composing the flotilla were assembled at Étapes, Boulogne, Vimereux, and Ambleteuse, always excepting those which had been built between Brest and Bayonne, for the sort of craft intended for the assemblage could never have doubled Ushant. But nearly the whole being built between Brest and the mouths of the Scheldt, no considerable number were absent. There were sufficient to convey the hundred and twenty thousand men intended to pass over in the gun-boats. The remainder, as will be remembered, were always intended to embark in the fleets of Brest and the Texel.

The Dutch flotilla, built and assembled in the Scheldt, was behindhand. Napoleon had given the command of it to admiral Verhuell, who possessed his high esteem, and deserved it. The Dutch, but little zealous, and, especially, having but little confidence in this singular project, far too bold for their cold and methodical spirit, threw but little ardour into their co-operation. Nevertheless, the zeal of the admiral, and the urgings of our minister at the Hague, M. de Sémonville, had accelerated the armament for which Holland had engaged. A fleet of seven ships of the line, attended by numerous merchantmen, was ready to transport the twenty-four thousand men of the camp of Utrecht, commanded by general Marmont. At the same time, a flotilla, consisting of some hundreds of gun-boats and large fishing-boats, had completed its formation in the Scheldt. It remained to leave those moorings and clear the mouth of the Scheldt, which was far more accessible to the enemy than the coasts of France. Admiral Verhuell, personally commanding his detachments, had fought some brilliant battles between the Scheldt and Ostend. Notwithstanding the loss of some boats, five or six at the most, he had baffled all the efforts of the En-

glish, and converted the incredulity of the Dutch sailors into confidence. The Dutch flotilla succeeded, in the spring of 1804, in assembling at Ostend, Dunkirk, and Calais, and held itself in readiness to embark the corps of marshal Davoust, encamped at Bruges. Napoleon would have wished for more; he would have wished that the two flotillas, Dutch and French, united into one, in the ports lying to the westward of Cape Grisnez—that is to say, at Ambleteuse, Vimereux, Boulogne, and Etaples, should have all had the same wind for departure. An effort was made to gratify his wish, by concentrating the encampments of the troops and the stations of the flotillas.

The works of the armament along the coast of Boulogne were finished, the forts constructed, and the basins dug. The troops having completed their task, had now returned to their military exercises. They had acquired a truly admirable discipline and precision of movement; and they presented an army not only inured to war by numerous campaigns, and hardened by rude labours, but as perfect in manœuvres as though they had spent whole years upon the parade ground. That army, perhaps the finest that prince or general ever commanded, impatiently expected the arrival of its chieftain, newly raised to the throne. It burned to congratulate him, and to follow him to the theatre of a new and prodigious glory.

Napoleon was no less impatient to join it. But an important question had arisen among the professional men, as to whether the gun-boats composing the flotilla, *nutshells*, as they were called, could brave the English fleet. Admiral Bruix, and admiral Verhuell had the utmost confidence in those boats. Both of them had exchanged cannon shots with the English frigates, had gone out of port in all weathers, and had acquired the conviction that these light craft were sufficient for clearing the Strait. Admiral Decrès, inclined to contradict every one, and especially inclined to contradict admiral Bruix, thought the reverse. Those of our marine officers who were not employed on the flotilla, whether from prejudice, or from the ordinary inclination to criticise what we have no part in doing, inclined to the opinion of the minister Decrès. Admiral Ganteaume, transferred from Toulon to Brest, had witnessed an accident which we have mentioned above, and which had caused him much anxiety for the fate of the army and of the Emperor, to whom he was sincerely devoted. The sight of a gun-boat, capsized before his eyes in Brest roadstead, almost keel upwards, had filled him with anxiety, and he had instantly written upon the subject to the minister of marine. That accident, as we have said, was of no importance. The boat had been unskilfully ballasted, the artillery had been ill-arranged, the men were not sufficiently practised, and the ill-distributed weight, added to the confusion of the crew, had led to the shipwreck.

It was not want of stability that admiral Decrès apprehended. The flotilla of Boulogne, manœuvring for two years in the heaviest squalls, had done away with all uncertainty on that head. But he addressed the following objections to the Emperor and to admiral Bruix.*

“Undoubtedly,” said he, “a twenty-four pound shot has the same force, whether discharged from a gun-boat or from a ship of the line. It causes the same damage, often even more, when discharged from a slight vessel, which it is difficult to hit, and whose horizontal fire takes effect between wind and water. Add to this the musketry, destructive at a short distance, and the facility for boarding, and the value of the gun-boats cannot be doubted. They carry above three thousand guns of large calibre, that is to say, as many as a fleet of from thirty to thirty-five sail of the line, a fleet which it is not often easy to assemble. But where have these boats been seen to measure themselves with the large vessels of the English? In but one situation, that is to say, close in shore, in shallows, amidst which those large craft dared not trust themselves, to follow an enemy which, numerous though individually weak, was prepared to riddle them with balls. It is similar to an army enclosed in a defile, and assailed, from the summit of inaccessible positions, by a cloud of adroit and intrepid sharpshooters. But,” continued admiral Decrès, “suppose those gun-boats in mid channel, out of reach of shoals and sand-banks, and in presence of ships no longer afraid to bear down upon them; suppose, still further, a stiff breeze, which would render manœuvring easy to the ships and difficult to your gun-boats, would not these latter be in danger of being sunk in great numbers by the giants with which they would be obliged to contend?”

“Perhaps,” replied admiral Bruix, “we might lose a hundred boats out of two thousand; but nineteen hundred would pass over, and they would suffice for the ruin of England.” “Yes,” rejoined admiral Decrès, “supposing the disaster of the hundred boats not to strike a panic into the crews of the other

* The private correspondence of M. Decrès with the Emperor, so private that M. Decrès wrote the whole of it with his own hand, is extant, in the private archives of the Louvre; it is one of the finest productions of that time, after the correspondence of the Emperor. It does equal honour to the patriotism of the minister, to his sound sense, and to the piquant originality of his mind. It contains very precious views upon the organisation of the marine of France: it should be unceasingly studied by seamen, and all connected with the administration of the navy. It is in that correspondence that I have been able to study that profound conception of the Emperor, and to acquire a new proof of his extraordinary foresight, and the certainty of the sincerity of his projects. One of these letters contains admiral Decrès' opinion of the flotilla, an opinion which at that time was rather suspected than known, for Napoleon ordered every one to observe silence alike upon the strong and upon the weak side of his plans. Operations were not then, as they since have been, decried by the indiscretion of the very agents entrusted with their execution.

nineteen hundred; supposing the number of the nineteen hundred should not prove an inevitable cause of confusion, and supposing the officers to preserve their coolness, for hesitation or alarm would be inevitably followed by a general catastrophe."

Attention had also been bestowed upon the hypothesis of a summer's calm, or a winter's fog, two equally propitious opportunities, for in a calm the English ships could not bear down upon our boats, in a fog they would be unable to see them, and in both cases their redoubtable encounter would be avoided. But these circumstances, though occurring twice or thrice in every season, would not afford sufficient security. Two tides, that is to say, the space of four-and-twenty hours would be required to get out the whole flotilla, ten or twelve hours to cross over, and, allowing for the always inevitable loss of time, about forty-eight hours in the whole. Was it not to be apprehended that in this interval of two days, a sudden change in the atmosphere might surprise the flotilla in full operation?

The objections of the minister Decrès, then, were very serious. Napoleon drew his answers from his character, his confidence in fortune, and the remembrance of the St. Bernard and of Italy. He said, that his most brilliant operations were accomplished in spite of obstacles as great; and that while it was necessary to leave to chance as little as possible, something must be left to it. However, while refuting the objections, he knew how to appreciate them, and this man who by dint of tempting fortune, at length forfeited her protection, this man knew how to spare himself a peril in order to add a chance of success to his plans. Rash in conception, he always evinced consummate prudence in execution. It was in order to meet these objections that he incessantly reflected upon the plan of bringing, by an unexpected manœuvre, a grand fleet into the Channel. If this fleet, only for three days superior to the English force in the Downs, should cover the passage of the flotilla, all obstacles would be at an end. Admiral Decrès confessed that, supposing that case, he had not another objection to raise, and that the vanquished ocean would deliver Great Britain up to our attacks. And if, as was almost certain, our fleet should have the superiority for more than two days (for intelligence could not be rapidly enough conveyed to the English fleet which blockaded Brest, to enable it immediately to join that which observed Boulogne), there would be time enough for the flotilla to make the passage several times, to take over fresh troops, left in the camps, where too ten or fifteen thousand horses and considerable additional baggage, ammunition, and artillery were waiting for the means of transport. The mass of force would then be so great that all resistance on the part of England would be impossible.

Prodigious results, therefore, depended upon the sudden arrival of a fleet in the Channel. For this, an unexpected combina-

tion was requisite, such as the English could not baffle. Fortunately, the old British admiralty, especially powerful by its traditions and its *esprit de corps*, could not compete in invention with a prodigious genius, constantly reflecting on the same subject, and free from the necessity of consulting with a collective administration.

Napoleon had at Brest a fleet of eighteen vessels, which was very soon to be increased to twenty-one; one of five at Rochefort, one of five at Ferrol, a ship lying for safety at Cadiz, and, finally, eight vessels at Toulon, which were about to be increased to ten. Nelson with his squadron was cruising off the isles of Hyères, to observe Toulon. Such was the state of the respective forces, such the field which presented itself to the combinations of Napoleon. His idea was to steal away one of his fleets, and send it unexpectedly into the Channel, in order to be superior there for some days to the English. When he proposed to act in the winter, that is to say, in the preceding February, he had thought of sending the Brest fleet to the coast of Ireland, to land there the 15 or 20,000 men on board it, and to cause it then suddenly to appear in the Channel. This bold plan had no chance of success except in winter, as at that season the continual blockade of Brest being impracticable, advantage could be taken of bad weather to put to sea. But in summer the presence of the English was so constant, that it was impossible to get out without a battle, and vessels encumbered with troops looking upon the sea for the first time, opposed to vessels exercised by a long cruise, and but lightly laden, would run great risks unless immensely superior in point of numbers. At that time of year the facilities for getting out were greater on the side of Toulon. In June and July strong north-westerly breezes, frequently blowing, would oblige the English to seek shelter in Corsica or Sardinia. A squadron, availing itself of such an occurrence, could set sail at the close of day, make twenty leagues in a night, deceive Nelson by making false route, and, by inspiring him with fears for the East, probably draw him towards the mouths of the Nile, for since Napoleon had escaped him in 1798, Nelson was constantly engrossed with the possibility of the French throwing an army into Egypt, and he was unwilling to be taken off his guard a second time. Napoleon determined to entrust the Toulon fleet to the most daring of his admirals, Latouche-Tréville, to compose it of ten ships of the line and several frigates, and to form a camp in the neighbourhood in order to awaken the idea of a new expedition to Egypt; to embark, in reality, only a few troops, and to send this fleet out during a north-westerly breeze, assigning to it the following route. It was first to sail towards Sicily, then, bearing to the westward to steer for the Straits of Gibraltar, pass them, pick up on the way the frigate *l'Aigle*, which had taken refuge at Cadiz, avoid Ferrol, whither Nelson would probably be tempted to hurry when he should

learn that the French had passed the Straits, enter the Gulf of Gascony to rally the French division of Rochefort, and, finally lying-to on the south of the Serlingueser to the north of Brest, profit by the first favourable breeze to pass into the Channel. This fleet, ten sail of the line strong at its departure, reinforced with six others during its cruise, and numbering sixteen on its arrival, ought to be sufficiently numerous to command the Strait of Calais for several days. To deceive Nelson was quite possible, for that great seaman, full of the genius of battle, had not always a perfectly correct judgment, and, moreover, his mind was continually disturbed with the remembrance of Egypt. To avoid Ferrol, in order to reach Rochefort to rally the squadron which lay there, was also very practicable. The most difficult was to penetrate into the Channel, and pass between the English squadron which guarded the coasts of Ireland, and the fleet of admiral Cornwallis, which blockaded Brest. But the squadron of Ganteaume, always kept ready for sailing, with all its people embarked, could not fail strongly to attract the attention of Cornwallis, and to compel him to keep close up to the mouth of Brest. If the latter, abandoning the blockade of Brest, should hasten after Latouche-Tréville, Ganteaume would instantly sail out, and one of the two French fleets, perhaps both of them, would be sure to arrive before Boulogne. It was almost impossible for the English Admiralty to divine such a combination, and guard against it. A point of departure so distant as that of Toulon ought less than any other to give alarm for the Channel. Moreover, in fitting out the flotilla in such a manner as that it could suffice for itself, all idea of external assistance was banished, and the vigilance of the enemy put to sleep. Thus, then, every thing was combined for the success of this scientific manœuvre, which could only occur to the mind of a man conceiving and acting alone, keeping his secret well, and perpetually thinking of the same thing.*

“If,” said M. Decrès to the Emperor, “you would entrust a grand design to a man, it is necessary that you should first see him, speak to him, and animate him with your genius. This is especially necessary with our marine officers, demoralised by our maritime reverses, always ready to die like heroes, but thinking less of conquering than of falling nobly.” Napoleon, in consequence, sent for Latouche-Tréville, who had just previously returned from St. Domingo. That officer had neither the range of mind nor the organising spirit of admiral Bruix, but in execution he displayed a boldness, and a ready perception, which would, probably, have made him, had he lived, the rival of Nelson. He was not discouraged like others, his companions in arms, but was ready to

* This was the first conception of Napoleon. We shall hereafter see that it was frequently modified according to the circumstances under which it was necessary to act.

attempt any enterprise. Unfortunately he had contracted at St. Domingo the seeds of a disease of which many brave men had already died, and even more died subsequently. Napoleon unfolded to him his plan, made its feasibility palpable to him, disclosed to him the grandeur, the immense consequences of it, and succeeded in infusing into the admiral's soul the ardour which transported his own. Latouche-Tréville, full of enthusiasm, quitted Paris before he had recovered his health, and went to superintend the equipment of his squadron. All was calculated for the execution of the project in July, or, at the latest, in August.

Admiral Ganteaume, who preceded Latouche in the command at Toulon, was transferred to Brest. The Emperor relied upon the devotion of Ganteaume, and was much attached to him. Nevertheless, he did not think him enterprising enough to be entrusted with his important manœuvre. But though inferior to admiral Bruix with respect to capacity, and to admiral Latouche as to audacity, he preferred him to all others for courage and experience. He had, therefore, confided to him the Brest squadron, which was probably destined to throw troops into Ireland, and had charged him to complete its equipment, that it might be in a state to co-operate with that of Toulon.

The fleet, however, was behindhand, owing to the unheard of efforts that had been made for the equipment of the flotilla. Since that had been ready, all the means of the marine had again been devoted to the equipment of the squadrons. They were working hard in the ports of Antwerp, Cherbourg, Brest, Lorient, Rochefort, and Toulon. Napoleon had said that he would have a hundred ships of the line in two years, and twenty-five out of that hundred at Antwerp; that it was in that port that he placed his hopes of effecting the restoration of the French navy, and that he should, besides, find in that system of vast naval constructions, a means of employing the idle hands in the ports. But the consumption of materials, the encumbered state of the dock-yards, and also the inadequate number of the workmen, retarded the execution of the Emperor's grand designs. Scarcely any vessels were put upon the stocks at Antwerp, both the men and the materials having been employed at Flushing, Ostend, Dunkirk, Calais, and Boulogne, to supply the unceasing necessities of the flotilla. At Brest, only the eighteenth vessel was equipped; at Rochefort the fifth. At Ferrol, the poverty of the Spanish resources delayed the refitting of the division sheltered in that port. At Toulon there were only eight ships fit for instant service, and yet the winter had been most actively employed. Napoleon urged his minister of marine, Decrès, and left him no repose.*

* The following are two letters from the Emperor to the admirals, which

He had even given orders that they should work by torch-light, that the ten ships intended for Latouche should be equipped in good time. Sailors were no less wanted than materials and workmen. Admirals Ganteaume at Brest, Ville-

show the energy of will with which he busied himself with the restoration of the French navy.

To the Minister of Marine.

Saint Cloud, 21st of April, 1804 (1st Floréal, Year XII).

It appears to me to be very desirable that an imposing ceremony should mark the laying of the first stone of the arsenal of Antwerp; but it seems to me no less desirable not to destroy the building on the pretext of regularity. It is sufficient to build nothing contrary to the general plan of regularity. Insensibly the rest will be established. When we have to destroy, we destroy what is irregular; but I must repeat to you what I lately said, that I cannot feel satisfied with the works at Antwerp, seeing that there is but one ship on the stocks, and five hundred workmen. I should desire that before the 1st Messidor there should be at least three seventy-fours on the stocks, that before the 1st Vendémiaire, year XIII., there should be six, and before the 1st Nivôse, nine; and all this cannot be done with the small number of workmen you have there. There are many unemployed workmen in Provence, and there will be many more at Bayonne and Bordeaux; therefore collect three thousand workmen at Antwerp. Stores from the north, wood, iron, every thing easily reaches there. If we were three years at war, we ought still to build twenty-five vessels there. Everywhere else this is impossible. We want a navy, and we cannot be considered to have one till we have a hundred ships. We must have them in five years. If, as I think, ships can be built at Havre, two must be put on the stocks there. Two new ones must also be begun at Rochefort, and two more at Toulon, the four last-mentioned should, I think, be three-deckers.

I should also wish to keep an eye upon the port of Dunkirk. I beg that you will send me a note of the depth of the water there at low tide.

The flotilla will soon be complete everywhere. It is necessary, therefore, to find employment for that host of workmen at Nantes, Bordeaux, Honfleur, Dieppe, St. Malo, &c. We must consequently begin building frigates, brigs, and tenders. It is necessary as a matter of public spirit, that the workmen on the coast be not allowed to die of hunger, and that the seaward departments, which have been the least friendly to the Revolution, be made to perceive that the time approaches when the sea will also be our domain. St. Domingo cost us two millions per month; the English have taken it, we must apply the two millions per month solely to ship-building. My intention is to have the same activity in that as for the flotilla, only, as we are not hurried, business will be carried on with stricter order. I am in no hurry for the completion, but I require the commencement of a great deal.

I beg you to let me have, next week, a report from which I can ascertain the present condition of our marine, of what we are building, of what we require to build, and in what ports, and what will be the monthly cost, setting out from the principle that I should prefer your taking eighteen months to build each ship, so that I have by one-third the greater number.

As to the ships, I would construct them on the same plan, the frigates on the model of the *Hortense*, or the *Cornelie*, which seem good; for the ships take the best ships, and build ships of eighty, and of three decks, everywhere except at Antwerp, *where it appears to me to be prudent to commence in the first instance with seventy-fours.*

To the Minister of Marine.

[Saint Cloud, 28th of April, 1804 (8th Floréal, Year XII).

I this day sign a decree relative to the constructions. I will admit of no sort of excuse. Let me have an account twice a week of the orders that you

neuve at Rochefort, Gourdon at Ferrol, and Latouche at Toulon, complained of being short-handed. Napoleon, after many experiments, was confirmed in his idea of supplying the deficiencies of the crews by young soldiers picked from the regiments, who, being exercised at the guns and at upon-deck manœuvres, would advantageously complete the manning of the ships. Admiral Ganteaume had already tried that measure at Brest, and had found it answer well. He bestowed great praise upon these sailors borrowed from the land service, and especially for their services at the guns. Only he requested not to have formed soldiers sent to him, who unwillingly submitted to a second training, but young conscripts, who, having nothing to unlearn, were more apt in learning what it was desired to teach them, and showed themselves more docile. However, they were taken on trial, and only those retained who showed an inclination for the sea. By this means the total number of seamen was augmented by a fourth or a fifth.

France had then about forty-five thousand seamen fit for service; fifteen thousand in the flotilla, twelve thousand at Brest, from four to five thousand between Lorient and Rochefort, four thousand between Ferrol and Cadiz, and about eight thousand at Toulon, without reckoning some thousands in India. To this total force, twelve, or perhaps fifteen thousand men could be added, which would carry the number of men embarked up to sixty thousand. The Brest fleet alone had received an addition of four thousand conscripts. They were much praised. If such squadrons could have sailed for some time under good officers, they would speedily have equalled the English squadrons. But, blockaded in the ports, they had no sea practice; and, moreover, the admirals were without that confidence which is only acquired by victory. However, every thing progressed under the influence of a powerful will, which exerted itself to restore confidence to those who had lost it. Admiral Latouche left nothing undone at Toulon, to be ready in July or August. Admiral Ganteaume sailed out of Brest, and returned to train his crews a little, and to keep the English in continued doubt as to his actual intentions. By dint of threatening them with a

give, and see to their execution; if any extraordinary measures are required, let me know. I will not admit any excuse to be valid, for with a good administration I would build thirty vessels of the line in France in a year, if that were necessary. In a country like France we ought to be able to do whatever we will. It will not have escaped you that I intend to commence numerous constructions, except at Brest, where I do not intend to build any longer. My intention is to have afloat before Vendémiaire, year XIV., twenty-six ships of war: of course their being afloat at that time will depend upon whether we are previously at peace. But henceforth all seventy-fours should be built at Antwerp. Our principal building-yard should be at Antwerp. It is there only that in a few years the French navy can be restored.

Before the year XV. we ought to have a hundred ships of war.

sortie, he would inspire them with an incredulity, of which he would some day take advantage.

Napoleon required a still further supplement to his naval force, and wished to appropriate to that purpose the marine of Genoa. He considered, that with a squadron of seven or eight ships of the line and some frigates in that port, he would divide the attention of the English between Toulon and Genoa, and oblige them to keep a double fleet of observation in that sea, or else to leave one of the two ports free, while blockading the other. He ordered M. Salicetti, our minister at Genoa, to conclude with that Republic a treaty, by which she should give up to us her dock-yards, for the building of ten frigates, and the same number of ships of the line. France, in return, engaged to receive into her navy a number of officers proportioned to that force, with pay equal to that of the French officers. Further, she undertook to enrol six thousand Genoese sailors, whom the Ligurian Republic, on her part, undertook to hold in constant readiness. On the conclusion of peace, France was to grant her flag to the Genoese, which would secure her French protection, very serviceable against the states of Barbary.

All the arrangements of Napoleon were now concluded, and it was necessary for him to set out. But he chose previously to receive the ambassadors charged to present him with their new credentials, in which he was styled Emperor. The Pope's nuncio, the ambassadors of Spain and Naples, and the ministers of Prussia, Holland, Denmark, Bavaria, Saxony, Baden, Wurtemberg, Hesse, and Switzerland, presented themselves to him on Sunday, the 8th of July (19th Messidor), with the forms adopted by all courts, delivered him their credentials, and treated him, for the first time, as a crowned sovereign. The ambassador from the court of Vienna, with which a negotiation was still in progress relative to the imperial title for the house of Austria; the ambassador of the court of Russia, with which France had quarrelled on account of the note addressed to Ratisbon, and finally, the ambassador of England, with which power we were at war, were alone absent from this assemblage. It may be said that, Great Britain excepted, Napoleon was recognised by all Europe, for Austria was about to execute a formal act of recognition; Russia regretted what she had done, and only required an explanation which should save her dignity, to recognise the imperial title of the Bonaparte family.

Some days later, the decorations of the Legion of Honour were distributed. Although this institution was decreed two years earlier, its organisation had required considerable time, and was now scarcely finished. Napoleon in person distributed those grand decorations to the first civil and military personages of the Empire, in the church of the Invalides, a monument for which he had an especial affection. He had not as

yet exchanged the order of the Legion of Honour against foreign orders; but in the absence of those exchanges which he proposed to make, in order to place in every respect his new monarchy on an equal footing with others, he, in the very middle of the ceremony, called the cardinal Caprara to his side, and detaching from his own breast the order of the Legion of Honour, he gave it to that old and respectable cardinal, who was profoundly affected by so marked a distinction. He also commenced with the Pope's representative the affiliation to an order which, all recent as it was, was speedily to be coveted by all Europe.

Endeavouring to render serious even the things apparently most vain, he sent the cross of grand-officer to admiral La-touche-Tréville. "I have named you," he wrote to him, "grand-officer of the Empire, and inspector of the coasts of the Mediterranean; but I am very anxious that the operation you are about to attempt may enable me to raise you to such a degree of consideration and honour as shall leave you nothing to wish for. Let us be masters of the Channel for six hours, and we are masters of the world."* (2nd of July, 1804.)

* The following is the entire letter:

By my courier, on his return, let me know on what day, wind and weather permitting, you will be able to sail; let me know what the enemy has done, and where Nelson is.

Meditate upon the grand enterprize with which you are intrusted, and before I sign your final orders, let me know the manner in which you think that they will be most advantageously fulfilled.

I have named you grand-officer, and inspector of the coasts of the Mediterranean; but I am very anxious that the operation you are about to attempt may enable me to raise you to a degree of consideration and honour which shall leave you nothing to desire.

The squadron of Rochefort consisting of five vessels, one a three-decker, and four frigates, is ready to weigh anchor; she has but five of the enemy's vessels against her.

The Brest squadron consists of twenty-one vessels. These vessels weigh anchor to harass admiral Cornwallis, and oblige the English to have a greater number of vessels on that station. The enemy keep also six vessels in front of the Texel, to blockade the Dutch squadron, consisting of fifty-one ships of the line, four frigates, and a convoy of eighty sail.

General Marmont's army is embarked.

Among Etaples, Boulogne, Vimereux, and Ambleteuse, two new ports that I had constructed, we have 270 gun-boats, 534 gun-brigs, 396 pinnaces, in all 1200 vessels, carrying 120,000 men, and 10,000 horses. Let us be masters of the Strait for six hours, and we are masters of the world.

The enemy have in the Downs, or before Boulogne, and before Ostend, two seventy-fours, three of sixty, or sixty-four, and two or three of fifty. Hitherto, Cornwallis has only fifteen ships; but all the reserves of Plymouth and Portsmouth have come to reinforce him. The enemy have also at Cork, in Ireland, four or five ships of war. I do not speak of frigates and smaller craft, of which they have a great number.

If you deceive Nelson, he will go to Sicily, or to Egypt, or to Ferrol. I do not think he will fail to present himself before Ferrol. Of five vessels which are in those parts, four are ready, as the fifth will be in Fructidor. But I think that Ferrol is too plainly pointed out; and it is so

Wholly occupied with his grand projects, the Emperor set out for Boulogne, after having delegated to the arch-chancellor Cambacérès, in addition to the ordinary care of presiding over the Council of State and the Senate, the power to exercise the supreme authority should that be necessary. The arch-chancellor was the only personage in the Empire in whom he had sufficient confidence to delegate to him such an extent of prerogatives. He arrived on the 20th of July at Pont-de-Briques, and immediately proceeded to the port of Boulogne to inspect the flotilla, and the various works which he had ordered. The two armies, sea and land, welcomed him with transports of joy, and saluted his presence with unanimous acclamations. Nine hundred discharges of cannon from the forts and the line of broadsides, resounding from Calais to Dover, apprised the English of the presence of that man who, for eighteen months past, had so deeply disturbed the accustomed security of their isle.

Napoleon, embarking on the instant, in spite of a stormy sea, would visit the stone forts of La Crèche and of L'Heurt, as well as the wooden fort placed between the two first, all destined, as we have said, to cover the line of boats. He had some shots fired under his own eyes, in order to ascertain if the instructions he had given for obtaining the longest possible ranges had been duly followed. He then put out to sea, and, within cannon shot distance of the English squadron, witnessed the manœuvring of several divisions of the flotilla, of which admiral Bruix had constantly boasted the improvement. He returned highly pleased,

natural for the enemy to suppose if your Mediterranean force enter the ocean, that it is intended to raise the blockade of Ferrol! It would appear better, then, to take a wide berth to make Rochefort, which will complete you a squadron of sixteen ships of the line, and of eleven frigates, and then, without losing a moment, without letting go an anchor, whether in doubling Ireland, keeping well out to sea, or in executing the first plan, to arrive before Boulogne. Our Brest squadron of twenty-three sail, will have an army on board, and will be daily ready to sail, so that Cornwallis will be obliged to hug the coast of Brittany to endeavour to oppose its sortie.

For the rest, I await, ere I determine upon this operation, which has some hazards, but of which the success offers such immense results, the plan that you have promised me by the return of the courier.

You should embark as much provisions as possible, in order that under any circumstances you may not be straitened for any thing.

At the end of the month a new ship will be launched at Rochefort and at Lorient. That of Rochefort we need say nothing about, but should that of Lorient be in the road and unable to join before your appearance at the Isle of Aix, I wish to know if you think that you should make your course to pick her up; at all events, I think that going out with a good north-wester, it is above every thing preferable to execute the operation before winter; for, in bad weather, it would be possible for you to have more chances of arriving, but no less so, that there might be many days such as would render it impossible to profit by your arrival.

Supposing that you can set sail before the 10th Thermidor (10th of July), it is improbable that you should not arrive before Boulogne in the course of September, a time when the nights are already reasonably long, and the weather not bad for any length of time.

after having lavished testimonies of satisfaction upon the chiefs, both naval and military, who, under his supreme direction, had contributed to this prodigious creation.

The following, and the succeeding days, he visited all the camps, from Etaples to Calais; then returned to the interior to inspect the cavalry, which was encamped at some distance from the coasts; and, above all, the splendid division of grenadiers, organised by general Junot, in the environs of Arras. That division consisted of companies of grenadiers picked from the regiments which were not destined to make part of the expedition. There was not a finer corps, for the choice and beauty of the men. It far surpassed even the Consular guard, now become the Imperial guard. It comprised ten battalions of 800 men each. With these grenadiers the reform of the military head-dress had been commenced. They wore shakos instead of hats, and short hair, unpowdered, instead of the former long and powdered hair, which was at once inconvenient and uncleanly. Inured to warfare by numerous campaigns, and manœuvring with unequalled precision, they were animated by that pride which gives its greatest strength to a *corps d'élite*, and presented a division of about 8000 men, which no European corps of even twice or thrice their number, would have ventured to oppose. It was these grenadiers whom Napoleon intended first to throw upon the shores of England, making them cross in the light pinnaces which we have elsewhere described. On beholding their bearing, their discipline, and their enthusiasm, Napoleon felt his confidence redoubled, and he doubted not that he should enter London and there conquer the sceptre of the earth, and the trident of the ocean.

Having returned to the coast, he resolved to inspect the flotilla, boat by boat, to see if his orders had been strictly attended to, and if it were possible, at the first signal, to embark, with the requisite rapidity, all that had been got together in the magazines of Boulogne. He found things exactly to his wishes. It required some days to embark the heavy *matériel*, but when that was once got on board, which should be done several weeks previous to the expedition, the horses, men, and field artillery, could be embarked on the flotilla in three or four hours. All was not yet ready, however. Some divisions were behind from Havre to Boulogne. The guard-boats, especially, under command of captain Daugier, had not yet arrived. The Dutch flotilla, too, caused Napoleon more than one difficulty. He was, to the highest degree, satisfied with admiral Verhuell, but the equipment of a part of that flotilla was not finished, whether from a lack of zeal on the part of the Dutch government, or, which is more probable, from the very nature of things. The two first divisions were assembled at Ostend, Dunkirk, and Calais; the third had not left the Scheldt. There remained another element of success, which Napoleon exerted himself to secure; it was to assemble the en-

fire Dutch fleet in the ports situated to the west of Cape Grisnez, by uniting more compactly in the four ports of Ambleteuse, Vimereux, Boulogne, and Etaples. The two flotillas would thus sail at the same time, and with the same wind, at three or four leagues distance from each other. But there are two things which are expended in grand operations with a rapidity, and to an extent, which always go far beyond the notions of matter-of-fact persons, time and money. Arrived at the commencement of August, Napoleon saw that he could not be entirely prepared before the month of September, and caused an intimation to be given to Admiral Latouche that the expedition was deferred for a month. He consoled himself for that delay, by considering that the month would be employed in getting better prepared than he at that moment was; and, that the season, moreover, being still sufficiently fine in the course of September, there would be the advantage of longer nights.*

In the meantime, he determined to give the army a grand fête, calculated to raise the spirits of the troops, if it were possible. He had distributed the grand decorations of the Legion of Honour to the principal personages of the Empire, in the church of the Invalides, on the anniversary of the 14th of July. He now proposed, personally, to distribute to the army the crosses which were to be given in exchange for the suppressed arms of honour, and to celebrate that ceremony on his birthday, on the very brink of the ocean, and in the presence of the English squadrons. The result answered his wishes, and it was a magnificent spectacle, long remembered by all who witnessed it.

He selected a spot situated to the right of Boulogne, on the high land, not far from the column which has since been erected in that part. This spot, having the form of a semicircular amphitheatre that had been designedly constructed on the brink of the ocean, seemed to have been prepared by nature for some grand national spectacle. There was space enough to allow the whole army to be drawn up there. In the centre of that amphitheatre a throne was erected for the Emperor, with its front to the land and its back to the sea. To the right and left

* The following is the text of the new order.

To the Minister of Marine.

14th Thermidor, Year XII (2nd August, 1804).

I wish you to despatch a courier extraordinary to Toulon, to make known to general Latouche, that different divisions of the flotilla having been unable to join, I have come to the conclusion that the delay of a month cannot but be advantageous, especially as we shall then have longer nights, but that it is my intention that he avail himself of this delay to add the ship *Berwick* to the squadron; that all possible means be used to bring about that result; that a ship more or less is no unimportant consideration, as it will bring the squadron up to eighteen ships.

I also wish the orders to be renewed for fitting out the *Algésiras* with all speed at Lorient. She must be in the road on the 10th Fructidor.

of it benches were put up to accommodate the grand dignitaries, the ministers, and the marshals. In prolongation of these two wings, detachments of the Imperial guard were to be drawn out. In front, on the slope of this natural amphitheatre, were to be ranged, as formerly the Roman people were in their vast arenas, the various corps of the army, formed in closed columns, and disposed in rays terminating at the throne as their common centre. At the head of each of these columns was to be the infantry, and at the rear the cavalry, overlooking the infantry from the whole height of their horses.

On the 16th of August, the morrow of Saint Napoleon, the troops repaired to the scene of the fête, through the streams of an immense population that hurried from all the neighbouring provinces to be present at this spectacle. A hundred thousand men, almost all of whom were veterans of the Republic, with their eyes fixed upon Napoleon, awaited the recompense of their exploits. Those soldiers and officers who were to receive the crosses, had left the ranks, and had advanced to the foot of the imperial throne. Napoleon, standing up, read to them the noble formula of the oath of the Legion of Honour, and then altogether, and accompanied by martial music and the reports of artillery, they responded, "WE SWEAR IT!" Then for several hours they in succession came forward to receive those crosses which were to replace nobility of birth. Gentlemen of the oldest lineage ascended the steps of the throne, side by side with simple peasants, no less delighted than these were to obtain the distinctions awarded to courage, and all promising to shed their blood upon the shores of England, to secure to their country and to the man who governed it the undisputed Empire of the world.

This magnificent spectacle thrilled all hearts, and an unforeseen circumstance occurred to render it profoundly serious. A division of the flotilla, which had recently left Havre, entered Boulogne at this moment in heavy weather, and exchanging a smart cannonade with the English. From time to time Napoleon quitted the throne to direct his telescope upon the fight, and observe how his seamen and soldiers bore themselves in presence of the enemy.

Such scenes could not but be productive of great agitation in England. The British press, arrogant and insulting, as the press ever is in free countries, jested very much upon Napoleon and his preparations, but jested like a jester who trembles at that which he affects to laugh at. The immense preparations which had been made for the defence of England, agitated the country without completely reassuring men acquainted with the art of war. We have seen that, regretting that she had not a great army almost as much as France regretted that she had not a powerful navy, England had wished, by means of a *corps de reserve*, to augment her military force. A part of the men who

were drawn by the ballot to serve in the reserve, had passed into the line, which was thus increased to about 170,000 men. To this force were joined local militia corps, indefinite in number, who were only bound to serve in the provinces; and, finally, 150,000 volunteers, who presented themselves in the three kingdoms, and who displayed great zeal in submitting themselves to military training. As many as 300,000 volunteers were spoken of, but there was not, in reality, above half that number in actual preparation for service. The most eminent personages in England, in order to give an impulse to the public spirit, had assumed the uniform of the volunteers. Messrs. Pitt and Addington alike wore it. The levy, *en masse*, which had been decreed on paper, was not actually carried into effect.

Making the usual allowance for defalcations, England had to oppose to us 100,000 or 120,000 regular troops, of excellent quality, militias without organisation, and 150,000 volunteers, without experience, having inferior officers, and no general; the whole distributed in Ireland and England, and dispersed upon those points of the coast at which danger was apprehended. Of regular troops and volunteers, 70,000 men were reckoned to be in Ireland, leaving from 180,000 to 200,000 men of troops of the line and volunteers, for Scotland and England. Even with the art of moving masses of men, which only Napoleon at that time possessed, it was as much as could have been done to get 80,000 or 90,000 men of these forces together at the place of danger. And what could even double their number have done against the 150,000 perfect soldiers that Napoleon could throw across the Strait? The ocean was England's true defence. The English had 100,000 sailors, 89 ships of the line distributed over every sea, a score of fifty gun ships, and 132 frigates, besides a proportionate number of vessels on the stocks, or in the docks. Like Napoleon, perfecting their preparations with time, they had created sea *fencibles*, in imitation of the land *fencibles*. Under this title they had assembled all the fishermen and seamen not liable to the ordinary impressment, and these, to the number of about 20,000, were distributed along the coast in boats, forming a continual guard, independently of the advanced guard of frigates, brigs, and corvettes, which extended from the Scheldt to the Somme. Night signals, and carriages adapted for conveying troops by post, completed that system of precaution which we have described elsewhere, and which had been still further perfected in the course of the fifteen months which had elapsed since its commencement. Further, entrenchments had been thrown up, and in the Thames there was a line of frigates connected together by iron chains, capable of opposing a continuous and solid obstacle to all vessels. From Dover to the Isle of Wight, every approachable point of the shore was crowned with artillery.

The expense of these preparations, and the confusion which resulted from them, were immense. Men's minds excited as they

very naturally were in presence of a threatened invasion, deemed nothing good, nothing sufficiently reassuring, and, with a weak ministry whose capacity every one felt entitled to dispute, there was no moral authority which could repress the rage for censuring and suggesting. Every measure that was proposed was pronounced to be trivial, bad, or not sufficiently strong, and something else was suggested in its stead. Mr. Pitt, who had for some time been reserved, now ceased to be so, encouraged as he was by the general outcry. He bitterly blamed the measures of ministers, either because he considered the time to have arrived for overthrowing them, or because he really deemed their measures of precaution insufficient or badly calculated. It is at the least certain that his objections were better founded than those of other members of the opposition. He reproached the ministers for not having anticipated and prevented the concentration of the flat-bottomed boats at Boulogne, to the number, according to him, of above a thousand at the lowest. Although he sought rather to exaggerate than to conceal the actual danger, he was below the truth, for, including the Dutch flotilla, the number was 2300. He attributed this error to the ignorance of the Admiralty, which had not been able to foresee the use that might be made of gun-boats, and which had employed ships and frigates in shallows where those large craft could not follow the small vessels of the French. He maintained that with some hundreds of gun-boats, supported at a distance by frigates, the preparations of the French might be combatted with equal weapons, and their immense armament destroyed ere it could be assembled in the Channel. The reproach was specious, at least, if it were not well-founded.

The ministers replied, that during the last war an attempt had been made to employ gun-boats, and that they could not hold to the wind. This proved that the English seamen had applied themselves less than the French seamen to handling this sort of craft, for our boats had sailed in all weather. Sometimes they had grounded in shallows, but, with the exception of the accident which happened at Brest, not one had been lost owing to faulty construction.

Mr. Pitt, agreeing neither with the opinion of Mr. Wyndham, his former colleague, nor with that of Mr. Fox, his new ally, upon the insufficiency of the regular army, and perceiving the difficulty of instantly and at pleasure extending the proportions of an army, especially in a country which would not resort to the conscription, Mr. Pitt complained that greater use had not been made of the volunteers. He maintained that if these 150,000 English had been heartily made use of, and made to acquire that degree of training and discipline of which they were capable, they would have been rendered far less inferior than they actually were to the regular troops. This reproach, well or ill-founded, was as specious as the former one.

Mr. Pitt maintained these opinions with great warmth. In proportion as he became more strongly engaged with the opposition, he approached, if not in opinions and feelings, at least in conduct, to the old Whig opposition, that is to say, to Mr. Fox. The two adversaries, who had combatted each other for twenty-five years, now seemed to be reconciled, and there was a report in circulation that they were about to form a coalition ministry, the old majority being broken up. It has already been shown that a small part of that majority had followed Messrs. Wyndham and Grenville into opposition. A still larger part had joined them since Mr. Pitt had raised his standard. This Tory opposition consisted of all who thought that the existing ministry was incapable of making head against the circumstances, and that it was necessary to have recourse to the old leader of the war party. On the other hand, the old Whig opposition, headed by Mr. Fox, though it had sustained some losses, such as those of Messrs. Tierney and Sheridan, who were said to have joined Mr. Addington, had been singularly increased by a court occurrence. The intellect of the king appeared to be affected again, and the approaching regency of the Prince of Wales was announced. Now that prince, who had formerly quarrelled with Mr. Pitt, and recently with Mr. Addington, was greatly attached to Mr. Fox, and it was supposed would make him prime minister. Thence a certain number of members of the House of Commons, acting under his influence, had swelled the party of Mr. Fox. The two oppositions, united and augmented, the one by the demonstrations of Mr. Pitt, the other by the anticipated success of Mr. Fox, almost counterbalanced the majority of the Addington ministry.

Several successive votes speedily proved the seriousness of this state of things for the cabinet. In the month of March, Mr. Pitt had brought forward a motion for an account of the comparative state of the English navy in 1797, in 1801, and in 1803. Supported by the friends of Mr. Fox, he had succeeded in getting 130 votes for his motion, against 201. The ministry, then, had only a majority of 70 votes, and on comparing that vote with previous votes, one could not but be struck with the progress made by the opposition. Success encouraging the new allies, they pressed forward with new motions. In April, Mr. Fox moved that all measures adopted for the defence of the nation since the renewal of the war, should be referred to a committee. This was only another method of submitting to the judgment of parliament the conduct and capacity of the Addington administration. This time the majority was still further diminished. The opposition mustered 204 votes, and the ministers 256, which reduced to 52 the former majority of 70. This majority became daily weaker, and in the month of May a third motion was announced, which would place the ministry in an

actual minority, when lord Hawkesbury declared, in terms too clear to be misunderstood, that this motion was needless, as the cabinet was about to resign.

The old king, who liked Mr. Addington and lord Hawkesbury very much, and Mr. Pitt very little, nevertheless ended by summoning the last-named. That celebrated and all-powerful personage, so long our enemy, then resumed the reins of state, with the task of sustaining if possible, the threatened fortune of England. On returning to the ministry, he had left out his old friends, Messrs. Wyndham and Grenville, and his recent ally, Mr. Fox. He was reproached with his double breach of faith, of which very different explanations were given. The apparently true one was, that he was unwilling to have Messrs. Wyndham and Grenville, as being too violent Tories, and that the king was unwilling to have Mr. Fox, as being too decidedly a Whig. Mr. Pitt was accused of not having on this occasion made sufficient effort to overrule George III. It appeared to be the general wish, looking to the dangers with which the country was threatened, that the two ablest statesmen of England should unite their talents to give greater vigour and stability to the government.

Mr. Pitt, however, exercised so much influence on public opinion, he had so long enjoyed personal confidence, that he alone was sufficient to re-establish power. On entering the ministry he immediately demanded 2,400,000*l.* of secret service money. It was maintained that he wanted this money to renew the connexion of England with the Continent; for he was rightly looked upon as the fittest of all ministers to re-establish those coalitions, by the great respect in which he was held by the courts inimical to France.

Such were the events that occurred in England while Napoleon assumed the imperial crown, and repaired to Boulogne to make preparations for forcing the barrier of the ocean. It seemed as though Providence had brought these two men again upon the stage to strive once more against each other, and with more fierceness and violence than ever, Mr. Pitt in forming coalitions, which he well knew how to do, and Napoleon in destroying them at the edge of the sword, which he knew how to do still better. Napoleon was indifferent enough to what was passing on the other side of the Strait. He smiled at the military preparations of the English, still more sincerely than the English journalists jeered at his flat-bottomed boats. He asked but one boon of Heaven, that but for eight-and-forty hours he might have a fleet in the Channel, in which case he undertook to have his own way full speedily with all the armies that could be assembled between Dover and London. The ministerial changes in England would only have affected him had they placed Mr. Fox in office. Believing in that statesman's sincerity, and in his friendly feelings towards France, he would in that case have been led to turn from ideas of

an obstinate warfare to those of peace and even of alliance. But the appointment of Mr. Pitt, on the contrary, strengthened him in the opinion that it was necessary to end with some bold and desperate stroke, in which the two nations would stake their very existence. At the same time a demand of 60 millions of secret service money, which was only explicable on the supposition of some secret proceedings on the continent, could not fail to excite his attention. He saw that Austria was very tardy in sending new credentials, and very far from being frank at Ratisbon in the affair of the Russian note. Finally, he had received from M. d'Oubril the reply of the cabinet of St. Petersburg, to the despatch in which he had alluded to the death of Paul I. That reply of Russia appeared to him to indicate some ulterior project. With his usual sagacity, Napoleon already perceived the commencement of a coalition in Europe; he complained to M. de Talleyrand of his credulity, and of his complaisance to the two Messrs. de Cobenzel, and he added, that at the first doubt as to the dispositions of the Continent, he would throw himself, not upon England, but upon that power which should cause his anxiety; for he was not, he said, sufficiently infatuated to cross the Channel, if he were not entirely secure on the side of the Rhine. It was thus that he wrote from Boulogne to M. de Talleyrand, pointing out to him the necessity of urging Austria and Russia to explain themselves, when a sudden and ever to be regretted incident occurred, inevitably to put an end to his uncertainties, and to compel him to defer till some months later his projects of descent.

The brave and unfortunate Latouche-Tréville, a prey to an incompletely-cured malady, and to an ardour which he could not control, died in the port of Toulon, on the 20th of August, and when on the very eve of sailing. Napoleon received this melancholy intelligence at Boulogne, towards the end of August, 1804, at the moment when, prepared to embark, he was struck with some presentiment of a European coalition, and tempted, at times, to direct his blows elsewhere than upon London. The Toulon fleet having lost its commander, it was unavoidably necessary to postpone the English expedition; for, to select and appoint a new admiral, send him to his squadron, and give him time to become acquainted with it, all this would require more than a month. Now, it was the end of August; this, then, would lead to the month of October for the departure from Toulon, and to that of November for the arrival in the Channel. It would then be a winter campaign to make, and that would require new arrangements.

Napoleon immediately cast about for a man to be appointed in the room of admiral Latouche. "There is not a moment to be lost," wrote he to the minister Decrès, "in sending an admiral competent to command the Toulon squadron. It cannot be worse placed than it is now in the hands of Dumanoir, who is not

capable of maintaining discipline in so large a squadron, or of manœuvring it. It appears to me that for the Toulon squadron there are but three competent men, Bruix, Villeneuve, or Rossily. You can sound Bruix. I have great confidence in Rossily, but he has done nothing during fifteen years. However, the matter is so urgent that something must be done.”—(28th of August, 1804.)

From this time, he perceived that the naval and military establishment that he had formed at Boulogne, would be less temporary than he had at first imagined, and he busied himself on the spot in simplifying its organisation, to render it less expensive, and at the same time, to add to its perfection in manœuvring. “The flotilla,” he wrote to the minister Decrès, “has hitherto been looked upon as a mere expedition; henceforth it must be looked upon as a fixed establishment, and from this moment the greatest attention must be paid to that part of it which is to be permanent, in regulating it by other rules than the squadron.”—(18th of September, 1804, 23rd Fructidor, year XII.)

He simplified, in fact, the administrative machinery, suppressed many double employments, arising out of the connexion of the land and sea forces, revised all the appointments, in a word, employed himself in rendering the Boulogne flotilla a separate establishment, which, being maintained at the lowest possible cost, could be kept up as long as war lasted, and could still exist even should the army for a time have to quit the coasts of the Channel.

He also resolved upon the formation of escadrilles, to give a greater degree of order to the movements of these 2300 boats. The following was the division that was finally resolved on: nine boats or gun-boats formed a section, and carried a battalion, two of these sections formed a division, and carried a regiment. The pinnaces, accommodating only half as many people, were to be double in number. The division of pinnaces was composed of four sections, or thirty-six pinnaces, instead of eighteen, in order to take on board a regiment of two battalions. Several divisions of boats, gun-boats, and pinnaces, formed an escadrille, and were to carry several regiments, that is to say, a *corps d'armée*. To each escadrille were added a certain number of those fishing-boats or coasters which had been got ready for the embarkation of the cavalry horses, and the heavy baggage. The whole flotilla was divided into eight escadrilles, two at Etaples for the corps of marshal Ney, four at Boulogne for the corps of marshal Soult, two at Vimereux for the advanced-guard and reserve. The port of Ambleteuse, in the new plan which there had been time to mature, was devoted to the Dutch flotilla, which was to carry the corps of marshal Davoust. Each escadrille was commanded by a superior officer, and independently manœuvred at sea, though combined in the unity of operations. In this wise, the arrangements of the flotilla were completely adapted to those of the army.

In the meanwhile, admiral Decrès sent for admirals Villeneuve and Missiessy, to offer them the vacant commands. Deeming Bruix indispensable at Boulogne, and Rossily as too long unaccustomed to the sea, he looked upon Villeneuve as the fittest to command the Toulon squadron, and Missiessy that of Rochefort, which Villeneuve would leave vacant. Admiral Villeneuve, whose name is surrounded by an unfortunate celebrity, was a man of ability, courage, and practical acquaintance with his profession, but he had no firmness of character. Susceptible to the highest degree, he was apt to exaggerate beyond bounds the difficulties that presented themselves, and to sink into that state of depression which leaves no command of either head or heart. Admiral Missiessy, less able, but cooler, was but little given to elation, but as little to depression. Admiral Decrès sent for them both, and endeavoured to reason them out of that discouragement which had seized not upon the sailors and officers, who were all animated with a noble ardour, but upon the commanders-in-chief of our fleets, who had to risk in every battle that renown which they prized above life. Decrès caused admiral Missiessy to accept the command of the Rochefort squadron, and admiral Villeneuve to accept that of the Toulon squadron. Towards the latter he bore a friendship, which dated from their early childhood. To him he entrusted the Emperor's secret, and the immense operation to which the Toulon squadron was destined. He excited his imagination by pointing out the grand object that was to be achieved, and the great honours that were thereby to be obtained. Deplorable endeavours of an old friendship! This momentary excitement was to give place with Villeneuve to a fatal depression, and to inflict the most sanguinary reverses upon our navy.

The minister hastened to transmit an account to the Emperor, of the result of his conferences with Villeneuve, and of the effect produced upon that officer by the perspectives of danger and glory which he had laid open to him.*

* We quote the letter of admiral Decrès, for it is important to understand the appointment of the man who lost the battle of Trafalgar.

Sire (wrote Decrès), vice-admiral Villeneuve, and rear-admiral Missiessy are here.

I have spoken to the first about the grand project. . . .

He listened coldly, and was silent for some instants. Then with a calm smile he said; I expected to hear something of the sort, *but to be approved, such projects must be achieved.*

I literally transcribe his reply in a private conversation, because it will depict to you more vividly than I can, the effect which the offer produced upon him. He added: *I will not lose four hours in rallying the first; with the five others and my own I shall be strong enough. It is necessary to be fortunate, and to ascertain how far I am so, I must be enterprising.*

We spoke of the course. He agrees with your majesty as to that. He only dwelt upon the unfavourable sufficiently to show me that he was not going blindly to work. Nothing of the kind affected his courage.

The appointments of grand-officer and vice-admiral have made a new man

Napoleon, who well understood men, did not expect much from the substitute of admiral Latouche. Constantly reflecting upon his project, he again modified and extended it in accordance with the circumstances which had occurred. The winter had restored freedom of movement to the Brest fleet, by interrupting the continuance of the blockade. Although Ganteaume had failed in decision, in 1801, he nevertheless had, on more than one occasion, displayed both courage and devotion, and Napoleon determined to intrust him with the most dashing and difficult part of his plan. He postponed the expedition until after the 18th Brumaire (9th of November), the epoch appointed for the coronation, and he resolved to send Ganteaume out at that rough season, with fifteen or eighteen thousand men destined for Ireland; then, when that admiral should have landed those men on some accessible point of the island, to have him speedily back into the Channel, there to protect the crossing of the flotilla. In this modified plan, admirals Missiessy and Villeneuve were intrusted with quite a different part from that which was assigned to the Toulon and Rochefort squadrons, when Latouche-Tréville had the command. Admiral Villeneuve, setting out from Toulon, was to sail for America, to reconquer the Dutch colonies of Surinam, Berbice, Demerara, and Essequibo. A division, detached from Villeneuve's squadron, was to take the island of St. Helena, *en passant*. Admiral Missiessy had orders to throw a reinforcement of from three to four thousand men into our Antilles, then to ravage the English Antilles, taking them by surprise, and almost undefended. The two admirals then joining company, to return to Europe, had for their last instructions to raise the blockade of the squadron at Ferrol, and to return to Rochefort to the number of twenty sail. They were ordered to sail before Ganteaume, in order that the English, being informed of their departure, might be induced to pursue them. Napoleon desired that Villeneuve might sail from Toulon on the 12th of October, Missiessy, from Rochefort, on the 1st of November, and Ganteaume, from Brest, on the 22nd of December, 1804. He deemed it certain that the twenty sail of Villeneuve and Missiessy would draw fifty sail at least beyond the European seas! for the English, being suddenly attacked in

of him. The ideas of danger are effaced from his mind by the hope of glory and he ended by saying, *I embark in it with heart and soul*, and this with a tone and gesture cool and decided.

He will set out for Toulon, as soon as your majesty shall have made me aware whether there are any further orders for him.

Rear-admiral Missiessy is more reserved with me, he asks to remain here for a week; he has an extreme coolness but less defined. I have heard that he was offended that your majesty had not given him the Mediterranean squadron. He is so because he is not vice-admiral. His great argument among his intimates is this, that not having been employed during the war, he has had no failures! I have given him orders to go and take the command of the squadron, and I reckon upon his being *en route* within a week. It will take him five or six days to reach his destination.

all quarters, could not fail to send succour everywhere. It was then probable that admiral Ganteaume would have sufficient freedom of movement to execute the operation entrusted to him, which consisted, after having touched at Ireland, of presenting himself before Boulogne, either by doubling Scotland or by sailing directly from Ireland into the Channel.

All his orders being given from Boulogne itself, where he was then located, Napoleon wished to avail himself of the time which still remained to him before winter, to clear up the affairs of the Continent. Directing the course of M. de Talleyrand by a daily correspondence, he prescribed to him the diplomatic measures which were calculated to lead to that end.

The reader will doubtless recollect the imprudent note of the cabinet of Russia, on the subject of the violation of the Germanic soil, and the bitter reply of the French cabinet. The young Alexander had deeply felt that reply, and had perceived, but too late, that the manner in which he had come to his throne had deprived him of all right to give such lofty lessons of morality to other governments. He was humiliated and alarmed at this. The soul of Alexander was rather quick than firm. He willingly threw himself forward, and then as willingly drew back, when he perceived danger. It was without consulting his ministers that he went into mourning for the duc d'Enghien, and it was in opposition to a portion of them that he had sent to Ratisbon the note of which we have made mention. Nevertheless, they had the greatest difficulty in keeping him in his first resolutions. The prudent men of St. Petersburg, when the first excitement was gone by, perceived that too little judgment had been shown in the affair of the duc d'Enghien, and they blamed first the young men who governed the empire, and, among those young men, the prince Czartoryski above all, because he was a Pole, and entrusted with the ministry of foreign affairs, since the retirement to the country of the chancellor Woronzoff. Nothing could be more unjust than this censure, as regarded the prince Czartoryski, for he had made all the resistance that he could to the vivacities of the court; but he was now desirous that the evil should be repaired without sacrifice of dignity. He consequently had directed M. d'Oubril, *chargé-d'affaires*, at Paris, to complain in a note, at once firm and moderate, of the manner in which the French cabinet had thought fit to refer to certain reminiscences; to show pacific inclinations, but to require a reply upon the three or four usual subjects of Russian remonstrance, such as the occupation of Naples, the still deferred indemnity of the king of Piedmont, and the invasion of Hanover. M. d'Oubril had orders, should he obtain even only a specious explanation on those points, to content himself with it, and to remain at Paris, but to take his passports, should he be met by an obstinate and disdainful silence.

Prussia, which, to use the expression of Napoleon, *continually*

struggled between two giants, being informed of the precise situation of the Russian cabinet, had communicated it to M. de Talleyrand, through her minister, Lucchesini, and had said to him: "Defer the reply as long as possible; then give a reply which will furnish the dignity of Russia with a seeming satisfaction, and this northern tempest, with which it is sought to alarm Europe, will be stilled."

These various communications having arrived at Paris while Napoleon was at Boulogne, M. de Talleyrand had had recourse to that procrastinating policy, in which it has been seen that he was an adept. Napoleon had willingly acquiesced in it, neither seeking nor fearing war with the Continent, and rather desiring to terminate all by a direct expedition against England. He, therefore, continued his preparations at Boulogne, leaving M. d'Oubril, in the meantime, in suspense at Paris. Nevertheless, M. de Talleyrand, not attaching sufficient importance to the Russian note, and taking too literally the intention of Prussia, had too readily trusted that all difficulty could be escaped from by delays. M. d'Oubril, after having waited through the whole month of August, had at length required a reply. Napoleon, wearied with M. d'Oubril's questions, and, moreover, inclined to come to a categorical explanation with the Continental powers, since the return of Mr. Pitt to power, desired that a reply should be made. He had himself sent the form of the note that was to be transmitted to M. d'Oubril, and M. de Talleyrand, according to his custom, had done his utmost to soften it, both as to form and substance. But, such as he transmitted it, the note was little calculated to spare the dignity of the Russian cabinet, which was unhappily involved.

This note opposed to the wrongs charged against France the wrongs which were chargeable against Russia. Russia, it argued, ought to have no troops at Corfu, yet she was daily augmenting the number of her forces there. She ought to have refused all favour to the enemies of France, and she had not confined herself to giving shelter to emigrants; she had still further bestowed upon them public functions at foreign courts. That was a positive violation of the last treaty. Moreover, the Russian agents everywhere showed themselves hostile. Such a state of things precluded all idea of intimacy, and rendered impossible that concert which had been agreed upon between the two cabinets, in conducting the affairs of Italy and Germany. As for the occupation of Hanover and Naples, that had been an inevitable consequence of the war. If Russia had engaged to cause Malta to be evacuated by the English, the cause of the war being then removed, the countries occupied by France would have been instantly evacuated. But to endeavour to press upon France, without endeavouring equally to press upon England, was neither just nor becoming. If Russia pretended to constitute herself the arbitress between the two belligerent powers, to judge, not only of the grounds of the

quarrel, but also of the means employed to decide it, the arbitration should be both impartial and firm. France was determined to accept no other. If war was wished for, she was quite ready for it, for, after all, the late campaigns of Russia in the west did not warrant her in assuming towards France so lofty a tone as that which she now appeared to take. It was necessary that they should distinctly understand that the Emperor of the French was not the emperor of Turks, or of Persians. If, on the contrary, there was a desire to come to a better understanding with him, he was quite disposed to that; and, then, he assuredly would not refuse to do what had been promised, especially as regarded the king of Sardinia, but in the present state of relations, nothing could be obtained from him, for, as regarded him, threatening was the most inefficacious of all means.

This lofty note scarcely left M. d'Oubril any pretext for declaring himself satisfied. It was the consequence of the levities of his cabinet which, now wishing, with reference to Naples and to Hanover, to constitute itself judge of the means of war employed by the belligerent powers, and anon wishing to interfere as to some interior act, like that of the death of the duc d'Enghien, had laid itself open to having only unsatisfactory answers upon all the points upon which it touched. On consulting his instructions, M. d'Oubril deemed that it was his duty to demand his passports; but, that he might act in precise conformity to his instructions, he added that his departure was a simple interruption of diplomatic connexions between the two courts, but not a declaration of war; that when those connexions were no longer either useful or agreeable, there was no reason for continuing them; that, for the rest, Russia had no intention of resorting to arms; and that it was the French cabinet that would decide, by its posterior course of action, whether war was to follow this interruption of diplomatic relations.

M. d'Oubril, after this cold and yet pacific declaration, left Paris. Orders were sent to M. de Rayneval, who continued at St. Petersburg, as *chargé-d'affaires*, to return to France. M. d'Oubril set out at the end of August, and stopped some days at Mayence, to await the news of a free departure being permitted to M. de Rayneval.

It was evident that Russia, while endeavouring to evince its displeasure by the interruption of its relations with France, would, nevertheless, not resort to war unless a new European coalition should furnish her with an advantageous opportunity of doing so. All, consequently, in Napoleon's opinion, depended upon Austria. He put her, therefore, to close proof, that he might know what he had to expect, previous to giving himself up altogether to his maritime projects. The recognition of the imperial title that he had assumed being still withheld, he peremptorily demanded it. His intention of visiting the banks of the Rhine would shortly take him to Aix-la-Chapelle, and he required that M. de Co-

bentzel should pay his respects and deliver his credentials in that very city in which the Germanic emperors were accustomed to take the crown of Charlemagne. He declared that if satisfaction were not given him in this respect, M. de Champagny, who had been named minister of the interior, in the room of M. Chaptal, who had been called to the Senate, should have no successor appointed to him at Vienna, and that a withdrawal of ambassadors, between powers so closely neighbouring as France and Austria would not pass over so pacifically as between France and Russia. Finally, he required that the Russian note, already avoided at Ratisbon by an adjournment, but the fate of which would shortly have to be decided on, should be finally rejected, or, he repeated, he would address to the Diet such a reply as must inevitably give rise to war.

All this being done, Napoleon quitted Boulogne, where he had passed six weeks, and proceeded towards the departments of the Rhine. Before setting out he had the opportunity of witnessing a battle between the flotilla and the English division. On the 26th of August (8th Fructidor, year XII.) at two o'clock in the afternoon, he was in the roadstead inspecting the line of the flotilla, consisting, as usual, of from 150 to 200 boats and pinnaces. The English squadron, moored at a distance from the shore, consisted of two ships of the line, two frigates, seven corvettes, six brigs, two luggers, and one cutter, in all twenty sail. A corvette, detaching herself from the main body of the enemy's division, placed herself at the end of our line of broadsides, to reconnoitre it, and to discharge some broadsides at it. The admiral, on this, gave orders to the first division of gun-boats under the command of captain Leray, to weigh anchor and bear down altogether upon the corvette; the order was executed, and the corvette was obliged to retire immediately. Seeing this the English formed a detachment, consisting of one frigate, several corvettes or brigs, and the cutter, to compel our gun-boats to retire in their turn, and to prevent them from regaining their usual position. The Emperor, who was in his barge with admiral Bruix, the ministers of war and marine, and several marshals, went into the midst of the boats that were fighting, and, to give them the example had his barge steered right for the frigate, which was advancing, full sail. He knew that the sailors and soldiers, who admired his daring when ashore, sometimes asked each other whether he would be as daring on the sea. He wished to enlighten them on that head, and to accustom them carelessly to attack the great vessels of the enemy. He had his barge put well a-head of the French line, and as near as possible to the frigate. She, seeing the imperial barge, dressed out in colours, and, perhaps, suspecting the precious freight it bore, had reserved her fire. The minister of marine, fearing the consequences to the Emperor of such an act of daring, was about to seize the rudder and alter the barge's course, but an imperative gesture of Napoleon stopped the movement of the minister, and the barge

held on its course towards the frigate. Napoleon with telescope in hand was examining her, when suddenly she discharged her reserved broadside, and covered with her projectiles the barge that carried *Cæsar and his fortunes*. No one was wounded, and they got off with the mere splashing from the projectiles. All the French craft, witnesses of this scene, had advanced as rapidly as possible, in order to sustain the fire, and to cover the Emperor's barge by passing before it. The English division assailed in its turn by a shower of balls and grape-shot, began to fall astern by degrees. It was followed, but put about and bore down again towards the shore. In the meantime, a second division of gun-boats, under the command of captain Pevricu, had weighed anchor and made towards the enemy. Very shortly the frigate, much damaged and scarcely answering her helm, was obliged to stand out to sea. The corvettes followed the same course, some of them much damaged, and the cutter so riddled that she was seen to sink.

Napoleon quitted Boulogne, delighted with the battle he had witnessed, and the more so, that secret reports which reached him from the English coast, gave him the most satisfactory details as to both the physical and moral effects which the battle had produced. We had had but one man killed and seven wounded, one of them mortally. The English, according to the reports addressed to Napoleon, had had from twelve to fifteen men killed, and sixty wounded. Their vessels had suffered very much. The English officers had been struck with the bearing of our small vessels, and with the rapidity and precision of their fire. It was evident, that if these boats had to fear the ships on account of their size, they could oppose to them a power, very formidable from the multiplicity of their fire.*

Napoleon passed through Belgium, visited Mons and Valenciennes, and arrived at Aix-la-Chapelle on the 3rd of September. The Empress, who had gone to Plombières to take the waters, during Napoleon's stay on the coast, now joined him, to be present at the fêtes which were in preparation in the Rhenish provinces. M. de Talleyrand and several grand dignitaries and ministers were also there. M. de Cobentzel was punctual to the rendezvous given him. The emperor Francis, feeling the inconvenience of further delays, had taken, on the 10th of August, at an extraordinary conference of state, the imperial rank, and had assumed for himself and for his successors, the title of *electèd* Emperor of

* Napoleon wrote to Marshal Soult:

Aix-la-Chapelle, 8th of September, 1804.

The little battle at which I was present on the eve of my departure from Boulogne has produced an immense effect in England. It has created a real alarm there. On this subject you will see some very curious details translated for the newspapers. The howitzers which are on board the gun-boats tell admirably. The private information that I have received makes the loss of the enemy sixty wounded, and from twelve to fifteen killed. The frigate was much damaged.—*State Paper Office.*

the Romans, always august, *hereditary* emperor of Austria, king of Germany, Bohemia, and of Hungary, arch-duke of Austria, duke of Styria, &c. He had then directed M. de Cobentzel to repair to Aix-la-Chapelle, there to present his credentials to the Emperor Napoleon. To this procedure, which the place at which it took place rendered still more significant, was joined a formal, and for the moment, sincere assurance of a desire to live in peace with France, and the promise, in compliance with Napoleon's desire, to take no heed of the Russian note to Ratisbon. That note, in fact, was done away with by an adjournment *sine die*.

The Emperor of the French gave M. de Cobentzel a gracious reception, and lavished upon him the most encouraging declarations in return for his own. With M. de Cobentzel there presented themselves, M. de Souza, the bearer of the recognition of Portugal, the bailiff of Ferrato, with that of the Order of Malta, and a crowd of foreign ministers, who, knowing how agreeable their presence at Aix-la-Chapelle would be, had determined upon the compliment of soliciting leave to go thither. They were received there with great pleasure, and with the grace which gratified sovereigns can always command. This assemblage was singularly brilliant by the concourse of both foreigners and French, by the splendour displayed, and by the military pomp. The reminiscences of Charlemagne were recalled there, with a scarcely disguised purpose. Napoleon descended into the vault in which the great man of the middle age had been interred, curiously examined his reliques, and gave the clergy striking proofs of his munificence. No sooner had he quitted these fêtes, than he returned to his serious occupations, and traversed all the country between the Meuse and the Rhine, Juliers, Venloo, Cologne, and Coblenz, inspecting at once the roads and the fortifications, everywhere amending the designs of his engineers, with that correctness of glance and profound experience, which belonged only to himself, and ordered new works, which would render that part of the frontiers of the Rhine invincible.

At Mayence, where he arrived towards the end of September (the commencement of the year XIII.), new pomps awaited him. All the German princes, whose states were in the neighbourhood, and who had an interest in paying court to their powerful neighbour, hastened to offer him their congratulations and homages, not through others, but in person. The prince arch-chancellor, owing to France the preservation of his title and of his opulence, came to render homage to Napoleon at Mayence, his former capital. With him there also presented themselves the princes of the house of Hesse, the duke and the duchess of Bavaria, and the venerable elector of Baden, the oldest of the princes of Europe, who was accompanied by his son and grandson. These personages and others who succeeded them at Mayence, were received with a magnificence far superior to that which they could have met with even at Vienna. They were all impressed with the prompti-

tude with which the crowned soldier had taken the bearing of a sovereign. That was caused by his having early commanded men, not by virtue of a vain title, but by virtue of his genius, his character, and his sword; and, as regarded command, that was an apprenticeship far superior to that which can be served in courts.

The rejoicings which had taken place at Aix-la-Chapelle, were renewed at Mayence, in presence of the French and Germans who had had hastened thither to be close spectators of the spectacle which at this moment excited the curiosity of all Europe. Napoleon invited to the fêtes of his coronation the greater number of the princes who visited him. In the midst of that tumult, withdrawing himself every morning from the vanities of the throne, he traversed the banks of the Rhine, and examined in all its details the fortress of Mayence, which he regarded as the most important on the Continent, not so much for its works as for its position on the bank of that great river, along which for ten centuries Europe has battled against France. He ordered the works which would give it the strength of which it was susceptible. The sight of this place inspired him with the idea of a most useful precaution, of which no one else would have thought had he not gone to the very spot. The recent treaties had ordained the destruction of the forts of Cassel and of Kehl. The first forms the outlet of Mayence, and the second the outlet of Strasburg, on the right bank of the Rhine. These two fortresses would lose their value without those two *têtes de pont*, which served them at once as means of defence, and as means of crossing to the other bank of the river. He gave orders for getting together great quantities of wood, and every kind of materials necessary for sudden works, together with fifteen thousand spades and pickaxes, so that within four-and-twenty hours from eight to ten thousand labourers could be set to work upon the opposite side of the river to reconstruct the destroyed works. The want of tools alone, wrote he to the engineers, would cause you a loss of a week. He even laid down all the plans for the immediate commencement of the works at a telegraphic order.

Napoleon, after having stayed at Mayence and the new departments long enough to arrange all his plans, set out for Paris, visited Luxembourg in passing, and reached St. Cloud on the 12th of October, 1804 (20th Vendemiaire, year XIII).

He had, for a time, flattered himself with the hope of presenting to France and to Europe an extraordinary spectacle, by crossing the strait of Calais with a hundred and fifty thousand men, and returning to Paris master of the world. Providence, which had reserved so much glory for him, had not permitted him to add so much splendour to his coronation. There remained to him another means of dazzling men's minds; that of causing the Pope to descend for an instant from the pontifical throne, to go to Paris itself to bless his sceptre and his throne. That was a great moral

triumph to gain over the enemies of France, and he did not doubt that he should succeed in gaining it. All was prepared for his coronation, to which he had invited the principal authorities of the Empire, numerous deputations of the army and navy, and a crowd of foreign princes. Thousands of workmen had been employed upon the preparations for the ceremony in the church of Notre Dame. A rumour of the coming of the Pope had got abroad, and the public mind was struck with wonder and admiration, the devout population enraptured, the emigrant party deeply annoyed, and Europe at once astonished and jealous. The question had been discussed where all business was discussed, in the Council of State. In that body, in which the most complete freedom had been left to opinions, the objections engendered by the Concordat were reproduced in still greater strength by the idea of, in some sort, submitting the coronation of the new monarch to the head of the Church. Those repugnances, so ancient in France, even among religious men, to ultramontane domination were all reawakened at once. It was said that this was to raise up again all the pretensions of the clergy, to proclaim a dominant religion, to make it appear that the recently elected Emperor held his crown not from the will of the nation and the exploits of the army, but from the sovereign Pontiff, a dangerous supposition, for he who gave the crown could also take it away again.

Napoleon, out of patience with so many objections to a ceremony which would be a real triumph over European malevolence, took up the argument in person, pointed out all the advantages of the presence of the Pope at such a solemnity, the effect that it would produce upon the religious public, and upon the whole world, the strength that it would bring to the new order of things, in the maintenance of which all the men of the Revolution were alike interested; he maintained that the pretensions of a Gregory VII. were incompatible with the spirit of the times, that the ceremony in question was simply an invocation of the protection of Heaven in favour of a new dynasty; an invocation made in the ordinary forms of the worship, which was oldest, most general, and most popular in France; that, moreover, without a religious pomp there would be no real pomp, especially in Catholic countries, and that if priests were to figure at the coronation, it was better to call the greatest and most highly qualified, and, if possible, the highest of them all, the Pope himself. Pushing his opponents as he pushed his enemies in war, that is to say, to extremities, he finished by this pointed question, which terminated the discussion at once: "Gentlemen," said he, "you are deliberating at Paris, at the Tuileries; suppose that you were deliberating at London, in the British cabinet—in a word, suppose that you were the ministers of the king of England, and that you were informed that the Pope at this moment crosses the Alps to crown the Emperor of the French; would you look upon that as a triumph

for England or for France?" To this interrogation, at once so pointed and so home-thrust, no one made any reply, and the journey of the Pope to Paris encountered no further objection.

But to consent to that journey was not all; it still remained to get the consent of the court of Rome, and that was no ordinary difficulty. To succeed it was necessary to employ great skill, to combine much firmness with much gentleness; and the French ambassador, cardinal Fesch, with the irascibility of his temper and the inflexibility of his pride, was far less qualified for the task than his predecessor, M. de Cacault. This is the opportunity to describe that personage, who figured both in the Church and in the Empire. Cardinal Fesch was corpulent, of middle height, and of mediocre abilities, vain, ambitious, hasty, but firm; he was destined to prove a great obstacle to Napoleon. During the Reign of Terror, he, like so many other priests, had thrown aside the ensigns of the priesthood, and, with the ensigns, the obligations. Having become commissary of war in the army of Italy, no one, judging from his way of life, would have supposed him to be a former minister of religion. But when Napoleon, restoring all things to their proper places, had restored the priests to the altar, cardinal Fesch thought of returning to his first profession, and of obtaining in it the rank which his powerful relationship warranted him in hoping for. Napoleon would only restore him on condition of an exemplary conduct; and the abbé Fesch, with a rare moral resolution, altered his manners, concealed his habits, and gave, in a seminary, the spectacle of an edifying penitence. Having received the archbishopric of Lyons, which had been kept vacant for him, and a cardinal's hat, he immediately showed himself, not the supporter of Napoleon, but rather his antagonist in the Church; and it was already evident that he intended some day to compel a nephew, to whom he owed every thing, to be dependent upon an uncle supported by the secret ill-will of the clergy.

Napoleon had complained bitterly to the prudent Portalis of this new instance of family ingratitude, and Portalis had advised him to rid himself of that uncle by sending him as ambassador to Rome.

"There," said M. Portalis, "he will have enough to do with the pride and prejudices of the Roman court, and he will employ the faults of his disposition to your service instead of to your injury." It was to this end, and not for the purpose of some day making him pope, as was pretended by the retailers of false reports, that Napoleon had accredited cardinal Fesch to the court of Rome. No pope could have been more disagreeable, more hostile, more dangerous to him.

Such was the personage who was to negotiate the journey of Pius VII. to Paris.

As soon as Pius VII. had learned from the extraordinary

courier of cardinal Caprara the desires conceived by Napoleon, he was seized with perplexity, and for some time remained agitated by the most opposite feelings. He fully comprehended that this was an opportunity to render new services to religion, to obtain concessions for it which hitherto had been constantly refused; perhaps, even to obtain the restitution of the rich provinces which had been taken from the patrimony of St. Peter. But then, what risks were to be run! What painful remarks to endure from Europe! How many possible annoyances in the midst of that revolutionary capital, infected with the spirit of the philosophers, still swarming with their followers, and inhabited by the most satirical people upon the face of the earth! All these prospects presenting themselves at once to the mind of the Pope, sensitive and irritable as it was, agitated him to such a degree as obviously to affect his health. His minister and favourite councillor, the cardinal-secretary Gonsalvi, immediately became the confidant of his agitations.* He communicated to him his own anxieties, and received the communication of those of the cardinal, and both found themselves almost in agreement. They dreaded what the world would say of this consecration of an illegitimate prince, of an usurper, as Napoleon was called by a certain party; they feared the discontent of the courts of Europe, and especially that of the court of Vienna, which looked with a deadly dislike upon the rising of a new Emperor of the West; they feared from the party of the *ancien régime*, a far greater and better-grounded outcry than that which was raised at the epoch of the Concordat; better grounded, because in this case the interests of religion were less evident than the interests of a man. They feared that when the Pope was once in France, something unforeseen and inadmissible would be demanded from him with respect to religion, which he would have difficulty enough in refusing while at Rome, and which he could still less refuse at Paris, which would lead to troublesome, perhaps violent, disagreement. They did not go so far as to fear an actual violence, like the detention of Pius VI. at Valence; but they confusedly pictured to themselves strange and alarming scenes. It is true, that cardinal Gonsalvi, who had been to Paris about the Concordat, and cardinal Caprara, who had passed his life in that capital, had very different ideas of Napoleon, his courtesy, and the delicacy of his proceedings, from those which generally obtained in that court of old priests, who never thought of Paris but as an abyss governed by a fearful giant. Cardinal Caprara, especially, never ceased to repeat, that if the Emperor was the most passionate and imperious of men, he was also the most

* I do not suppose any invention here, I do not imagine any. What follows is faithfully extracted from the secret correspondence of cardinal Gonsalvi with cardinal Caprara, which correspondence remains in the possession of France.

generous and amiable when no offence was offered to him ; that the Pope would be delighted to see him, and would obtain from him whatever he wished for religion and for the Church ; that now was the time to set out, as the war tended towards some decisive crisis ; that there would once more be vanquished and victors, and new distributions of territory, and that the Pope would perhaps obtain the Legations ; that nothing had been promised, indeed, but that that, at bottom, was the intention of Napoleon, and that he only required an opportunity to realise it. These representations somewhat calmed the disturbed imagination of the luckless Pope ; but Paris, the capital of that frightful Revolution which had destroyed kings, queens, and thousands of priests, was an object of undefinable terror to him.

Then he was assailed by the opposite fears. No doubt Europe would speak ill, should he go to Paris ; it was possible that in that capital he might be exposed to unknown and fatal dangers ; but should he not go, what would be the results to religion and the Holy See ? All the states of Italy were within the grasp of Napoleon. Piedmont, Lombardy, Tuscany, and even Naples, despite the Russian protection, were swarming with French troops. Out of respect to the Holy See the Roman state had alone been spared. What would not Napoleon do, if irritated and affronted by a refusal which would infallibly be known to all Europe, and which would be taken for a denial of his rights, set forth by the Holy See ? All these contradictory ideas formed a most painful ebb and flow in the minds of the Pope and his secretary of state, Gonsalvi. The cardinal Gonsalvi, who had already braved the danger, and who had found Paris any thing but unpleasant, was less agitated. He was only anxious about Europe, its opinions, and the displeasure of all the old cabinets.

However, the Pope and the cardinal, expecting to receive from Paris such urgings as would put it out of their power to refuse, wished to have the sanction of the sacred college. They did not dare to consult it as a whole, for it contained cardinals connected with foreign courts, who probably would betray the secret. They selected ten of the most influential members from the congregation of cardinals, and submitted to them, under the seal of confession, the communications that had been made by cardinal Caprara and cardinal Fesch. Unfortunately, these ten cardinals were divided in opinion, and it was to be feared that the same would be the case with the sacred college. The Pope and his minister then judged that it was necessary to refer to ten other cardinals, making twenty. That consultation, which remained secret, gave the following results. Five cardinals were absolutely opposed to the demand of Napoleon, fifteen were favourable to it, but with some objections and upon some conditions. Of the five who were against, only two grounded their refusal upon the illegitimacy of the sovereign whose coronation was in question. All the five urged that it was to consecrate and ratify all that the

new monarch had done or permitted to be done to the injury of religion; for, if he was the author of the Concordat, he was no less so of the Organic Articles, and, when he was general, had deprived the Holy See of the Legations; that again, more recently, in concurring in the secularisations, he had assisted in despoiling the Germanic Church of its property; that, if he wished to be treated as a Charlemagne, he must conduct himself like that Emperor, and display the same munificence towards the Holy See.

The fifteen cardinals who were inclined to consent, with some restrictive conditions, had objected the opinions and the discontent of the European courts, the inconsistency with the papal dignity of the Pope going to Paris to crown the new Emperor, while the emperors of the Holy Empire had all come to be crowned at Rome, at the foot of the altar of St. Peter; the unpleasantness of meeting the constitutional bishops whose retractation was incomplete, or who, subsequent to their reconciliation with the Church had raised new controversies; the false position of the Holy Father, in presence of some high functionaries, as, for example, M. de Talleyrand, who had broken the bands of the Church to enter those of matrimony; the danger of being exposed, in a hostile capital, to inadmissible demands, the refusal of which would probably lead to a violent rupture; and, finally, the danger of such a journey for a health so delicate as that of Pius VII. Referring to the censure which had been incurred in the last century by Pope Pius VI., when he made the journey to Vienna to visit Joseph II., and returned without having obtained any thing favourable to religion; the fifteen cardinals maintained that there could, in the eyes of the Christian world, be but one valid excuse for the act of condescension that was demanded of Pius VII., which was to demand and to obtain certain obvious advantages, such as the revocation of a portion of the Organic Articles, the abolition of the measures adopted by the Italian Republic respecting the clergy, the revocation of what the French commissioner had done at Parma and Plaisance, relatively to the church of that country, and finally, territorial indemnities for the losses which the Holy See had suffered, and, above all, the adoption of the ancient ceremonial observed at the coronation of Germanic emperors. Some of the fifteen cardinals now added, as an express condition, that the coronation should take place, not in Paris, but in Italy, when Napoleon should visit his transalpine states, and insisted upon this condition, as indispensable to the dignity of the Holy See.

Somewhat re-assured by these opinions, the Pope was inclined to consent to the wishes of Napoleon, insisting, however, in a peremptory manner, upon the conditions demanded by the fifteen consenting cardinals, and he had communicated that resolution to cardinal Fesch. But, in the interval, there had arrived at Rome

the text of the *Senatus Consultum* of the 28th Floréal, and the formula of the Emperor's oath, containing these words:—"I swear to respect, and to cause to be respected, THE LAWS OF THE CONCORDAT, AND THE FREEDOM OF RELIGION." The laws of the Concordat appeared to include the Organic Articles; the freedom of religion seemed to carry with it the consecration of heresies, and never had the court of Rome, on its part, admitted such a freedom. This oath suddenly became an argument for an absolute refusal. However, the twenty cardinals were again consulted, and this time there were only five who considered that the oath was not an insurmountable obstacle; while fifteen replied that it was impossible for the Pope to anoint the new monarch.

Although the secret had been well kept by the cardinal, the news from Paris, and some inevitable indiscretions of the agents of the Holy See, caused the negotiations to be divulged, and the public, consisting of prelates and diplomatists, who surround the Roman court, overflowed with censures and sarcasms. Pius VII. was styled *the chaplain of the Emperor of the French*, for that Emperor, standing in need of the ministry of the Pope, had not come to Rome as the Charlemagnes, the Othos, the Barbarossas, and the Charles V., of the olden day, had done; he had summoned the Pope to his palace.

This outcry, added to the difficulties of the oath, shook the determination of Pius VII., and the cardinal Gonsalvi, and they both agreed to the resolution of sending an answer, apparently favourable, but in reality negative, for it consisted in an acquiescence, loaded with conditions which the Emperor could not admit.

The cardinal Fesch had hastened to reply to the principal difficulty raised against the oath, and drawn from the engagement of the sovereign to respect liberty of religion, by saying that this engagement was not the canonical approbation of dissenting creeds, but the promise to permit the free exercise of all religions, and not to persecute any, which was conformable to the spirit of the Church, and to the principles adopted in the present age by all sovereigns. These very sensible explanations had, according to cardinal Gonsalvi, only a private character, not a public character, and could not excuse the court of Rome in the eyes of the faithful, or in the eyes of God, if it were wanting to the Catholic faith.

Although of any thing but an insinuating turn, cardinal Fesch had contrived to penetrate, by means of fear and presents, into the secrets of more than one personage of the Roman court, and was pretty correctly acquainted with both the objections and their authors. He communicated all that he knew to Paris, that the Emperor might perfectly understand how matters stood; and yet, being unaware to what extent the Pope desired to shelter himself from what was required of him, by proposing unacceptable conditions, he gave greater hope of success than he at the time

had reason to entertain, adding, however, that, in order to succeed, it was necessary to give the Holy See entirely satisfactory promises and explanations.

These communications, being transmitted to Paris, cruelly embarrassed cardinal Caprara, for they were taken for a consent, dependent only upon some explanations to be given, and the Pope's journey to Paris was held to be certain. Cardinal Caprara, who was acquainted with the real dispositions of his court, and did not dare to disclose them, was trembling and confused. The empress Josephine was even more anxious than Napoleon himself for the coronation, which seemed to her the pronouncing of Heaven's pardon for an act of usurpation. Accordingly, she received cardinal Caprara at St. Cloud, and lavished the kindest attentions upon him. Napoleon, on his part, testified his lively satisfaction, and both told the cardinal that they deemed the matter arranged; that the Pope would be received at Paris with all the honours due to the head of the universal Church, and that religion would reap infinite benefits from his journey. Napoleon, without knowing all, yet surmised a part of the secret wishes of the court of Rome, and shunned the approach of cardinal Caprara, from fear of being asked either for something utterly impossible, as the revocation of the Organic Articles, or very difficult, under the circumstances, as the restitution of the Legations. The cardinal, therefore, was doubly embarrassed, by the hopes, too easily conceived in Paris, and by the difficulty of getting access to Napoleon, to obtain from him such promises as would determine the court of Rome.

The abbé Bernier, who had become bishop of Orleans, the man whose at once prudent and profound intellect had been employed in overcoming all the difficulties of the Concordat, was again very serviceable on this occasion. He was intrusted with the replies to be made to the Roman court. He conferred for this purpose, with cardinal Caprara, and showed him that after the hopes that had been conceived by the imperial family, and the expectation to which the French public had been excited, it was impossible to draw back without insulting Napoleon, and risking the most serious consequences.

The bishop of Orleans drew up a despatch which would have done honour to the most learned and practised diplomatist. He referred to the services rendered by Napoleon to the Church, and the claims that he had upon its gratitude, the benefit that religion might still expect from him, the effect, above all, that the presence of Pius VII. would produce upon the French people, and the impulse which it would give to religious ideas. He explained the proper construction to be put upon the oath, and the expressions relative to freedom of religion; moreover, he proposed an expedient, it was to have two ceremonies; the one, civil, in which the Emperor would take the oath, and assume the crown; the other, religious, in which he would have that crown blessed by the

Pontiff. Finally, he positively declared that it was for the interests of religion and of the affairs cognate thereto, that the presence of the Pope at Paris was requested. There were sufficient hopes hidden beneath this language personally to win over the Pope, and to furnish him with a pretext on which he could justify to Christendom his condescension towards Napoleon.

To this official despatch of the French government, cardinal Caprara added some private letters, in which he described what was passing in France, the good which was to be accomplished there, and the evil that was to be repaired, and positively affirmed that a refusal could not be given but with the greatest perils, and that the Pope would reap from his journey nothing but subjects of satisfaction.

A second time transported to Rome, the negotiation was destined to be successful. The Pope and the cardinal Gonsalvi, enlightened by the letters of the legate and of the bishop of Orleans, comprehended the impossibility of a refusal, and, urged by cardinal Fesch, ended by agreeing. But they still felt the necessity of once more consulting the cardinals, and they were especially alarmed at that proposal of the bishop of Orleans, in which he started the idea of a double ceremony. The Pope admitted but one of them, for he wished not only to sprinkle holy water over the new Emperor, but also to crown him. The cardinals, therefore, were consulted anew, upon the explanations that had been sent from Paris. Cardinal Fesch obtained access to them, and struck fear into their hearts, which he was better calculated to do than he was to persuade. The reply was favourable, but they demanded an official note explanatory of the oath, promising but a single ceremony, and containing an express mention of the terms on which the Pope was to proceed to Paris.

Pius VII., therefore, caused it to be declared, that he had consented to go to Paris, on condition that the oath should be explained as not implying approbation of heretical dogmas, but the simple physical toleration of dissenting religions; that they should promise to listen to him when he should remonstrate against certain Organic Articles, or reclaim in behalf of the interests of the Church and the Holy See (the Legations were not named); that access to him should not be granted to the bishops who had disputed their submission to the Holy See, until after a new and complete submission on their part; that he should not be exposed to the meeting with persons in a situation repugnant to the laws of the Church (the wife of the minister for foreign affairs was specifically pointed out); that the ceremonial observed should be that of the court of Rome crowning the emperors, or of the archbishop of Rheims crowning the kings of France; that there should be but one ceremony, by the ministry of the Pope exclusively; that a deputation of two French bishops should be the bearers to Pius VII. of a letter of invitation, in which the Emperor should say that, detained by cogent considerations in the heart of his Empire,

and having much to consult upon with the Holy Father concerning the interests of religion, he begged him to visit him in France to bless his crown, and treat of the interests of the Church; that no sort of demand should be addressed to the Pope; and that his return to Italy should in nowise be obstructed. The pontifical cabinet finally expressed its desire that the coronation should be postponed to the 25th of December, the day on which Charlemagne had been proclaimed emperor, for the Pope, cruelly agitated, needed to pass some time at Castel-Gandolpho, to take some little repose, and moreover, could not leave Rome without arranging many affairs of the Roman government.

There was nothing but what was very admissible in these conditions, for in promising to listen to the remonstrances of the Pope against certain of the Organic Articles, no pledge was given to act upon those remonstrances, in the event of their being contrary to the principles of the French Church. Cardinal Fesch, indeed, had honestly declared that those of the Organic Articles which were most offensive to Rome would never be modified; those which required the consent of the civil authority to the introduction of papal bulls into France. Again, there could be no scruple as to promising a single ceremony; the observance of the Roman or the French ceremonial; a hope as to the territorial amelioration of the Holy See, for Napoleon had often contemplated this; the sending a deputation solemnly to invite the Pope to proceed to Paris; or the allegation of the interests of the Church as causing his journey; the repression of the four bishops who had relapsed from their reconciliation, and disturbed the Church in a mischievous manner. Finally, it was quite convenient to engage not to demand anything of Pius VII., and to leave him his liberty, for never had a contrary design entered the minds of Napoleon and his government. In fact, it was only in the minds of those trembling and enfeebled old men that the supposition could have birth, of the liberty of the Pope being at all endangered in France.

As soon as the consent was obtained, cardinal Fesch declared that the Emperor would defray all the expenses of the journey, which, for an impoverished government, was one great difficulty removed. He further made known the details of the magnificent reception that was in reserve for the Holy Father. Unfortunately, he worried him by accessory exactions, which were altogether misplaced. He desired that twelve cardinals, besides the secretary of state, Gonsalvi, should accompany the Pope; he wished, contrary to the established custom, by which the cardinals take precedence in the order of seniority, to have the first place in the pontifical carriage, in quality of ambassador, grand-almoner, and uncle of the Emperor. All this was useless, and gave to timid and punctilious men as much pain as the most serious difficulties.

Pius VII. yielded upon some points, but was inflexible as to the number of cardinals, and as to being accompanied by the secretary

of state, Gonsalvi. In their vague terrors Pius VII. and Gonsalvi had determined upon a singular precaution for providing against all the dangers of the Church. The Holy Father, who imagined his health worse than it really was, and mistook the nervous agitation into which he was thrown for a dangerous illness, thought it very likely that he might die on his journey. He also thought it possible that advantage might be taken of his presence in France. For this second case he had drawn up and signed his abdication, and placed it in the hands of Gonsalvi, in order that he might be able to declare the papacy vacant. Further, in the event of his death or abdication, it would be requisite to convoke the sacred college, in order to fill the chair of St. Peter. It was necessary, therefore, to have as many cardinals as possible at Rome, and among them the man whose ability rendered him the most capable of directing the church in grave conjunctures, that is to say, cardinal Gonsalvi himself. There was still another reason that decided the Pope upon acting thus. He had not been able to avoid an explanation with the court of Austria, to cause it to agree to his journey to Paris. Austria, appreciating his position, had admitted the necessity he was under of making the journey, but demanded a guarantee, whereby he promised not to treat at Paris about the arrangements of the Germanic Church, which were to be the result of the recess of 1803. It was especially on this account that Austria dreaded the Pope's stay in France. Pius VII. had solemnly promised not to treat with Napoleon upon any question foreign to the French Church. But in order that faith should be placed in his promise, it was necessary that he should not take with him to Paris the cardinal Gonsalvi, the man by whom all the important business of the Roman court was transacted. For these reasons Pius VII. refused to take more than six cardinals with him, and persisted in his resolution to leave the secretary of state, Gonsalvi, at Rome. He consented to an arrangement as to the personal pretensions of cardinal Fesch. He was to occupy the first place from their arrival in France.

These points being settled, the Pope proceeded to Castel-Gandolpho, where the pure air, the calm which follows a resolution taken, and the news, every day more satisfactory, of the reception that was in preparation for him at Paris, re-established his much shaken health. Napoleon considered what he had obtained as a grand victory, which put the last seal on his rights, and which, in point of legitimacy, left him nothing more to desire. At the same time he would not lay aside his proper character amidst these external pomps; he would neither do nor promise any thing opposed to his own dignity, or to the principles of his government. Cardinal Fesch having informed him that it would be sufficient to depute to the Pope some general enjoying a high reputation, he sent general Caffarelli as the bearer of his invitation, and he couched that invitation in respectful, and even caressing terms, but

without giving any intimation that he invited the Pope to France on any other business than that of the coronation. The letter, in which a perfect dignity was preserved, ran thus:

“MOST HOLY FATHER:

“The happy effect produced upon the morality and the character of my people by the re-establishment of religion, induces me to beg your holiness to give me a new proof of your interest in my destiny and in that of this great nation, in one of the most important conjunctures presented by the annals of the world. I beg you to come and give, to the highest degree, a religious character to the anointing and coronation of the first Emperor of the French. That ceremony will acquire a new lustre from being performed by your holiness in person. It will bring down upon myself and our people the blessing of God, whose decrees rule the destiny alike of empires and of families.

“Your holiness is aware of the affectionate sentiments I have long borne towards you, and can thence judge of the pleasure that this occurrence will afford me of testifying them anew.

“And hereupon, we pray God that He may preserve you, most Holy Father, for many years, to rule and govern our mother, the holy Church.

“Your dutiful son,

“NAPOLEON.”

This letter was accompanied by urgent entreaties that the Pope would arrive towards the end of November, instead of on the 25th of December. Napoleon did not disclose his real reason for wishing the ceremony to take place at the earlier epoch; that reason was no other than his project of a descent upon England, prepared for December. He alleged a reason, which was true, indeed, but less important; the inconvenience of too long detaining at Paris all the civil and military authorities, who were already convoked thither.

General Caffarelli, having set out, and travelled with all speed, reached Rome in the night of the 28th to the 29th of September. Cardinal Fesch presented him to the Holy Father, who gave him a truly paternal reception. Pius VII. received the Emperor's letter from the hands of general Caffarelli, and deferred reading it until after the audience. But when he had read it, and found no allegation of religious affairs as the cause of his journey to Paris, he was deeply grieved, and was thrown into a state of nervous agitation, which excited the most lively anxiety. At bottom, what really affected that respectable Pontiff, as it does all high-souled princes, was his honour, the dignity of his crown. He considered these compromised if the interests of religion were not set forth as the cause of his journey. The nickname of *chaplain to Napoleon*, which had been given to him by his enemies, deeply wounded him. He summoned cardinal Fesch, and said to him, “*It is poison that you have brought me.*” He added that he would not reply to such a letter; and that he would not go to Paris, for faith had not been kept with him. Cardinal Fesch en-

deavoured to soothe the irritated Pope, and considered that a new consultation of cardinals would overcome this last difficulty. All began to feel the impossibility of drawing back, and by means of a last explanatory note, signed by the cardinal-ambassador, the difficulty was removed. It was settled that the Pope, on account of All Saints' day, should set out on the 2nd of November, and reach Fontainebleau on the 27th.

While this was going on at Rome, the Emperor Napoleon had prepared every thing at Paris to give a prodigious splendour to the ceremony. He had invited to it the princes of Baden, the prince arch-chancellor of the Germanic Empire, and numerous deputations, selected from the administration, the magistracy, and the army. He had committed to the bishop Bernier, and to the arch-chancellor Cambacérès, the task of examining the ceremonial observed at the coronation of emperors and kings, and of suggesting the modifications that the manners and spirit of the times, and even the prejudices of France against the authority of Rome rendered it necessary to effect in it. He had prescribed the utmost secrecy to them, in order that those questions should not become the subject of mischievous disputes, and reserved to himself the final decision on whatever was doubtful.

The two rituals, the Roman and the French, contained points of procedure, which would have been equally difficult to render palatable to public taste. According to each ceremonial, the monarch arrived without the ensigns of supreme power, such as the sceptre, the sword, and the crown, and received them only from the hand of the Pope. Further, the crown was placed upon his head. By the French ritual, the peers, by the Roman ritual, the bishops, held the crown above the head of the kneeling monarch, and the Pope, laying his hands upon it, lowered it upon his brow. Messrs. Bernier and Cambacérès, after suppressing certain forms that were too much in contradiction to the feelings of the time, had decided for preserving the last part of the ceremony, substituting for the peers of the French ritual, and for the bishops of the Roman ritual, the six grand dignitaries of the Empire, but still leaving it to the Pope, according to the ancient custom, to place the crown on the sovereign's head. Napoleon, grounding his argument upon the spirit of the nation and of the army, maintained that he could not thus receive the crown from the Pontiff; that the nation and the army, from whom he held it, would be offended at the sight of a ceremony at variance with fact, and with the independence of the throne. On this point he was inflexible, saying that he, better than any one, knew the real sentiments of France, tending, no doubt, towards religious ideas, but on that very account always ready to censure those which went beyond certain limits. He was resolved, then, to present himself at the church with his imperial ensigns; that is to say, as an emperor, and only to give them to the Pope to be blessed. He consented to be blessed, consecrated, but not

crowned. The arch-chancellor, admitting what was correct, in the opinion of Napoleon, pointed out the not inferior danger of offending the Pope, already much chagrined, and of depriving the ceremony of an important and valuable conformity with the antique forms in use from the days of Pepin and Charlemagne. Messrs. Cambacérès and Bernier, who were both intimately connected with the legate, were commissioned to procure his assent to the wishes of the Emperor. Cardinal Caprara, knowing how important forms were to his court, considered that he ought not to determine the question without obtaining the opinion of the Pope, but, at the same time, that it was best not to make any communication to the Holy See, lest new difficulties should be created. Satisfied that when the Pope should have once arrived, he would be at once reassured and delighted by the reception which was prepared for him, the cardinal believed that every thing would be more easily arranged at Paris, under the influence of an unexpected gratification, than at Rome, under the influence of the most vague alarms.

These difficulties being surmounted, there remained others, which originated in the bosom of the imperial family. The parts of the wife, the brothers, and the sisters of the Emperor, in this ceremony, had to be decided upon. First, it was to be settled whether Josephine should be crowned and anointed, like Napoleon himself. She ardently desired it, for it was a new tie to her husband—a new guarantee against a future divorce, which was the haunting anxiety of her life. Napoleon hesitated between his tenderness for her, and the secret presentiments of his policy, when a domestic scene almost produced the ruin of the unfortunate Josephine. All were eager and busy around the new monarch; brothers, sisters, and relations. All were anxious that in this ceremony, which seemed to consecrate them all, for a part consistent with their existing pretensions and future hopes. On witnessing this excitement, and the importunities of which Napoleon was the object, especially on the part of one of his sisters, Josephine, agitated, and devoured by jealousy, manifested frightfully injurious suspicions of that sister, and of Napoleon himself, suspicions in accordance with the atrocious calumnies of the emigrant party. Napoleon was suddenly transported with a violent anger, and, deriving from that anger the power of rising above his affection, he told Josephine that he would separate from her;* that, moreover, it would at a future time be necessary to do so, and that it would be better to do so at once, previous to having formed still closer ties. He called for his two adoptive children, and communicated his resolution, and plunged them into the deepest grief by the intelligence. Hor-

* I here give the faithful account of a lady of unquestionable veracity, who was an eye-witness, and attached to the Imperial family, and who has this reminiscence in her MS. memoirs.

tense and Eugène Beauharnois declared, with a resolution at once calm and sad, that they would follow their mother into the retreat to which she was to be condemned. Josephine, prudently counselled, displayed a submissive and resigned grief. The contrast between her grief, and the satisfaction displayed by the rest of the family, rent the heart of Napoleon, and he could not resolve to see exiled and unfortunate that wife, the companion of his youth, and exiled and unfortunate with her, those children who had become the objects of his paternal tenderness. He caught Josephine in his arms, and told her, in a burst of tenderness, that he should never have the strength to part from her, even should his policy require him to do so; and then he promised her that she should be crowned with him, and should receive by his side, and from the hand of the Pope, the divine consecration.

Josephine, with her characteristic mobility, passed from alarm to the most lively satisfaction; and gave herself up with a childish joy to the preparations for the coronation.

Napoleon, secretly cherishing the design of some day re-establishing the Empire of the West, wished his throne to be surrounded by vassal kings. For the present he had made his brothers, Joseph and Louis, grand dignitaries of the Empire; he intended soon to make them kings, and he had even now prepared a throne in Lombardy for Joseph. His design was, that on becoming kings, they should still remain grand dignitaries of the Empire. They were to bear the same relation to the French Empire of the West as the princes of Saxony, Brandenburg, Bohemia, Bavaria, Hanover, &c., bore to the Germanic Empire. It was necessary that the ceremony of the coronation should correspond to that design, and be an emblem of the reality that was in preparation. He had not allowed that the bishops or the peers should hold the crown suspended above his head, or even that the chief of bishops, the bishop of Rome, should place it on his brow. For similar reasons, it was his will that his brothers, destined to be vassal kings of the Grand Empire, should take beside him a position which should plainly indicate that future vassalage. He therefore required that when he, clad in the imperial robes, should proceed to the interior of the church, from the throne to the altar, from the altar to the throne, his brothers should bear the train of his robes. He required this not only for himself but also for the Empress. It was the princesses, his sisters, who were to perform to Josephine the service that his brothers were to perform to him. An energetic expression of his will was required to obtain this. Although his kindness rendered domestic quarrels painful to him, he was very absolute when his resolutions concerned the views of his policy.

It was now November; every thing was in readiness at Notre Dame. The deputations had arrived; the tribunals had adjourned; sixty bishops or archbishops, attended by their clergy

had abandoned the duties of the altar. The generals, the admirals, the most distinguished officers of the land and sea service, marshals Davoust, Ney, and Soult, and admirals Bruix and Ganteaume, instead of being at Boulogne or at Brest, were at Paris. Napoleon was annoyed at this, for however much he liked pomps, they held a very secondary place in his liking to serious business. A multitude of the curious, flocking from all parts of Europe and France crowded the capital, and impatiently awaited the spectacle which had attracted them. Napoleon, who was far from being displeased with the crowding of which he was the object, Napoleon nevertheless was in haste to put an end to a state of things which interfered with that regular order which he loved to see existing in his Empire. He despatched officers after officers with letters to the Pope, filled with filial tenderness, but filled also with earnest importunities to him to hasten his progress. From delay to delay, the ceremony was now fixed for the 2nd of December.

The Pope had at length determined on quitting Rome. After having confided all powers to cardinal Gonsalvi, and having heaped caresses upon him, he, on the morning of the 2nd of November, proceeded to the altar of St. Peter, and knelt there for some time, surrounded by the cardinals, the grandees of Rome, and the populace. At this altar he offered up a fervent prayer, as though he had been about to brave some great peril, and then entered his carriage and took the road to Viterbo. The populace of Transtevvers, so devoted to their pontiffs, accompanied his carriage for a long time, weeping. The time was gone by when that Roman court was the most enlightened in Europe! Now the members of the sacred college, scarcely understanding the age in which they lived, and even blaming, for lack of comprehending it, the prudent condescension of Pius VII., were prepared to believe the most absurd fables relating to it. There were some among them who considered as probable the report of a snare set in France to make the Holy Father prisoner, and wrest his states from him: as though Napoleon need resort to such means to become master of Rome! As if he at that moment desired any thing but the pontifical benediction, which would render the character of his power respectable in the eyes of men!

Pius VII., on setting out, had desired, notwithstanding his poverty, to carry with him some presents worthy of the host with whom he was about to reside. With his usual delicacy of tact, he had chosen, as presents for Napoleon, two antique cameos, as remarkable for their beauty as for their signification. The one represented Achilles, the other the continence of Scipio. For Josephine he destined some vases, also antique, and of admirable workmanship. By the advice of M. de Talleyrand he took for the ladies of the court a profusion of rosaries.

He set out, then, traversed the Roman state and Tuscany, amidst the population of Italy, kneeling on his path. At Florence

he was received by the queen of Etruria, now a widow, and regent for her son, of the new kingdom created by Napoleon. That princess, pious as a Spanish princess, received the Pope with demonstrations of devotion and respect which delighted him. He already began to recover somewhat from his anxieties. He desired to avoid the Legations, in order that his presence might not consecrate the grant that had been made of them to another state than the state of Rome. He was conducted by Plaisance, Parma, and Turin. He was not yet in France, but French authorities and French troops already surrounded him. He saw the veteran Menou, and the officers of the army of Italy respectfully bowing before him, and he was touched with the respectful expression of those masculine countenances. Cardinal Cambacères and a chamberlain of the palace, M. de Salmatoris, who had been sent forward, presented themselves on the frontiers of Piedmont, which were also those of the Empire, and presented him with a letter from Napoleon, filled with expressions of his gratitude and of his wishes for the speedy and prosperous journey of the Pontiff. Becoming more reassured every hour, Pius VII. at length ceased to feel much fear of the consequences of his resolution. He passed the Alps. Extraordinary precautions had been taken to render the journey there safe and easy to him and to the aged cardinals who accompanied him. Officers of the imperial palace provided every thing with infinite zeal and magnificence. At length he arrived at Lyons. There his alarms were changed into positive delight. Crowds of people had assembled from Provence, Dauphiny, Franche-Comté, and Burgundy, to see the representative of God on earth. The people have all at heart a confused but deep sentiment of the Divinity. Little matters the form under which it is presented to their adoration, provided that that form have been very anciently admitted, and that those above them set the example of respect. If to the natural force of this sentiment, we add the extraordinary power of reaction, and the vivacity with which the multitude reverts to ancient practices that it has temporarily abandoned, we may conceive the eagerness with which the people, both in the towns and rural districts of France, pressed forward to see the Holy Father. On beholding upon their knees, those people who had been described to him as continually in rebellion, alike against earthly and heavenly authority, Pius VII. was delighted and completely reassured; and he now perceived that his veteran councillor, Caprara, spoke quite truly when he told him that this journey would be a great benefit to religion, and would procure to himself infinite gratifications. Another letter from the Emperor was presented to him at Lyons, conveying new thanks to him, and new wishes for his speedy arrival. That debilitated Pontiff, suffering from an unhealthy sensibility, no longer feeling his fatigue, now that he saw himself welcomed in this manner, himself proposed to accelerate his journey by two days—an offer

which was accepted. He left Lyons amidst the same homages, and passed through Moulins and Nevers, everywhere encountering on the road a multitude filled with emotion, and suing for the blessing of the head of the Church.

It was at Fontainebleau that Pius VII. was to stop. Napoleon had made this arrangement that he might have the opportunity of going to meet the Holy Father, and of providing him rest for two or three days in that lovely retreat. He had ordered for that day, the 25th of November, a hunting match, which was to approach the road by which the Holy Father was travelling. At the hour at which he knew that the pontifical cortége would arrive at the cross of St. Herem, he turned his horse in that direction to meet the Pope, who almost immediately arrived there. He instantly presented himself to the Holy Father and embraced him. Pius VII., affected by this earnest eagerness, looked with mingled curiosity and emotion upon that new Charlemagne, whom for years past he had regarded as God's instrument here on earth. It was the middle of the day. The two sovereigns entered the carriage to proceed to Fontainebleau, Napoleon giving the right side to the head of the Church. At the entrance to the palace the Empress, the grandees of the Empire, and the chiefs of the army, were arranged in a circle to receive Pius VII., and offer him their homage. He, although accustomed to the pomps of Rome, had never before seen any thing so magnificent. He was conducted, surrounded by this attendance, to the apartments intended for him. After some hours' repose, according to the rules of etiquette among sovereigns, he paid a visit to the Emperor and Empress, who immediately returned that visit. Each time more completely reassured, and carried away by the seductive language of his host, who had promised himself not to intimidate but to enchant him, he conceived an affection for Napoleon, which, at the close of his life, and after numerous and terrible vicissitudes, he still felt for the hero in exile. The grandees of the Empire were successively presented to him. He received them with perfect cordiality, and that gracefulness of advanced age which has a very great and a very powerful charm. The at once mild and dignified countenance of Pius VII. touched all hearts, and he in turn was touched by the effect that he produced. He had not been spoken to about any of the difficulties which still remained to be removed. His sensitiveness and his fatigue had been considered. He was wholly filled with the emotion, the joy, of a welcome which to him seemed an actual triumph to religion.

The moment at length arrived to set out for Paris, to enter, at length, that dreaded city, in which for a century the human mind had so violently worked, in which for some years past the destinies of the world had been regulated. On the 28th of November, after three days of repose, the Emperor and the Pope entered the same carriage to proceed to Paris, the Pope still having the right. The Pope was lodged in the Pavilion of Flora, which had been pre-

pared for his reception. The whole day of the 29th was left to him entirely to recover from his fatigue, and on the 30th the Senate, the Legislative Body, the Tribunate, and the Council of State, were presented to him. The presidents of these four bodies addressed him in speeches in which his virtues, his wisdom, and his noble condescension towards France were celebrated in language at once brilliant and dignified. But among these harangues, fugitive as the sensation which inspired them, it is necessary to distinguish that of M. de Fontanes, grave and durable as the truths with which it was filled:—

“ MOST HOLY FATHER:

“ When upon the field of battle the victor of Marengo conceived the design of re-establishing religious unity, and of restoring to the French people their ancient worship, he preserved the principles of civilisation from total ruin. This grand thought, occurring in the day of victory, gave birth to the Concordat; and the Legislative Body, on whose behalf I have the honour to address your holiness, converted the Concordat into a law of the land.

“ Memorable day, equally dear to the wisdom of the statesman, and the faith of the Christian! It was then that France, abjuring but too serious errors, gave the most useful lessons to the human race. She seemed to confess in its presence, that all irreligious ideas are impolitic ideas, and that every offence against Christianity is an offence against society. The return to the ancient worship speedily led the way to the return to a government more natural to great states, and more in accordance with the habits of France. The whole social system, shaken by the inconstant opinions of man, rested once more upon a doctrine immutable as God himself. It was religion which in the bygone times polished savage societies, but it was now more difficult to repair their ruins than to lay their foundations.

“ We owe this benefit to a double prodigy. France has witnessed the birth of one of those extraordinary men, who, at rare intervals, are sent to the succour of empires that are on the brink of ruin; while Rome, at the same time, has seen shining upon the throne of St. Peter all the apostolic virtues of the earliest ages. Their gentle authority is felt by all hearts. Universal homage must be paid to a pontiff as wise as he is pious, who knows alike what should be left to the course of human events, and what is demanded by the interests of religion.

“ That august religion comes to consecrate with him the new destinies of the French Empire, and observes the same solemnity as in the age of the Clovises and the Pepins.

“ All things have changed around it; it alone has remained unchangeable.

“ It sees the families of kings become extinct like those of subjects; but upon the ruins of fallen thrones, and upon the steps of thrones that are raised up, it ever admires the successive manifestations of the Eternal designs, and obeys them with confidence.

“Never had the universe a more imposing spectacle; never had the people grander lessons.

“The time no longer exists in which the Empire and the priesthood were rivals. Both unite to repel the fatal doctrines which have threatened Europe with utter subversion. May they for ever yield to the double influence of religion and policy united together. That wish will doubtless be realised; never in France had policy so great genius, and never did the pontifical throne present to the Christian world a more respectable and touching model.”

The Pope displayed a lively emotion as he listened to that noble language, the noblest that had been spoken since the age of Louis XIV. The populace of Paris crowded beneath his windows, soliciting his appearance. The fame of his mildness, and of his noble countenance, had already spread throughout the capital. Pius VII. several times presented himself at the balcony of the Tuileries, always accompanied by Napoleon, was saluted with lively acclamations, and saw the people of Paris, that people who had been the actors of the 10th of August, and had worshipped the goddess Reason, kneeling before him, and awaiting the pontifical benediction. Singular inconstancy of men and of nations! which proves the necessity of holding to those grand truths on which human society reposes; for there is neither dignity nor repose in the caprices of a day, which are embraced and abandoned with a degrading precipitation.

The gloomy apprehensions which had so embittered the resolution of the Pope were now dissipated. Pius VII. found himself the guest of a prince full of respectfulness and attention, and adding courtesy to genius; and in the midst of a great nation, that had been led back to the old traditions of Christianity, by the example of a glorious chieftain. He was delighted that he had arrived, to add to this impulse by his presence. There were still some annoyances in store for him, both as touching the ceremony, and upon the subject of the constitutional bishops, who, after their reconciliation to the Church had allowed themselves to cavil about the terms of that reconciliation. They were four in number, Messrs. Lecoq, archbishop of Besançon; Lacombe, bishop of Angoulême; Saurine, bishop of Strasburg; and Remond, bishop of Dijon. M. Portalis had sent for them, and, by order of the Emperor, had enjoined them, if they desired to be presented to the Pope, to write a letter of reconciliation, drawn up in agreement with bishop Bernier and the cardinals of the pontifical cortège. At the last moment they wished to change an expression of this letter, which the Pope perceived and remarked upon, leaving to the Emperor the task of terminating these melancholy disputes. For the rest, he showed an equally mild and paternal countenance to all the members of the French clergy. There still remained the questions relating to the ceremonial. The Pope had admitted the principal modifications, founded upon the state

of society; but he was singularly affected by the question of the crowning. He was desirous to preserve the right transmitted by his predecessors, of placing the crown upon the brow of the Emperor. Napoleon gave orders for the point not to be insisted upon, and said that he would undertake to settle every thing at the spot itself.

The eve of that grand solemnity now approached; that is to say, the 1st of December. Josephine, who had found favour with the Holy Father by a kind of devoutness much akin to that of the women of Italy, Josephine sought an interview with him, to make an avowal, which she hoped to turn to good account. She declared to him that she had only been civilly married to Napoleon, as, at the time of her marriage, religious ceremonies were abolished.

The very throne presented a strange specimen of the manners of the time. Napoleon had put an end to this state of things for his sister, the princess Murat, by begging the cardinal Caprara to give her the nuptial benediction; but he had not chosen to do the same for himself. The Pope, scandalised by a situation which, in the eyes of the Church, was a mere concubinage, instantly demanded an interview of Napoleon, and in that interview declared that he could very well consecrate him, for the state of the consciences of emperors had never been inquired into by the Church, when they were to be crowned, but that he could not, by crowning Josephine, give the divine consecration to a state of concubinage. Napoleon, irritated against Josephine for this interested revelation, fearing to offend the Pope, whom he knew to be inflexible in matters of faith, and, moreover, unwilling to alter a programme which had already been published, consented to receive the nuptial benediction. Josephine, sharply reprimanded by her husband, but delighted with her success, received, in the very night preceding the coronation, the sacrament of marriage in the chapel of the Tuileries. It was cardinal Fesch, having M. de Talleyrand and marshal Berthier for witnesses, who, with the most profound secrecy, married the Emperor and Empress. The secret was faithfully kept until the epoch of the divorce. On the following morning the reddened eyes of Josephine still bore testimony to the tears which these inward agitations had cost her.

On Sunday, the 2nd of December, a cold, but clear winter's day, that population of Paris which, forty years later, we have seen crowding, in similar weather, towards the mortal remains of Napoleon, hurried to see the passing of the imperial cortége. The Pope first set out at ten o'clock in the morning, and much earlier than the Emperor, in order that the two cortéges should not obstruct each other. He was accompanied by a numerous body of clergy, attired with the most costly ornaments, and escorted by detachments of the imperial guard. A richly decorated portico had been erected all round the Place Notre Dame, to receive, at their descent from their carriages, the sovereigns and princes who

were to proceed to the ancient basilick. The Archbishopric, adorned with a luxury worthy of the guests that it was to shelter, was arranged so that the Pope and the Emperor could rest there for an instant. After a brief stay, the Pope entered the church, where for several previous hours there had already been assembled the deputies of the towns, the representatives of the magistracy and of the army, the sixty bishops, with their clergy, the Senate, the Legislative Body, the Council of State, the princes of Nassau, Hesse, and Baden, the arch-chancellor of the Germanic Empire, and, lastly, the ministers of the different powers. The great door of Notre Dame had been closed, because the back of the imperial throne was placed against it. The church, therefore was entered by the side doors, situated at the two extremities of the transversal nave. When the Pope, preceded by the cross, and by the ensigns of the successor of St. Peter, appeared within that ancient basilick of St. Louis, all present rose from their seats, and 500 musicians pealed forth in solemn strain the consecrated chant, *TU ES PETRUS*. The effect of this was instant and sublime. The Pope, proceeded at a slow pace direct to the altar, before which he knelt, and then took his place on a throne that had been prepared for him to the right of the altar. The sixty prelates of the French Church presented themselves in succession to salute him. To each of them, constitutional or not, his countenance was equally benevolent. The arrival of the imperial family was now awaited.

The church of Notre Dame was decorated with an unequalled magnificence. Hangings of velvet sprinkled with golden bees, descended from the roof to the pavement. At the foot of the altar stood two plain arm-chairs, which the Emperor and Empress were to occupy before their crowning. At the west-end of the church, and opposite to the altar, raised upon twenty-four steps, and placed between columns, which supported a pediment, stood an immense throne, a sort of monument within a monument, intended for the Emperor, when crowned, and his wife. It was the custom in both the Roman and the French ritual. The monarch did not seat himself upon the throne until after he had been crowned by the Pontiff.

They now waited for the Emperor, and waited for a considerable time. This was the only disagreeable circumstance in this grand solemnity. The position of the Pope during this long delay was painful. The fear of the director of the ceremonies lest the two cortéges should meet, was the cause of the delay. The Emperor set out from the Tuileries in a carriage completely surrounded with glass, surmounted by gilt genii, bearing a crown, a popular carriage in France, and always recognised by the Parisians when it has since appeared in subsequent ceremonies. He was attired in a costume designed by the greatest painter of the day, and very similar to the costumes of the sixteenth century.

He wore a plumed hat, and a short mantle. He was not to assume the imperial costume until he reached the Archbishopric, and at the moment of entering the church. Escorted by his marshals on horseback, he proceeded slowly along the Rue St. Honoré, the Quay of the Seine, and the Place Notre Dame, amidst the acclamations of immense crowds, delighted to see their favourite general become Emperor, as though he had not himself achieved this with his excitable passions, and his warlike heroism, and as if some touch of a magic wand had done it for him. Napoleon, on arriving before the portico which we have already described, alighted from his carriage, proceeded to the Archbishopric, took the crown, the sceptre, and the imperial robe, and directed his course to the cathedral. Beside him was borne the grand crown, in the form of a tiara, and modelled after that of Charlemagne. At this first stage of the ceremony he wore only the crown of the Cæsars, namely, a simple golden laurel. All admired that noble head, noble beneath that golden laurel, as some antique medallion. Having entered the church to the sound of pealing music, he knelt, and then passed on to the arm-chair which he was to occupy previous to taking possession of the throne.

The ceremony then commenced. The sceptre, the sword, and the imperial robe had been placed on the altar. The Pope anointed the Emperor on the forehead, the arms, and the hands, then blessed the sword, with which he girded him, and the sceptre, which he placed in his hand, and approached to take up the crown. Napoleon, who had watched his movements, now, as he had promised, settled that difficulty on the spot, by firmly, though not violently, seizing the crown, and placing it upon his own head. This action, which was perfectly appreciated by all present, produced an indescribable effect. Napoleon, then, taking the crown of the Empress, and approaching Josephine, as she knelt before him, placed it, with a visible tenderness, upon the head of the partner of his fortunes, who at that moment burst into tears. This done, he proceeded towards the grand throne. He ascended it, followed by his brothers, bearing the train of his robes. Then the Pope, according to custom, advanced to the foot of the throne to bless the new sovereign, and to chant those words which greeted Charlemagne in the basilick of St. Peter, when the Roman clergy suddenly proclaimed him Emperor of the West:—*VIVAT IN ÆTERNUM SEMPER AUGUSTUS*. At this chant, shouts of "*Vive l'Empereur*" resounded through the arches of Notre Dame; the cannon added their thunder, and announced to all Paris the solemn moment of Napoleon's consecration, with all the forms received among mankind.

The arch-chancellor Cambacérès then presented him with the form of the oath, a bishop handed him the New Testament, and upon the book of Christians he took that oath which embodied the great principles of the Revolution. A pontifical high mass

was then chanted, and the day was far advanced when the two cortéges regained the Tuileries, through an immense concourse of people.

Such was the august ceremony which consummated the return of France to monarchical principles. It was not one of the smallest triumphs of our Revolution, to see that soldier, sprung from her own womb, anointed by the Pope, who, for that express purpose, had quitted the capital of the Christian world. It is on this account especially that such pomps are worthy of the attention of the historian.

If moderation of desires, ascending that throne as the companion of genius, had provided sufficient liberty for France, and put a timely limit to heroic enterprises, that ceremony would have consecrated the new dynasty for ever—that is to say, for several centuries. But we were destined to pass by other tracks to a more free political condition, and to a grandeur unhappily too confined.

It was fifteen years since the Revolution had commenced. A monarchy during three years, a Republic during twelve, it had now become a military monarchy, still based upon civil equality, upon the nation's participation in the framing of the laws, and upon the free admission of all the citizens to those re-established social distinctions. It was thus that French society had progressed in fifteen years, successively decomposed and recomposed with the characteristic promptitude of popular passions.

BOOK XXI.

THIRD COALITION.

Stay of the Pope at Paris—Endeavours of Napoleon to retain him there—The Fleets having been unable to act in December, Napoleon employs the Winter in organising Italy—Transformation of the Italian Republic into a Vassal Kingdom of the French Empire—Offer of that Kingdom to Joseph Bonaparte, and his refusal of it—Napoleon determines to place the Iron Crown on his own Head, declaring at the same time, that the Two Crowns of France and Italy will be separated on the return of Peace—Solemn Sitting of the Senate—Second Coronation at Milan fixed for the Month of May, 1805—Napoleon finds in his Transalpine Journey a Means of more completely concealing his new Maritime Projects—His Naval Resources are increased by England's sudden Declaration of War against Spain—Naval Strength of Holland, France, and Spain—Project of a grand Expedition to India—Momentary Hesitation between that Project and that of a direct Expedition against England—Final Preference of the Latter—Every thing is prepared to make the Descent in the Months of July and August—The Fleets of Toulon, Cadiz, Ferrol, Rochefort, and Brest, are to assemble together at Martinique, to return into the Channel in July, to the Number of Sixty Sail—The Pope at length prepares to return to Rome—His Overtures to Napoleon, previous to departing—Replies as to the various Points treated of by the Pope—The Pope's mortification tempered, however, by the Success of his Journey into France—Departure of the Pope for Rome, and of Napoleon for Milan—Dispositions of the European Courts—Their Leaning towards a new Coalition—State of the Russian Cabinet—The young Friends of Alexander form a grand Plan of European Mediation—Ideas of which that Plan consisted; real Origin of the Treaties of 1815—M. de Nowosiltzoff charged to procure their Acceptance at London—Reception that he met with from Mr. Pitt—The Plan of Mediation is converted by the English Minister into a Plan of Coalition against France—Return of M. de Nowosiltzoff to St. Petersburg—The Russian Cabinet and Lord Gower sign the Treaty which constitutes the Third Coalition—The Ratification of that Treaty is subject to a Condition, the Evacuation of Malta by England—In Order to preserve to this Coalition the original Form of a Mediation, M. de Nowosiltzoff is to repair to Paris to treat with Napoleon—Ineffectual efforts of Russia to engage Prussia in the new Coalition—More Successful Efforts with Austria, who enters into conditional Engagements—Russia has recourse to Prussia as a Mediator, to obtain Passports for M. de Nowosiltzoff—Those Passports are granted—Napoleon in Italy—Enthusiastic personal Affection shown to him by the Italians—Coronation at Milan—Eugène de Beauharnais declared Viceroy—Military Fêtes and Visits to the various Cities—Napoleon irresistibly attracted towards certain Plans by the Sight of Italy—He projects the future Expulsion of the Bourbons from Naples, and determines forthwith to unite Genoa to France—Motives to this Union—Conversion of the Duchy of Lucca into an Imperial

Fief to the Profit of the Princess Eliza—After a Stay of Three Months in Italy, Napoleon prepares to proceed to Boulogne to execute the Descent—Ganteaume, at Brest, has not found a single Day favourable for Sailing—Villeneuve and Gravina having successfully got out of Toulon and Cadiz, are instructed to release Ganteaume from Blockade, that they may all proceed together into the Channel—Stay of Bonaparte at Genoa—His sudden Departure for Fontainebleau—While Napoleon is preparing for the Descent upon England all the Continental Powers are preparing for a formidable War against France—Russia, embarrassed by the refusal of England to evacuate Malta, finds in the annexation of Genoa a Pretext for yielding that point, and Austria for deciding at once—Treaty of Subsidy—Immediate Armaments obstinately denied to Napoleon—He sees the State of the Case and demands Explanations, at the same time making some Preparations towards Italy and the Rhine—He is more than ever persuaded that it is at London that all the Coalitions must be broken up, and sets out for Boulogne—His Resolution to embark, and his Impatience while awaiting the French Fleet—Movement of the Squadrons—Long and fortunate Passage of Villeneuve and Gravina to Martinique—Admiral Villeneuve's first Feelings of Discouragement—He suddenly returns to Europe, and Sails to Ferrol to raise the Blockade of that Port—Naval Battle of Ferrol against Admiral Calder—The French Admiral might have claimed the Victory had he not lost Two Spanish Ships—He has attained his Object in raising the Blockade of Ferrol and rallying two new Divisions, French and Spanish—Instead of gaining Confidence and hastening to raise the Blockade of Ganteaume, in order to proceed with Fifty Sail into the Channel, Villeneuve becomes disconcerted, and determines to Sail towards Cadiz, leaving Napoleon to suppose that he is Sailing for Brest—Tedious Suspense of Napoleon at Boulogne—His hopes on the Receipt of the first Despatches from Ferrol—His Irritation when he begins to believe that Villeneuve has sailed for Cadiz—Violent Excitement and Anger with Admiral Decrès—Positive Intelligence of the Projects of Austria—Sudden Change of Resolution—Plan of the Campaign of 1805—Estimate of the Chances of Success of the Descent, which was prevented by the Mismanagement of Villeneuve—Napoleon finally turns his Forces against the Continent.

BOOK XXI.

THIRD COALITION.

THREE days after the ceremony of the coronation, Napoleon determined to distribute to the army and the national guards, the eagles which were to surmount the colours of the Empire. This ceremony, as nobly regulated as the preceding one, had the Champ de Mars for its scene. The representatives of all the corps came to receive the eagles intended for them, at the foot of a magnificent throne, raised in front of the palace of the military school, and previous to receiving them they took the oath, which they have since fulfilled, of keeping them even unto death. On the same day there was a banquet at the Tuileries, where the Pope and the Emperor sat side by side at the same table, clad in their pontifical and imperial ornaments, and served by the grand officers of the crown.

The multitude, ever greedy for display, was delighted with these pomps. Many, without acknowledging their import, yet admitted them to be a natural consequence of the re-establishment of monarchy. The wise and prudent put up their prayers that the new monarch might not allow himself to be intoxicated by these fumes of omnipotence. However, no sinister prognostic as yet disturbed the public satisfaction. The new order of things was believed to be permanent. With much magnificence, perhaps with too much, there yet was seen a faithful adherence to the social principles proclaimed by the French Revolution, a constantly increasing prosperity, notwithstanding the war, and a continuation of grandeur which was calculated to flatter the national pride.

The Holy Father had not wished to remain long in France, but he now hoped, that by remaining there, he should find a favourable opportunity to express to Napoleon the secret wishes of the Roman court, and he had resigned himself to a two or three months' stay in Paris. Moreover, the season did not admit of his immediately repassing the Alps. Napoleon, who desired to have the Pontiff by his side to show him France, to enable him to comprehend her spirit, and the conditions upon which the re-establishment of religion was practicable, and, finally, to win his confidence by frank and daily communication, Napoleon em-

ployed consummate courtesy and kindness in order to detain him, and at length succeeded in completely gaining the affection of that Holy Pontiff. Pius VII. was lodged in the Tuileries, at liberty to follow his simple and religious tastes, but surrounded, when he went abroad, with all the attributes of supreme power, escorted by the Imperial guard, in a word, covered with honours. His interesting countenance, and his virtues, almost visible in his person, had deeply touched the Parisians, who followed him everywhere with a mingled curiosity, sympathy, and respect. He visited in their turns all the parishes of Paris, where he officiated amidst extraordinary crowds. His presence added to the religious impulse that Napoleon desired to give to the public mind. The Holy Pontiff was rejoiced at it. He visited the public monuments, and the museums which Napoleon had enriched, and seemed to interest himself in the grandeurs of the new reign. In a visit that he made to one of our public establishments, he displayed a tact and discretion which obtained him general approbation. Surrounded by a kneeling crowd who solicited his benediction, he perceived a man, whose stern and disapproving countenance still bore the imprint of our extinguished passions, and who had turned away to withdraw himself from the pontifical benediction. The Holy Father approaching this person said to him in the gentlest tone—"Do not go away, sir, an old man's blessing never injured any one." This noble and touching speech was repeated and applauded by all Paris.

The fêtes and the hospitable attentions that he had lavished upon his venerable guest, had not withdrawn the attention of Napoleon from his grand affairs. The fleets that were destined to aid in the descent, continued to occupy his full attention. That of Brest was at length ready to sail; but that of Toulon, retarded in its fitting out by the determination to increase it from eight ships to eleven, had occupied the entire month of December. Since it had been complete, foul winds had detained it in port during January. Admiral Missiessy, with five ships fitted out at Rochefort, waited for a tempest to put to sea unperceived by the enemy. Napoleon devoted this time to the interior administration of his new Empire.

Although determined upon a war of extinction against England, he thought it necessary to commence his reign by a procedure which was quite useless at that time, and which, besides its uselessness, had the inconvenience of being a mere repetition of another admirably well-timed proceeding which he had taken on attaining the Consulate. He wrote a letter to the king of England, proposing peace, and he forwarded that letter by a brig belonging to the English squadron before Boulogne. It was immediately communicated to the British cabinet, who sent word that an answer would be given at a future time. Peace was not only possible but even necessary to the two powers in 1800. The proceeding of the First Consul at that time, therefore, was very proper, and the

rejection of his conditions of peace, followed by the victories of Marengo and Hohenlinden, covered Mr. Pitt with confusion, and was even a principal cause of the fall of that minister. But in 1805, the two nations were at the commencement of a new war, their pretensions had risen to such a height, that they could only be settled by force, and a proposal for peace seemed too obviously resorted to for the purpose of affecting moderation, or of creating an opportunity to address the king of England as monarch addressing monarch.

What was of more importance than these vain proceedings, was the definitive organisation of the Italian Republic. That Republic, daughter of the French Republic, was in every thing to share the lot of her mother. In 1802, at the epoch of the *Consultum* of Lyons, she had framed for herself a constitution in imitation of France, and adopted a government republican in form, but absolute in fact. Now, it was natural that she should take the last step in the track of France, and that from a republic she should become a monarchy.

In the preceding book, we have recounted the overtures that M. Cambacérès and the minister of the Italian Republic at Paris, M. de Marescalchi, had been charged to make to the vice-president Melzi, and to the members of the *Consultum* of the State. Those overtures had been pretty well received, although the vice-president Melzi, rendered ill-tempered by the state of his health, and by a task too onerous for his powers, had mingled some tolerably bitter reflections with his reply. The Italians had without hesitation accepted the transformation of their Republic into a monarchy, because they hoped to profit by this opportunity to obtain, in part at the least, the fulfilment of their wishes. They were quite willing to accept a king, and to have a brother of Napoleon for that king, but on condition that the choice should fall upon Joseph or Louis Bonaparte, and not upon Lucien, whom they formally excepted; that their king should belong to them alone; that he should constantly reside at Milan; that the two crowns of France and Italy should be immediately separated; that they should pay no further subsidy for the support of the French army; and finally, that Napoleon should undertake to procure Austria's approval of this new change.

"On these conditions," said the vice-president Melzi, "the Italians would be satisfied, for as yet they had felt their enfranchisement only by the imposition of new burdens."

The idea of their money being carried beyond the Alps is in general an engrained one with the Italians, subjected, as they so long have been, to powers placed on the other side of the Alps. At the same time they had a more cogent and a nobler motive for wishing for their enfranchisement—the desire of living under a national government. The paltrier reasons disgusted Napoleon, but did not surprise him; for if he had but a sorry opinion of mankind, he never laboured to debase them. In fact no one seeks to debase

them who requires great things at their hands. He consequently was indignant at the reasoning of the vice-president Melzi.

“What!” exclaimed he, “the Italians can only consider the money which their independence costs them! That supposes them very base and very dastardly: for my part, I am far from thinking so poorly of them. Can they free themselves and protect themselves without French troops? If they cannot do so, is it not just that they should contribute to the support of the soldiers who shed their blood for them? Who, then, has consolidated into one state, to make it the body of a nation, five or six provinces formerly governed by five or six different princes? Who, I ask, but the French army, and I who command it? Had I so chosen, Upper Italy would now be cut up, distributed in separate bits, one part given to the Pope, another to the Austrians, a third to the Spaniards. At this price I should have disarmed the powers, and obtained continental peace for France. Do not the Italians perceive that the foundation of their nationality is laid in a State that already includes one-third of all Italy? Is not their government composed of Italians, and founded upon the principles of justice, equality, and a prudential liberty—in a word, upon the principles of the French Revolution? What better can they desire? Can I accomplish every thing in a day?”

Napoleon on this occasion was perfectly in the right as to Italy. But for it, the fragments of Lombardy would have gratified the Pope, the emperor of Germany, Spain, and the house of Sardinia, and have served as an equivalent for the annexation of Piedmont to France. It was true that it was in the interests of French policy that Napoleon had laboured to constitute the Italian nationality. But was it not a great benefit to the Italians thus to be bound up with the French policy? Was it not incumbent on them to lend that policy their strenuous support? And, in truth, 22 million francs per annum for the support of above 30,000 men—a fictitious number, too, for there were generally 60,000 at least required there—was that such a very heavy burden for a country which included the richest provinces in Europe? However, Napoleon gave himself but very little uneasiness about these doleful complaints of the vice-president Melzi. He knew that all this was not to be taken to the letter. The Italian moderate party, with whose support he governed, abandoned by the nobility and by the priests, who in general inclined towards the Austrians, and by the liberals, who were imbued with exaggerated ideas—the liberal party, in its isolation, felt a certain depression, and willingly painted its situation in the darkest colours. Napoleon attached no weight to this, and, constantly anxious to withdraw Italy from the influence of Austria, he sought the means of accommodating its institutions to the new institutions of France.

The coronation had afforded an opportunity of assembling at Paris the vice-president Melzi and some delegates of the various Italian authorities. Messrs. Cambacérès, de Marescalchi, and

de Talleyrand entered into conferences with them, and came to an understanding upon all points excepting one — that of the subsidy to be paid to France; for although the Italians invoked the French occupation as their salvation, they were nevertheless unwilling to bear the expense of it.

The arch-chancellor Cambacères was then charged to treat with Joseph Bonaparte on the question of his elevation to the Italian throne. To the great astonishment of Napoleon, Joseph refused that throne upon two pleas, one of them very natural, the other singularly presumptuous. Joseph declared that, on account of the principle of the separation of the two crowns, the condition of the throne of Italy being the renunciation of the throne of France, he preferred to remain a French prince, with all his rights of succession to the Empire. Napoleon having no children, Joseph preferred the distant possibility of some day reigning in France, to the certainty of immediately reigning in Italy. Such a pretension was only natural and patriotic. The second reason given by Joseph for his refusal was, that the kingdom offered to him was too near a neighbour to France, and consequently too dependent; that he could only reign under the authority of the head of the French Empire; and that it did not suit him to reign on those terms. Thus already broke forth those sentiments which animated the brothers of the Emperor, upon all the thrones which he bestowed upon them. It was a proof of a silly vanity, to be unwilling to have for counsellor such a man as Napoleon. It was a very impolitic ingratitude to wish to be freed from his power; for, placed at the head of a newly-created Italian state, to tend towards isolation was to tend alike towards the ruin of Italy and the weakening of France.

All persuasions employed with Joseph were in vain; and although his future royalty had been announced to all the courts with which France had amicable relations, to Austria, to Prussia, and to the Holy See, it was necessary to revert to other ideas, and to determine upon a new arrangement. Napoleon, warned by this new experience that he must not create, in Lombardy, a jealous royalty disposed to obstruct his grand designs, resolved to take himself the iron crown, and assume the title of **EMPEROR OF FRANCE AND KING OF ITALY**. There was but one objection to this project; it was to recall too forcibly to attention the annexation of Piedmont to France. It was to run the risk of deeply offending Austria, and to recall her from her pacific ideas to the warlike ideas of Mr. Pitt, who, since his return to office, had endeavoured to avail himself of the breaking off of diplomatic relations between France and Russia to form a new coalition. In order to ward off this inconvenience, Napoleon resolved upon making a formal declaration that he would only wear the crown of Italy until the return of Peace; that at that epoch he would proceed to the separation of the two crowns, by choosing a successor from the French princes. For the moment he adopted

Eugène de Beauharnais, the son of Josephine, whom he loved as his own son, and entrusted to him the vice-royalty of Italy.

This determination once taken, he gave himself but little trouble to make it palatable to M. de Melzi, whose somewhat unreasonable complaints began to weary him, for he perceived in him far more of hankering after popularity than of intention to labour in common for the future establishment of Italy. Messrs. Cambacérès and de Talleyrand were charged to signify these resolutions to the Italians who were present in Paris, and to concert with them the means of execution. These latter appeared apprehensive lest the three grand permanent colleges of *possidenti*, *dotti*, and *commercianti*, to which was entrusted the task of electing the authorities and modifying the constitution when there was need, might resist the project of any other than a Lombard monarchy, completely distinct from the French monarchy, and might cloak their opposition under Italian nonchalance, by voting neither for nor against. Napoleon, then, renounced the employment of constitutional forms; he acted as a creator who had made Italy what she then was, and who had the right still to make her whatever he believed it useful that she should become. M. de Talleyrand addressed a report to him, in which he demonstrated that those provinces, some of which were dependant on the ancient Republic of Venice, some of them on the house of Austria, these on the duke of Modena, those on the Holy See, depended, as conquered provinces, upon the will of the Emperor; that what was due to them was an equitable government, adapted to their interests, and founded upon the principles of the French Revolution; but that, for the rest, he could give to that government whatever form might best accord with his vast designs. A decree followed, constituting the new kingdom, a decree which was to be adopted by the State *Consultum* and the Italian deputies who were then at Paris, and then communicated to the French Senate, as one of the grand constitutional acts of the Empire, and promulgated in an imperial sitting. However, it was necessary that Italy should seem to be more or less a party to these new arrangements. It was determined to prepare for her, also, the pageant of a coronation. It was resolved to take out of the treasury of Monza the famous iron crown of the Lombard kings, that Napoleon might place it upon his head after its being blessed by the archbishop of Milan, according to the ancient custom of the Germanic emperors, who received the crown of the West at Rome, but that of Italy at Milan. The ceremony would impress the Italians, revive their hopes, regain the nobles and priests, who especially missed in the domination of the Austrians the monarchical forms, and gratify the populace, always captivated by the state of their rulers; for that very state while it charms their sight also feeds their industry. As for the enlightened liberals, they could not fail ultimately to perceive that the future security of Italy could only be provided for by the association of her destinies with those of France.

It was agreed that after the adoption of the new decree, the Italian deputies, the minister Marescalchi, and the grand master of the ceremonies, M. de Segur, should precede Napoleon to Milan, there to arrange an Italian court, and prepare the programme of the coronation.

At this moment a thousand rumours were circulated among the European diplomatists. Now it was affirmed that Napoleon was about to give the crown of Holland to his brother Louis, now that he was about to confer that of Naples upon Joseph, and anon that he was about to annex Genoa and Switzerland to the French territory. There were even some who maintained that Napoleon wished to promote cardinal Fesch to the papacy, and who already spoke of the crown of Spain as being reserved for a prince of the house of Bonaparte. The hatred of his enemies anticipated his projects on some points, exaggerated them on others, attributed to him some designs which he had not as yet formed, and undoubtedly facilitated them by preparing the mind of Europe for them. The sitting of the Senate for the promulgation of the decree constituting the kingdom of Italy, was to reply to all these suppositions, whether true or false, and, for the time at least, pushed too far.

The Italian deputies were previously assembled at Paris; the decree was submitted to them, and they unanimously agreed to it; and then the imperial session was ordered for the 17th of March, 1805 (26th Ventôse, year XIII.). The Emperor proceeded to the Senate at two o'clock, surrounded by all the state of the constitutional sovereigns of England and France when they hold a royal sitting. A grand deputation received him at the door of the palace of the Luxembourg, and he proceeded to seat himself upon the throne, around which were ranged the princes, the six grand dignitaries, the marshals, and the grand officers of the crown. M. de Talleyrand read his report and, after the report, the imperial decree. A copy of the same decree, in the Italian language, and bearing the adhesion of the Lombard deputies, was then read by the vice-president Melzi. Then the minister Marescalchi presented those deputies to Napoleon, to whom in his quality of king of Italy, they took the oath of fidelity. That ceremony being terminated, Napoleon, seated, and wearing his hat, delivered a firm and concise speech, such as he well knew how to make, and of which the intention will easily be perceived.

“SENATORS,

“We have willed, on this occasion, to come among you, fully and freely to acquaint you with our views upon one of the most important subjects of State policy.

“We have conquered Holland, three-fourths of Germany, Switzerland, and Italy. Amidst the greatest prosperity we have been moderate. Out of so many provinces we have kept only those which were necessary to maintain France in the rank of consideration and power to which she has been accustomed. The partition of Po-

land, the abstraction of provinces from Turkey, the conquest of India, and of almost all the colonies had, to our injury, disturbed the general balance of power.

“All that we have deemed not absolutely necessary for the re-establishment of this balance we have restored.

“Germany has been evacuated; their possessions have been restored to the descendants of many illustrious houses, who would have been irredeemably ruined had we not granted them a generous protection.

“Austria herself, after two unsuccessful wars, has obtained the state of Venice. At any time she would gladly have exchanged for Venice the provinces which she has lost.

“Scarcely was Holland conquered ere she was declared independent. Her annexation to our Empire would have been the completion of your commercial system, as the greatest rivers of one half of our territory have their mouths in Holland. Nevertheless, Holland is independent, and her customs, her commerce, and her administration, are regulated at the will of her own government.

“Switzerland was occupied by our armies; we defended it against the combined forces of Europe. Its annexation would have completed our military frontier. Nevertheless, Switzerland, by the act of mediation, governs itself according to the pleasure of the nineteen free and independent cantons.

“The annexation of the territory of the Italian Republic to the French empire would have aided the development of our agriculture; nevertheless, after its second conquest, we confirmed, at Lyons, its independence. We this day do still more, we proclaim the separation of the crowns of France and Italy, appointing for that separation the epoch when it shall be practicable and safe to our Italian subjects.

“We have accepted and we will place upon our head, the iron crown of the ancient Lombards, that we may temper anew and strengthen it. But we do not hesitate to declare that we will transmit this crown to one of our lawful children, whether of our own issue, or adoptive, as early as we shall be without fears for the independence which we have guaranteed to the other states of the Mediterranean.

“The Genius of Evil will in vain seek for pretexts for rekindling war upon the Continent; that which has been annexed to our Empire by the constitutional laws will remain annexed to it. No new province will be incorporated with it, but the laws of the Dutch Republic, the act of mediation of the nineteen Swiss cantons, and this first statute of the kingdom of Italy will be constantly under the protection of our crown, and we will never permit them to be attacked.”

At the conclusion of this lofty and peremptory address Napoleon received the oath of some senators whom he had named, and then returned, surrounded by the same attendance, to the palace of the Tuileries. Messrs. de Melzi, de Marescalchi, and the other

Italians, were directed to proceed to Milan, to prepare the public mind for the new solemnity which had been determined upon. Cardinal Caprara, the Pope's legate to Napoleon, was archbishop of Milan. He had accepted that dignity only in obedience, being very old and oppressed by infirmities, and after a long life passed in courts, he was far more inclined to leave the world than to prolong his part. At the request of Napoleon, and with the consent of the Pope, he set out for Italy to crown the new king according to the ancient custom of the Lombard Church. M. de Segur instantly set out, with orders to hurry on the preparations. Napoleon fixed his own departure for the month of April, and his coronation for the month of May.

This excursion into Italy agreed perfectly well with his military projects, and, indeed, even considerably forwarded them. Napoleon had been all the winter waiting till his squadrons should be ready to run out of Brest, Rochefort, and Toulon. In January, 1805, it was about twenty months since the naval war with England had been proclaimed, for the rupture with England took place in May, 1803, and yet the fleet of men-of-war had been unable to set sail. The administration had not been without the strong impulse of Napoleon, but in naval matters nothing can be hurried, as all nations well know who endeavour to create a naval power. At the same time we must admit that the Brest and Toulon fleets would have been sooner ready if it had not been determined to increase their original strength. That of Brest had been increased from eighteen sail to twenty-one, and was calculated to embark seventeen thousand men and five hundred horses, with a great *matériel*, without any aid from transports borrowed from the merchant service. In the project of sailing in winter, and during bad weather, it had been necessary to give up the idea of being accompanied by vessels of small tonnage, which were equally incapable of following vessels of the line, and of being towed by them. Old men-of-war were, in consequence, taken up, cleared of their guns, and laden with men and munitions. By this means the squadron could run out altogether, and in all weathers, touch at Ireland, land its seventeen thousand men and its munitions, and then return into the Channel. For the rest, it had been ready, as desired, in November. That of Rochefort, consisting of five ships of the line, and four frigates, carrying three thousand men, four thousand muskets, and one hundred cwt. of powder, was ready at the same period. Only that of Toulon, increased from eight to eleven sail, had required the whole month of December. General Lauriston, Napoleon's aide-de-camp, had been appointed to form a corps of six thousand picked men, with fifty cannon and a battering train, and to embark the whole in the Toulon fleet. That fleet, as we have mentioned, was to detach a division to St. Helena, to take possession of that island, then proceed to Surinam to retake the Dutch colonies, and then join the squadron of Missiessy, which, on its part would have relieved our own West India islands, and ravaged the

colonies of the English. Both then, after having thus decoyed the English towards America, and liberated Ganteaume, were to return to Europe. Ganteaume, whose preparations were completed, had during the whole winter awaited the moment when Missiessy and Villeneuve, running out of Toulon, should draw off the English. Missiessy, who wanted energy, but did not want courage, ran out of Rochefort on the 11th of January, during a frightful storm, and, steering through the narrow passes, gained the open sea without being overtaken or even seen by the English. He made sail for the West Indies with five ships of the line and four frigates.

His vessels received some damage, which was repaired at sea. As for Villeneuve, to whom the minister Decrès had communicated a factitious and merely temporary excitement, he was instantly cooled on obtaining a close sight of the Toulon squadron. To make eleven crews out of eight, it had been necessary to divide, and, of course, to weaken them. They had been completed with conscripts drafted from the land service. The materials used in the port of Toulon were not of good quality, and it was found that the iron-work, cordage, masts, and spars, easily broke. Villeneuve was in great, perhaps too great, anxiety about the risks to be run in facing with such craft and such crews, the ships of the enemy trained by a cruise of twenty months. His soul was shaken, even before he put to sea. However, urged by Napoleon, and by the minister Decrès, he got ready to weigh anchor towards the end of December. A head wind detained him in Toulon roads, from the end of December to the 18th of January. On the 18th, the wind having shifted, he set sail, and by shifting his course, succeeded in evading the enemy. But in the course of the night a heavy tempest arose, and the inexperience of the crews, and the bad quality of the materials, exposed all our vessels to serious accidents. The squadron was dispersed. In the morning, Villeneuve found himself separated, with four ships of the line and one frigate. Some had carried away their top-masts, others had sprung leaks, or had received damage not easily repaired at sea. Besides these misadventures, two English frigates were watching us, and the admiral was afraid of the enemy coming up with him at the moment when he had but five sail to oppose to him. He therefore determined to put back to Toulon, although he was already seventy leagues distant from it; and notwithstanding the entreaties of general Lauriston, who, reckoning four thousand and some hundreds of men on board the vessels which still remained together, demanded to be taken to his destination, Villeneuve returned to Toulon on the 27th, and succeeded in assembling his whole squadron there.

The time was not thrown away. The damages that had been sustained were repaired, the masts and rigging were repaired, and every thing put in order for sailing again. But admiral Villeneuve was much affected; on the very day of his return to

Toulon he wrote the minister: "I declare to you, that vessels thus equipped, short-handed, encumbered with troops, with superannuated or bad materials, vessels which lose their masts or sails at every puff of wind, and which, in fine weather, are constantly engaged in repairing the damages caused by the wind, or the inexperience of their sailors, are not fit to undertake any thing. I had a presentiment of this before I sailed; I have now only too painfully experienced it."*

Napoleon was sensibly displeas'd on hearing of this useless sortie. "What," said he, "is to be done with admirals who allow their spirits to sink and determine to hasten home at the first damage that they receive? It would be requisite to give up sailing, and to remain wholly inactive even in the finest weather, if an expedition is to be prevented by the separation of a few vessels. The whole of the captains," he added, "ought to have had sealed orders to meet off the Canary Islands. The damages should have been repaired *en route*. If any vessel leaked dangerously she should have been left at Cadiz, her crew and the troops being transferred to the *Eagle*, which was in that port and ready for sailing. A few topmasts carried away, some casualties in a gale of wind, were everyday occurrences. Two days of fine weather ought to have cheered up the crews and put every thing to rights. *But the great evil of our navy is that the men who command it are unused to all the risks of command.*"†

Unfortunately, the right moment for the expedition to Surinam had gone by, and it was necessary that Napoleon, with his usual fertility of invention, should devise a new plan. The first, which had consisted in admiral Latouche proceeding from Toulon into the Channel, had fallen to the ground, owing to the death of that valuable officer. The second, which had consisted in decoying the English into the American seas, by sending Villeneuve's squadron to Surinam, and Missiessy's to the Antilles, and in taking advantage of this diversion to bring Ganteaume's squadron into the Channel had equally failed from delays in organisation, foul winds, and an unsuccessful sortie. It was necessary, therefore, to resort to another plan. A new loss, that of admiral Bruix, different from admiral Latouche, but at least his equal in merit, added to the difficulty of naval operations. The unfortunate Bruix, so remarkable for his firmness, experience, and strength of mind, had died through his zeal and devotion to the organisation of the flotilla. Had he lived, Napoleon would certainly have placed him at the head of the squadron charged with the grand manœuvre that he meditated. One would have said that Fate, conjured up in hostility to the French navy, had purposely deprived it in the course of ten months of its two most eminent

* Despatch of the 1st Pluviôse, year XIII. (21st of January, 1805), dated on board the ship *Buccontaur*, in Toulon road.

† Letter to Lauriston, of the 1st of February, 1805.

admirals, either of them, undoubtedly, capable of opposing the English admirals. It was, in consequence, necessary to be content with admirals Ganteaume, Villeneuve, and Missiessy, until the events of war should develop new officers of merit.

A grave event had recently taken place as to the sea, where it greatly altered the situation of the belligerent powers. England, in an unlooked-for and very unjust manner, had declared war against Spain. For some time she had perceived that the neutrality of Spain without being friendly in intention towards France, was, nevertheless, useful to her in more than one respect. Our squadron, lying at Ferrol, had refitted there while waiting for the blockade to be removed. The *Eagle* did the same at Cadiz. Our privateers entered the ports of the Peninsula for the purpose of selling their prizes. As matter of reciprocity, England had a right to the same advantages; but she preferred to forego them rather than suffer France to enjoy them. Accordingly, she announced to the court of Madrid, that she considered as a breach of neutrality what was taking place in the ports of the Peninsula, and threatened war if our vessels continued to repair or fit out there, and if our privateers continued to find an asylum and a market there. She had still further required Charles IV. to guarantee Portugal against all attempts on the part of Napoleon. This last was an exorbitant exaction, going beyond the limit of the neutrality that was required from Spain. At the same time, France had permitted the court of Madrid to show itself accommodating towards England, and even to grant a part of her demands, in order to prolong a state of things which answered our purpose. In fact, the military co-operation of Spain was not worth so much to us as a subsidy of 48 million francs per annum, and that subsidy could only be paid by means of the neutrality, which alone permitted the arrival of specie from the New World. We were, consequently, ready to consent to every thing; but England, becoming more exacting in proportion as her demands were complied with, had required that all repairs and outfitting should cease in the ports of Spain; by which she meant that our ships were immediately to be sent out of Ferrol, in other words, to be given up. Openly violating the law of nations, she, without any previous notice, ordered the capture of all Spanish vessels that might be met with at sea. Considering that such an order had no other object than the capture of vessels coming from America laden with gold, we may justly term it a measure of downright piracy. At this time four Spanish frigates, laden with 12 million dollars (2,400,000*l.*), on their passage from Mexico to Spain, were captured by an English squadron. The Spanish commander, having refused to give up his vessels, was barbarously attacked by an immensely superior force, and made prisoner, after a gallant defence. One of the frigates was blown up, the other three were taken to ports of Great Britain.

This odious measure excited the indignation of Spain and the reprobation of all Europe. Charles IV. unhesitatingly declared war against England. He at the same time ordered the arrest of the English who were found on the territory of the Peninsula, and the sequestration of all their property, to answer for the property and persons of Spanish merchants.

Thus, in spite of her inaction, and in spite of the skilful forbearance of France, Spain was dragged into war by the maritime violences of England. Napoleon, having no longer any ground for requiring the subsidy of 48 million francs, hastened to settle the manner in which Spain should co-operate in the war, and especially endeavoured to inspire her with resolutions worthy of herself and of her ancient greatness.

The Spanish cabinet, with the desire of gratifying Napoleon, and from a sense of justice towards merit, had chosen admiral Gravina as its ambassador to France. He was at the head of the Spanish navy, and beneath a simple exterior concealed a rare intelligence and great courage. Napoleon was much attached to admiral Gravina, who was equally attached to Napoleon. For the same reasons that had caused him to be named ambassador, he had the principal command of the Spanish navy given to him, and previous to quitting Paris, he was instructed to concert with the French government on the plan of naval operations. To this end, the admiral, on the 4th of January, 1805, signed a convention which detailed the part which each of the two powers should take in the war. France engaged constantly to keep at sea forty-seven ships of the line, twenty-nine frigates, fourteen corvettes, and twenty-five brigs; and to hasten as much as possible the finishing of the sixteen ships and fourteen frigates which were on the stocks; to concentrate all the troops which were encamped near the ports of embarkation, in the proportion of five hundred men to each ship, and two hundred to each frigate; to keep the French flotilla constantly ready to transport ninety thousand men, exclusive of the thirty thousand intended to be embarked in the Dutch flotilla. Reckoning the flotilla as equal to so many ships and frigates, and adding our ships of war, we may be said to have had an effective total of sixty ships and forty frigates, at that time at sea.

Spain, on her part, promised instantly to fit out thirty-two ships of the line, furnished with provisions for six months, and with water for four months. The division of them was thus fixed: fifteen to Cadiz, eight to Carthagena, and nine to Ferrol. Spanish troops were to be assembled at the points of embarkation, at the rate of four hundred and fifty men to each ship, and two hundred men to each frigate. Further, she was to be prepared with vessels *en flute* (*i. e.* converted into transports by having their guns taken out), in the proportion of four thousand tons at Cadiz, two thousand at Carthagena, and two thousand at Ferrol. It was agreed that admiral Gravina should have the chief com-

mand of the Spanish fleet, and should correspond directly with the French minister Decrès. In other words, he was to receive instructions from Napoleon himself, and Spanish honour needed not to blush for accepting such a direction. Some political conditions accompanied these military stipulations. The subsidy naturally ceased on the day on which England commenced hostilities against Spain. Further, the two nations agreed not to make peace separately. France promised to cause the colony of Trinidad to be restored to Spain, and Gibraltar also, should the war be attended with some signal success.

The engagement entered into by the court of Madrid was far above its means. Instead of thirty-two ships, it was much if she fitted out twenty-four, and but of middling quality, though with gallant crews. If, then, the whole forces of France, Spain, and Holland, be summed up, we may consider the three nations to have possessed ninety-two ships of the line; of which sixty belonged to France, twenty-four to Spain, and eight to Holland. But the flotilla must be reckoned for fifteen, which reduced the actual naval force of the three nations to seventy-seven sail of the line. The English had eighty-nine, perfectly armed, well found, manned with experienced crews, and in every respect superior to those of the two allies, and this number was about to be increased to a hundred. The advantage, therefore, was on their side; they could only be beaten by superior combinations, which are far from being as efficacious by sea as they are by land.

Unfortunately, Spain, formerly so powerful in her navy, and still so much interested in being so, on account of her vast colonies—Spain, as we have already often remarked, was in a state of absolute destitution. Her arsenals were abandoned, and contained no wood, hemp, copper, or iron. The magnificent establishments of Ferrol, Cadiz, and Carthagena, were empty and deserted. They had neither stores nor workmen. The seamen, few in number in Spain, since her commerce was almost reduced to the conveyance of specie, were just now still further diminished in number by the yellow fever, which had ravaged all the seaboard, and had driven them abroad or into the interior. When to this we add a great scarcity of grain, and extreme financial distress, increased by the loss of the galleons that had recently been captured, we shall still have but an inadequate idea of all the miseries which afflicted that power, once so great, but at that period so sadly reduced.

Napoleon, who had so often and so vainly counselled Spain, during the late peace, to devote at least a portion of her resources to the reorganisation of a navy—Napoleon, although with but little hope of being attended to, resolved to make another effort with that court. This time, instead of employing threats, as in 1803, he employed encouragements and caresses. He had recalled marshal Lannes from Portugal, to place him at the head of the grenadiers, who were to be the first of our troops to land in Eng-

land. He had appointed general Junot to replace Lannes in Portugal. He was partial to Junot, who had natural talent, and a boundless devotion, though somewhat too ardent a temperament. He ordered him to stop at Madrid, to see the prince of peace, the queen, and the king. Junot was to pique the honour of the prince of peace, to make him feel that the fate of the Spanish monarchy was in his hands, and that he had to choose between the part of a contemptible and detested favourite, and that of a minister making use of the favour of his sovereigns to restore power to his country. Junot was authorised to promise him the full friendship of Napoleon, and even a principality in Portugal, if he would zealously serve the common cause, and endeavour to infuse an adequate activity into the Spanish administration. Napoleon's envoy was then to see the queen, to declare to her that her influence over the government—that is to say, over the king and the prince of peace—was well known in Europe; that her personal honour, as well as the honour of the kingdom, was interested in great and successful exertions being made; that if the power of Spain was not put forth on this occasion, she, the all-powerful queen, would, in the eyes of the world and of her children, be responsible for the disorders which would have weakened and ruined the monarchy. Junot was to try all possible means to inspire this princess with better principles. As regarded the king, no such efforts were necessary, for his sentiments were excellent; but the weak king had neither attention nor energy. He was brutalised by the chase, and by mechanical labours.

Junot had orders to make some stay at Madrid, previously to proceeding to Portugal, and to play the part of ambassador extraordinary, in order to reanimate in some degree that degenerate court.

The great matter now was to make the best possible use of the naval resources of the three nations, France, Holland, and Spain. The project of suddenly bringing a more or less considerable portion of his navy into the Channel, a project which had twice been modified, had incessantly occupied the attention of Napoleon. But a grand and sudden idea now for a moment turned him aside from it.

Napoleon had frequently received reports from general Decaen, commandant of our factories in India, who had retired to the Isle of France since the renewal of war, and, in conjunction with admiral Linois, had done great damage to the English commerce. General Decaen, an ardent spirit, well qualified to command at a distance, and in an independent and perilous position, had formed connexions with the Mahrattas, who were still insubordinate. He had procured some curious information as to the dispositions of the recently vanquished princes, and had arrived at the conviction that six thousand French, disembarked with a sufficient war *materiel*, and speedily joined by a multitude of insurgents eager to throw off the yoke, could shake the British Empire in India. It will be remembered that it was Napoleon who in 1803

had suggested this to general Decaen, who had ardently seized the idea. But it was no mere mad enterprise that Napoleon contemplated; if any thing was to be attempted it was a grand expedition, worthy to rival that of Egypt, and adequate to wresting from the English that important conquest which forms at once their glory and their grandeur in the present century. The distance alone would render that expedition far more difficult than that of Egypt. To transport, in a time of war, thirty thousand men from Toulon to Alexandria, was a difficult operation; but to convey them from Toulon to the shores of India, doubling the Cape of Good Hope, was a gigantic enterprise. Napoleon was of opinion, founded on his own experience, that, the immensity of the ocean rendering meetings there very unfrequent, only invention was required to venture upon and succeed in the boldest movements without falling in with an enemy, though very superior in number. It was thus that in 1798 he had passed through the English fleets with some hundreds of vessels and an entire army, taken Malta, and reached Alexandria, without being met by Nelson. It was thus that he hoped to get a fleet into the Channel. The success of such enterprises required profound secrecy and great art to deceive the British admiralty. He had elaborately prepared every thing for perplexing the English nation. Having troops assembled and ready for embarkation wherever he had squadrons, at Toulon, at Cadiz, at Ferrol, at Rochefort, at Brest, and at the Texel, he at all times had it in his power to send out an army without the English being aware of either its strength or its destination. The project of the descent had this use, that the attention of the enemy being constantly directed towards that object, they would anticipate an expedition against Ireland or the coasts of England. The moment, then, was favourable for attempting one of those extraordinary expeditions, which Napoleon was so prompt in planning and deciding upon. He considered, for instance, that to wrest India from the English was a result sufficiently grand to warrant him in deferring all his other projects, even including that of the descent, and upon that expedition he was inclined to employ all his naval resources. The following were his calculations upon this subject. In the outfitting ports he had, besides the squadrons ready to sail, a reserve of old vessels not very fit for active service. He had also among his crews, besides able and experienced seamen, very young novices, and conscripts newly put on board ship. It was upon this double consideration that he based his plan.

He determined to combine with a certain number of new vessels, all those which were past service, but which were still fit to make a voyage; he resolved to arm them *en flute*, that is, to remove their guns, to put on board, instead of them, a great mass of troops, complete the crews with all sorts of men from our ports, and thus to send out from Toulon, Cadiz, Ferrol, Rochefort, and Brest,

fleets which, without being accompanied by a single transport-ship, could land a considerable army in India. He proposed to send thirteen ships from Toulon and twenty-one from Brest, in all thirty-four, one-half of them at least old vessels, and to add to them a score of frigates, one half of them almost past service. These two fleets, running out to sea almost at the same time, and being appointed to join company at the Isle of France, would be capable of carrying soldiers and sailors to the number of 40,000. On reaching India the vessels in bad condition were to be broken up, and only those preserved which were fit for sailing, which would be fifteen ships out of thirty-four, and ten frigates out of twenty. There were also two divisions to be made in the crews. All the good sailors were intended to man the vessels that were to be preserved, while the inferior sailors, capable, however, of being converted into soldiers, were to complete the army of disembarkation. Napoleon judged that it would require about 14,000 or 15,000 seamen efficiently to man the fifteen ships and ten frigates which were to return to Europe. We should then have in India from 25,000 to 26,000 troops, out of the 40,000 seamen and soldiers sent from Europe, and we should have back a fleet of fifteen sail, excellent alike for the quality of the vessels, the choice of the men, and the experience acquired in a long voyage. In reference to the navy the only loss would be worthless hulks and the fag ends of crews, and we should leave in India an army sufficient to conquer the English, especially if it were commanded by so enterprising a man as general Decaen. Napoleon still further prepared to send out 3000 French in the Dutch fleet of the Texel, 2000 in a new fleet organised at Rochefort, and 4000 Spaniards in the Spanish fleet of Cadiz, which would form a new reinforcement of 9000 men, and raise the army of general Decaen to 35,000 or 36,000 men. It is extremely probable that, India being scarcely subjected, such a force would have overthrown the British power there. As regarded the voyage, nothing was less likely than meeting the English. It would have been difficult to escape from them if the war squadron had to be accompanied by some hundreds of transport ships. But the old ships and old frigates, armed *en flute*, rendered that unnecessary. The principle, then, on which the project rested, was to sacrifice the inferior or bad portion of the navy, alike as to men and vessels, and resolve to bring back only the portion which was excellent. At this cost the miracle would be performed of transporting to India an army of 36,000 men. Indeed, the sacrifice was not as great as it appeared to be, for every sailor knows that at sea, as on land, and even more at sea than on land, the quality of forces is every thing, and that more can be done with ten good vessels than with twenty inferior ones.

This project implied the momentary postponing of the descent; but it was possible that it would favour it in an extraordinary manner, for, after some time, when the English should learn the

departure of our fleets they would follow them, and thus leave the seas of Europe open, while the squadron, returning from India with fifteen ships and ten frigates, could pass into the Straits of Dover, where Napoleon, in constant readiness, would be prepared to avail himself of even the shortest gleam of good fortune. It is true that this latter part of the plan supposed a double success; success in going to India and success in returning; and Fortune rarely heaps her favours to this extent upon any man, however great. During four weeks Napoleon remained in suspense between the idea of sending this expedition to India, and the idea of crossing the Straits of Dover. The overthrow of the English power in India appeared to him to be so important a result as to dispense with the necessity for risking himself and his army in so perilous an attempt as the descent. For a whole month, then, he hesitated between these two plans, and his letters bear testimony to the fluctuations of his mind between those two extraordinary enterprises.

However, the Boulogne expedition gained the preference. Napoleon considered that stroke the prompter of the two, the more decisive, and even the more infallible, if a French fleet should suddenly appear in the Channel. He set his mind to work again, and he hit upon a new arrangement, grander, more profound, and more promising than the two former ones, for assembling without the knowledge of the English all his naval forces between Dover and Boulogne.

His plan was resolved upon early in March, and the orders accordingly given. In this plan, as in that of Surinam, the English were to be decoyed towards India and the West Indies, whither the squadron of admiral Missiessy, which had sailed on the 11th of January, already called their attention, and the French were then suddenly to return to the seas of Europe, with an assemblage of force superior to any squadron the English could muster. It was in some degree the same project as that of the previous December, but increased and completed by the junction of the forces of Spain. Admiral Villeneuve was to sail with the first favourable wind, pass the Strait, call at Cadiz for admiral Gravina, with six or seven Spanish ships, besides the *Eagle*, then proceed to Martinique, and, if Missiessy were still there, join him, and wait for a further junction more considerable than all the others. This junction was that of Ganteaume. He, profiting by the first equinoctial gale which should disperse the English, was to sail from Brest with twenty-one ships, the best of this arsenal, steer for Ferrol, be joined by the French division in port there, and the Spanish division which would be ready to sail, and then steer for Martinique, where Villeneuve would be awaiting him. After this general assemblage, which presented but few real difficulties, there would be at Martinique twelve sail under Villeneuve, six or seven under Gravina, five under Missiessy, and twenty-one under Ganteaume, besides the Franco-Spanish

squadron of Ferrol, that is to say, about fifty to sixty vessels—an enormous force, the concentration of which had never been witnessed at any time or on any sea. The plan was now so complete, so well-calculated, that it necessarily produced in the mind of Napoleon a rapture of hope. Even the minister Decrès confessed that it presented the greatest chances of success. It was always possible to run out of Toulon with the (*Mistral*) north-west wind, as the late sortie of Villeneuve showed. The junction with Gravina at Cadiz, should Nelson be outwitted, was easy, for the English had not yet thought it necessary to blockade that port. The Toulon squadron, thus increased to seventeen or eighteen sail, was almost certain to reach Martinique. Missiessy had touched there without meeting any thing during his voyage, except some merchantmen, which he captured. The most difficult point was to get out of Brest road. But in March there was every reason to expect some equinoctial gale. Ganteaume, on arriving before Ferrol, which was only blockaded by five or six English vessels, would, on presenting himself with twenty-one, put all idea of fighting out of their minds, and, without striking a blow, succeed in adding to his force the French division commanded by admiral Gourdon, and those Spanish vessels which were ready, and then proceed to Martinique. It could not be suspected by the English that there was any design of assembling, at a single point like Martinique, from fifty to sixty vessels at once. It was probable that their ideas would turn towards India. At all events, Ganteaume, Gourdon, Villeneuve, Gravina, and Missiessy, having once effected a junction, no English squadron that they might meet, and numbering at most only from twelve to fifteen sail, would venture to oppose fifty, and the return into the Channel was consequently secured. All our forces, then, were to be assembled together between the shores of England and France, at the moment when the fleets of England would be sailing towards the East or the West Indies. Events speedily proved that this grand plan was practicable even with an inferior execution.

Every precaution was taken to preserve the most profound secrecy. The plan was not confided to the Spaniards, who had engaged to follow with docility the directions of Napoleon. Villeneuve and Ganteaume alone of the admirals were to be entrusted with the secret, and they were not to have it on sailing, but when fairly at sea, and without opportunity of communicating with land. Then their sealed orders, which they were only to open on reaching a certain latitude, would instruct them what course to steer. None of the captains of these vessels were let into the secret of the expedition, but they had certain fixed points at which to rejoin each other in case of separation. None of the ministers were acquainted with the plan excepting admiral Decrès. He was expressly instructed to correspond directly with Napoleon, and to write his despatches with his own hand.

The report of an expedition to India was circulated in all the ports. It was pretended that great numbers of troops were embarked; in reality, the Toulon squadron was charged to take scarcely three thousand men, and the Brest squadron six or seven thousand. The admirals were instructed to land half that force in the West Indies, to reinforce the garrisons there, and to bring back four or five thousand of the best soldiers, to add to the force of Boulogne.

By arranging matters thus, the fleets would not be greatly encumbered, but free and comfortable. They were all victualled for six months, so that they might remain at sea a long time without putting into port. Couriers were despatched to Ferrol and Cadiz, bearing orders to have every thing prepared for weighing, because, at any moment, the blockade might be raised by an allied fleet, without saying which or how.

To all these precautions for outwitting the English, one more was added, which was not less calculated to deceive them—the journey of Napoleon into Italy. He computed that his fleets, sailing towards the end of March and employing the month of April to go to Martinique, the month of May to assemble together, and the month of June to return, would get into the Channel in the beginning of July. He was to remain all that time in Italy reviewing troops, and giving fêtes, hiding his profound designs beneath the appearances of a vain and sumptuous life; then, at the appointed moment, to set off secretly by post, travel in five days from Milan to Boulogne, and while he was supposed to be still in Italy, strike his long-meditated blow upon England; that blow which she had so much expected for two years, that she now began to disbelieve it. Europe now considered it a mere feint, intended to convulse the British nation, and oblige it to exhaust itself in useless efforts. While this idea was adopted, Napoleon, on the contrary, had incessantly been increasing his army of invasion by drafting from the depôts the number of men necessary to increase the effective force of the war battalions, and by filling up, from the conscription of the year, the void thus caused in the depôts. The army of Boulogne was thus augmented by nearly thirty thousand men, without any one knowing it. He had always kept this army in such a state of activity and readiness, that it was scarcely possible to judge of its greater or less effective force. The opinion of a mere demonstration intended to harass England, daily became the prevalent opinion.

Every thing being thus arranged, with the firmest resolution to attempt the enterprise, and with a deep conviction of success, Napoleon prepared to set out for Italy. The pope had remained during the whole winter at Paris. He at first intended to set out in the middle of February on his return to his own states. Heavy snow-storms in the Alps delayed his departure. Napoleon so winningly urged his further stay, that the holy father yielded, and consented to defer his departure to the middle of March. Napo-

leon was not ill pleased that Europe should note this long visit, that his intimacy with the pope should become greater every day, and that his holiness should remain on this side of the Alps while preparations were making at Milan for a second coronation. The courts of Naples, Rome, and even Etruria, did not without regret perceive the creation of a vast French kingdom in Italy, and if the pope had been at the Vatican, besieged by all sorts of suggestions, perhaps he would have been induced to show himself unfavourable to it.

Pius VII., after having learned to put full confidence in Napoleon, had ended by entrusting him with his secret desires. He was delighted with the honours paid to his person—honours which benefited religion—with the good which his presence appeared to do, and also with what the new Emperor had done in France to aid the restoration of public worship. But though a saintlike man, Pius VII. still was a man, and a prince; and the triumph of spiritual interests, while it filled him with satisfaction, did not cause him to forget the temporal interests of the Holy See, damaged since the loss of the Legations. Six cardinals had accompanied him, one of whom, cardinal Borgia, had died at Lyons. The others, especially Antonelli and di Pietro, were of the ultramontane party, and strongly opposed to cardinal Caprara, who was too prudent and enlightened to suit them. They, consequently, had induced the Pope to conceal his proceedings from that cardinal, who, in his quality of legate, ought to have been informed of all negotiations attempted in Paris. He certainly would not have taught them the way to succeed in their projects, for what could be done for the Church Napoleon did spontaneously, and without being urged. But that personage, full of prudence and experience, would have dissuaded them from useless efforts, which are always to be regretted, as they most frequently became the cause of quarrel.

They began to dogmatise with Napoleon upon the four propositions of Bousset, which Louis XIV., towards the close of his reign, was said to have promised to annul. Napoleon, gentle in manner, but inflexible as to the essential, made it manifest that nothing was to be expected from him as to the revocation of the famous Organic Articles. There remained the manner of executing them. He appeared inclined to attend to the observations which they might offer to him upon this subject. At first they spoke to him of the jurisdiction of bishops over the ecclesiastics, of which much had been said to him, and which Pius VII. did not deem to be sufficiently complete. To this Napoleon, concerting his replies with M. Portalis, replied that every spiritual offence was, and would continue to be, left to the ecclesiastical jurisdiction, but that every civil offence against the civil law would continue to be referred to the ordinary tribunals, for the priests were citizens, and therefore must be held accountable to the common laws. It was pretended that 38 million francs per annum

(1,520,000*l.*) were required for the support of religion, while there were but 13 million francs (520,000*l.*) devoted to it in the budget of the State, which left a deficiency of 25 million francs (1,000,000*l.* sterling.) Napoleon replied by enumerating what he had done in that respect, and that which he still intended to do, in proportion to the gradual increase of the revenues of the State. Mention was made to him of various other objects, foreign to the Organic Articles, and their execution, especially of divorce, which was permitted by our new laws. Napoleon, still consulting M. Portalis, replied, that divorce had appeared to the legislator to be indispensable as a remedy to certain disorders of morals, but that the priests remained free to refuse the religious benediction to divorced persons who wished to contract a new marriage; that the conscience of the priests, therefore, was not outraged; and that, moreover, that was not a matter opposed to the dogma, inasmuch as divorce had existed in the ancient Church. From this subject they turned to that of Sundays and holidays, which, notwithstanding the re-establishment of the Gregorian calendar, were not generally enough observed by the people. Napoleon replied that already, towards the close of the last century, manners, more potent than laws, had brought about a relaxation; and that, before the Revolution, workmen in the towns used to work on Sundays; that penalties applied in this case would be less serviceable than example; that the government would always set good ones; and that workmen paid by the State should never work on holidays; that the Sunday was faithfully observed by the country people, and only neglected by the population of the towns; and that in the towns, to compel the people in the towns to be idle, would, besides the inconvenience of having recourse to the penal law, be giving to drunkenness and vice the time taken away from labour; and, finally, that every thing had been tried that was permitted by a religious, but also a prudent policy.

Another subject was touched upon—that of education; and they demanded for the clergy the power of superintending the schools. Napoleon replied, that in the Lyceums there would be almoners chosen from among priests conforming in doctrine with the Church; that they would virtually be ecclesiastical inspectors of houses of education, and could point out to their bishops those in which the religious teaching was defective, but that there would be over the educational establishments no other authority than that of the State. Some mention was also made of the bishops dissentient with the Holy See, and it was agreed to reduce them to that peace, voluntary or forced, in which Napoleon was resolved that the whole clergy should live. This series of questions of spiritual interests was terminated by the discussion of a plan which had unceasingly occupied the court of Rome—that of obtaining that the Catholic religion should be the established religion of the State. On this subject Napoleon was inflexible. He maintained that that religion was dominant, in fact, since it was the religion

of the majority of the French people, and since the important actions of the government, such, for instance, as the taking of the crown, had been surrounded by Catholic ceremonies. But a declaration of that kind was calculated to alarm all the dissenting faiths; now his intention was to ensure perfect repose to them all, and he would not allow that the re-establishment of the Catholic faith, a re-establishment which he had willed, and frankly willed, should be any diminution of the security of any other religion.

On all these points Napoleon was extremely mild in form, unalterably firm as to substance. At length they passed to the essential point, that which touched Rome more nearly than all the points of ecclesiastical discipline—the business of the Legations. A memorial was drawn up, which Pius VII. himself delivered to Napoleon, and which related to the losses which the Holy See had sustained during a century past, alike in revenues and in territories. In this memorial various revenues were enumerated, which the Holy See formerly collected in all Catholic States, and which, under the influence of the public spirit in France, had been diminished or wholly suppressed in France, in Austria, and even in Spain.

The memorial recalled the manner in which the Holy See had been kept out of its reversion of the duchy of Parma, on the extinction of the Farnese house, the still older privation of the county Venaissin, which had been ceded to France; and the gravest of all the losses, that of the Legations, incorporated in the Italian Republic. Thus reduced, the Holy See could no longer, it was urged, make head against the inevitable expenses of the Catholic worship in all parts of the world. It could neither put the cardinals in a position to support their dignity, nor support foreign missions, nor provide for the defence of its weak states. They reckoned upon the modern Charlemagne vieing in munificence with the ancient one. Here Napoleon did not fail to feel some embarrassment at so direct a demand. He had made no promise to attract the Pope to Paris; but all along he had, in a general way, left room to hope that he would ameliorate the worldly circumstances of the Holy See. To restore the Legations to the pontifical court was a thing impossible, without odiously betraying that Italian Republic of which he was the founder, and was about to become the monarch. That would have been to destroy all the hopes of the Italian patriots, who looked upon that new State as the commencement of the independent existence of their country. But he had at his disposal the duchy of Parma, which he would not grant either to the house of Sardinia as an indemnity for Piedmont, nor to Spain as an aggrandisement of the kingdom of Etruria, and which at this time he reserved as a family endowment. It would no doubt have been prudent to employ it as an indemnity to the house of Sardinia, or even to add it to Etruria, while obliging the latter to indemnify the house of Sardinia with the Siennese. At the same stroke peace would have been

purchased with Russia, and great pleasure given to Spain. But if it were not thought worth while to keep on good terms with Russia, who had withdrawn her *chargé d'affaires*, or to gratify Spain, whose inertness was scarcely to be roused into energy by friendly actions, it would have been a destination worthy of the lofty designs of Napoleon, to give the duchy of Parma to the Pope. In ceding it to the Holy See, Napoleon would have put an end to many rumours as to his designs in Italy; he would have destroyed the chief argument used to induce Austria to join in a new coalition, and what was no less important, he would for ever have bound the Pope to him, and prevented that painful rupture with the Holy See, which, at a later period, did him so much moral injury, and which in reality had no other origin than the ill-disguised discontent of the court of Rome on this occasion. All this would have been better than reserving Parma, as Napoleon then resolved to reserve it, as a family endowment. His having, in 1804, allowed the alliance of Prussia to escape him, and sent home the Pope in 1805, covered with honours, but wounded in his interests, formed, in our opinion, the first essential errors of that powerful policy, whose mistake it was to account only with itself, and never with others.

Napoleon took advantage of these applications being confined solely to the Legations, to make the simple and easy reply which sprang out of the very state of the case. He could not betray a State which had chosen him for its head, a legitimate and decisive reason as to the Legations; and he announced his intention of, at a future time, ameliorating the situation of the Holy See. He charged cardinal Fesch to enter into an explanation with the Pope. He would at that time render him pecuniary aid, and he held out the prospect of new distributions of territory at no distant day, by means of which the Pope could be indemnified. For the rest he was sincere, for he described these distributions in a not distant future. He saw, in fact, an early rekindling of war upon the Continent, Italy wholly conquered, Venice wrested from Austria, and Naples from the Bourbons, and he deemed that in all this he could easily find wherewithal to satisfy the Pope.

But the deferring of these good intentions allowed a present displeasure to arise, which speedily became the source of mischievous consequences.

Napoleon and the Pope separated without being so much displeased with each other as the demands made and refused might have given reason to fear. The Pope, in lieu of the dangers which blunderers had predicted on his leaving Rome, had experienced a magnificent reception at Paris, had augmented the religious impulse by his presence; in short, had occupied in France a position worthy of the palmiest days of the Church. On the whole, if his interested councillors were discontented, he departed satisfied. He left Paris on the 4th of April, 1805, in the midst

of a greater crowd of people than had welcomed his arrival. He was to stay some days at Lyons to celebrate Easter.

Napoleon had prepared every thing for his journey at the same period. After having given his final orders to the fleet and the army, and reiterated his urgent directions to the court of Spain, to have every thing ready at Ferrol and at Cadiz, and after giving the arch-chancellor Cambacérès, not the ostensible, but the actual direction of the Empire, he, on the 1st of April, proceeded to Fontainebleau, where he was to remain for two or three days. He departed, delighted with his projects, and full of confidence in their success. He had a first pledge of that success in the fortunate departure of admiral Villeneuve. He had at length set sail on the 30th of March, with a favourable wind, and he had been lost sight of from the heights of Toulon, without any fear existing of his having met the English. One thwarting circumstance alone prevented the satisfaction from being complete. On the 1st of April the equinox was not yet felt at Brest, and the existing calm and clear weather was not that which was needed for dispersing the English, or concealing from them the movements of a squadron, so that the departure of Ganteaume had been rendered impossible. Had he once been clear of Brest, the success of the assemblages would have been almost made certain; and it was to suppose a phenomenon in the seasons, to entertain a doubt that the equinox would not bring on a gale in the course of April. Napoleon departed from Fontainebleau on the 3rd of April, proceeding by Troyes, Châlons, and Lyons, and preceding the Pope by the rapidity with which he travelled, so that the two trains should not interfere. While he journeyed towards Italy, busied with his grand ideas, and occasionally allowing his attention to be diverted by the homages of the people, Europe, variously excited, was in travail with a third coalition. England, alarmed for her existence, Russia wounded in her pride, Austria deeply annoyed at what was in progress in Italy, and Prussia, constantly hesitating between opposing fears, formed, or suffered to be formed, a new European league, which, far from being more successful than the former ones, was to procure Napoleon a colossal empire, which, unhappily, was too disproportioned to be permanent.

The Russian cabinet, regretting the errors which the ardour of the young sovereign had caused him to commit, would have been glad to have discovered in the replies of France a pretext for retracing its inconsiderate course. The pride of Napoleon, which withheld even a specious explanation of the occupation of Naples, of the refusal to indemnify the house of Savoy, or of the invasion of Hanover, considering them as matters which might be explained to a friendly court, but not to a hostile court—this pride had disconcerted the cabinet of St. Petersburg, and compelled it, in spite of itself, to recall M. D'Oubril. The emperor Alexander, who had not firmness enough to bear the consequences of a first movement, was disconcerted, and almost intimidated. Messrs.

de Strogonoff, de Nowositzoff, and Czartoryski, more firm, but perhaps less penetrating, had surrounded him, and made him feel the necessity of upholding the dignity of his crown in the eyes of Europe. The Russian cabinet had reverted to the not very practicable, but seductive ideas of a supreme arbitration, exercised in the name of justice and right. Two powers, France and England, disturbed Europe, and oppressed it, for the interests of their rivalry. It was necessary to head the ill-treated nations, and propose to them a common plan of pacification, in which their rights should be guaranteed, and the points of dispute between France and England set at rest. It was necessary to rally Europe to this plan, propose it in the name of Europe to England and France, then side with that one of the two powers which adopted it, against the one which refused it, and to overwhelm this latter with the force and just right of the whole world. Men not quite so young, nor so crammed with theory, would have seen in all this just simply a coalition with England and part of Europe against France. This plan, in fact, which was conceived in a spirit entirely favourable to England, which managed Russia, and unfavourable to France, which did not, was sure to be tolerably acceptable to Mr. Pitt, and unacceptable to Napoleon, and productive, sooner or later, of a war against the latter. It brought about a third coalition. The proposals presented to the emperor Alexander were mingled with so many specious and brilliant ideas, and with some so generous and so just, that the young czar, alarmed at first at what was proposed to him, was at length struck and seduced to the extent of immediately putting his hand to the work.

Previous to giving an account of the negotiations which followed, we must describe this plan of European arbitration, and point out its author. It will be seen, from the gravity of the consequences, that they merit to be known.

One of those adventurers, sometimes endowed with rare and eminent abilities, who carry into the north the intellect and learning of the south, had proceeded to Poland to find a field for his talents. He was an abbé, named Piatoli, and had in the first instance been attached to the court of the last king of Poland. After the various partitions he had passed into Courland, and from Courland into Russia. He was one of those active spirits, who, unable to rise to the government of states, placed too far above them, conceive plans, which, though commonly chimerical, are not always contemptible. The man of whom we speak had meditated much upon the affairs of Europe, and chance having brought him into connexion with the young friends of Alexander, he seized the opportunity of exercising a great though secret influence, and of causing a part of his conceptions to prevail in the resolutions of the powers. Those subaltern thinkers rarely have such an honour. The abbé Piatoli had the melancholy advantage of furnishing, in 1805, some of the principal ideas, which ended by being admitted into the treaties of 1815. On this account he is

worthy of notice, and the ideas which we attribute to him are not mere suppositions, for they are contained in secret memorials sent at that time to the emperor Alexander.* This foreigner discovering in prince Czartoryski a more earnest and thoughtful spirit than animated the other young men who governed Russia, associated himself more closely with him, and their ideas became identical to such an extent, that the plan proposed to the emperor belonged almost as much to one as to the other. The following was this plan.

The ambition of the northern powers, and the conquests of the French Revolution, had for thirty years disturbed the balance of Europe, and oppressed all the second-rate nations. It was necessary to remedy this by a new organisation, and by the establishment of a new law of nations, placed under the protection of a grand European confederation. To this end, it was necessary that there should be one perfectly disinterested power, which would cause that disinterestedness to be shared by all the others—and which would labour for the accomplishment of the proposed object.

One power alone bore all the marks of that noble mission, and that power was Russia. Her true ambition, if she rightly understood her part, would be to acquire, not territory, as England, Austria, or Prussia would, but moral influence. For a great state influence is every thing. After a long influence come territorial acquisitions. This Italian was right. By appearing to protect, against what is called the Revolution, the European princes, great or small, to whom it was a bugbear, Russia has gained Poland. It is not impossible that she may yet gain Constantinople. The first thing needful is influence—conquest follows.

Russia, then, was to propose to the other courts, not a war against France, which would not have been either politic or just, but a *mediatory alliance for the pacification of Europe*. There would certainly be no difficulty in procuring the adhesion of Austria and England to this alliance, but every thing was in peril without the concurrence of Prussia. It was necessary, therefore, to drag that astute court from its interested hesitations, or even to trample her down with European armies, should she refuse to concur in the common project. No consideration was to be shown to Prussia, or to any other power that should resist the proposed plan, *because* (by such resistance) *they would have deserted the cause of humanity*.

The co-operation of all the European states, with the exception of France, being once secured, three grand masses of troops were to be formed; one to the south, consisting of Russians and English transported into Italy by sea, and intended to ascend, with the Neapolitans, the Italian peninsula, to join a column of one hundred thousand Austrians operating in Lombardy; a mass to the east,

* There is a copy of these memorials extant in France.

consisting of two grand Austrian and Russian armies, marching by the valley of the Danube towards Suabia and Switzerland; finally, a mass to the north, consisting of Russians, Prussians, Swedes, and Danes, proceeding straight from north to south upon the Rhine. These three grand masses of troops were to act independently of each other, in order to avoid the inconveniences of coalitions, which strive in vain to produce an impracticable concert. Each of the three was to act as an army having to think only of its own safety and its own action. It was by endeavouring to combine their movements that the archduke Charles and Suwarrow produced the disaster of Zurich.

The three masses of troops being thus composed, proceedings would be taken in the name of a general congress, representing the *Mediatory Alliance*. To France conditions would be offered compatible with her existing grandeur; conditions to which the consent of England would be preliminarily obtained, and war would not be resorted to except in the case of a refusal. The bases treated upon would be these: the treaties of Lunéville and Amiens, but, those treaties as expounded by Europe. Assuredly a high idea may be formed of our power at that period, merely by looking at the plans elaborated by our jealous enemies.

France would be allowed to keep the Alps and the Rhine, that is to say, Savoy, Geneva, the Rhenish provinces, Mayence, Cologne, Luxembourg, and Belgium. Piedmont would be restored. The new state created in Italy would not be destroyed in order to give the fragments to Austria, but would be employed to construct an independent Italy. With that view, Austria would be required even to give up Venice. Switzerland, preserving the organisation bestowed upon it by Napoleon, would be closed against the French troops, and declared perpetually neutral. It would be the same with Holland. In a word, France, maintained in her grand limits of the Alps and the Rhine, would be obliged to evacuate all Italy, Switzerland, and Holland, not to mention Hanover, which, the war over, could not longer be occupied.

In return for these concessions demanded from France, England would be compelled to give up Malta, to restore the colonies which she had seized upon, and even to aid the French in another enterprise against St. Domingo, for Europe was interested in seeing that magnificent country wrested from the barbarism of the revolted negroes. England would also be obliged to agree with all the nations upon an equitable maritime code. As the last condition, all the courts were to acknowledge Napoleon Emperor of the French.

Undoubtedly, if Russia had been strong enough to make Austria consent to the independence of Italy, and England to the freedom of the seas, Napoleon would have been very blameable for refusing the proposed conditions! But, far from abandoning Venice to those benevolent organisers of a new Europe,

Austria was eager to regain possession of Milan, and to extend her frontier into Suabia; and England was determined to keep possession of Malta, and not to recognise the rights of the neutrals. If, then, Napoleon was bent, as doubtless he was, upon keeping Piedmont, Switzerland, and Holland, in order to turn to his own advantage those countries which his enemies desired to combine against him, we certainly may excuse his ambition in the face of that of all the other governments of Europe.

This plan, conceived, in the first instance, sincerely and with generous intentions, had been wholly equitable if wholly accepted by all parties. But it was to be a pretext in the hands of a hypocritical coalition for urging France to a refusal which would rouse the whole power of Europe once more against her. The facts will speedily prove this.

Supposing France to refuse, which was probable, military measures were to be employed against her. In that case it would be requisite rather to conceal than to publish the intention of changing her government, to spare her pride, re-assure the holders of national property, promise to the military the preservation of their ranks (all of which was done in 1814) and, if the weariness of a warlike and agitated government should turn the public mind of France towards the old dynasty, then, but then only to think of restoring it, because that dynasty, owing its restoration to Europe, would be more easily reconciled than the Bonaparte family with the remnant of a kingdom left to it.

The war might have various results. If it were only half successful, Italy and Belgium would be taken from France, if it were completely successful, France would also be deprived of the Rhenish provinces, that is to say, of the territory lying between the Meuse and the Rhine. Still, it was necessary to bear in mind the error committed against Louis XIV., and beware of imitating the lofty proceedings of the Pensionnary Heinsius, for if France were too sternly treated she would never remain at rest. It was necessary, then, to leave her some of her existing conquests, by drawing a line from Luxembourg to Mayence, and conceding to her, besides the fortress of Mayence, what is called Rhenish Bavaria. It is evident that the plans of this policy not having yet been modified by Mr. Pitt, did not bear the imprint of passionate hate which marked those which prevailed ten years later.

On the double hypothesis of a war more or less fortunate, Europe was to be distributed in the following manner:

It was before all things necessary to guard against that French nation that was endowed with *such dangerous talents*, and was of so enterprising a turn. For this purpose it was necessary to surround her with powerful states capable of protecting themselves. It was, in the first place, requisite to strengthen Holland, and for this purpose to give her Belgium, to make of the two countries what was called *the kingdom of the two Belgioms*, which should be given to the house of Orange, which had suffered so severely

from the consequences of the French Revolution. Prussia would be maintained as she was on the Rhine; perhaps she would have restored to her the small provinces that she had ceded to the French Republic, such as the duchies of Cleves and Gueldres, and, as far as possible, she would be established in Westphalia, around Holland, to separate her from all contact with France. Nevertheless, in accordance with the principle of disinterestedness that was imposed upon the great courts, a principle without which Europe could not be established upon a durable footing, but little would be given to Prussia, in order that there might be means of giving a fitting organisation to Germany and Italy. After creating the kingdom of the two Belgioms on the north of France, they would create to the south and east the kingdom of Piedmont, under the name of the *Subalpine Kingdom*. This crown would be adjudged to the then dethroned house of Savoy, which had suffered even more than the house of Orange for the common cause of kings. Savoy would not be restored to it, but it would be put in possession of all Piedmont, all Lombardy, and even the Venetian state, taken with this object from Austria, which was to receive compensation as specified hereafter. Finally, to this vast territory Genoa was to be added. This *Subalpine Kingdom*, thus forming the most considerable state in Italy, would be capable of holding the balance between France and Austria, and of serving at a future time as the foundation of Italian independence.

Italy, that splendid and interesting country, was to be separately constituted, and to enjoy that independent existence so much and so vainly desired by her. To consolidate her into one single nation was for the time impracticable. She was to be composed of several states united by a federal bond, a sufficiently strong bond to render common action at once prompt and easy. Besides the *Subalpine Kingdom*, comprising all upper Italy, from the Maritime Alps to the Julian Alps, and having two ports, such as Venice and Genoa, there would be the kingdom of the two Sicilies preserved within its existing limits, which would be placed at the other extremity of the Peninsula; at the centre would be the Pope, with the Legations restored to him, enjoying a perpetual neutrality, and, like the elector of Mayence in the Germanic body, performing the duties of chancellor of the Confederation; also at the centre would be the kingdom of Etruria, left to Spain; and then either between these or at the extremities, the Republic of Lucca, the Order of Malta, the Republic of Ragusa, and the Ionian Islands. This Italian body, in its federative organisation, would have a head like the Germanic body, but not like him elective. The king of Piedmont and the king of the two Sicilies were alternately to enjoy that dignity.

Here, undoubtedly, was a grand and a skilful combination, for which France ought to have imposed some sacrifices upon her-

self, if the young heads that governed Russia had been capable of seriously and resolutely carrying out any scheme truly great.

Savoy, taken from the crown of Sardinia, was not to be given up to France, but, together with the Valteline and the Grisons, converted into a Swiss canton. Switzerland, divided into cantons, was to be joined to Germany, as one of the confederated states.

The Germanic empire was to be absolutely modelled anew. It had been alternately oppressed by Austria and Prussia, who had striven with each other for preponderance. Those two powers would be excluded from the confederation, in which they played only the part of ambitious party leaders. The Germanic body thus left to itself, diminished by these two great members, but increased by the kingdom of the two Belgiums and by Switzerland, freed from all mischievous influence, and having only the interests of Germany in view, would no longer be dragged in its own despite into wars, unjust in themselves, or hostile to its real interests. The crown was to cease to be elective in Germany. The principal States of the Confederation would in succession have the supreme power, as it was proposed for Italy. By means of new territorial delimitations, Baden, Wurtemberg, and Bavaria, were to be strengthened. The mischievous quarrel between Bavaria and Austria would be terminated, by giving the frontier of the Inn to the latter.

The three great states of the Continent, France, Prussia, and Austria, would thus be separated from each other by three great independent confederations:—the Germanic confederation, the Swiss confederation, and the Italian confederation, extending themselves from the Zuyder Zee to the Adriatic.

Even supposing these combinations correct and practicable, we cannot refrain from pointing out, that to cut off Prussia and Austria from the Germanic body, was not to enfranchise Germany, for those two powers, remaining excluded, would have acted towards Germany as absolute states adjoining a free state; as Frederick and Catherine had acted towards Poland; they would have convulsed and divided it; instead of seeking to influence it, they would have tried to conquer it. The true independence of Germany consisted, then, in a strong organisation of the Diet, and in an equitable division of votes between Austria and Prussia, in such wise, that the confederation could hold the balance between them. Add to this, such European arrangements, as should not render Prussia the natural enemy of France (as was done in 1815, by giving the former the Provinces of the Rhine) and the two German powers remaining rivals, but kept in equilibrium by the Diet, Germany would have been free; that is to say, capable of making her interests and resolutions coincide.

The suppression of the election to the imperial crown, would not, as it seems to us, have been a whit more useful. Although

for two centuries that crown had not gone out of the house of Austria, the election, nevertheless, was a dependent tie, which put that house under obligations to the states of Germany. Now it is sometimes useful to render the great dependent upon the little, when anarchy is not the consequence. Germany, constituted as she had been in 1803, by Napoleon, with some votes given to the Catholics, to re-establish the balance that had been too much disturbed at the expense of Austria, would, in our opinion, have presented a better and more natural arrangement than that which was conceived by the authors of the new European organisation.

Although disinterestedness was the fundamental principle of the proposed plan, that disinterestedness could readily go so far as not to acquire aught, and to content itself with a better arrangement of Europe, as the sole indemnity for the costs of war, but it could not go so far as actual loss. It was necessary, therefore, to indemnify Austria for the required cession of the state of Venice. In consequence, it was proposed to give her Moldavia and Wallachia, to extend her thus to the Black Sea, and secure her against the danger of seeing herself at a future time hemmed in by Russia.

The Ottoman Empire was to be maintained, such as it was, with the exception of some restrictions, which will be hereafter mentioned.

There still remained the north to be arranged. In that quarter a great deal was to be done, according to the singular organizer of Europe, who carved out so freely the map of the world. Prussia and Russia were separated by an ill-chosen frontier. Poland was divided between these two powers. In the judgment of the abbé Piatoli, in that of the young men whom he inspired with his policy, and especially in that of prince Czartoryski, and, finally, in the judgment even of Alexander, the partition of Poland was a great crime. Alexander, in fact, in unoccupied and oppressed youth, during the life of Paul, had often, in the outpourings of his confidence, declared that the partition of Poland was a crime of his predecessors which he should be happy to repair. But how reconstruct that Poland? How replace her, erect and isolated, between the rival states which had destroyed her? There existed one means, it was to reconstruct her entirely, to restore her all the parts of which she was formerly composed, and then to give her to the emperor of Russia, who would bestow independent institutions upon her, in such wise that Poland, intended in the ancient ideas of Europe to serve as a barrier to Germany against Russia, would now serve as a barrier, or rather an advanced post, of Russia against Germany.

Such was the dream of these young politicians, such was the ambition with which they imbued Alexander! That grand indignation against the crime of the preceding century, that

noble disinterestedness imposed upon all the courts, for the purpose of restraining the ambition of France, was to end in reconstructing Poland for the purpose of giving her to Russia! It is not the first time that beneath displays of virtue, ostentatiously claiming the esteem of the world, towering ambition and consummate vanity have been concealed. This court of Russia which at that time pushed to the utmost extent its affectation of justice and disinterestedness, and which pretended to lecture England and France, was in secret dreaming of the possession of Poland! However, amidst these projects, there was a sentiment to which we must pay due honour. It was that of the prince Czartoryski, who, seeing no immediate possibility of re-establishing Poland, solely by Polish hands, was willing, for want of others, to use Russian hands. He, at least, had a legitimate object. He was open to reproach only upon one point, which was often perceived by the Russians, and more than once denounced to the emperor Alexander; namely, that the prince Czartoryski was less zealous for the interests of Russia than for those of his native country, and was thus led to urge his master into an imprudent war. The abbé Piatoli, long attached to Poland, partook of all those ideas. It was difficult, however, to propose to this *Mediator Alliance*, founded upon the principle of disinterestedness—it was difficult to propose to it the abandonment of Poland to Russia; still there were means of attaining the end. Prussia, strongly attached to the peace, and the profits of neutrality, would probably not give her adhesion. Then, to punish her for her refusal, she would be attacked, deprived of Warsaw and the Vistula, and with those vast portions of ancient Poland, added to those which Russia already possessed, that new Poland would be founded, of which Alexander would be the king and the legislator.

To these ideas were added some others, accessory to the plan, some of them whimsical, and others just and generous.

England was to be compelled to restore Malta to the order. Russia would give up Corfu, which would thenceforth be reckoned among the Ionian islands. England had conquered India, which there was no choice but to leave to her; but Egypt could be made immensely serviceable to the civilisation of the world, to general commerce, and to the balance of naval power. It would be taken from the Porte, and given to France, that the latter might undertake the task of civilising it. It would be formed into an eastern kingdom, subject to France. The Bourbons would reign there, if, on the return of peace, Napoleon were to be kept on the throne of France; and Napoleon, if the Bourbons were restored. The Barbary States were to be restored to the Porte, and that power would even be assisted in reconquering them, that their piracy, which was a barbarism disgraceful to Europe, might be suppressed. Finally, there were certain possessions contrary to the nature of things, although

consecrated by time and conquest, which it would be both wise and humane to put an end to. For instance, Gibraltar enabled the English to keep up a system of smuggling in Spain, at once shameful and demoralising to that country; the islands of Jersey and Guernsey assisted the English in stirring up civil war in France; Memel, in the possession of Prussia, was to the Russian territory a sort of Gibraltar for the purposes of smuggling. If possible, it was requisite to induce, by means of compensations, the possessors to renounce posts of which so reprehensible a use was made.

Spain and Portugal were to be reconciled and united by a federal tie, which should protect them from the French influence on the one hand, and from the English influence on the other. It was requisite that England should be obliged to redress the wrongs she had inflicted on Spain, and constrained to restore the captured galleons; by this course Spain, which demanded nothing better, would be wrested from the tyranny of France.

To complete this grand work of European reorganisation, the emperor of Russia was to address himself to all the learned men of Europe, to demand from them a code of the laws of nations, including a new maritime law. It was urged that it was inhuman and barbarous, that a nation should declare war without having previously submitted the cause of dispute to a neighbouring and disinterested State; and it was especially so, that one nation should commence hostilities against another, without a previous declaration of war, as England had lately done towards Spain, and that innocent merchants should thus find themselves ruined, or deprived of their property, by a sort of ambush. It was also intolerable that neutral nations should be made victims of the fury of powerful rivals, and could not cross the seas without being exposed to the consequences of a quarrel in which they had no part. The honour of the grand reforming court demanded that all these evils should be provided against by international laws.

It was by this mixture of heterogeneous ideas, some lofty, others merely ambitious, these wise, those chimerical, that ardour was communicated to the heart and the head of this young, mercurial, and sprightly emperor, who was as vain of his honest, but fugitive intentions, as one should be of long-practised virtues. He believed himself really called upon to regenerate Europe; and if he sometimes awakened from his splendid dreams, it was when he thought of the great man who ruled the West, and who was not of a temper to tolerate any regeneration without his aid or against his policy. Those who had the opportunity of closely observing Alexander, plainly perceived that his heart failed him, when he perceived war with Napoleon to be the probable final consequence of all his plans.

This strange conception would not have merited the honour of being introduced at such length, any more than the thousand

and one projects with which schemers often pester those courts which have the weakness to listen to them, if it had not captivated the good-will of Alexander and his friends, and if, which is still more important, it had not become the text of all the succeeding negotiations, and served, at last, as the basis of the treaties of 1815.

One thing is worthy of remark. This epoch of the French Revolution is reproached with having promised, and not given, liberty, independence, and happiness, to the nations, and having thus been guilty of breach of promise to humanity. Now, observe absolute power at work. Young men of ability, some of them honest and sincere, others merely ambitious, all reared in the school of the philosophers, united by their birth and the uniformity of their tastes, and surrounding the inheritor of the mightiest despotic empire upon the face of the earth, were possessed with the idea of rivalling the French Revolution, as respected generous and popular intentions. That Revolution which, according to them, had not even procured liberty for France, as it had given her a master, and which had given nothing to other nations but a humiliating dependence upon the French Empire, that Revolution they resolved to confound, by opposing to it a European regeneration, founded upon an equitable distribution of territories, and upon a new law of nations. There was to be an independent Italy, a free Germany, and a reconstructed Poland. Each great power was to be restrained by efficient counterpoises. France herself was to be not humiliated, but merely brought back to respect the rights of others. The abuses of war would disappear alike from sea and land; piracy would be abolished; the ancient road of commerce would be re-established by Egypt; and finally, science would be called upon to remodel the public law of nations. All this was not merely laid down by some vulgar scribbler of memorials, but seriously proposed to all the courts of Europe, and discussed with the least chimerical of men, with Mr. Pitt! We know now, we who are forty years older, what has been the upshot of all those philanthropic views of absolute power. The inventors of these plans, beaten and baffled, during ten years, by him whom they wished to destroy, but at length conquerors in 1815, have made neither a code of the laws of nations, nor a code of maritime laws; they have freed neither Italy, nor Germany, nor Poland. The English have not been deprived of Malta nor of Gibraltar; and the territorial boundaries of Europe, traced according to temporary interests, and without any view to the future, are the least prudent that can be imagined.

However, let us not anticipate the sequel of this history. To describe how all those ideas became common to Alexander and his young friends, would be useless. What is certain, is, that both he and they were fully possessed with those ideas, and with the desire to make them the basis of the Russian policy.

Prince Czartoryski, seeing in this system a chance of reconstruction for Poland, was most ardently desirous of having it carried into execution. The prince, since the retirement of M. de Woronzoff, had become, from a mere assistant in the Foreign Office, the directing minister of that department. Messrs. de Nowosiltzoff and de Strogonoff, subalterns, one in the Department of Justice, and the other in the Home Department, devoted their energies to far other matters than those of their ostensible employments ; they, with their young colleague and the emperor, employed themselves in poisoning the world upon new bases. It was agreed that the most dexterous among them, M. de Nowosiltzoff, should be sent to London to confer with Mr. Pitt, and procure his assent to the projects of the court of Russia. It was necessary to bring round the ambitious British cabinet, and render acceptable the disinterested views of the project, in order to found the *Mediatorial Alliance*, and, in the name of that alliance, to speak to France in such a manner as to secure attention. A cousin of M. de Strogonoff set out for Madrid, with the double view of reconciling England and Spain, and of binding Spain and Portugal together by indissoluble bonds. It was decided that M. de Strogonoff should proceed to London, before going to Madrid, in order to commence in that capital his conciliatory mission. In the judgment of all Europe, the procedure of the British government against the Spanish shipping had been unjust and odious. That government was to be told that if it did not exhibit more moderation it would be left alone to contend with France, and that Russia, with all the continental powers, would observe a neutrality which would be fatal to Great Britain.

The two young Russians who were charged to present the policy of their cabinet for acceptance abroad, set out for London at the close of 1804. M. de Nowosiltzoff was presented at the court of St. James's by the ambassador Woronzoff, brother of the retired chancellor, and was received with distinction and attention, well calculated to affect a young statesman admitted, for the first time, to the honour of treating upon the affairs of Europe. Roughness and haughtiness, rather than astuteness, usually characterise English diplomatists. Nevertheless, lord Harrowby, and especially Mr. Pitt, with whom the Russian envoy entered into direct conference, could soon discover with what sort of minds they had to do, and conducted themselves accordingly. The veteran Pitt, a veteran still more by the part he played than by age, rendered flexible by danger, lofty as he was, was too happy to regain the alliance of the Continent, to show himself unaccommodating. He was complaisant, as it was necessary to be towards inexperienced young men nurtured in chimeras. He listened to the singular proposals of the Russian cabinet, and appeared to receive them with great consideration, but modified them to suit his own policy, abstaining from refusal, and confining him-

self to postponing till the general peace, those points which were incompatible with the interests of English policy. He had the proposals of the Russian envoy delivered to him, and added his own observations.* At first, Mr. Pitt tolerated even the reproaches of the young Russian envoy; he allowed himself to be reproached with the ambition of England, with the harshness of her proceedings, and with her encroaching system, which served as a pretext for the encroaching system of France. He allowed himself to be told, that in order to form a new alliance it was necessary to found it upon a grand disinterestedness on the part of all the contracting powers. The head of the British cabinet became animated on this subject, much approved of the ideas of Alexander's ambassador, and declared that, in fact, it was necessary to display the most perfect freedom from all personal views, if the mask was to be torn away that covered the ambition of France; that it was indispensably necessary that the allies should not appear to think of themselves, but only of the enfranchisement of Europe, oppressed by a barbarous and tyrannical power. The gravity of men, and the gravity of the interests which they treat, does not prevent them from frequently presenting a very puerile spectacle! Was there not something, in fact, truly puerile in the sight of these diplomatists, representatives of ambitious nations which for centuries have agitated the world, reproaching France with her insatiable greediness? As if the English minister wanted in this instance aught less than Malta, the Indies, and the empire of the seas! As if the Russian minister really aimed at aught less than Poland, and a dominant influence on the Continent! How pitiable to hear the heads of States addressing such reproaches to each other! No doubt, Napoleon was far too ambitious for his own interest, and still more so for ours; but Napoleon considered, if we may so speak, in his moral position—Napoleon, was he aught else than the re-action of the French power against the encroachments of the European courts in the last century, against the partition of Poland, and the conquest of India? Ambition is the vice or the virtue of all nations—vice, when it agitates the world without benefitting it; virtue, when it civilises while agitating it. Thus considered, the ambition of which the nations have still the least reason to complain is that of France, for there is not a country which has been traversed by her armies, which France has not left ameliorated and enlightened.

It was agreed, then, between Mr. Pitt and M. de Nowosiltzoff, that the new alliance should lay great and public stress upon its disinterestedness, in order to make more than ever evident the insatiable cupidity of the Emperor of the French. While admitting that it would be very important to disembarass

* I have myself perused the minutes of these conferences, of which a copy is extant in France.

Europe of that redoubtable personage, it was, nevertheless, agreed that it would be imprudent to announce the intention of imposing a new government upon France. It was necessary to wait till the nation should declare itself, to second it to the utmost should it show a disposition to shake off the yoke of the imperial government, and especially to take great pains to assure the heads of the army of the preservation of their rank, and the holders of national property, of that property being preserved to them. All the proclamations addressed to the French nation were to abound in the most tranquillising assurances on these points. So important did Mr. Pitt consider this precaution, that he even stated himself to be ready to make, from the funds of England, a *provision* (his own words) to indemnify the emigrants who surrounded the Bourbons, and thus deprive them of any motive for alarming the holders of the national property. Mr. Pitt, then, thought of the famous indemnity to the emigrants, twenty years before it was voted by the Parliament of France. In wishing to render such pretensions disinterested, he assuredly knew not what he undertook; but in showing himself disposed to try it, at the expense of the British treasury, he proved the immense importance which England attached to the downfall of Napoleon, who had become so menacing towards her.

The idea of assembling an imposing mass of forces, in whose name the Mediatory Alliance could treat, previous to fighting, was naturally admitted by Mr. Pitt with extreme readiness. He consented to the mockery of a preliminary negotiation, well knowing that it would lead to no result, and that the pride of Napoleon would never be reconciled to the conditions proposed. The latter could, on no account, suffer that, without him, or against him, Italy, Switzerland, and Holland should be organized, under the specious pretext of their independence. Mr. Pitt, therefore, allowed the young rulers of Russia to fancy that they were labouring for a grand mediation, because he was well convinced that they were simply and merely progressing towards a third coalition. As regarded the distribution of the forces, he opposed certain parts of the project. He agreed readily enough to three grand masses; one to the south, composed of Russians, Neapolitans, and English; another to the east, composed of Russians and Austrians; and one to the north, composed of Prussians, Russians, Swedes, Hanoverians, and English. But he declared that he could not, on the instant, supply a single Englishman. He maintained, that in keeping them upon the coasts of England, constantly ready to embark, a very important result would be produced, that of threatening the sea-board of France on all points at once; which signified that, living in constant terror of the expedition prepared at Boulogne, the British government was unwilling to send troops from its own territory; which, after all, was natural enough. Mr. Pitt pro-

mised subsidies, but not nearly to the amount asked ; he offered six millions sterling. He insisted upon one point, to which it seemed to him that the authors of the Russian project had by no means attached sufficient importance ; the concurrence of Prussia. Without her, all seemed to him to be difficult, even impossible. To him it seemed requisite to have the concurrence of all Europe, in order to destroy Napoleon. He approved of attacking Prussia, if she could not be persuaded to give her adhesion, for Russia would thus permanently ally herself to English policy ; he offered even, in that case, to send to St. Petersburg the portion of the subsidy intended for Prussia ; but he considered this a matter of grave importance, and that the most advantageous proposals should be made to the cabinet of Berlin, in order to seduce it. " Do not imagine," said he to M. de Nowosiltzoff, " that I am at all favourable to that hypocritical, astute, and greedy cabinet, which now asks from Napoleon, and even from Europe, the price of its perfidies. No. But upon that cabinet depends the fate of the present, and even of the future. Prussia, jealous of Austria, and fearing Russia, will always have a leaning to France. We must detach her from that country, or she will never cease to be the accomplice of our irreconcilable enemy. With reference to her alone, you must depart from your ideas of disinterestedness ; we must give her more than Napoleon can offer ; something, especially, which will irrevocably embroil her with France." Mr. Pitt, then, aided by hate, which sometimes enlightens, if it sometimes blindfolds—Mr. Pitt proposed a modification of the Russian plan, as fatal for Germany as for France. He confessed that it was a luminous and profound idea, that of surrounding our soil with kingdoms able to resist us, a kingdom of the two Belgioms, and a Subalpine kingdom ; the one for the house of Orange, protected by England ; the other for the house of Savoy, protected by Russia. But he thought that the precaution was insufficient. He desired that, instead of separating Prussia and France by the Rhine, they, on the contrary, should be placed in immediate contact ; and he proposed that if Prussia pronounced for the Coalition, she should receive all the country enclosed between the Meuse, the Moselle, and the Rhine, which we now call the Rhenish provinces. This appeared to him to be indispensable, if it were desired, for the future, to withdraw Prussia from her interested neutrality, and her leaning to Napoleon, in whom she had incessantly sought and found a support against Russia. This project was extended in 1815, when, besides Prussia, Bavaria was placed upon the Rhine, in order to deprive us of all our ancient allies in Germany. When Germany shall some day need support against the dangers which will threaten her from the north, she will appreciate the services rendered to her by those who have studied to create causes of dispute between her and France.

From these conferences there sprang a new idea, destined to complete the creation of a kingdom of the two Belghiums: it was to construct a chain of fortresses, like those which Vauban formerly planned to cover France, in that country without frontiers, and to construct those fortresses at the expense of the alliance.

As regarded Germany and Italy, the English minister showed how impossible it was to execute these vast projects immediately; how they would offend the two powers who were most needed, Prussia and Austria. Neither one nor the other would consent to quit the German confederation; Prussia, in particular, would not agree to the crown of Germany being made hereditary; Austria would oppose a constitution for Italy that would exclude her from that country. Of the project as to Italy, Mr. Pitt only admitted the constitution of the kingdom of Piedmont. He wished Savoy to be added to all which the Russian project already bestowed upon Piedmont.

Finally, scarcely any mention was made of Poland; all that portion of the project rested on the supposition of war with Prussia, and that Mr. Pitt was especially anxious to avoid. The Russian diplomatist who was imbued with such generous ideas when he quitted St. Petersburg, dared not even make mention of Egypt, Gibraltar, Memel—in a word, of that which was loftiest in the original project. Upon two very important subjects Mr. Pitt was by no means favourable, that is to say, he was almost negative—we mean Malta and the maritime law. As regarded Malta, Mr. Pitt peremptorily declined the discussion, and postponed all explanations on that point till it should be known what sacrifices France was inclined to make. As regarded the new law of nations, he said that it would be necessary to refer that work, a moral but somewhat impracticable one, to a congress which would assemble after the war to conclude a peace, in which all the interests of the nations would be equitably weighed. The idea of a new law of nations seemed to him to be a very admirable one, but difficult of realisation, for various populations do not easily adopt uniform dispositions, and observe them still less readily when they have adopted them. However, he had no objection to allowing these matters to be treated in the congress, which at a future time would settle the conditions of a general peace.

These conferences ended with a singular explanation. The object of it was the East and Constantinople. Very recently, by her policy in Georgia, and by her connexions with the insurgents of the Danube, Russia had given some umbrage to England, and provoked a note from her, in which the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire were already professed as principles of the European policy. “That is not the way to proceed in order to produce confidence between allies,” said M. de Nowosiltzoff to Mr. Pitt. “My master is the noblest and

most generous of men ; it is sufficient to trust to his honour. But to endeavour to stop him by menaces, or only by insinuations, is uselessly to affront him. He will be rather excited than restrained by such means." In reply, Mr. Pitt made many apologies for having shown suspicions so ill-founded, which, however, were natural previous to the establishment of that full mutual confidence, though, of course, in the intimate connexion which was about to be established they, for the future, would be quite impossible. "Moreover," added M. de Nowosiltzoff, "what inconvenience would there be in Constantinople belonging to a civilising people like the Russians, instead of belonging to a barbarous people like the Turks ? Would not your commerce in the Black Sea be greatly improved by it ? No doubt, were the East subjected to this ever-encroaching France, there would be a real danger, but to Russia there would be no danger." Mr. Pitt* replied, "That assuredly these considerations had great importance in his view ; that, as far as he was concerned, he had no prejudice upon this subject, and could not see the great danger if Constantinople should fall to Russia ; but that it was a prejudice of his nation, which he must avoid offending, and that it was essentially necessary to avoid touching upon such a subject at that period."

Relatively to Spain, M. de Strogonoff obtained nothing, or next to nothing. She gave up all her resources to France, argued the British cabinet, and to serve or gratify her would be merely to be her dupe. However, if she would declare against France, her galleons would be restored to her.

M. de Strogonoff set out for Madrid, and M. de Nowosiltzoff for St. Petersburg. It was agreed that Lord Gower, since Lord Granville, ambassador from England to St. Petersburg, should be furnished with detailed powers to conclude a treaty upon the bases agreed upon by the two courts.

The Russian plan had only undergone a few days' elaboration at London, and it returned divested of every thing generous, and also of whatever was impracticable, that it had contained. It was reduced to a destructive project against France. No more mention of independent Italy, independent Germany, or independent Poland ! The kingdom of Piedmont, the kingdom of the two Belgioms, with a profoundly inimical idea, Prussia upon the Rhine ; the restitution of Malta evaded, the new law of nations postponed for a future congress ; finally, previous to the commencement of hostilities, a pretence of negotiation, a very vain pretence, for general and immediate war was at the very heart of the proceeding—such was all that remained of the boastful project of European reconstitution, the production of a sort of fermentation of mind in the young heads which governed Russia. The negotiation was, however, opened at St. Petersburg by

* These details are contained in a very curious letter of M. de Nowosiltzoff to his cabinet.

Lord Gower upon the points agreed upon at London between Mr. Pitt and M. de Nowosiltzoff.

While this sort of league was being formed with England, it was necessary to undertake a similar labour with Austria and Prussia, to draw them into the new coalition. Prussia, who had engaged with Russia to declare war if the French should go beyond Hanover, but who, at the same time, had promised France to remain unalterably neutral if the number of French in Germany were not augmented—Prussia would not quit that perilous equilibrium. She affected not to understand Russia, and entrenched herself in her old system, become proverbial, *of the neutrality of the north of Germany*. This manner of evading the question was the more facile to her, because, from fear of seeing the secrets of the new coalition divulged to Napoleon, the Russian diplomatists dared not openly explain. The cabinet of Berlin, from its hesitations, had got such a reputation for duplicity, that it was thought impossible to entrust it with a secret which it would not immediately communicate to France. Nothing, therefore, was said to that cabinet about the project sent to London, and the subsequent and consequent negotiation, but Prussia was daily reminded of new encroachments by Napoleon, especially the conversion of the Italian Republic into a kingdom, which, it was argued, amounted to an annexation of Lombardy to France, equal to the annexation of Piedmont. The most gigantic plans were announced. It was reported that Napoleon was about to convert Parma, Piacenza, Naples, and, finally, Spain herself, into kingdoms for his family; that Holland would very soon share the same fate; that Switzerland would be incorporated, under the pretext of rectifying the French frontiers; that cardinal Fesch would soon be raised to the papacy; that it was necessary to save Europe, which was threatened with a universal domination; that the courts which should persist in want of forethought would be the cause of the general ruin, and would at length be themselves involved in it. Well knowing that the rivalry of Austria and Prussia was the principal cause of the latter inclining to France, an endeavour was made to reconcile the rivals. Prussia was asked to fix her pretensions, and to make them known; she was told that an endeavour would be made to draw from Austria an avowal of her pretensions, and to reconcile the pretensions of both parties by a definitive arbitration. It was announced that, in consideration of some addition to the Catholic votes in the College of Princes, an unimportant concession, Austria would be permanently contented with the recess of 1803, and would consecrate, by her irrevocable adhesion, the new arrangements by which Prussia had so largely profited. It was even insinuated that if, unfortunately, a struggle should become inevitable, Prussia would be largely indemnified for the risks of the war. However, it was not avowed that a coalition was on the point of being formed, still less that its basis was agreed upon;

only the wish seemed to be expressed, that Prussia would unite herself to the rest of Europe to guarantee the equilibrium of the nations, which was seriously threatened.

In order to get into closer communication with the court of Prussia, a Russian general was sent to it, an officer of the staff, well acquainted with what was in agitation, M. de Vinzingerode, who was to explain matters by degrees to the king, but to the king alone, and who, being acquainted with the military plan, could, if he succeeded in obtaining his majesty's attention, propose the means of execution, and regulate the whole future warfare and its details. M. de Vinzingerode arrived at the close of the winter of 1804, at the time when Napoleon was preparing to set out for Italy; the general observed a great reserve towards the Prussian cabinet, but was somewhat more communicative with the king, and, invoking the friendship which had commenced between the two sovereigns at Memel, endeavoured to win this prince in the name of that friendship, and of the common cause of kings. The young Frederick William, finding himself closely pressed, and comprehending at length what was in question, dwelt upon his personal affection for Alexander, and his warm sympathies in the cause of Europe, but objected that he was the first who would be exposed to the attacks of Napoleon; that he did not believe himself able to resist so powerful an adversary; that the aid for which he was led to hope had so far to come that it must needs be tardy, and that he should probably be vanquished before aid arrived. He also pointed out the danger of acting on the suggestions of England, and even proposed, in order to prevent a general war, of which he was greatly in dread, to mediate between Russia and France.

In this delicate state of things, the king had called for the advice of M. de Haugwitz, who had for some time retired to his estates in Silesia, and found in his opinions a new encouragement to his ambiguous and pacific policy. If it had been necessary, however, to take a positive resolution, M. d'Haugwitz would rather have inclined to France. M. de Hardenberg, who had succeeded him, would rather have inclined to Russia, but this latter was ready, he said, to determine in favour of France, as soon as to determine in favour of Russia, provided only that some positive course were determined upon. With less talent, tact, and prudence than M. d'Haugwitz, he was fond of censuring that statesman's tergiversations, and, in order to distinguish himself from his predecessor, professed a liking for decided measures. It was requisite, in his view of affairs, to side with France, if it were thought useful to do so, and to embrace her cause, but in that case to secure the advantages and reap the reward of a decided support. In this he was less agreeable to the king than M. d'Haugwitz, who allowed that prince to enjoy the pleasure of indecision; and already there arose

between M. d'Haugwitz and M. de Hardenberg that discrepancy of language by which quarrels between rival ministers are preceded, whether in despotic courts or in free states.

The king, in acknowledgment of the mission of M. de Vinzingerode, determined to send a confidential agent to St. Petersburg, and despatched M. de Zastrow, with the mission of explaining to the emperor Alexander the position of the king, to reconcile him to his reserved conduct, and, if possible, to become better acquainted with the still hidden secret of the new coalition. While he despatched M. de Zastrow to hold this language at St. Petersburg, Frederick William claimed credit of Napoleon for the resistance he had made to the suggestions of Russia; he spoke of the neutrality of the north of Germany, not as of a real neutrality, as it really was, but as of a positive alliance, which to the north covered France against all the enemies whom she could have to combat; further, this prince offered Napoleon, as he had already offered Russia, to play the part of a conciliator.

M. de Vinzingerode, after having prolonged his stay at Berlin until he had rendered himself unwelcome to the court, which feared to be compromised by the prolonged presence of a Russian agent, repaired to Vienna, where the same efforts were made as at Berlin. With Austria there was not so much dissimulation required as with Prussia. None at all, indeed, was needed with the former. Austria was full of hatred towards Napoleon, and ardently desired the expulsion of the French from Italy. With her it was not necessary, as with the king of Prussia, to conceal the truth under specious professions of disinterestedness. Here the plain truth and the real object might be avowed, for Austria desired what was desired at St. Petersburg; true, she indulged in none of the illusions of youth, and disdained false sentimentality, which fell short of her veteran experience. Moreover, Austria could keep a secret. If, in appearance, she was infinitely anxious to show her complaisance towards France, and if towards Napoleon personally her language was constantly flattering, she, in her heart, nourished all the resentment of a balked ambition, constantly ill-treated for ten years. From the first, then, she had entered secretly into the passions of the Russian government, but, remembering her defeats, she had only with extreme prudence consented to enter the alliance, and had taken only conditional engagements of pure precaution. She had signed with Russia a secret convention, which was, as to the south of Europe, what the convention signed by Prussia was as to the north. She promised, in this convention, to abandon her inactive policy, if France, committing new usurpations in Italy, should extend further the occupation of the kingdom of Naples, then extending to the gulf of Taranto, make new incorporations, like that of Piedmont, or threaten Egypt or any part of the Turkish Empire. Three hundred and fifty

thousand Austrians were, in that case, to be her war contingent. She had the assurance, should fortune favour the arms of the coalitionists, of obtaining Italy to the Adda and the Po, the Milanese being thus reserved. She was also promised the restoration of the two archdukes to their ancient states of Tuscany and Modena; while she should have the then vacant territories of Salzburg and the Brisgau. The house of Savoy was to receive large possessions in Italy, consisting of the Milanese, Piedmont, and Genoa. Here, then, was the upshot of the Russian scheme: at Vienna, as at London, there remained no portion of it but what was hostile to France and advantageous to the coalitionists. Austria desired and obtained, that this convention* should be buried in the most profound secrecy, that she,

* This convention is dated 6th of November, 1804. We give the hitherto unpublished text of it, as we have given that of the convention with Prussia.

*Declaration signed the 25th of October, N. S., 1804:
6th of November, O. S.,*

The preponderating influence exercised by the French government upon the circumjacent states, and the number of countries occupied by its troops, having inspired just anxieties for the maintenance of the general tranquillity and safety of Europe; his majesty the emperor of all the Russias shares with his majesty the Emperor-King the conviction that this state of things calls for their mutual and most serious solicitude, and renders it necessary that they should unite to that end by a close concert, adapted to the state of crisis and of danger to which Europe is exposed.

The undersigned having been furnished in consequence with instructions and powers for negotiating and treating with the plenipotentiary of his majesty the Emperor-King, for the attainment of this salutary object, and having mutually communicated their full powers, found in due form, have agreed with the said plenipotentiary upon the stipulations contained in the following articles:—

Article I.—His majesty the emperor of all the Russias promises and engages himself to establish, in consideration of the crisis and danger above-mentioned, the closest concert with his majesty the Emperor-King, and the two monarchs, will be careful to give mutual notice and explanations of all negotiations and agreements into which they shall think fit to enter with other powers, for the same object as that upon which they have agreed, and their measures in that respect will be so taken as in nowise to compromise the present engagement determined upon between them, until they shall mutually have agreed to its being made public.

Art. II.—His majesty the emperor of all the Russias, and his majesty the Emperor-King, will not neglect any opportunity or precaution to be in a condition efficiently to co-operate in the active measures judged necessary for preventing the dangers which may suddenly threaten the general safety.

Art. III.—If, in revenge for the opposition which the two imperial courts, in virtue of their mutual agreement, will offer to the ambitious views of France, one of them should be immediately attacked (the Russian troops presently stationed in the Seven Ionian Isles are included in the present stipulation), each of the two high contracting parties obliges himself, in the most formal manner, to put in motion, for the common defence, as speedily as possible, the forces enumerated hereafter in Article VIII.

Art. IV.—If it should happen that the French government, abusing the advantages procured to it by the position of its troops, which now occupy the territory of the empire of Germany, should invade the adjacent countries, of which the integrity and independence are essentially connected with the interests of

Austria, might not be prematurely compromised with Napoleon. Thus much justice must be done to Austria that at least she did not, like Prussia, make a display of pretended virtues. She pursued her interests steadily, sternly, and without pretence.

Russia, and that, consequently, being unable to look upon such an encroachment with an indifferent eye, his majesty the emperor of all the Russias should find himself obliged to march his troops thither, his majesty the Emperor-King will consider such proceedings on the part of France as an aggression which will impose upon him the obligation of placing himself, as speedily as possible, in a condition to furnish prompt succour, according to the stipulations of the present agreement.

Art. V.—His imperial majesty of all the Russias fully participates in the lively interest that his imperial and royal Apostolic Majesty takes in the maintenance of the Ottoman Porte, the vicinity of which is agreeable to both ; and as an attack upon European Turkey, by any other power, cannot but compromise the safety of Russia and Austria, and as the Porte, in its present disturbed state, would not be able to repel with its own force an enterprise directed against it, on that supposition, and if war on that account should ensue directly between one of the two imperial courts and the French government, the other will immediately prepare to assist, as speedily as possible, the power at war, and to aid in concert towards the preservation of the Ottoman Porte, in its present integrity.

Art. VI.—As the fate of the kingdom of Naples must necessarily influence that of Italy, in the independence of which their imperial majesties take an especial interest, it is agreed that the stipulations of the present convention will have effect in the event of the French determining to carry their occupation of the kingdom of Naples, beyond their present lines ; to seize upon the capital, or the fortresses of that country, or to penetrate into Calabria ; in a word, if they shall force his majesty the king of Naples to peril his whole state, in resisting such encroachments upon it, and forcibly to oppose this new violation of his neutrality ; and that if his imperial majesty the emperor of all the Russias, through the succour which, in such case, he will be bound to furnish to the king of the Two Sicilies, shall be engaged in a war against France, his imperial and royal majesty obliges himself to commence on his part the operations against the common enemy, in accordance with the stipulations herein contained, and with especial reference to Articles IV., V., VIII. and IX., of the present agreement.

Art. VII.—In consideration of the uncertainty in which the two high contracting powers up to the present moment remain, as to the future designs of the French government, they reserve it to themselves, beyond what is stipulated above, to agree, according to the urgency of the circumstances, upon the different cases which may also require the employment of their combined forces.

Art. VIII.—In all cases in which the two imperial courts resort to active measures, in virtue of the present agreement, or of those which hereafter may be made between them, they promise and engage to co-operate simultaneously and according to a plan which will immediately be agreed upon between them, with sufficient forces to combat the enemy with the probability of success, and of driving him back into his own territories, which forces will not be fewer than 350,000 men under arms for the two imperial courts ; his imperial and royal majesty on his part will furnish 235,000 men, and the rest will be supplied by his imperial majesty the emperor of Russia. These troops will be embodied and constantly provided on both sides with every requisite, and there will further be a corps of observation left to secure the non-activity of the court of Berlin. The respective armies will be so distributed as shall prevent the forces of the two imperial courts, acting in concert, from being inferior in number to those of the enemy they will have to combat.

Art. IX.—In conformity with the desire manifested by the imperial royal court, his imperial majesty of all the Russias undertakes to use his good offices to obtain from the court of London, for his imperial and royal Apostolic

She can be censured for nothing on the present occasion, but the falseness of her language at Paris.

At the same time, in signing this convention, she flattered herself that it would be but an act of simple precaution, for she

Majesty, in the cases of war with France, set forth in the present declaration, or which may result from the future agreements, which by Article VII., the two imperial courts reserve the power of making, subsidies alike for the opening of the campaign, and annually for the whole duration of the war, which shall as far as possible, meet the expectations and wants of the court of Vienna.

Art. X.—In the execution of the plans determined upon, a just consideration will be paid to the obstacles arising, as well from the present state of the frontiers and forces of the Austrian monarchy, as from the imminent dangers to which she would, in that state, be exposed, by demonstrations and armaments, which would provoke immediately a premature invasion on the part of France. Consequently, in determining the active measures to be mutually agreed upon, and so far as the safety of the two empires and the essential interests of the common cause will permit, the greatest care will be taken to combine with the employment of them, the time and means of putting the forces and frontiers of his majesty the Emperor-King into a condition for opening the campaign with the energy necessary to attaining the object of the war. When once, however, the encroachments of the French shall have established the cases in which his said imperial and royal Apostolic Majesty will be engaged to take part in the war, by virtue of the present agreement, and of those which may hereafter be mutually formed, he engages not to lose an instant in making his preparations in the shortest possible space of time, and which shall not exceed three months after demand made for efficient co-operation on the part of his imperial majesty of all the Russias, and for vigorously proceeding to the execution of the plan which will be settled.

Art. XI.—As the principles of the two sovereigns forbid their seeking, under any circumstances, to constrain the free will of the French nation, the object of the war will be not to operate any counter-revolution, but solely to provide against the common dangers of Europe.

Art. XII.—His majesty the emperor of all the Russias admitting that it is just that, in the event of a new breaking out of war, the house of Austria should be indemnified for the immense losses that it has suffered in its recent wars with France, engages to co-operate in procuring it such indemnification in such event, as far as may consist with the success of their arms. Nevertheless, in the case of even brilliant success, his majesty the Emperor-King will not extend his frontiers beyond the Adda on the west, and the Po on the south; it being distinctly understood that of the different mouths of the latter river, it is the most southerly which is in this case referred to. The two imperial courts are desirous that, in the supposed case of success, his royal highness the elector of Salzburg may be replaced in Italy, and that to this end he either be put into possession of the grand duchy of Tuscany, or that he obtain some other suitable possessions in the north of Italy, supposing events to render such arrangements practicable.

Art. XIII.—Their imperial majesties, on the same supposition, will strive to procure the re-establishment of the king of Sardinia in Piedmont, even with a great ulterior accession of territory. Should the issue be less favourable, every endeavour will still be used to secure him suitable possessions in Italy.

Art. XIV.—In the same case of great successes, the two imperial courts will agree upon the destination of the Legations, and will concur in causing the duchies of Modena, of Massa, and of Carrara to be restored to the legitimate heirs of the last duke; but, in the case of events compelling a limitation of these projects, the said Legations or the Modenese shall form the dominion of the king of Sardinia; the archduke Ferdinand will remain in Germany; and his majesty will content himself, if need be, with a frontier nearer than that of the Adda to that now existing.

had not ceased to dread war. Accordingly, after having signed it, she resisted all the solicitations of the Emperor of Russia to proceed immediately to military preparations; she even angered him by her inertness. But on receiving tidings of the arrangements made by Napoleon in Italy, she was suddenly drawn from her inaction. The title of King, taken by Napoleon, and, above all, so general a title as that of "King of Italy," which seemed necessarily to apply to the whole Peninsula, had alarmed Austria to the highest degree. On the instant she commenced those armaments, which, at first, she had desired to defer, and called to the war department the celebrated Mack, who, although destitute of the qualities of a general-in-chief, was not without talent in the organisation of armies. Henceforward she paid quite a new attention to the urgent proposals of Russia, and, without engaging herself, as yet, in writing, to an immediate war; she left to Russia the task of pushing forward the common negotiations with England, and of treating with that power upon the difficult question of subsidies. In the meanwhile, she discussed with M. de Vinzingerode a plan of campaign adapted to all imaginable hypotheses.

It was at St. Petersburg, then, that was finally to be formed the new coalition; that is to say, the third, reckoning from the commencement of the French Revolution. That of 1792 ended in 1797, at Campo Formio, under the blows of general Bonaparte; that of 1768 ended in 1801, under the blows of the First Con-

Art. XV.—If the circumstances shall permit the replacement of the elector of Salzburg in Italy, the territories of Salzburg, Berchtolsgaden, and Passau, will be annexed to the Austrian monarchy. This is the only contingency in which his majesty is to obtain also an extension of his frontier in Germany. As to the part of the territory of Aichstaedt, at present possessed by the elector of Saizburg, it is then to be disposed of in such manner as the two courts shall mutually agree upon, and especially in favour of the elector of Bavaria, if, by his part taken in the common cause he has acquired a claim to be benefited. In like manner, in the case supposed in the preceding Article, of the re-establishment of the heirs of the late duke of Modena in his ancient possessions, the possessions of Brisgau and Ortenau would become a means of encouragement in the good cause to one of the principal princes of Germany, particularly to the elector of Baden, in whose favour it then would be renounced by the house of Austria.

Art. XVI.—The two high contracting powers engage not to lay down their arms, and not to treat of an accommodation with the common enemy, except by mutual consent, and after preliminary agreement between them.

Art. XVII.—In limiting for the present to the above objects and points, this present preliminary agreement, upon which the two monarchs mutually promise the most inviolable secrecy, they reserve to themselves, without delay and directly, to fix by ulterior arrangements, as well upon a plan of operations, in the event of war becoming inevitable, as upon all which relates to the support of the respective troops, as well in the Austrian states as upon foreign territory.

Art. XVIII.—The present declaration, mutually recognised as being equally obligatory with the most solemn treaty, will be ratified within the period of six weeks, or earlier if practicable, and the acts of ratification likewise exchanged at the same time.

In witness whereof, &c. &c.

sul; the third, that of 1804, was destined to have a no more prosperous issue under the blows of the Emperor Napoleon.

Lord Gower, as we have said, had powers from his court to treat with the Russian cabinet. After long discussions, the following conditions were agreed upon. A coalition was to be formed among the powers of Europe, comprising England and Russia, at the outset, and, subsequently, those which they could influence. The object was to procure the evacuation of Hanover, and of the north of Germany, the effective independence of Holland and Switzerland, the evacuation of the whole of Italy, including the Isle of Elba, the reconstitution and enlargement of the kingdom of Piedmont, the consolidation of the kingdom of Naples, and, finally, the establishment in Europe of an order of things which would guarantee the safety of all the States against the usurpations of France. The object was not more precisely defined, in order that a certain latitude might remain for treating with France; at the least, deceptively. All the powers were to be invited to give their adhesion.

The coalition had determined to assemble, at fewest, 500,000 men, and to take the field as soon as it had 400,000 men. England furnished an annual subsidy of 1,250,000*l.* sterling, per 100,000 men. She further advanced a sum down, amounting to three months subsidy, to defray the expences of opening the campaign. Austria engaged to supply 250,000 men, out of 500,000; the remainder was to be furnished by Russia, Sweden, Hanover, England, and Naples. The very grave question of the adhesion of Prussia was settled in a very summary and hardy manner. England and Russia promised to make common cause against any power, which, by hostile measures, or by its too close connexions with France, should oppose the designs of the coalition. It was determined, in fact, that Russia, dividing her forces into two masses, should march one by Galicia, to the aid of Austria; the other, by Poland, to the frontiers of the Prussian territory; and if definitively Prussia should refuse to enter into the coalition, overrun her territory before she could put herself in a state of defence; and as it was desirable not to forewarn her by the assemblage of such an army upon her frontiers, it was agreed that the pretext should be taken of a desire to hasten to her aid, in the event of Napoleon suspecting her, and throwing himself upon her states. The name, then, of auxiliaries and friends were to be given to the eighty thousand Russians, destined to trample Prussia under foot.

This projected violence against Prussia, although it appeared to England to be somewhat rash, was very acceptable to her, as she could do nothing better towards saving herself from invasion, than to kindle a vast flame upon the Continent, and excite a frightful war there, no matter who the combatants, or who the vanquished or the victors. On the part of Russia, on the contrary, this resolution was a great imprudence; for to

risk throwing Prussia into the arms of Napoleon, was to insure herself a certain defeat, even were the invasion of the Prussian territory as prompt as it was proposed to be. But prince Czartoryski, the most obstinate of those young men in pursuing an object, saw in all this only a means of wresting Warsaw from Prussia, in order to reconstitute Poland, by giving it to Alexander.

The military plan that was indicated by the situation, was still to attack in three masses; in the south, with the Russians of Corfu, the Neapolitans, and the English, ascending the Italian peninsula, and joining a hundred thousand Austrians in Lombardy: in the east, with the grand Austrian and Russian army acting upon the Danube; lastly, in the north, with the Swedes, the Hanoverians, and the Russians, descending upon the Rhine.

As to the diplomatic plan, it consisted in an intervention in the name of a *Mediatory Alliance*, and an offer of a preliminary negotiation previous to fighting. Russia was much attached to this portion of her original project, which preserved to her that altitude of arbiter which flattered her pride, and which, it must be added, was also agreeable to the weakness of her sovereign. He still entertained a vague hope that Prussia would be prevailed upon, provided that she were not too much alarmed by being made aware of the fixed design of a coalition, and that Napoleon would thus have only to choose between an alarming league of all Europe, and reasonable concessions.

From England, consequently, was obtained the most singular dissimulation, the least dignified, but also the best adapted to her views. England consented to be left out, to be unmentioned in the negotiations, especially with Prussia. In the efforts upon the last-mentioned power, Russia was to represent herself as being unconnected with Great Britain by any project of common war, but as wishing to impose a mediation, in order to put an end to a state of things that was burdensome to all Europe. In a solemn proceeding with respect to France, Russia, without ostensibly acting in the name of a coalition, was to offer her mediation, affirming that she would cause every one to accept equitable conditions, provided that Napoleon would accept similar ones. Here was a double means intended to avoid, alike, alarming Prussia and irritating the pride of Napoleon. England lent herself to every thing, provided only that Russia, compromised by this mediation, were definitively drawn into the war. As to Austria, the greatest pains were taken to leave her in the shade, and not even to name her; for, should she appear to be in the plot, Napoleon would throw himself upon her before preparations were completed for aiding her. She actively prepared herself without taking any part in the negotiations. It was necessary to pursue the same course as to the court of Naples, which was the first exposed to the

blows of Napoleon, as general St. Cyr was at Taranto with a division of from fifteen to eighteen thousand French. Queen Caroline had been advised to take all the engagements of neutrality, and even of alliance which Napoleon might impose upon her. In the meantime, Russian troops were by degrees transported in vessels through the Dardanelles, and disembarked at Corfu. Here a strong division was preparing, which at the last moment was to be joined at Naples by a reinforcement of English, Albanians, and others. It would then be time to throw aside the mask, and to attack the French by the extremity of the Peninsula.

In order to attempt a preliminary negotiation with Napoleon, it was necessary to be able to offer him some at least specious conditions. There were none such apart from offering to cause Malta to be evacuated by the English. The Russian cabinet had thrown aside all the brilliant portion of its plan, such as the reorganisation of Italy and of Germany, the reconstitution of Poland, and the framing of a new maritime code. If, in addition, it conceded Malta to the English, instead of playing the part of arbiter between France and England, it only became the agent of the latter, or, at the very most, her docile and dependent ally. The Russian cabinet consequently held to the evacuation of Malta with an obstinacy not common to it, and, when the moment arrived for signing the treaty, was inflexible. Hitherto, Lord Gower had given way on every point, in order to compromise Russia, by means of a treaty of some kind, with England; but now he was asked to abandon a maritime position of the greatest importance, a position which, if not the only, was, at least, the principal cause of the war, and he would not yield. Lord Gower deemed it incompatible with his instructions to go any further, and he refused to sign the abandonment of Malta. The project was in danger of falling to the ground. However, on the 11th of April, the emperor Alexander consented to sign the convention, at the same time declaring that he would not ratify it, unless the English cabinet would give up the island of Malta. A courier, therefore, was despatched to London, bearer both of the convention and of the condition which was annexed to it, and upon which depended the ratification by Russia.

It was settled that, without loss of time, lest the season for military operations should be lost, the step agreed upon should be taken as to the Emperor of the French. For this mission the personage was selected who, at London, had fastened the first link of the coalition, M. de Nowosiltzoff. As assistant to him the abbé Piatoli was selected, the actual author of that plan of a new Europe, which had since been so disfigured.

M. de Nowosiltzoff was extremely proud of being about to proceed to Paris to present himself to that great man, who for years past had attracted the gaze of the whole world. If, as

the decisive moment drew nearer and nearer, the emperor Alexander more and more warmly desired to see this preliminary mediation successful, M. de Nowosiltzoff desired it no less. He was young and ambitious ; he considered it a great distinction in the first place to treat with Napoleon, and in the second place, to be the negotiator who, at the moment when Europe seemed about to return to war, would suddenly pacify it by his able intervention. It could thence be relied upon that he would not himself add to the difficulties of the negotiation. After long deliberations, the conditions were agreed upon which he was to offer to Napoleon, and it was also agreed that they should be kept a profound secret. He was charged to offer a first, a second, and a third project, each more advantageous to France than the preceding one, but was recommended not to pass from one to the other until after a great struggle.

The basis of all these projects was the evacuation of Hanover and of Naples, the practical independence of Switzerland and Holland, and, in return, the evacuation of Malta by the English, and the promise of subsequently compiling a new code of maritime law. Thus far Napoleon would oppose no serious difficulties. In fact, in the event of a solid peace, he had no objection to evacuate Hanover, Naples, Holland, and even Switzerland, on condition of the act of mediation being maintained in the last named country. The real difficulty was Italy. Russia, already obliged to forego her plans of European re-constitution, had promised in the event of war becoming inevitable, one part of Italy to Austria, and another part to the future kingdom of Piedmont. Now, on the supposition of a mediation, it would be indispensable, on pain of seeing the negotiator sent away from Paris on the day after his arrival there, to concede to France a part of this same Italy. It was necessary in order that the mediation should appear serious, above all, that it should appear serious to Prussia, that she might be persuaded and compromised by the appearance of a negotiation attempted in good faith. It was resolved, in the first place, to demand the separation of Piedmont, but saving its reconstitution as a separate state for a branch of the Bonaparte family, and further, the abandonment of the existing kingdom of Italy intended, together with Genoa, for the house of Savoy. Parma and Piacenza remained to furnish another endowment for a prince of the Bonaparte family. This was only the first proposition ; the second was then to be brought forward. Piedmont would remain incorporated with France ; the kingdom of Italy, with the addition of Genoa, would, as in the first proposition, be given to the house of Savoy. Parma and Piacenza would remain the only endowment of the collateral branches of the house of Bonaparte. From this second proposition the envoy was finally to pass to the third, which would be as follows : Piedmont continuing to be a French province, and the existing kingdom of

Italy being given to the Bonaparte family, the indemnity of the house of Savoy would be reduced to Parma, Piacenza, and Genoa. The kingdom of Etruria, assigned for four years past to a Spanish branch, would remain as it was.

It must be allowed that if to these last conditions the evacuation of Malta by the English had been added, Napoleon would have had no legitimate reason for refusing peace, for they were the conditions of Lunéville and Amiens, with the addition of Piedmont for France. The sacrifice demanded of Napoleon being in reality confined to that of Parma and Piacenza, which had become French possessions by the death of the last duke, and of Genoa, hitherto independent, Napoleon might consent to such an arrangement provided always care was taken to give no offence to his dignity in the form of the propositions.

All the five projects, then, of the friends of Alexander, led to a very slender result! After having dreamed of a reconstitution of Europe, by the means of a powerful mediation, after having seen that reconstitution of Europe converted at London into a destructive project against France, Russia, alarmed at having advanced so far, reduced her grand mediation to the obtaining Parma and Piacenza as an indemnity for the house of Savoy; for the evacuation of Hanover and Naples, and the independence of Holland and Switzerland, which she further demanded, had never been contested by Napoleon, peace being once re-established. And should so small a matter not be obtained, she would have a terrible war upon her hands. The rash and inconsiderate conduct of Russia had hemmed her up in a very narrow pass.

It was further agreed upon, that passports should be solicited for M. de Nowosiltzoff, through the medium of a friendly court. There was only the choice between Prussia and Austria. To apply to Austria would be to draw upon her the penetrating glance of Napoleon, and, as we have already said, it was desired to have her as much as possible kept in the back ground, in order that she might have time to make her preparations. Prussia, on the contrary, had offered herself as mediatrix, which furnished a natural reason to make use of her mediation to procure passports for M. de Nowosiltzoff. He at the same time was to proceed to Berlin, see the king of Prussia, make another effort with that prince, communicate to him alone, and not to his cabinet, the moderate conditions proposed to France, and make him perceive that if she refused to accede to such arrangements, it must be from her having views alarming for Europe, views irreconcilable with the independence of all states, in which case it was the duty of all to unite and march against the common enemy.

M. de Nowosiltzoff, then, set out for Berlin, where he speedily arrived, eager as he felt to commence the negotiation. He was accompanied by the abbé Piatoli. His demeanour was mild,

conciliating, but extremely reserved. Unfortunately, the king of Prussia was absent, engaged in visiting his provinces of Franconia. This was a vexatious circumstance. There was a double danger: of a refusal on the part of England relative to Malta, which would render all negotiation impossible, or of some new enterprise of Napoleon upon Italy, where he then was, an enterprise which would ruin beforehand the various projects of reconciliation on their way to Paris. The prompt arrival of M. de Nowosiltzoff in Paris was, consequently, of immense importance for the peace. Moreover, the young Russians who governed the Empire were so impressionable, that their first contact with Napoleon might attract them to him, and seduce them, as the contact with Mr. Pitt had drawn them far indeed away from their first plan of European regeneration. There was, consequently, reason greatly to regret the time which was about to be lost.

The king of Prussia having learnt that he was solicited to demand passports for the Russian envoy, greatly congratulated himself upon that circumstance, and upon the probabilities of peace, which he deemed he could discern in it. He did not suspect that, masked behind this endeavour at reconciliation, there was a project of war more mature than had been entrusted to him, more mature than it was deemed to be by those who had so inconsiderately engaged in it. The pacific Frederick William gave the order to his cabinet immediately to apply to Napoleon for passports for M. de Nowosiltzoff. The latter was not to assume at Paris any official character, in order to avoid the difficulty of recognising the imperial title borne by Napoleon; but in addressing him, he was to employ only the title of Sire and of Majesty, and he was, moreover, provided with full and positive powers, which he was to show as soon as they should be agreed, which authorised him on the instant to concede the recognition of the imperial title.

While the powers of Europe were thus exerting themselves against Napoleon, he, surrounded by all the pomps of Italian royalty, was brimful of ideas the very opposite to those of his adversaries, even to the most moderate of them. The sight of that Italy, the scene of his first victories, the object of all his predilections, filled him with new designs for the grandeur of his Empire and for the establishment of his family. Far from purposing to share Italy with any one, he proposed, on the contrary, wholly to occupy it, and to create there some of those vassal kingdoms which were to strengthen the new Empire of the West. The members of the Italian *Consultum*, who were present at the formality of the institution of the kingdom of Italy, accompanied by the vice-president Melzi, and the minister Marescalchi had preceded him to prepare his reception at Milan. Although the Italians were proud to have him for their king, though his government reassured them more than any other,

yet the hope lost, or at the very least deferred, of a purely Italian royalty, the fear of war with Austria in consequence of this change, and even the generality of that title of King of Italy, calculated to please them, but also to alarm Europe, all this had much perplexed them. Messrs. Melzi and Marescalchi found them more disturbed and also less zealous than previous to their departure. The ultra-liberal party receded more every day, and the aristocracy did not draw closer. Napoleon alone could mend this state of things. Cardinal Caprara had arrived, and endeavoured to inspire the clergy with his own devotion to Napoleon. M. de Ségur, accompanying M. Marescalchi, had selected the ladies and officers of the palace from the first Italian families. Some at first declined. The exertion of M. de Marescalchi, of some members of the *Consultum*, and the general attraction of the fêtes which were in preparation, had brought over the froward, and finally the arrival of Napoleon had determined every one. His presence as general had always deeply moved the Italians; his presence as emperor and king could not but strike them still more forcibly; for that prodigy of fortune whom they had delighted to gaze on, had become a prodigy still more vast and marvellous. Magnificent troops assembled upon the battle fields of Marengo, and Castiglione prepared to execute grand manœuvres, and to represent immortal combats. All the foreign ministers were convoked to Milan. The crowds of gazers who had flocked to Paris to see the coronation there, now repaired to Milan. The impulse was given, and the Italian imaginations were again seized with love and admiration of the man who for nine years had so much excited them. The youth of the great families formed, in imitation of the towns of France, guards of honour to receive him.

On his arrival at Turin he had there met Pius VII. and exchanged tender and filial adieux with him. Then he had with an infinite gracefulness and affability received his new subjects, and had busied himself about their interests, which were still distinct from those of the rest of the French Empire, with that intelligent solicitude which marked all his journeys. He had repaired the blunders or the acts of injustice of the administrations, decided upon a whole host of demands, and displayed, to seduce the people, all the attractions of the supreme power. He had then employed several days in visiting the stronghold, which was his grand creation, and the foundation of the defensive system of Italy, that of Alexandria. Thousands of workmen were employed on it at this instant. Finally, on the 5th of May, in the middle of the plain of Marengo, from the summit of a throne raised in that plain where, five years previously, he had gained the sovereign authority, he had witnessed some splendid manœuvres representing the battle. Lannes, Murat, and Bessières, executed those manœuvres. There wanted only Desaix! Napoleon had laid the first stone of an

intended monument to the memory of the brave who fell upon that field of battle. From Alexandria he had proceeded to Pavia, whither the magistrates had repaired to offer him the homages of his new capital, and he had entered Milan itself on the 8th of May, amidst the pealing of bells, the thunder of cannon, and the acclamations of a population excited to enthusiasm by his presence. Surrounded by the Italian authorities and the clergy, he had bent the knee in that old Lombard cathedral, which was admired by all Europe, and which was destined to receive from him its final completion. The Italians, sensitive to the highest degree, sometimes agitate themselves for sovereigns whom they do not love, seduced thereto, like all other people, by the power of grand spectacles; what, then, must they not have felt at sight of that man whose grandeur commenced under their eyes, that star that they could boast of having been the first to perceive upon the European horizon?

It was amidst these intoxicating displays of grandeur that the proposal to receive M. de Nowosiltzoff at Paris reached Napoleon. He felt every inclination to welcome the Russian minister, to hear him, to treat with him, no matter under what form, official or not, provided the negotiation was serious; and that in endeavouring to influence him no partiality or condescension was shown to England. As for the conditions he was far enough from reckoning as the Russians did. But he was unaware of their offers; he saw only the advance, which was made in becoming terms, and he cautiously avoided the error of repulsing it. He replied that he would receive M. de Nowosiltzoff at Paris towards the month of July; his maritime projects, to which he never ceased to be attentive, notwithstanding his apparent abstraction from them, would not recall him to France until that period. He proposed then to receive M. de Nowosiltzoff, to judge if it was worth while to attend to him; and he would at the same time hold himself in constant readiness to interrupt this diplomatic communication, and set out for London, there to cut the Gordian knot of all the coalitions.

Although he was not precisely aware of the one which had been organised, and was far from believing it to be so far perfected as it really was, he well understood the character of the emperor Alexander, and the unreflecting impulses which had rapidly drawn him towards the English policy, and on sending to Prussia the passports for M. de Nowosiltzoff, he caused the following observations to be communicated to that court:

“The Emperor,” wrote the minister for foreign affairs to M. de Laforest—“the Emperor having read your despatch, finds that it fully justifies the fears that he had manifested in his letter to the king of Prussia, and all that his majesty hears of the language that has been held by the British ministers, tends to keep him in that of state of suspicion. The emperor Alexander is

led away in spite of himself; he has not perceived that the design of the English cabinet in offering him the part of a mediator, was closely to connect the interests of England and those of Russia, and eventually to lead the latter to take up arms to sustain a cause which would have become her own.

“From the instant that, by experience in public affairs, the Emperor Napoleon had acquired precise ideas of the character of the emperor Alexander, he felt that, at one time or another, that prince would be seduced into the interest of England, who had so many means of gaining over so corrupt a court as that of St. Petersburg.

“Probable as that future appeared to the Emperor Napoleon, he contemplated it coolly, and he had taken steps to meet it, as far as that rested with him. Independently of the conscription of the year, he had made a call upon the reserve of the year XI. and of the year XII., and had augmented by fifteen thousand men, the call made upon the conscription of the year XIII.

“At the slightest word of menace that may be uttered by M. de Nowosiltzoff, of threatening, of affront, or of hypothetical treaties with England, he will no longer be listened to. If Russia, or any other continental power, wishes to interfere in the affairs of the day, and to press equally upon France and upon England, the Emperor will have no objection to that, and will readily make some sacrifices. England, on her part, should make equivalent concessions: but if, on the contrary, sacrifices are required from France alone, then, whatever be the union of the powers, the Emperor will avail himself, to their utmost extent, of his good right, of his genius, and of his armies.” (Milan, 15 Prairial, year XIII., 4th of June, 1805.)

On the 26th of May, Napoleon was crowned in the cathedral of Milan, with as much pomp as that with which he had six months previously been crowned at Paris, in presence of the ministers of Europe, and of the deputies of all Italy. The crown of iron, reputed to be the ancient crown of the Lombard kings, had been conveyed from Monza, where it is carefully kept. After cardinal Caprara, archbishop of Milan, had blessed it with the forms anciently used in the case of the German emperors, when crowned kings of Italy, Napoleon placed it upon his own head, as he had placed that of Emperor of the French, pronouncing, in Italian, these decisive words, “*God has given it to me, let him beware who shall touch it!*” (*Dio me l'ha data, guai a chi la toccherà!*) He sent a thrill through all present by the significant accents in which he spoke those words. This pageant, prepared by Italian artists, and especially by the painter Appiani, surpassed in splendour and magnificence all that had ever been witnessed in Italy.

After this ceremony, Napoleon promulgated the Organic Statute, by which he created in Italy a monarchy in imitation of that of France, and named Eugene de Beauharnais viceroy.

He then presented that young prince to the Italian nation in a royal sitting of the Legislative Body. He employed the whole of the month of June in presiding over the Council of State, and in giving to the administration of Italy the impulse that he had given to the administration of France, by daily occupying himself with its affairs.

The Italians, for whose satisfaction there needed only a government present in the midst of them, had one now beneath their eyes, which to its real value added a prodigious magic of externals, and thus, withdrawn from their discontents, and from their repugnance to foreigners, they had already rallied, great and small, around the new king. The presence of Napoleon, supported by those formidable armies which he had formed and organised for every event, had dissipated the fear of war. The Italians began to believe that they should see it no more upon their soil, even should it again break out, and that its shoutings and its thunders would come to them from the banks of the Danube, and from the very gates of Vienna. Every Sunday Napoleon held grand reviews of troops at Milan; after which he returned to his palace, and gave public audience to the ambassadors of all the courts of Europe, to foreigners of distinction, and, above all, to the representatives of the great Italian families and the clergy. It was at one of these audiences that he exchanged the insignia of the Legion of Honour with the insignia of the most ancient and illustrious orders of Europe. The Prussian minister first presented himself, to deliver to him the Black Eagle and the Red Eagle. Then came the ambassador of Spain, who delivered to him the Golden Fleece; and then the ministers of Bavaria and Portugal, who delivered to him the orders of St. Hubert and of Christ. Napoleon gave them in exchange the Grand Cordon of the Legion of Honour, and bestowed a number of decorations equal to that which he received. He then distributed those foreign decorations among the principal personages of the Empire. In a few months his court was on the same footing as all the other courts of Europe; the same insignia were worn in it, with rich costumes, chiefly of a military character. In the midst of all this splendour, remaining simple in his personal appearance, having for his sole decoration a star of the Legion of Honour upon his breast, wearing a coat of the chasseurs of the guard, without gold embroidery, a black hat, with no ornament but a tricoloured cockade, Napoleon proved to all that the luxury by which he was surrounded was not for himself. His noble and handsome countenance, around which the imagination of men ranged so many glorious trophies, was all that he chose to display to the eager gaze of the people. Yet his person was the only one that they sought, that they desired to behold amidst that train glittering with gold and bedizened with the ribands of all Europe.

The various towns of Italy sent deputations to him to obtain the favour of seeing him within their walls. It was not only an honour but an advantage that they solicited, for everywhere his penetrating eye discerned some good to be done, and his powerful hand found the means of accomplishing it. Having resolved to devote the spring and half the summer to Italy, the better to divert the attention of the English from Boulogne, he promised to visit Mantua, Bergamo, Verona, Ferrara, Bologna, Modena, and Piacenza. These tidings completed the joy of the Italians, and gave them all hopes of participating in the benefits of the new reign.

His abode in this splendid country soon engendered within him those formidable impulses which were so much to be dreaded for the maintenance of general peace. He began to feel an extreme irritation against the court of Naples, which, wholly devoted to the English and to the Russians, and publicly protected by the latter in all negotiations, incessantly displayed the most hostile feelings towards France. The imprudent queen, who had allowed the government of her husband to be compromised by odious cruelties, had now taken a most unfortunately imagined step. She had sent to Milan the most clumsy of negotiators, a certain prince de Cardito, to protest against the title of king of Italy, taken by Napoleon, a title which many people translated by those words that were inscribed upon the Iron Crown: "*Rex totius Italiæ—King of ALL Italy.*" The marquis de Gallo, ambassador from Naples, a man of sense, and much esteemed at the imperial court, had vainly endeavoured to prevent this perilous proceeding. Napoleon had consented to receive the prince de Cardito, but upon a day of diplomatic audience. On that day he first gave the most gracious reception to the marquis de Gallo, and then, in Italian, addressed the most crushing harangue to the prince de Cardito, declaring to him in terms equally harsh and contemptuous to the queen, that he would drive her out of Italy, and scarcely leave her Sicily for shelter. The prince de Cardito was led away nearly fainting. This outbreak produced a great sensation, and speedily filled the despatches of all the European ministers. Napoleon from this moment conceived the idea of making the kingdom of Naples a family kingdom, and one of the fiefs of his grand Empire. By degrees the idea had entered his mind of expelling the Bourbons from all the thrones of Europe. However, the accidental zeal that those of Spain had displayed in the war against the English, banished this formidable idea as concerned them. But Napoleon, under the strong presentiment that he should speedily have to reconstruct Europe, whether he should become all-powerful by crossing the straits of Dover, or whether, withdrawn from the maritime war by continental war, he should succeed in expelling the Austrians from Italy, Napoleon promised himself that he would

unite the Venetian states to his kingdom of Lombardy, and that he would then effect the conquest of Naples for one of his brothers. But all this portion of his designs was for the moment postponed. Exclusively occupied with the descent, he would not actually provoke a continental war. Nevertheless, there was one measure which seemed to him to be opportune and without danger: it was to put a period to the sad situation of the Republic of Genoa. That Republic, placed between the Mediterranean, which was commanded by England, and Piedmont, which France had annexed to her territory, was, as it were, imprisoned between two great powers, and was thus deprived of her ancient prosperity, for she had all the inconveniences of being annexed to France, without any of its advantages. In fact, the English had refused to recognise her, considering her as an annexation of the French Empire, and had attacked her flag. Even the Barbary states pillaged and insulted her vessels without mercy. France, treating her as a foreign country, had separated her from Piedmont and from the territory of Nice, by lines of custom-houses and by exclusive tariffs. The trade of Genoa was consequently stifled between the sea and the land, which were alike closed against her. France received no more benefit from Genoa than she bestowed upon her. The Apennine, separating Genoa from Piedmont, formed a frontier that was infested by brigands: it required the bravest gendarmerie in great numbers to render the roads safe there. With reference to the navy the treaty that had recently been made, only very partially, secured the services which Genoa was capable of rendering us. That borrowing of a foreign port for the purpose of founding a naval establishment there, was an essay leading to other things. By uniting the port of Genoa, and the population of both shores of the gulf of Genoa to the French Empire, Napoleon would acquire from the Texel to the extremity of the principal gulf of the Mediterranean, an extent of coasts, and a number of seamen which, with time and persevering attention, might render him if not England's equal upon the seas, at least her respectable rival.

Napoleon could not resist all these temptations. He considered that England alone could take any real interest in this question. He would not have ventured to deal with the duchy of Parma and Piacenza; whether on account of the Pope, for whom that duchy was a motive to hope; on account of Spain, who coveted it to extend the kingdom of Etruria; or, finally, on account of Russia herself, who did not despair of an indemnity for the late sovereign of Piedmont, so long as it remained an unappropriated territory in Italy. But Genoa, appearing to him to possess but little interest for Austria, who was too far removed from it, and of no consideration to the Pope and Russia, was of importance, in his opinion, only to England; and having no

occasion to avoid offending her, and not supposing her to be as strongly bound up as she was with Russia, he resolved to annex the Ligurian Republic to the French Empire.

This was an error, for in the then temper of Austria, to pronounce a new annexation was to throw her into the arms of the Coalition; it was to furnish to all our enemies who filled Europe with perfidious rumours, new and not unfounded pretext for declaiming against the ambition of France, and, especially against her violation of promises, since Napoleon himself, on instituting the kingdom of Italy, had promised to the Senate that he would not add a single province more to his Empire. But Napoleon, sufficiently apprised of the inimical designs of the Continent; to deem himself warranted in dispensing with considerations towards it, yet not sufficiently apprised to perceive all the danger of a new provocation; flattering himself, moreover, that he should speedily solve all European difficulties at London; did not hesitate, but determined to add Genoa to the naval establishments of France.

His minister to that Republic was his fellow-Corsican Salicetti, whom he instructed to sound and prepare the public mind. The task was not a difficult one, for the public mind of Liguria was well disposed. The aristocratic and Anglo-Austrian party could not become more hostile than it was. The existing protectorate under which Genoa was placed seemed to that party to be as hateful as annexation to France. As for the popular party, it saw in that annexation the freedom of its commerce with the interior of the Empire, the certainty of a great future prosperity, a guarantee against ever again falling beneath the yoke of oligarchy, and, finally, the advantage of belonging to the greatest power in Europe. The minority of the nobility, favourable to the Revolution, alone contemplated with some pain the destruction of the Genoese nationality, but the grand employments of the imperial court were a sufficient attraction to console the principal personages of that class.

The proposition, prepared in concert with some senators, and presented by them to the Genoese senate, was there adopted by twenty members out of twenty-two, who deliberated upon it. It was then confirmed by a species of *Plebiscitum*, given in the form employed in France during the Consulate. Registers were opened, upon which every one could inscribe his vote. The people of Genoa hastened, as those of France had formerly done, to record their suffrages, almost all of which were favourable. The Senate and the Doge proceeded to Milan, to present their request to Napoleon. They were introduced to him amidst a pomp and ceremony which recalled the times when vanquished nations were wont to repair to Rome, to solicit the honour of forming part of the Roman Empire. Napoleon, on the 4th of June, received them on his throne, told them that he acceded to their wish, and that he would visit Genoa ere he

quitted Italy. To this incorporation was added another, which was of small importance in itself, but which was like the drop of water which overflows the vessel. The Republic of Lucca was without a government, and incessantly tossed about between Etruria become Spanish, and Piedmont become French, like a rudderless vessel—a very small vessel indeed, upon a very small sea. The same prompting that had been resorted to at Genoa caused Lucca to offer herself to France, and her magistrates, like those of Genoa, repaired to Milan to solicit a government and a constitution. Napoleon acceded to their request also, but considering them too distant to be annexed to the Empire, he made their territory the dowry of his elder sister, the princess Eliza, a woman of capacity and judgment, indulging in some pretensions as a wit, but endowed with the qualities of a queen regnant, and possessed of the talent to make her authority popular in that little state which she governed; which procured her the title, smartly enough coined by M. de Talleyrand, of the *Semiramis of Lucca*. Napoleon had already conferred the duchy of Piombino upon her; he now gave to her and her husband, the prince Baćciochi, the territory of Lucca, in the form of an hereditary principality, dependent on the French Empire, and reverting to the crown in the case of failure of the male line; consequently, with all the conditions of the ancient fiefs of the German Empire. This princess was for the future to bear the title of princess of Piombino and Lucca.

M. de Talleyrand was directed to write to Russia and to Austria, to explain these proceedings, which Napoleon considered of no consequence to those powers, or, at least, insufficient to rouse the court of Vienna from its inertness. Nevertheless, secret as were the military preparations of Austria, they had partially been perceived, and had not failed to strike the experienced glance of Napoleon. Troops were in motion towards the Tyrol and towards the ancient Venetian provinces. The march of those troops could not be denied, and Austria did not attempt to deny it, but hastened to declare that the grand assemblages of troops at Marengo and at Castiglione, appearing to her to be too vast for mere reviews, she had made some musters as a mere measure of precaution, musters which, moreover, were sufficiently justified by the yellow fever, which was raging in Spain and Tuscany, especially at Leghorn. To a certain extent this excuse was plausible; but the point to be ascertained was, whether this was a mere shifting of the quarters of some troops, or whether the army was in reality being put upon a war footing by the filling up of regiments and the remounting of cavalry; and more than one secret intimation, sent by Poles attached to France, began to render these things probable. Napoleon instantly sent some disguised officers into the Tyrol, the Friuli, and Carinthia, to ascertain upon

the spot the nature of the preparations which were being made there, and he at the same time demanded decisive explanations from Austria.

He determined upon another method of fathoming the intentions of that court. He had exchanged the Legion of Honour against the orders of friendly courts; he had not as yet effected that change against the orders of Austria, and he desired to place himself on the same footing with this court as with others. He conceived the idea, then, of making an immediate communication to Austria upon this subject, and thus to ascertain her real sentiments. He thought, that if she had really determined upon an early war, she would not venture, in the face of Europe and of her allies, to give a testimony of cordiality, which, in the usages of courts, was the most significant that could be given, especially to a power so recent as that of the French Empire. M. de la Rochefoucauld was minister at Vienna, in the room of M. de Champagny, who had become minister of the interior. The former was directed to demand explanations from Austria of her military preparations, and to propose to her an exchange of her orders against the order of the Legion of Honour.

Napoleon, continuing from the heart of Italy to keep the English under the delusion that the descent so often announced and so often put off, was but a mere feint, busied himself incessantly in providing for its execution in the summer. Never did an operation cause the sending of so many couriers and despatches as that which he at this period meditated. Consular agents and naval officers, stationed in the Spanish and French ports, at Carthagená, at Cadiz, at Ferrol, at Bayonne, at the mouth of the Gironde, at Rochefort, at the mouth of the Loire, at Lorient, at Brest, and at Cherbourg, having couriers at their orders, transmitted to Italy all naval intelligence, even the slightest. Numerous secret agents, kept in pay in the ports of England, forwarded their reports, which were immediately sent to Napoleon. Finally, M. de Marbois, who was well acquainted with English affairs, had the especial duty of reading all the journals published in England, and of translating the slightest news relating to naval movements; and it is a circumstance worthy of remark, that it was especially from these journals that Napoleon, who could with perfect correctness anticipate all the plans of the English admiralty, received the best information. Although their statements were for the most part false, they yet furnished to his prodigious sagacity the means of guessing at the real facts. There was something more singular still. By dint of attributing to Napoleon the most extraordinary, and, frequently, the most absurd plans, several of them, without knowing that they did so, hit upon his real project, and said that he had sent his fleets on distant voyages, only to re-assemble them on a sudden in the Channel.

The admiralty did not fasten upon this supposition, which, however, was the true one. Their measures, at all events, would lead us to suppose that they did not take it to be the true one.

With the exception of one circumstance which annoyed him greatly, and which had led to a last modification of his vast plan, Napoleon had every reason to be satisfied with the progress of his operations. Admiral Missiessy, as we have seen, had sailed in January for the West Indies. The details of his expedition were not yet known, but it was certain that the English were greatly alarmed for their colonies; that one of them, the island of Dominica, had been taken, and that they had sent strong reinforcements into the seas of America, a diversion all in our favour in the seas of Europe. Admiral Villeneuve, who sailed from Toulon on the 30th of March, had touched at Cadiz after a voyage of which the particulars were not known, rallied admiral Gravina with a Spanish division of six ships of the line and several frigates, besides the French frigate *l'Aigle*, and had steered for Martinique. No subsequent tidings of him had arrived, but it was known that Nelson, who guarded the Mediterranean, had not been able to intercept him either on his running out of Toulon, or on his getting clear of the strait. The Spanish seamen did their best in the state of destitution in which they were left by an ignorant, corrupt, and indolent government. Admiral Salcedo had assembled a fleet of seven sail at Carthagena; admiral Gravina, as we have just seen, one of six at Cadiz; admiral Grandellana a third of eight at Ferrol, which was to operate with the French fleet in harbour there. But sailors were scarce, owing to the epidemic, and to the depressed condition of Spanish commerce, and fishermen and the working men of the towns were taken to form crews. Finally, a scarcity of grain, added to scarcity of money, and the epidemic, had so exhausted the resources of Spain, that the six months' biscuit which was necessary for each squadron could not be procured. Admiral Gravina had scarcely enough for three months when he had joined the squadron of Villeneuve, and at Ferrol admiral Grandellana had scarcely enough for a fortnight. Fortunately, M. Ouvrard, whom we have seen undertaking to transact business for and with France and Spain, had arrived at Madrid, had delighted that debt-laden court with the most charming projects, obtained its confidence, concluded a treaty with it, a treaty which we shall describe by and by, and by various combinations put an end to the horrors of the dearth. He at the same time provided the Spanish navy with a considerable quantity of biscuit. Matters, therefore, in the ports of Spain, went on as well as the impoverished and wretched state of the Spanish administration would allow.

But while admiral Missiessy spread dismay in the English colonies, and admirals Villeneuve and Gravina, with their combined squadrons, sailed without accident towards Martinique,

Ganteaume, who was to have joined company with them, owing to a sort of phenomenon in the season, had not had a single day such as would admit of his running out of the port of Brest. Within the memory of man the equinox had never before been unattended by a gale. The months of March, April, and May (1805), however, had gone by without the English fleet having once been compelled to abandon the Brest station. Admiral Ganteaume, well knowing how immense an operation he was called upon to take part in, was so impatient for the moment of departure as actually to be rendered ill by his vexation.*

* I cite the two following letters, which will prove both the state of mind of the admiral, and the serious intention of the naval expedition, which some persons, bent upon seeing feints where no feints, in fact, exist, have supposed to be a mere demonstration. These are not the only letters of the same sort, but I select these for quotation :

Ganteaume to the Emperor.

On board *l'Imperial*, 11th Floréal, year XIII. (1st of May, 1805).

SIRE :

The extraordinary weather which we have had since we were ready for sea is quite distracting ; I cannot possibly describe to you the painful feelings which I have endured on finding myself kept in port, while the other squadrons are in full sail for their destinations, and may be cruelly compromised by our difficulties ; this last and most afflicting idea allows me no rest, and if I have thus long resisted the impatience and the sufferings by which I am racked, I have done so because I have seen not one chance in our favour, should I run out, and all chances in favour of the enemy ; a disadvantageous battle was and is inevitable as long as the enemy shall keep his present position, and then our expedition would be irreparably ruined, and our forces for a long time paralysed.

Nevertheless, at the moment when I received your Majesty's despatch of the 3rd Floréal, I had determined to run out at all hazards ; all the vessels had weighed anchor ; a westerly wind which had become fresher and fresher during twelve hours, had led me to hope that the enemy might be driven out to sea, when his look-out vessels were perceived from our moorings, and his squadron signalled off Ushant, and the shifting and lightness of the wind prevented me from carrying out my intention. Feeling sure that I should be obliged to bring up in Bertheaume road, and there attract the notice of the enemy, I abandoned all thought of stirring, and I wish to make it appear that we never had any real intention of running out.

Here I would fain repeat to your Majesty the assurance I have already given you, as to the order and preparation in which I keep all the vessels ; the crews are all mustered on board, no communications take place with the shore except for indispensable objects of duty, and at all hours every vessel is ready to obey the signals which may be made to it ; these arrangements, which alone can enable us to profit by the first favourable opportunity, will be kept up with the utmost exactitude.

Ganteaume to Decrès.

7th Floréal, year XIII. (27th of April, 1805).

I doubt not, my friend, that you share all that I am suffering. Every day that passes is a day of torment to me, and I tremble lest I should after all be forced upon some precious blunder ! The wind, which for two days was in the west, but light, although with rain and a dirty sky, has shifted into the north-north-east, and freshened, and I have been tempted to run all risks,

The weather was almost always calm and clear. Occasionally a gust from the west, accompanied by stormy clouds, gave hopes of a tempest, but suddenly all became clear again. There was no resource but to fight a disadvantageous battle with a squadron which was now very nearly equal in number to the French squadron, and very superior to it in quality. The English, without precisely suspecting what threatened them, yet struck by the presence of a fleet at Brest and another at Ferrol, and put still more on the alert by the sorties from Toulon and Cadiz, had augmented the force of their blockade. They had twenty sail before Brest, commanded by admiral Cornwallis, and seven or eight before Ferrol, commanded by admiral Calder. Admiral Ganteaume, in this position, passed out of the road and returned into it, anchored at Bertheaume, or returned to the inner moorings, having for two months all his hands kept strictly on board, land forces as well as seamen. In his vexation he asked if he should give battle in order to get out to open sea, but this he was expressly forbidden to do.

Napoleon, calculating that after the middle of May it would be dangerous to leave Villeneuve, Gravina, and Missiessy waiting any longer at Martinique, and that the English squadrons sent in their pursuit would end by overtaking them, once more altered this part of his plan. He determined that if by the 20th of May Ganteaume had not been able to sail, he should not do so at all, but remain at Brest until relieved from blockade. Villeneuve, therefore, had orders to return with Gravina to Europe to do what was in the first instance entrusted to Ganteaume; that is to say, to raise the blockade of Ferrol, where he would find five sail of French and seven of Spanish, then, if he could, to touch at Rochefort, and be reinforced by Missiessy, who would probably have returned from the West Indies, and, finally, to present himself before Brest to open the

although the enemy was still signalled as being in the Yroise, and though his advanced ships were in the road, and the weather was very clear. The certainty, however, which his position and his force gave me of having to fight to disadvantage, and the variableness of the wind, restrained me, and I am now glad of it; but I am none the less in a state of horrible anxiety.

The length of the days, and the fineness of the weather, make me now almost despair of getting out, and, then, how shall I support the idea of keeping our friends waiting in vain at the place of rendezvous and of compromising them by exposing them to delays and to an extremely dangerous return? These ideas leave me not an instant of peace, and I dare say that they harass you also. However, my friend, you may rest perfectly assured that I have done the best I could, unless I had run the risks of an encounter which, independent of the chances that the enemy would have derived from his superior force, would equally have spoiled the expedition. As I have already reported, the weather has constantly been such as to render it impossible for us to elude the observation of the enemy.

Although in your last you recommended me to write frequently to the Emperor, I dare not write to him, having nothing favourable to say; I remain silent, awaiting events, being unwilling to trouble him about mere trifles, and I confine myself to saying that I trust that he will do us justice.

sea to Ganteaume, which would increase his whole force to fifty-six sail. He was to steer for the Channel with this squadron, the largest ever assembled upon the ocean.

This plan was perfectly practicable, and even had great chances of success, as the result will presently prove. Nevertheless, it was less secure than the preceding one. In fact, if Ganteaume could have got out to sea in April, raised the blockade of Ferrol, which was possible without fighting, for only five or six English vessels then blockaded that port, and afterwards proceeded to Martinique, his junction with Villeneuve and Gravina would have taken place without any probability of battle: they would have returned to Europe to the number of fifty sail, and needed to touch nowhere previous to entering the Channel. There were no other risks to run than those of rencontres at sea, risks so rare that they might be wholly left out of question. The new plan, on the contrary, had the inconvenience of exposing Villeneuve to a battle before Ferrol, and to another before Brest; and though he would have a great superiority of force, there was no certainty that the two squadrons whom he had freed from blockade would have time to come to his aid and take part in the battle. In fact, the egress both from Ferrol and Brest is by narrow channels; there, as elsewhere, the wind that suits vessels going in is not that which suits them on coming out, and it was very possible for a battle to take place at the entrance of those ports, and be brought to a termination, before the fleets within could arrive to take a share in it. Even a battle of doubtful result would suffice to discourage the officers, whose confidence at sea was not very firm, however great their personal courage. Admiral Villeneuve, especially, though a gallant sailor, had not a firmness equal to these risks, and it was to be regretted that the serenity of the weather had prevented the execution of the first plan.

There was another which Napoleon had in contemplation for a moment, which would have consolidated fewer forces, indeed, but which would have taken Villeneuve with certainty into the Channel: it was, not to send Villeneuve before either Ferrol or Brest, but to cause him to double Scotland, and then steer down the North Sea, and so reach Boulogne. It is true that he would have arrived with only twenty sail, instead of fifty; but this would have sufficed for three days; and the flotilla, sufficiently protected, would certainly have crossed. This idea presented itself for an instant to the mind of Napoleon; he put it on paper and then, wishing for still greater security, he preferred a greater consolidation of forces to a greater certainty of making the Channel, and he reverted to the plan of raising the blockade of Ferrol and Brest by Villeneuve.

This was the last change of his plan that was produced by circumstances. It was in the midst of a fête, as he himself relates in a postscript to one of his letters, that he had ruminated on all these combinations, and decided upon his course.

He immediately gave the necessary instructions. Two ships of the line had been prepared at Rochefort; rear-admiral Magon commanded them. He immediately sailed for Martinique, to announce the change that had taken place in Napoleon's determination. Frigates fitted out at Lorient, at Nantes, and at Rochefort, were ready to leave these ports as soon as it was decided that Ganteaume was to make no further attempt at getting out, and they were commissioned to take orders to Villeneuve, to return immediately to Europe, there to execute the new plan. Each frigate was to be accompanied by a brig, furnished with a duplicate of these orders. The despatches were enclosed in leaden boxes, and entrusted to confidential officers, who were to throw them into the sea in case of danger. These precautions, and those which follow, are worthy of being mentioned for the instruction of governments.

In order that the fleets of Brest and Ferrol might be able to second those which were to raise the blockades for them, great precautions had been taken. Ganteaume was to anchor outside the road of Brest, in the creek of Bertheaume, an open place of doubtful safety. To correct this defect, a general of artillery was sent from Paris, and a hundred and fifty guns were placed in battery, in order to cover the squadron. Gourdon, commanding at Ferrol, in the room of admiral Boudet, who was ill, had orders to pass from Ferrol to Corunna, where the anchorage is open, and to conduct the French division thither. Admiral Grandellana was directed to do the same with the Spanish vessels. The court of Spain was solicited to take precautions similar to those taken at Bertheaume, to secure the anchorage by means of batteries. Finally, anticipating the case of the vessels that were to raise the blockade having consumed their provisions, there were prepared at Ferrol, at Rochefort, at Brest, at Cherbourg, and at Boulogne, barrels of biscuit containing many millions of rations, which could be embarked without loss of time. An order was awaiting admiral Missiessy at Rochefort, should he return thither. That order enjoined him to set sail again on the instant, to go and alarm Ireland by his presence for a few days, and then to cruise at a distance from Ferrol in a given latitude, where admiral Villeneuve, instructed by a frigate, was to join company with him.

While these measures of foresight were taken for the marine force, continual and secret pains were bestowed upon the land force, to increase the effective strength of the war battalions on the coasts of the ocean. The troops of the expedition now amounted to one hundred and sixty thousand men, exclusive of the Brest corps, which had been broken up since the new destination was assigned to the fleet of Ganteaume. Admiral Verhuell had orders to repair to Ambleteuse with the Dutch fleet, in order that the whole expedition might be able to set out together from the four ports adjoining Boulogne. Those ports, ar-

tificially created, had become choked up with sand in the four years that had elapsed since their construction. New labours had cleared them. Further, repairs had been done to the vessels of the flotilla, which had suffered a little from their continual sorties and an exposed anchorage ground.

At the same time that he sent forth this multitude of orders, Napoleon had continued his journey in Italy. He had visited Bergamo, Verona, and Mantua, and had been present at a representation of the battle of Castiglione, given by a corps of twenty-five thousand men, upon the actual field of that battle; he had stayed several days at Bologna, and enchanted the learned men of its celebrated university; then he had traversed Modena, Parma, Piacenza, and, finally, "Genoa the superb," acquired by a dash of the pen. Here he remained from the 30th of June to the 7th of July, amidst fêtes worthy of the city of marble palaces, and even surpassing the most splendid of those with which he had been welcomed by the Italians. At Genoa he met with an illustrious personage, weary of an exile which had lasted for twelve years, and with an opposition which his religious principles no longer justified: that personage was the cardinal Maury. The Pope had given him an example which he had at length determined upon following, and he had come to the resolution of espousing the cause of the restorer of religion. It was at Genoa that an opportunity had been provided for him to return to favour. Like those partisans of Pompey, who, one after the other, endeavoured to meet with Cæsar in some one of the cities of the Roman Empire, voluntarily to deliver themselves to his allurements, cardinal Maury, in the city of Genoa, bent before the new Cæsar. He was received by him with the courtesy of a man of genius, who desires to ingratiate himself with a man of talent, and could see that his return into France would be recompensed with the highest dignities of the Church.

After having received the oath of the Genoese, planned, with the engineer Forfait, the future naval establishment that he wished to create on that coast, and entrusted to the arch-chancellor Lebrun the task of organising this new portion of the Empire, Napoleon set out for Turin, where he pretended to occupy himself with reviews; then, on the evening of the 8th of July, leaving the Empress in Italy, he started with two very humble post-carriages, caused himself to be represented on the road as the minister of the interior, and, in eighty hours, reached Fontainebleau. He arrived there on the morning of the 11th. The arch-chancellor Cambacérès, and the ministers, were already in waiting there to receive his final orders. He was about to depart on an expedition which was to render him absolute master of the world, or plunge him, like another Pharaoh, into the abyss of the deep. Never had he been more calm, cheerful, or confident. But no matter what even

the mightiest geniuses may will, their will, however powerful it may be, is still but the will of man, it is a mere caprice without strength, when the will of Providence is opposed to it. Here is a memorable example of it. While Napoleon had every thing prepared for the meeting with armed Europe between Boulogne and Dover, Providence had prepared that meeting for him in very different places !

The emperor Alexander had adjourned the ratification of the treaty which constituted the new coalition to the moment when England should consent to evacuate Malta. Not doubting of a favourable reply, he had demanded passports for M. de Nowosiltzoff, in order to put himself as early as possible in communication with Napoleon. The emperor Alexander, less martially disposed as he approached the denouement, hoped, by this promptitude, to increase the chances of peace. But he had misjudged the cabinet of London. That cabinet, resolved to preserve a capital position, which the course of events, and an act of bad faith had thrown into its hands, had positively refused to abandon the island of Malta. That intelligence, which arrived at St. Petersburg while M. de Nowosiltzoff was at Berlin, had thrown the Russian cabinet into indescribable embarrassment. What was to be done ? To give way to whatever England chose, to submit to all the exactions of her intractable ambition, would be to accept, in the eyes of Europe, a very inferior part, and to relinquish the negotiation of M. de Nowosiltzoff, for he would be dismissed from Paris on the very day of his arrival there, and probably in a humiliating manner, should he not take with him England's consent to the evacuation of Malta. It was, therefore, immediate war for the profit of England, at her beck, at her wages, and Europe would know that it was so. On the other hand, to break with her on account of this refusal, was publicly to confess having engaged in a course of policy without understanding it, to decide, before the whole world, in favour of Napoleon, and to place Russia in a ridiculous isolation, involved in a quarrel with England through the exactions of that power, and with France through her own levities. To avoid being at the mercy of England was to become at the mercy of Napoleon, who would be master of the conditions of reconciliation with France.* If Napoleon had not come to the aid of the Russian cabinet, by his error in annexing Genoa to France, he would now have seen his enemies plunged into the greatest confusion. In fact, the Russian cabinet was busily deliberating upon this grave situation, when it was informed of the annexation of Genoa. It was a real subject of rejoicing, for that unforeseen event released from their embarrassment statesmen who had most imprudently committed themselves. It was resolved to

* It is from authentic documents that I describe this embarrassment of the Russian cabinet.

noise the tidings abroad to the utmost, and to declare very plainly that it was impossible to treat with a government which daily committed new usurpations. A very natural pretext was hereby furnished for recalling M. de Nowosiltzoff from Berlin, and an order was instantly despatched to him to return to St. Petersburg, leaving behind him a note to the king of Prussia, explanatory of this change of determination. The Russian cabinet now held itself released from the necessity of urging England to the evacuation of Malta, and ratified the treaty which constituted the third coalition, alleging as its "reason" for so doing the recent usurpations of the Emperor of the French.

M. de Nowosiltzoff was at Berlin, whither the king of Prussia had at length arrived. The order for his return surprised and deeply annoyed him, for it was an opportunity lost of undertaking the finest of negotiations. He did not disguise his disappointment from the king himself, made him aware of his own personal inclination to do every thing to win over the Emperor of the French, had he gone on to Paris, and disclosed to him even the concessions to which he would have subscribed in the name of his court. It was an additional reason for the king of Prussia to deplore the new impulse to which Napoleon had yielded, and to indulge in his usual complaints, complaints very mild, as was his custom, but also extremely doleful, for every additional risk added to the already very numerous risks of war, affected him deeply.

At Vienna the effect was still more decisive. It was not from an embarrassment arising out of inconsiderate conduct that the cabinet of Vienna was drawn, but from long prudential hesitations. That cabinet had long perceived that Napoleon desired to possess himself of the whole of Italy, and could not resign itself to abandon it to him without making one last resistance with all the courage of despair. But the Austrian finances were in a deplorable condition, and a frightful dearth of grain afflicted upper and lower Austria, Bohemia, Moravia, and Hungary. Bread was so dear at Vienna, that the usually mild and submissive population of that capital grew so enraged, as even to plunder the shops of some bakers. Thus situated, Austria would still have hesitated for a long time, ere she would have plunged herself into the expense of opposing so formidable an enemy as Napoleon; but on learning the annexation of Genoa, and the creation of the duchy of Lucca, all doubts ceased on the instant. The resolution to fight was immediately taken. Despatches were sent to St. Petersburg announcing the resolution, and were received with joy by the Russian cabinet, which, seeing itself drawn into a war, looked upon the concurrence of Austria as the most fortunate of events.

The adhesion of that court to the coalition was signed forthwith. Russia undertook to negotiate with England, to provide Austria with the largest possible amount of subsidy. They asked

and obtained, for the first expenses of opening the campaign, one million sterling, besides the immediate advance of the moiety of the annual subsidy, that is to say, two millions sterling more. The plan of the campaign, discussed between M. de Vinzingerode and the prince of Schwartzemberg, was settled on the 16th of July. It was agreed that ten thousand Russians and some thousands of Albanians should be opportunely thrown into Naples, to prepare a movement upon Lower Italy, while one hundred thousand Austrians should march upon Lombardy; that the grand Austrian army, supported by a Russian army of sixty thousand men at least, entering by Gallicia, should operate in Bavaria; that an army of eighty thousand Russians should advance towards Prussia; that another army of Russians, English, Hanoverians, and Swedes, assembled in Swedish Pomerania, should march upon Hanover; and that, finally, the Russians should have considerable reserves to bring up wherever needed. The English were to effect disembarkations upon the points of the French Empire which were deemed the most accessible, as soon as the diversion with which Napoleon was threatened should have led to the dissolution of the army of the coasts of the ocean. It was settled that the troops destined to aid Austria should be ready to march before the autumn of the current year, to prevent Napoleon from taking advantage of the winter to destroy the Austrian army.

It was further agreed that the court of Vienna, continuing its system of deep dissimulation, should persist in denying its military preparations, while making them more actively than ever; and, when dissimulation was no longer possible, should speak of negotiating and of resuming on her own part, and that of Russia, the negotiations abandoned by M. de Nowosiltzoff. This time, also, all connexion with England was to be disavowed, and the Continent alone to seem to be treated for. The usual duplicity of weakness characterised all this conduct. Prussia was in a state of cruel anxiety. Without completely penetrating it, she had had a presentiment of this determination to go to war, and she had kept herself aloof from all engagement by alleging to Russia that she was too much exposed to the attacks of Napoleon, and to Napoleon, who had renewed his offers of alliance to her, that she was too much exposed to the attack of Russia.

M. de Zastrow had returned from St. Petersburg after a disagreeable and bootless mission. An unforeseen circumstance nearly led to the sudden discovery of the coalition and the obligation of Prussia to pronounce. Since a treaty of subsidies concluded between England and Sweden had secured that, at least thus far, insane royalty to the coalition, Stralsund swarmed with troops. It is known that that important place was the last foothold that Sweden possessed in the north of Germany. Napoleon had perceived from certain reports of his diplomatic agents that something was brewing in that quarter, and had

given notice of it to the king of Prussia, telling him to take care of that neutrality of the north of Germany, that great object of his anxiety, and that he, for his part, would send thirty thousand more men into Hanover at the first danger. These few words had sufficed to alarm the king of Prussia, who immediately desired the king of Sweden to discontinue his military preparations in Swedish Pomerania. The king of Sweden feeling secure of support, replied to the king of Prussia that he was master in his own territory; that he was making preparations which he deemed to be necessary to his own safety; and that if the king of Prussia wished to restrict his liberty, he reckoned upon the king of England and the emperor of Russia, his allies, to aid him in compelling respect to the independence of his states. His gasconading did not end there; he returned to king Frederick William the orders of Prussia, saying that he would not wear them from the moment that they had been conferred on the most cruel enemy of Europe.

This affront deeply irritated Frederick William. Extremely prudent as he was, he would have taken vengeance for it, had not Russia, immediately interfering, declared to Prussia that Swedish Pomerania was under the protection of Russia, and should remain inviolable. This sort of prohibition of action signified to Prussia, gave her much cause for reflection, and humiliated her no less. She determined to make no reply, confining herself to dismissing the Swedish minister, and declaring to Napoleon that she could not answer for what would take place in Hanover; but, nevertheless, she would guarantee that the Prussian territory should not serve as the road of an invading army.

The horizon then grew dark on all sides, and in a manner very visible to the duller sight. From all parts assemblages of troops were announced, in the Friuli, in the Tyrol and in upper Austria. It was not simple concentrations of men that were spoken of, but the organisation of special services, which was more significant. Cavalry were remounted, artillery provided with horses, and conducted in numerous trains to the banks of the Adige; considerable magazines were everywhere formed, bridges thrown over the Piave and the Tagliamento, and field works thrown up in the lagunes of Venice; all this could scarcely leave any doubt. Austria denied her preparations with a hardihood of which there are but few examples in history, and confessed only some precautions in the Venetian states, caused by the French assemblages formed in Italy. As for the exchange of grand decorations which had been demanded of her, she had declined it under various pretexts.

It was upon this concatenation of circumstances that Napoleon had to come to a resolution during the few days that he was to pass at Fontainebleau and St. Cloud, previous to his departure for Boulogne. It was necessary to decide for the descent or for

an overwhelming march upon the continental powers. On the 11th of July, the very day of his arrival at Fontainebleau, the arch-chancellor Cambacérès had repaired thither, and commenced consulting with him on the grand affairs of the moment. That grave personage was alarmed at the state of the Continent, and at the threatening symptoms of an approaching war, and rightly looked upon the annexations in Italy as being the inevitable cause of a rupture. In such a state of things he could not well comprehend that Napoleon should leave Italy and France exposed to the attacks of the coalition, to throw himself upon England. Napoleon, full of confidence and enthusiasm for the vast maritime plan, of which he had not entrusted the whole secret even to the arch-chancellor, was not embarrassed by any of these objections. In his opinion the acquisition of Genoa and Lucca did not concern Russia, for Italy was not calculated to be subject to her influence. That court ought to think it fortunate that he asked no account of the Russian proceedings in Georgia, in Persia, and even in Turkey. Russia had allowed herself to be engaged in the English policy; she was visibly in a state of coalition with her; M. de Nowosiltzoff was a mere English commissioner, whom they had wished to send, but whom he would have received accordingly. It was very evident that Russia and England were closely engaged together, but those two powers could do nothing without Austria, without the armies and the territories of that power, and Austria, still impressed with a great dread of France, would still hesitate for some time ere she would be entirely gained over. At all events, she would not be ready soon enough to prevent the English expedition. A few days would suffice for the execution of that expedition, and the Channel being once crossed, all the coalitions would be destroyed at a single blow, and the arm of Austria, now raised against France would be stricken down on the instant. "Leave it to me," said Napoleon to the arch-chancellor Cambacérès—"rely on my activity; I will surprise the world by the grandeur and the rapidity of my strokes!"

He then gave some orders concerning Italy and the Rhine. He enjoined Eugène, who remained at Milan, and marshal Jourdan, the young prince's military Mentor, to set about provisioning fortresses, getting together field-artillery, purchasing draught horses, and forming parks of artillery, and stores of ammunition and provisions. He ordered the troops who had been reviewed at Marengo and Castiglione to be moved towards the Adige. He had some time previously posted a reserve division in the neighbourhood of Pescara, to support general St. Cyr, should he need it. He directed that general to obtain all possible information, and, should he discover the slightest attempt of the Russians or the English upon any part whatever of the Calabrias, to pass from Taranto to Naples itself, drive the court from the kingdom, and retain possession of it.

He sent forward upon the Rhine the heavy cavalry which was not intended to embark for England, and directed upon the same point the regiments which were not to be included in the expedition. He gave especial orders to commence the formation of field batteries at Metz, Strasburg, and Mayence.

He then gave his last instructions to M. de Talleyrand, with reference to diplomatic business. As often as any new information was received of the preparations of Austria, that court was immediately to be made aware of it, convicted of its bad faith, and made to tremble for the consequences of its conduct. This time it would perish, and have no mercy shown to it should it interrupt the expedition to England. As to Prussia, communications had long since been opened with her upon the subject of Hanover. It was necessary to seize upon the present opportunity to sound her about this valuable acquisition, to stimulate her known ambition, and, should she nibble at that bait, to offer it to her immediately on condition of an alliance with France, concluded on the instant, and publicly proclaimed. With such an alliance, Napoleon was certain to freeze Austria with terror, and render her motionless for many a year. In any case, he was convinced that between Boulogne and Dover he was about to arrange matters better than they could be arranged by the most skilful and successful negotiations.

Time pressed, every thing was prepared on the coasts of the ocean, and at any moment admiral Villeneuve might arrive before Ferrol, before Brest, and in the Channel. Admiral Missiessy had returned to Rochefort, after having traversed the West Indies, taken Dominica from the English, thrown troops, arms, and munitions into Guadaloupe and Martinique, taken numerous prizes, and displayed the French colours upon the ocean, without suffering a repulse. Nevertheless, he had returned too soon; and as he displayed some unwillingness to put to sea again, Napoleon had replaced him by captain Lallemand, an excellent officer, whom he sent off before the ships were repaired, to join company with Villeneuve in the latitudes of Ferrol. All this being finished, Napoleon repaired to Boulogne, leaving Messrs. Cambacérès and de Talleyrand at Paris, taking marshal Berthier with him, and giving orders to admiral Decrès to join him without delay. He arrived at Boulogne on the 3rd of August, amidst the enthusiastic joy of the army, which began to be weary of daily repeating the same exercises, during two years and a half, and which firmly believed that, this time, Napoleon arrived to place himself at its head, and finally cross into England.

On the very morrow of his arrival, he had all the infantry mustered on the shore at low-water mark. It occupied above three leagues, and presented the enormous mass of 100 thousand infantry, drawn up in a single line. In his whole warrior-life he had seen nothing finer. Accordingly, on returning to

his head-quarters in the evening, he wrote these significant words to admiral Decrès: "*The English know not what awaits them. If we have the power of crossing for but twelve hours, England is no more!*"*

He had now assembled, in the four ports of Ambleteuse, Vimereux, Boulogne, and Etaples, that is to say, to the west of cape Grisnez, and to the northward of Boulogne, all the corps which were to embark on the flotilla. The wish formed two years before was now realised, thanks to the pains taken in consolidating, and thanks to a splendid battle fought by the Dutch flotilla, under admiral Verhuell, in doubling cape Grisnez in presence of the English. That battle, fought on the 18th of July (29th Messidor), a few days previous to the arrival of Napoleon, was the most important check that the flotilla had offered to the English. Several divisions of Dutch gun-boats had fallen in at cape Grisnez with forty-five sail of the English, consisting of ships of the line as well as frigates and corvettes, and had fought them with a rare coolness and complete success. The meeting at the cape was dangerous, because, the water being deep there, the English vessels could press our slightly constructed vessels close, without fear of grounding. Notwithstanding this advantage of the enemy, the Dutch gun-boats held their own in presence of their powerful adversaries. The artillery that guarded the shore hastened to sustain them, the Boulogne flotilla ran out to their support, and, amidst a shower of projectiles, admiral Verhuell, with marshal Davoust by his side, passed at half cannon-shot from the English squadron without losing a single vessel. This battle established the reputation of admiral Verhuell, who already enjoyed great esteem in the expedition, and infused confidence into the hundred and sixty thousand men, soldiers and sailors, ready to cross the Channel upon the French and Dutch flotillas.

Napoleon had now his whole army under his hand. In two hours both men and horses could be embarked, and in two tides, that is to say, in twenty-four hours, they could be conveyed to Dover. As for the *materiel*, it was embarked.

The army assembled on this point, successively increased, now amounted to nearly one hundred and thirty-two thousand fighting men, and fifteen thousand horses, independently of the corps of general Marmont stationed at the Texel, amounting to twenty-four thousand men, and of the four thousand men at Brest destined to sail with the squadron of Ganteaume.

The one hundred and thirty-two thousand who were to go on board the flotilla and sail from the four ports of Ambleteuse, Vimereux, Boulogne, and Etaples, were divided into six corps.

* Letter to M. Decrès of the 16th Thermidor, year XIII. (4th of August, 1805).—*Archives of the State Paper Office.*

The advanced-guard, commanded by Lannes, fourteen thousand strong, consisting of the Gazan division and of the famous united grenadiers, encamped at Arras, was to embark at Vimeux. Those ten battalions of grenadiers, forming by themselves a corps of eight thousand men, of the finest infantry in the world, embarked on a light division of pinnaces, were called to the honour of being the first to throw themselves upon the shore of England, under the inspiring impulse of Lannes and Oudinot. Then came the main body, divided into right wing, centre, and left wing. The right wing, under the command of Davoust, numbering twenty-six thousand men, consisting of the valiant divisions of Morand,* Friant, and Gudin, which have since distinguished themselves at Awerstaedt and in a hundred fights, was destined to embark at Ambleteuse upon the Dutch flotilla. The centre, under Marshal Soult, numbering forty-six thousand men, distributed into four divisions, at the head of which were generals Vandamme, Suchet, Le Grand, and St. Hilaire, were to embark upon the four divisions of the flotilla that were assembled at Boulogne. Finally, the left, or camp of Montreuil, was under the command of the intrepid Ney. It consisted of twenty-two thousand men; it comprised three divisions, and especially the Dupont division, which soon after covered itself with glory at Albek, at the bridge of Halle, and at Friedland. This corps was to depart from Etaples upon two divisions of the flotilla. A division of the *élite* of the guard, three thousand strong, and already on its march, was about to arrive at Boulogne, there to strengthen the centre.

Finally, the sixth subdivision of that grand army was what was called the reserve. It was under the command of prince Louis; it comprised the dragoons and the foot chasseurs, commanded by generals Klein and Margaron, the heavy cavalry commanded by Nansouty, and an Italian division, perfectly disciplined, and not yielding in steadiness of bearing to the finest French divisions. Napoleon had said, that he would show the English what they had never seen since Cæsar,—Italians in their island, and that he would teach those Italians to know their own prowess and to fight as well as the French. This reserve, amounting to twenty-seven thousand men, and posted in the rear of all the other camps, was to march to the shore when the five first corps of the army had sailed; and as it was presumed that a squadron would cover the passage, and that we should for some days be masters of the Strait, the transport flotilla, parting company for a few hours with the war flotilla, was to return and embark this reserve, as well as the second half of the horses. In fact, out of fifteen thousand horses, the flotilla could only embark eight thousand at a time. The other seven thousand were to be taken at a second trip.

* At that time the Bisson division.

Thus, besides the twenty-four thousand men under Marmont, embarked in the fleet of the Texel, and the four thousand men embarked at Brest, Napoleon could at once put in motion a total mass of one hundred-and-thirty-two thousand men, being one hundred thousand infantry, seven thousand mounted, and twelve thousand dismounted cavalry, and thirteen thousand artillery.*

It was in this formidable array that Napoleon awaited the squadron of Villeneuve.

That admiral, as we have seen, had sailed on the 30th of March from Toulon, with eleven vessels, of which two were eighty-gun ships and six frigates. Nelson was cruising near Barcelona. Endeavouring to make it believed that his intention was to remain in that neighbourhood, he had suddenly steered to the south of Sardinia, in the hope that the French, misled by the reports that he had circulated, would endeavour to avoid the coast of Spain, and so meet him by their own act. The French fleet having run out with a fair wind, and being informed of the truth by a Ragusan vessel, steered between Majorca and Minorca on the one hand, and Carthage on the other, touched at the last-named place on the 7th of April, and lay there one day owing to a dead calm. Villeneuve offered the Spanish admiral, Salcedo, permission to join his squadron, an offer which, for want of orders, the latter could not accept; and Villeneuve, resuming his course with a favourable wind, arrived on the 9th of April at the entrance of the Straits of Gibraltar. On the same day, at noon, he entered the Straits in two columns, his frigates in advance, all his vessels cleared for action, and every thing prepared for fighting. The French fleet was perceived by the look-out at Gibraltar, the alarm-bells were rung, and the alarm-guns fired, for there was only a very weak division in the port. On the same evening, Villeneuve hove in sight of Cadiz.

Advertised by his signals, the captain of *l'Aigle* hastened to run out of port, and the brave Gravina, who had neglected nothing to be in readiness, hastened to weigh anchor to join the French admiral. But many things were still left undone at Cadiz. The two thousand five hundred Spaniards, who were to be conveyed to the colonies were not even embarked. All the provisions were not yet on board. It would have required at least eight-and-forty hours more for admiral Gravina to have been fully ready; but Villeneuve was in a hurry to be gone, and said that he would not wait if they could not join him at

* I have taken all these numbers from the memorandum-book of the Emperor; the very book which he carried with him. This memorandum-book is deposited at the Louvre, and it alone gives the true statistics of the army of the Ocean, which are not to be found in the archives of either the war or the navy department. Consequently all military works have given incorrect numbers relatively to the composition of the army.

once. Although somewhat recovered from the anxiety of his first sortie, he was still haunted by the image of Nelson, whom he constantly fancied he saw in pursuit of him.

Gravina, deeply devoted to the projects of Napoleon, embarked *pêle-mêle*, determining to complete stowage and other arrangements at sea, and sailed out of Cadiz during the night. Such, indeed, were the hurry and confusion of this *sortie*, that one vessel actually took the ground.

About two o'clock in the morning, Villeneuve, who had been riding at a single anchor, took advantage of the wind, and resumed his course to the west. On the 11th, he was well out at sea, having escaped the dreaded observation of the English. During the 11th and 12th he awaited the Spanish ships, but only two of them hove in sight, and, being unwilling to lose any more time, he made sail, reckoning that they would rejoin him either *en route*, or at Martinique, for every commander had received information of that general rendezvous. Moreover, no one but Villeneuve knew the main destination of the squadron.

Villeneuve should now have felt reassured, and have taken some confidence in himself, for he had overcome the most serious difficulties of his undertaking, in quitting Toulon, passing the Straits, and rallying the Spaniards, without accident. But the sight of his crews filled him with vexation. He saw that they were far inferior to those of the English, and to those of France in the time of the American war. It was very natural that they should be so, seeing that they had just left port for the first time. He complained not merely of the quality of his seamen, but also of the vessels themselves, and of their equipment. Three of his ships were inferior or bad sailers: these were *le Formidable*, *l'Intrepide*, and especially *l'Atlas*. A new vessel, *le Pluton*, had bad iron work, which frequently gave way. Admiral Villeneuve was annoyed by all this, to an extent which affected his self-confidence. The Emperor's aide-de-camp, Lauriston, had made every effort to cheer him, but to little purpose. For the rest, he had excellent captains, who, as far as possible, made amends for the inexperience of the crews and the defects of the fleet. Villeneuve was not consoled until he saw the condition of the Spanish ships, which were inferior to his own. However, the voyage though retarded by their slow sailers, which is not uncommon when sailing in a squadron, appeared a fortunate one, and continued without accident.

Nelson, outwitted, had in the first instance gone in pursuit of the French squadron to the south, and to the east of the Mediterranean. He had learned, on the 16th of April, that the French squadron had steered for the Straits, had been detained by westerly winds till the 30th, had anchored, on the 10th of May, in the bay of Lagos, and, after detaching one of his ships to escort a convoy, he had not made the ocean till the

11th of May, to sail for the West Indies, whither he supposed our squadron to have steered.

At this period, Villeneuve had very nearly reached his destination, for, on the 14th of May, he made Martinique, having been six weeks on the passage. On touching there, he had the gratification of being rejoined by the four Spanish sail which had parted company with the squadron, and which arrived nearly at the same time that he did. It was a great advantage, and he ought now to have felt a little more confidence in his fortune, which hitherto had been uniformly favourable.

This voyage had been of great service. It had given experience to the crews. As the weather had been moderate, the rigging too had been put into ship-shape. "*We are,*" wrote general Lauriston to the Emperor, "*stronger by one-third than we were when we sailed.*"*

A fleet already disciplined and practised, gains nothing by a voyage of twelve or fifteen hundred leagues the more, but a fleet which has never before been out of sight of port, will, in such a voyage, acquire the main of the instruction it required, and such was the case with ours.

Admiral Villeneuve, alarmed at his responsibility, and not setting due value upon any of the advantages which he at the same time enjoyed, considered that we were destitute of so many requisites that some improvements, made on the passage, would not suffice to supply our deficiencies. He had the folly, like a man whose moral courage is shaken, to exaggerate the merit of the enemy, and to under-rate that of his own men. He said that with twenty French or Spanish ships he would not venture to offer battle to fourteen sail of English, and this language he held in the presence of his own officers. Fortunately, the soldiers and sailors, full of zeal, were not so much impressed as their commander with the insufficiency of our means, but full of confidence in their own courage, ardently desired to engage the enemy. General Lauriston, whom the Emperor had attached to Villeneuve, that he might sustain and excite him, fulfilled his duty with untiring zeal, but rather contributed to vex and irritate him by contradiction. Gravina, simple, sensible, and full of energy, agreed with Villeneuve as to the quality of his squadron,

* All our vessels are in good order, and in better order, in my opinion, than when we first sailed from Toulon. The moderate weather has afforded the opportunity of setting up the rigging by degrees; notwithstanding this, the chains, and generally speaking, all the iron work of the *Pluton* and of the *Hermione* are of such bad quality, as well as the masts and spars, that many of them have been sprung.

At present, every thing is refitted; the sailors have learned a great deal; there is a sensible difference in the working of the ships; *we are stronger by one-third than at the moment of our first sailing.*—*Letter of General Lauriston to the Emperor.*

but with Lauriston, as to the necessity of unwavering devotion, and was resolved, if necessary, to sacrifice his own existence in carrying out the designs of Napoleon.

Now that they had escaped all the perils of the voyage, it was necessary to wait forty days at Martinique, for the arrival of Ganteaume, unaware of his detention at Brest by that rare occurrence, an equinox without a single gale. Villeneuve, then, having arrived at Martinique on the 11th of May, had to remain in those latitudes until the 23rd of June, and he reflected, with vexation, that that was a space of time even more than sufficient to allow of his being overtaken by Nelson, and blockaded in Martinique, or beaten if he ventured out.

His orders were, to wait for Ganteaume, which implied a sort of inaction; and, like all men who are ill at ease, he wished to be in motion. He complained of being unable to go and ravage the islands of the English, which, but for his orders, he easily could have done with twenty sail. To pass away the time they took the Diamond fort, which is in front of Martinique, and which admiral Missiessy, to the great regret of Napoleon, had neglected to capture. It was cannonaded by several ships, and then some hundreds of men landed from the boats, and carried it by assault. They now would fain have completed the occupation of Dominica, by the capture of the Bluff of Cabry, of which, also, admiral Missiessy had neglected to make himself master; but this position, strongly defended by nature and art, required a regular siege, and that they could not venture to undertake. Villeneuve sent his frigates, which were excellent, and fast sailers, to cruise in the Archipelago, to make prizes, and procure him tidings of the enemy.

They had brought troops; Missiessy had also brought some; there were about 12,000 men in the French Islands. Such a force would have sufficed for the execution of important operations, but they could not be ventured upon, from the fear of missing Ganteaume. For the rest, the French islands were in the best condition, garrisoned, provided with munitions, and, thanks to the privateers, with abundance of provisions, and moreover, animated by the best spirit. However, to prevent the crews from further contracting the sickness which had begun to prevail among them from their stay in this climate, and also with the view of preventing desertion, to which the Spaniards showed a strong inclination, it was determined to attempt a *coup de main* upon Barbadoes, where the English had important military establishments. It was in that island, in fact, that they kept all the *depôts* of their colonial troops. General Lauriston had brought with him an excellent division of five thousand men, organised and equipped with the greatest care. It was intended for this service. General Lauriston determined to go by Guadaloupe to embark another battalion there, for it was expected he would find some ten thousand men at Barbadoes, half

militia, and half troops of the line. It was determined, then, to set out on the 4th of June; but on the very day appointed, rear-admiral Magon arrived with the two vessels, from Rochefort, which Napoleon had despatched to convey the first tidings of the change which had taken place in his projects. Magon brought word, that as Ganteaume had not been able to get out of Brest, it was necessary to go and release from blockade not only him, but also the Ferrol squadron, and, after rallying the fleets which were in those parts, to steer in a body for the Channel. However, he, at the same time, brought orders for remaining at Martinique till the 21st of June, as, up to the 21st of May, it was possible that Ganteaume might get out of Brest, in which case, allowing a month for the passage to Martinique, it could not be definitively known until the 21st of June, whether that admiral had sailed or not. There was sufficient time, therefore, for executing the project against Barbadoes. Magon had brought troops and munitions in his ships. He joined the squadron, now twenty-seven sail strong, fourteen being French sail of the line, six Spanish sail of the line, and seven frigates. On the 6th of June they reached Guadaloupe, here they embarked a battalion; on the 7th they had got as far as Antigua, on the 8th they had got clear of that island, which had incessantly fired upon them, when they came in sight of a convoy of fifteen sail which had left Antigua. They were merchantmen, laden with colonial produce, and convoyed only by a corvette.

The admiral instantly gave the signal to give chase, *according to sailing*, as the sailors have it; that is to say, that each vessel should do its best, and take the rank that it could get by its speed. Before evening the convoy was taken. It was of the value of from nine to ten millions of francs. Some American and Italian passengers gave intelligence of Nelson. They stated that he had arrived at Barbadoes, as they left that island. They varied as to the strength of his squadron. But he had been joined by admiral Cochrane, who guarded those seas. This intelligence produced an extraordinary effect upon the mind of admiral Villeneuve. He fancied he saw Nelson, with fourteen, sixteen, perhaps even eighteen sail; that is to say, with a force nearly equal to his own, ready to come up with him, and give him battle. On the instant he formed the determination of returning to Europe. Lauriston, on the contrary, resting upon the assertion of the prisoners, which gave only two sail to Cochrane, leading to the supposition that Nelson had at most only fourteen, maintained that with twenty we were able to fight him to advantage, and that, after having rid ourselves of his pursuit, by a battle, our expedition would be far more secure of success. Villeneuve was not of this opinion, but would absolutely make sail for Europe. So much in haste was he, that he would not even return to the French islands, to reland the troops he had embarked thence. To do this, it would

have been necessary to beat up against the wind that blows from east to west, along the Antilles, and they were now at Antigua, far to the west of Martinique. Ten days, perhaps, would have been lost, and they would have run the risk of meeting with the English. He, therefore, determined to select his four best frigates, to put as many troops on board them as he could, and to despatch them for Martinique. He gave them orders to rejoin the squadron at the Western Islands. But there still remained some four or five thousand troops on board, and these were a very embarrassing freight. By keeping them, he would deprive the colonies of a very valuable force, which it was very difficult to send to them from the mother country, besides having so many more mouths to feed, which was very vexatious, seeing that he was somewhat short of provisions, and had barely water enough for the passage. Further, there was the risk of missing Ganteaume, as it was, as yet, uncertain whether he had left Brest for Martinique. In point of fact, they were right in supposing that Ganteaume had not set out, but they did not certainly know it, and the course proposed was, therefore, a serious blunder. To these objections Villeneuve replied, that if Ganteaume had set out, it was so much the better; that in that case they would not have to raise the blockade of Brest, but could pass that port without difficulty, and enter the Channel at once.

Villeneuve at once formed his determination, put all the troops that he could on board the frigates, and sent them to Martinique. Unwilling either to hamper himself with the convoy, or to lose it, he gave it in charge to another frigate, to escort it to one of the French islands. On the 10th of June he was on his passage to Europe. His resolution, though censurable in principle, was not bad in effect, provided he returned to Martinique to land his troops, to revictual and to take in water, and to receive tidings from Europe.

Nelson, whom he so much dreaded, had arrived at Barbadoes early in June, after a prodigiously rapid voyage, sailing fearlessly with only nine ships. Imagining that the French intended to retake Trinidad from the Spaniards, he had embarked two thousand men at Barbadoes, rallied the two vessels of admiral Cochrane, and, without staying to revictual or refit, on the 7th he was in the Gulf of Paria, before Trinidad. There he discovered his error, set sail again, and on the 10th made Grenada. He prepared to return to Barbadoes; to land there the troops he had needlessly brought thence, and to return to Europe with eleven sail. What activity! what energy! It is a new proof, that in war—and in war by sea still more than in war by land—the quality of the forces is always of more consequence than their number. Nelson, with but eleven sail, was full of confidence, on those seas on which Villeneuve trembled with twenty sail, and those manned by heroic sailors!

Villeneuve steered for Europe, bearing to the north-west with pretty favourable weather. On making the Western islands, on the 30th of June, he there found his frigates, which had occupied but four days in landing their troops, and which had not fallen in with the English, showing that Villeneuve might safely have done the same. The four detached frigates had fallen in with the fifth, which was escorting the captured convoy, and could not conduct it. They had therefore determined to burn it, which involved a loss of ten millions of francs. All had then assembled at the Western isles, and Villeneuve now resumed his voyage with the twenty ships and seven frigates, shaping his course towards the coast of Spain. They were repaid for the loss of the burned convoy by the capture of a rich galleon from Lima, laden with dollars to the amount of from seven to eight millions (280,000*l.* to 320,000*l.* sterling). It was a resource which soon became very valuable. Suddenly, at the commencement of July, when they were sixty leagues from cape Finisterre, the wind shifted to the north-east, and became entirely against them. They began to tack, in order to gain time without being driven back. But the wind continued in the same quarter, and became so violent that several vessels were damaged; some even losing their top-masts. The two ships that had come from Rochefort under Magon, had brought the fever with them from Charente. They were crowded with sick. The troops who had been carried from Europe to America, and from America to Europe, almost without touching land, were attacked by sickness of all sorts. Misery reigned throughout the squadron. Eighteen hours of a contrary wind completed that misery, and helped still further to depress the courage of admiral Villeneuve. He wanted to go to Cadiz, that is to say, directly away from the point at which Napoleon expected him, and to which his instructions directed him. Lauriston resisted as strongly as possible, and at length prevailed over him. The wind, too, having shifted about the 20th of July, they again made for Ferrol.

The bad weather had caused two misfortunes: the first, the depression of the moral courage of both the squadron and its commander; and the second, giving intelligence of its course to the British admiralty. Nelson had despatched in advance of him the brig *Le Curieux*, to convey to England the bulletin of his passage. This brig had seen the French squadron, and, making all sail, had arrived at Portsmouth on the 7th of July. On the 8th, the despatch had been delivered at the Admiralty. Though still unaware of the precise object of the French squadron, yet thinking it likely that it was to raise the blockade of Ferrol, the admiralty had ordered admiral Sterling, who was detached from the blockade of Brest to watch Rochefort, to take five sail, and join Calder, who was cruising off cape Finisterre. The length of time which had elapsed since Napoleon thought of his

grand naval plan, the various sorties that had been recently attempted, the departure of Villeneuve, his passage to Cadiz, his junction with Gravina, his return to Europe, where two fleets, for a long time ready to sail, seemed to be waiting for him to raise their blockade; all these circumstances had at length by degrees led the English, at the least, vaguely, to surmise a part of the projects of Napoleon. They did not exactly contemplate a junction of the French squadrons in the Channel, but they resolved to prevent the raising of the blockade of Ferrol or of Brest, which appeared to them to be the probable design. Accordingly, they had increased the blockading squadron of Cornwallis before Brest to twenty-four sail, of which five were detached to watch Rochefort, and that of Ferrol to ten. The latter was about to have fourteen or fifteen sail by the junction of the division of Rochefort. Every delay is a misfortune for a project which requires secrecy. It gives the enemy time to reflect, sometimes to guess by dint of reflecting, and frequently thus to receive such indications as end by putting him on the right scent.

On the 22nd of July, Villeneuve, sailing in three columns, was making for Ferrol, that is to say, to the north-east, with a tolerable north-west wind on his quarter. Towards the middle of the day he saw twenty-four sail, of which fifteen were ships of the line; it was admiral Calder's English squadron coming up in the opposite direction to meet him, and cut him off from Ferrol. They were forty leagues from that port.

There was not much room to doubt that a battle must take place. Villeneuve no longer thought of avoiding it; for it was responsibility, and by no means danger, of which he was afraid; but, still worn out with anxieties, he lost some precious time in ranging himself for battle. General Lauriston, urging him incessantly, pressed him to give at eleven o'clock in the morning the orders which he did not give until one. The best part of the day was thus wasted, which there was soon good reason to regret. The vessels of the two combined squadrons consumed two hours in forming in order of battle, and it was not until three o'clock in the afternoon that the twenty French and Spanish ships were brought into a regular line, the Spaniards forming the head of the column, and Magon, with the Rochefort division and several frigates, its rear. The English admiral, Calder, with fifteen ships of the line, several of them carrying a hundred guns, while the strongest of ours were only of eighty, in his turn ranged up for battle, and formed a long line parallel to ours, but advancing in the opposite direction. The English bearing to the south-west, and we to the north-west, and the wind blowing from the north-west, both squadrons had it on their quarter. Each bearing down, and in opposite directions, they would speedily have ended by avoiding each other, when Calder directed the head of his column

against the rear of our line in order to break it. Villeneuve, to whom danger restored the resolution of a man of courage, perceiving that the English admiral, according to a manœuvre often repeated in our days, wished to break our line, so as to place it between two fires, imitated the manœuvre of his enemy, and coming, as seamen say, *luff by luff by the stern way*, brought off the rear of this column, and presented its head to the head of that of the enemy. In this double movement, the two squadrons meeting, the first Spanish vessel, the *Argonaut*, with admiral Gravina on board, found itself engaged with the first English vessel, the *Hero*. English and French, following up this movement, were speedily engaged from one end of the line to the other. But the English squadron being less numerous than ours, the fire did not reach on one side further than to the thirteenth or fourteenth vessel. Our rear-guard, without an enemy before it, and merely receiving some stray shots, now was the time for some decisive manœuvre. Unfortunately, a heavy fog, which at this moment prevailed over several hundred leagues, for it was visible at Brest, obscured the two fleets to such a degree that the English admiral was for some time unaware whether he had an enemy on the starboard or on the larboard side. Each ship could perceive only the one that was opposite to it, and fought only that. A smart and well-sustained, but not quick cannonading ensued. The French and Spaniards, notwithstanding their inexperience, fought coolly, and in good order. Our crews had not attained to that precision of fire which now distinguishes them; nevertheless, in this kind of duel, of ship to ship, the English suffered as much as we did; and if our rear, which had no enemy to engage it, could have discovered what was passing, and had doubled upon the English line, so as to place part of it between two fires, the victory would have been secured to us. Villeneuve, making nothing out through the fog, had difficulty in giving his orders. Magon, it is true, had made his inaction known to Villeneuve; but this information, owing to the state of the atmosphere, having been transmitted, not by signals, but by frigates, arrived too late, and induced no determination on the part of the French admiral, who, after a momentary decision at the commencement of the battle, had relapsed into his customary indecision, fearing to act in the dark lest he should make false movements. All that he ventured upon was to fight his flagship gallantly.

After a long cannonade the English ship, the *Windsor*, had suffered so severely, that a frigate was obliged to tow her out of the line of battle to prevent her from falling into our hands. Other English vessels had also been much damaged. The French vessels, on the contrary, though they stood up gallantly, had been fortunate enough to escape serious damage. Our Spanish allies, who formed the first third of the line of battle,

had suffered much more, without being at all in fault. Their three ships nearest to us, *l'España*, the *San Firmo*, and the *San Rafaël* were in a sad condition. The *San Firmo*, especially, had lost two masts. As the wind blew from us to the English these vessels, being unable to manœuvre, were drifting towards the enemy. Seeing this, the brave captain of the *Pluton*, M. de Cosmao, lying nearest to the Spaniards, quitted the line, and advanced to cover with his ship the disabled Spanish vessels. The *San Rafaël*, a slow sailer, and the first of the three Spaniards thus drifting, endeavoured to let herself run between the two lines towards the rear-guard, in the hope of escaping by this movement. The *San Firmo*, which had suffered more, was in vain protected by M. de Cosmao, who could not prevent her from going to leeward, and thus falling into the hands of the English. M. de Cosmao succeeded in saving *l'España*, which, thanks to him, was kept in our line. About six o'clock a gleam of clear weather disclosed this spectacle to admiral Villeneuve. The *San Rafaël* was seen escaping to the rear-guard, and the *San Firmo*, already surrounded by enemies, driving gradually towards the English squadron. As they fought at long shot, there was sufficient space between the two to allow of a forward movement, by which movement our disabled vessels would again have made part of our line. General Lauriston kept by the side of Villeneuve, and he heard the officers of the squadron proposing that movement. He therefore advised him to make the signal for bearing up all together, that is to say, for sailing before the wind, which, blowing towards the English, would have enabled us to come up with our endangered vessels. We should have been nearer to the enemy, and he, damaged and inferior in number, would probably have given way before this offensive movement. Villeneuve, in consequence of the fog, seeing but imperfectly what was passing, and fearing to derange his line of battle, and to run new risks, preferred the loss of two ships to the chance of recommencing the action. He consequently refused to give the order, which was solicited on all hands. By this time night was coming on, and the firing had almost ceased. The English drew off, towing with them two of their ships which were much shattered by the fire, and the two Spaniards that were abandoned to them by our blunder.

As for us, we had suffered but little; there was not one of our crews that was not ready to recommence the fight, and who did not believe himself a conqueror on seeing the enemy withdraw. The loss of the two Spanish vessels was unknown in the fleet.

All night the English were visible far away to leeward, with lights astern, busied in repairing damages.

The same was done on our side. At daybreak the situation of the two squadrons was clearly discernible. The English were retreating, but carrying off the two Spanish vessels

with them. Grief and exasperation became general on board our vessels. The crews asked to renew the action, and fight a decisive battle. The wind was in our favour, as on the previous evening, blowing from us towards the English. If at this instant Villeneuve had given the signal to bear down upon the enemy, without any other order of battle than the order of speed in sailing, fourteen of the eighteen vessels we still possessed, being of an equal rate of speed, would have fallen upon the English at once; the other four would have arrived soon afterwards, and the battle would certainly have been in our favour. Roused by the cry which arose among all the officers, Villeneuve at length gave orders for that movement, and went with Lauriston on board the frigate *l'Hortense*, to give his orders verbally to each chief of division. The *Argonaut*, the Spanish admiral's ship, having sprung her mizen-top-yard, required time to fish it. Villeneuve would wait for her, which took till near noon. Then he commenced the chase; but the wind had slackened, and he saw the English steal away from him without his being able to gain much upon them even under a press of canvass. Imagining that he should not overtake them until night, he waited till morning, in order to fight by daylight. But on the morrow the wind had shifted to the north-east, that is to say, in the very contrary direction. The English now had the weather gage; to come up with them was difficult. Villeneuve had now good reason to halt. In pursuing the contrary course he would have been getting further and further from Ferrol, and have run the risk of finding the English reinforced, and thus for two damaged and captured vessels, have sacrificed his main object, the raising the Ferrol blockade and pursuing his mission.

Thus ended the battle, which might have been taken for a victory on our side but for the loss of the two Spanish ships. The crews, notwithstanding their inexperience, had fought bravely and well; but, on the other hand, the fog, which had increased the natural indecision of admiral Villeneuve, his exaggerated want of confidence in himself and in his seamen, had paralysed the resources that he had at his command, and prevented this battle from ending in a brilliant victory. There, as in so many naval battles, one wing of our fleet did not aid the other; but, on this occasion, it was not the fault of the wing that remained inactive, for rear-admiral Magon was not the officer who would willingly keep out of fire. In the first moments after the battle, Villeneuve was almost happy that he had met the English without experiencing a disaster; but having left the scene of action, and having had time for reflection, his discouragement and habitual melancholy deepened into a profound grief. In his imagination, he saw himself exposed to the censure of Napoleon and of public opinion for having lost two ships while fighting with twenty against fifteen. He believed himself disgraced, and was a prey to a kind of depression that

bordered upon despair. The severe judgment of his people, who openly complained of his want of resolution, and were loud in their praise of the bravery and decision of admiral Gravina, cut him to the heart's core. To complete his misfortune, the wind, which for two days had been favourable, had now become contrary again. To the sick, whose numbers had increased, the wounded had now to be added. There were not the necessary refreshments for them, and there was only water for five or six days. Thus situated, he again wanted to proceed to Cadiz. Lauriston again opposed this course: they split the difference, and ran into Vigo.

This port was far from being secure, and, moreover, had no great resources to offer. However, succour was found there for the sick and wounded. Three vessels, one French, *l'Atlas*, and two Spanish, *l'America* and *l'España*, were such heavy sailers that they could not keep up with the squadron. The *Atlas* was turned into an hospital, into which the sick and wounded were conveyed. General Lauriston had brought with him, for the use of his division, the necessaries for a field hospital; and he employed it for the succour of the sailors who were left at Vigo. The treasure of the Spanish galleon was now in part, employed in supplying the various wants of the squadron. Fresh provisions and water for a month were laid in, wages were paid to the whole squadron; and having somewhat reanimated the men's spirits, no difficult matter with sailors of a lively temperament, they set sail again after a stay of five days, which had been serviceable. The wind not being foul, the squadron stood up from Vigo to Ferrol, and, on the 2nd of August, entered the open roadstead which separates Ferrol from Corunna.

The moment the French squadron hove in sight, the consular agents, who were stationed on the shore by the orders of Napoleon, communicated to admiral Villeneuve the orders which awaited him. These orders enjoined him not to enter Ferrol, which was difficult of egress; barely to allow himself time to rally the two divisions which awaited the junction, and then to proceed to Brest. Villeneuve transmitted this order to Gravina; but the latter was already in the pass, and could not retrograde, and a part of the squadron entered with him. The rest, obeying Villeneuve, brought up opposite, that is to say, at Corunna.

This separation placed the two squadrons at three or four leagues distance from each other. The greatest evil that could result from it was the loss of three or four days in getting out again. This loss would have been greatly to be regretted with an admiral who was not in the habit of losing days at a stretch; but with Villeneuve it was of minor importance.

That admiral found at Corunna the pressing orders of Napoleon, his encouraging words, and his magnificent promises, as well as the private communications of the minister Decrès, the friend of his boyhood. The Emperor and the minister both urged him

not to remain for an instant, to hasten to Brest, and give battle to Cornwallis, at the risk even of annihilation, provided that Ganteaume succeeded in getting out safe and sound, and to rally what might remain entire of the squadron after he had raised the blockade of Brest. All these things, for a moment, revived the spirits and courage of Villeneuve. The little consequence that Napoleon attached to the sacrifice of ships, provided only that a fleet should arrive in the Channel, greatly tended to reassure him. Had he rightly comprehended the task entrusted to him, he would have been gratified, rather than depressed. After all, if the enemy had captured two vessels from him in the late battle, he had regained Ferrol safe and sound, escaped the enemies' squadrons, and eluded the precautions of the English Admiralty. Of the two admirals, the English and the French, Calder, not Villeneuve, was the most ill-treated by fortune; for Villeneuve had achieved his object, and Calder had failed in his. Deducting the two vessels which had been taken, and the three which had been left at Vigo, he had now twenty-nine French and Spanish vessels assembled at Ferrol, which might at any moment be increased to thirty-four by the division of Lallemand, and would then be strong enough to attempt to raise the blockade of Brest. Moreover, the English Admiralty itself, and Napoleon, were of the same opinion; the Admiralty sent admiral Calder before a court-martial, and Napoleon publicly addressed great praises to Villeneuve, for having fulfilled his mission, said he, although two ships remained in the hands of the enemy.

What fear, then, could an officer conceive for his reputation, to whom an all-powerful master, disposing of the reputation and the fortunes of his lieutenants, constantly said: "Give battle, risk all, lose all, provided only that your efforts open the port of Brest." But it seems that there was a sort of fatality attached to this unfortunate seaman, to disturb his spirit, and to lead him from pang to pang to the result which he fain would have shunned, that is to say, to losing a great battle, and losing it without obtaining the only result that Napoleon demanded of him, that of being four-and-twenty hours in the Channel.

Nevertheless, he felt some consolation on seeing the division of rear-admiral Gourdon, which division had sailed some time previously to being shut up in Ferrol, had been carefully repaired and completed, and merited every confidence. He saw with no less satisfaction, nine Spanish ships equipped by admiral de Grandellana, and far superior to those of admiral Gravina, because that time had been bestowed upon equipping them, which could not be spared for those which had sailed from Cadiz. "Would to Heaven," wrote Villeneuve, when he had compared the division of Ferrol and that of Cadiz, "that the Spanish squadron (*l'Argonaut*, and the line-of-battle ship *l'Atlas*, alone excepted, had never made part of my squadron. Those vessels are also

lutely fit for nothing but to peril their consorts. They alone have brought us to the lowest depths of misfortune." This language shows how deeply Villeneuve's feelings were shocked, since he characterises as "the lowest depths of misfortune," a cruise which, thus far, had fulfilled the object prescribed by Napoleon, and which had even won him the approbation of a master who was not easily pleased.

Villeneuve was now concerned only about what awaited him on quitting Ferrol. He imagined that Calder would be at him again, reinforced by Nelson or Cornwallis, and that a new battle awaited him, in which he might reasonably look for destruction. Letters from Cadiz informed him, in fact, that Nelson had returned to Europe, that he had been seen at Gibraltar, but that he had steered for the ocean, in order to form a junction with Calder before Ferrol, or with Cornwallis before Brest. The truth is, that Nelson, sailing with prodigious speed, had touched at Gibraltar towards the end of July, at the very epoch when Villeneuve gave battle to Calder; that he had repassed the Straits, and strove against contrary winds to get into the Channel; that he had only eleven sail; that he had rallied neither Calder nor Cornwallis, and that his intention, after two years' constant sailing, was to go into harbour for a short time to revictual his exhausted division. Villeneuve was unaware of these facts; but he knew his orders, which for a man of courage were easy of execution, since he was not ordered to conquer, but to fight as long as he had a ship to swim, in order to raise the blockade of Brest. If, before Brest, he should be seconded by Ganteaume, it was not likely that the battle, fought with fifty-five sail against twenty or twenty-five, would be a lost battle. If, on the contrary, the weather or other circumstances should prevent Ganteaume from taking part in the action, Villeneuve, in fighting desperately, even to the utter destruction of his fleet, would render it impossible for Cornwallis to remain at sea and continue the blockade, and Ganteaume, rallying to his fleet the remains of a fleet gloriously vanquished, could still command the Channel for some days. That was all that Napoleon demanded of his admirals.

Unfortunately, Villeneuve had made port. All the captains of the vessels that had been in the action were anxious to refit. They would have sailed for another month or two had they been kept out at sea; but, being within reach of a grand arsenal, they all found some damage to repair. Masts were replaced, rigging refitted, leaks were to be stopped; the surplus stores of some ships were to be removed to others. The whole squadron was thus detained for forty-five days. Owing to the Spanish dearth, it had not been possible to execute at Ferrol the orders of Napoleon, to have biscuit, to the number of two or three millions of rations, in each port. But they would find biscuit at Brest, at Cherbourg, and at Boulogne. Moreover, forty-five days suf-

ficed. At length, on the 10th of August, they prepared to weigh anchor. Villeneuve stationed himself off Corunna, in the bay of Ares, waiting for Gravina and the second Spanish division to run out of Ferrol, which was no easy matter, on account of the wind. He waited three days, which he employed in worrying himself. He wrote thus to the minister Decrès: "I am made the arbiter of vast interests; my despair redoubles with the confidence shown me, because I see no prospect of success, take what course I may. It is quite evident to me that the navies of France and Spain can do nothing in great squadrons. Divisions of three, four, or five vessels, are, at the utmost, all that we are capable of commanding. Let Ganteaume put to sea, and he will judge for himself. *As regards the public, the question will be decided.*

"I am about to sail; but I know not what I shall do. Eight vessels remain in sight of the coast, at eight leagues off. They will follow us; I cannot wait for them; and they will go and join the squadrons before Brest or Cadiz, according as I steer for the one or for the other of those two ports. No doubt it is thought that, sailing hence with twenty-nine sail, I am considered able to fight vessels of any thing like the same number; I am not afraid to confess to you, that I should be very sorry to meet with twenty. Our naval tactics are out of date; we only know how to range ourselves in line, and that is precisely what the enemy wishes for. I have neither time nor means to agree upon another system with the commanders of the vessels of the two nations. * * * I foresaw all this before I left Toulon; but all my delusions did not vanish until the day on which I saw the Spanish ships which are joined to mine * * * then I was obliged to despair of every thing."

At the moment of sailing, the fever broke out again in the vessels from Rochefort, *l'Algesiras* and *l'Achille*; some Spanish vessels ran foul of each other on leaving Ferrol, breaking their bowsprits and tearing their sails. These accidents, of no consequence in themselves, yet, being added to all the mishaps that Villeneuve had already experienced, completed his despair. Ready, at length, to set sail, he gave his orders to captain Lallemand. The latter, with an excellent division of five ships of the line and several frigates, was to touch at Vigo on the 15th or 16th of August. It would have been sufficient for Villeneuve to have taken his whole squadron thither, to rally that division, and thus procure a considerable augmentation of his strength; but not venturing to move, still haunted by the fear of Nelson, he sent an officer to captain Lallemand, and directed him to repair to Brest, without being sure that he would go thither himself; thus exposing this division to destruction should it arrive there alone. He wrote to admiral Decrès a despatch, in which, exposing all the distress of his soul, he manifested an inclination to steer for Cadiz rather than for Brest. To Lauriston,

whose troublesome presence reminded him of the Emperor, he said that they would proceed to Brest. Lauriston, grieved to see him in such a state of mind, delighted with his professed determination, wrote to the Emperor by a courier, whom he despatched from Ferrol, that at length they were going to Brest, and from Brest into the Channel.

In the midst of these deplorable anxieties, Villeneuve departed from Corunna, and lost sight of land during the day of the 14th. To crown his misfortunes, a pretty strong north-easterly wind came on, and prevented his making much progress towards his destination. Melancholy consequence of a want of confidence, which often makes us neglect the most splendid favours of fortune! At that very moment, Calder and Nelson were not united near Ferrol as Villeneuve feared. Nelson, after having vainly sought after the French at Cadiz, had returned northward, had long to beat up against the same north-easterly wind that then prevailed, and had at length rejoined Cornwallis before Brest, on the very day, the 14th of August, when the French squadron put out from Ferrol. He left with Cornwallis the few vessels which could still keep the sea, and went with the others to refit at Portsmouth, where he arrived on the 18th of August. Calder, on his part, after the battle of Ferrol, had rejoined Cornwallis with his damaged fleet. A part of his vessels were despatched to the Channel ports to refit. Cornwallis had immediately composed for him another division of seventeen or eighteen sail, and had sent him back to Ferrol, keeping at the most only eighteen sail to blockade Brest. Calder then, returned, to find Ferrol evacuated. If Villeneuve, regaining a little confidence, had rallied Lallemand at Vigo, and proceeded by open sea to the Channel, he would have crossed, without encountering Calder, who would have gone to blockade the empty Ferrol; he would have surprised Cornwallis, separated from Nelson and Calder, and with, at the most, seventeen or eighteen sail, and have attacked him with thirty-five, without reckoning the twenty-one of Ganteaume. What an opportunity was lost to him by his want of energy! For the rest, general Lauriston overwhelmed him with the most urgent persuasions; a momentary shifting of the wind, a momentary revival of the depressed spirits of Villeneuve, and the grand idea of Napoleon might yet have been realised!

It would not be easy to imagine the impatience with which Napoleon was racked upon that coast of Boulogne, where he every instant expected the appearance of his fleets, and the so much coveted opportunity of invading England. All his forces were embarked, from the Texel to Etaples. At the Texel, the horses of the artillery and of the cavalry had been many weeks on board. The troops, without an exception, were on board the boats. The line squadron, charged with convoying the forces, only awaited the signal to weigh anchor. In the four ports of Ambleteuse, Vimereux, Boulogne, and Etaples, the one hundred and thirty

thousand men intended to pass in the flat-bottomed boats had several times been put under arms. They had been marched to the quays, and all made to take their respective places on the boats. The time necessary for this operation was thus ascertained. At Ambleteuse, the men of Davoust's corps had been embarked in a quarter of an hour, and the horses in an hour and a half. It had been the same at Etaples and Boulogne, allowing for the different number of men and horses.

All, then, was ready, when Napoleon at length received tidings of the battle of Ferrol, of the putting in at Vigo, and of the entering of Corunna. Whatever displeasure he felt at the moral condition of Villeneuve, however sternly he judged his conduct, he, nevertheless, was gratified by the whole result, and by his orders all the gazettes contained an account of the sea-fight, with the most flattering praises of Villeneuve, and of the two combined squadrons. The loss of the two vessels appeared to him to be a mere accident, attributable to the fog; to be regretted, doubtless, but of very minor importance compared to the result obtained, that of the entrance of Vigo, and the junction of the two fleets.*

* The following letters were written upon the subject by Napoleon to admiral Villeneuve, and the Emperor's aide-de-camp, general Lauriston :

To admiral Villeneuve.

Boulogne, 25th Thermidor, year XIII. (13th of August, 1805).

VICE-ADMIRAL VILLENEUVE :

I perceive with pleasure, by the battle of the 3rd Thermidor, that several of my ships have borne themselves with the bravery that I anticipated from them. I am much pleased with the admirable manœuvre which you executed at the beginning of the action, and which baffled the designs of the enemy. I could have desired that you had employed your numerous frigates in aiding the Spanish ships, which, being the first engaged, must necessarily have been most in need of support. I could equally have desired that on the day after the action, you had not given the enemy time to place his ships—the Windsor Castle and Malta, in safety,—as well as the two Spanish ships which, having lost their rigging, must have been heavy and embarrassing sailers. This would have given to my arms the *éclat* of a grand victory. The tardiness of this manœuvre left the English time to send them into their ports. But I am justified in concluding that the victory remained on my side, since you have entered Corunna. I hope that this despatch will not find you there; that you will have repulsed the enemy's squadron, so that you may effect your junction with captain Lallemand, sweep away every thing that you find before you, and come into the Channel, where we await you with great impatience. If you have not done so, do it. Bear down boldly upon the enemy. The preferable order of battle appears to me to intermix the French and Spanish vessels, and to station behind each Spanish vessel frigates to aid them in the battle, and thus turn your numerous frigates to useful purpose. You can still further increase their number by means of *la Guerrière* and *la Revanche*, and that without retarding your operations. You at this time have under your command eighteen of our ships, and twelve, or, at the least, ten of those of the king of Spain. It is my desire, that wherever the enemy presents himself before you with fewer than twenty-four vessels, you give him battle.

By the return of the frigate *le President*, and of several others that I had despatched to you at Martinique, I have learned that, instead of your having

Now, he no longer doubted that Villeneuve would make his appearance at Brest. Ganteaume was at Bertheaume, that is to say, outside the inner roadstead, in face of the open sea, and supported by a hundred-and-fifty cannon, ranged in battery upon the coast. Nothing short of a concatenation of misfortunes could prevent Ganteaume from taking part in the attack of the blockade; and the French, having a force of fifty sail, twenty-nine under Villeneuve and twenty-one under Ganteaume, from scattering the enemy from their path, and entering the Channel with thirty or forty sail, even should they lose ten or twenty.

“You clearly perceive,” said Napoleon to Decrès, who was with him at Boulogne, “that notwithstanding a host of blunders and unfavourable accidents, the plan, as a whole, is essentially so good, that all the advantages are still on our side, and that we are on the eve of success.” Decrès, who was in the secret of the misgivings of Villeneuve, and who shared his doubts of fortune, was not so tranquil. “All this is possible,” he replied, “for all

landed troops in those islands, they are weaker than they were before. Nevertheless, Nelson had but nine sail. The English are not so numerous as you seem to imagine. They are everywhere in a state of uncertainty and alarm. Should you make your appearance here for three days, nay, even for twenty-four hours, your mission would be fulfilled. Make the moment of your departure known to admiral Ganteaume by an extraordinary courier. Never for a grander object did a squadron run such risks, and never have our soldiers and seamen poured out their blood for a grander and nobler result. For this great object of forwarding the descent upon that power which for six centuries has oppressed France, we may all die without regretting the sacrifice of life. Such are the sentiments which should animate you, and which should animate all my soldiers. England has in the Downs only four ships of the line, which we daily harass with our praams and our flotillas.

And with this, &c.

On the 14th of August he is still bent, and even more than ever bent, upon the expedition, although Decrès thought otherwise.

To general Lauriston.

Boulogne, 25th Thermidor, year XIII. (14th of August, 1805).

I have received, general Lauriston, your two letters of the 9th and 11th Thermidor. I hope that this letter will find you no longer at Ferrol, but that the squadron will have set sail and proceeded to its destination. I do not understand why you have not left the 67th and the 16th regiments at Martinique and at Guadaloupe. It was very distinctly expressed in your instructions. The consequence is, that after so extended an expedition I have not even the pleasure of seeing my islands secure from all attack. There are only 3000 men there now, and after Vendémiaire there will only be 2500. I hope that Villeneuve will not allow himself to be blockaded by a squadron inferior to his own. Aid and urge the admiral as much as you possibly can. Arrange with him about the troops that you have on board, and send me an exact account of their condition; you can leave them on board. If the admiral deem fit you can land them and form them into a division.

Take measures for forming a dépôt of the men whom you have landed at Vigo, whither an officer was sent in the supposition that Villeneuve had not made his appearance on the 20th Thermidor. *We are ready everywhere. Your presence in the Channel for twenty-four hours will suffice.*

With this, &c.

this has been perfectly calculated; but if this fall out to our hopes, I shall see the finger of God in our success! However, it has so often been visible in the operations of your majesty, that I should not be surprised to behold it in them once more.”*

It was from the 18th to the 20th of August that Napoleon was in the most lively expectation. Signals prepared on the most elevated points of the coast, were to inform him if the French fleet became visible upon the horizon. Attentive to every courier who arrived from Paris or from the ports, he every moment gave new orders for guarding against accidents that might have thwarted his designs. M. de Talleyrand having informed him that the preparations of Austria were daily becoming more significant and more threatening, and that a continental war was to be feared; but that, at the same time, Prussia, seduced by the brilliant temptation held out to her, that of Hanover, was ready to agree to an alliance with France, Napoleon, without taking an hour to deliberate, had summoned Duroc, and delivered him a letter for the king, and all the powers necessary for signing a treaty. “Set out directly,” said he to him; “proceed to Berlin without passing by Paris, and determine the king of Prussia to sign a treaty of alliance with me. I give him Hanover, but on condition that it be decided immediately. The present that I make him is an ample equivalent. In a fortnight I will not make him the same offer. At present I require to be covered on the side of Austria while I embark. To obtain this service from the king of Prussia, I grant him a vast territory, which will add forty thousand men to his army. But if by and by I should be obliged to quit the sea-shore to return inland, my camps being broken up, and my projects against England being abandoned, I should have no need of any one to bring Austria to her senses, and I would not pay so dear for a service which would be useless to me.”

Accordingly, Napoleon required that Prussia should immediately put troops in motion against Bohemia, and would not allow, moreover, that the treaty should be laden with conditions relating to Holland, Switzerland, and Italy. He ceded Hanover, and expected that Prussia would join him without any other condition.†

One can judge from a step of such gravity, and so promptly resolved upon, what paramount importance Napoleon at this moment attached to the free accomplishment of his projects. On the very day on which he gave instructions to Duroc, that is to say, on the 22nd of August, the courier who had been despatched from Ferrol as Villeneuve sailed thence, arrived at Boulogne. Napoleon

* I have confined myself to a correct analysis of the numerous notes which Napoleon and admiral Decrès daily exchanged, although they were within half a league of each other. One was at Pont de Briques, the other on the coast.

† This is the substance of the instructions given to the grand marshal Duroc.

immediately received at the little château of Pont de Briques, the despatch of Lauriston; while that of Villeneuve, addressed to Decrès, was delivered to Decrès, at the coast, in the hut in which he had taken up his quarters.

Napoleon, delighted with those words of Lauriston, *we are going to Brest*, had immediately dictated two letters for Villeneuve and Ganteaume. They are too worthy to be preserved in history to allow of our omitting their insertion here.

To Ganteaume he said:

“I have already made known to you by telegraph, that it is my desire that you do not allow Villeneuve to lose an hour, in order that, profiting by the superiority given to me by fifty ships of the line, you instantly put to sea and proceed to your destination, by making sail for the Channel with all your forces. I reckon upon your firmness, your talents, and your character, under circumstances so important. Set out and come hither. We will take vengeance for six centuries of insults and disgrace. Never have my soldiers and sailors exposed their lives for a grander object.” (From the Imperial Camp of Boulogne, 22nd of August, 1805.)

To Villeneuve he wrote:

“I hope, vice-admiral Villeneuve, that you are arrived at Brest. Set out, lose not a moment, bring my united squadrons into the Channel, and ENGLAND IS OURS! We are all ready, every thing is embarked. Be here but for twenty-four hours, and all is ended.” (Imperial Camp of Boulogne, 22nd of August.)

But while Napoleon, misled by the despatch of Lauriston, addressed these burning words to the two admirals; Decrès, by the same courier, had received a widely different despatch, which left but little hope of Villeneuve steering for Brest. He hastened to wait upon the Emperor, and to make known to him the melancholy moral condition in which Villeneuve had quitted Ferrol.

On hearing this contradictory intelligence, Napoleon was thrown into a fury. The first bursts of his anger fell upon admiral Decrès, who had given him such a man to command his fleet. He inveighed all the more violently against that minister, because he attributed to him, besides his choice of Villeneuve, opinions analogous to those which had deprived that unfortunate admiral of all courage. He reproached him alike with the weakness of his friend, and with decrying the French navy, which had carried despair into the hearts of all the fleet. He complained of not being seconded in his grand designs, and of being able to find only men who, in order to spare their persons or their reputations, did not even know how to lose a battle, when nothing more, after all, was required of them but the courage to fight it and lose it. “Your Villeneuve,” said he to Decrès, “is not even fit to command a frigate. What can be said of a man who, on account of a few sailors falling sick on board a couple of vessels of his squadron, for a broken bowsprit or a split sail, or for a report of a

junction between Nelson and Calder, loses his self-possession, and renounces his plans? They would have been at the very entry of Ferrol, ready to pounce upon the French, and not upon the open sea! All this is so simple, that it must strike the eyes of every one who is not blinded by fear!"*

Napoleon even went so far as to call Villeneuve a coward and even a traitor, and directed orders to be instantly drawn up for bringing him by force from Cadiz into the Channel, if he were gone to Cadiz; and, in case of his having made sail for Brest, for giving the command of the two united squadrons to Ganteaume. The minister of marine, who had not yet ventured to give his entire opinion upon the assemblage of the fleets in the midst of the Channel, and who, under existing circumstances, considered that assemblage to be horribly dangerous, since the English, on their guard, were concentrated between Ferrol, Brest, and Portsmouth, supplicated the Emperor not to issue so fatal an order; urged that the season was too far advanced; that the English were too much upon their guard; and that, should he persist, some horrible catastrophe would take place before Brest. To all such objections Napoleon had but one reply, that fifty sail would be assembled at Brest, should Villeneuve present himself there, that the English would never have that number, that, at all events, one of the two fleets being lost, would be of no consequence to him, provided that the other, being liberated, could enter the Channel and keep the command of it for twenty-four hours.

Decrès, overwhelmed by the sternness of the Emperor, determined to write to him what he could not venture to say verbally.

“4th Fructidor, Year XIII. (22nd of August).”

“On my knees I supplicated your Majesty not to associate the Spanish vessels in the operations of your squadron. Far from conceding this point, your Majesty required that this combined fleet should be increased by the vessels of Cadiz and those of Carthageña.

“With such an addition, you willed that a thing should be undertaken, difficult in itself, and rendered still more so by the elements composing the force, by the inexperience of the leaders, their want of the habit of commanding, and other circumstances with which your Majesty is as well acquainted as I am, and which, therefore, it is superfluous to recapitulate.

“In such a state of things, when your Majesty allows my reasoning and my experience to go for nothing, I know of no

* These scenes, of which there are now no living witnesses, would have been lost to history, but for the private and autograph letters of admiral Decrès and the Emperor. They are evidence of the stormy emotions of those memorable days. There are a great number of them for the same day, though the Emperor and Decrès were within half a league of each other.

situation more painful than mine. I beg that your Majesty will take it into your consideration, that I have no interest but that of your flag and the honour of your arms; and if the squadron is at Cadiz, I supplicate you to consider that as a decree of Providence, which reserves it for other operations. I entreat you not to compel it to come from Cadiz into the Channel, for the attempt at this moment cannot be unproductive of misfortunes. Above all, I entreat that this passage may not be ordered to be attempted with two months' provisions, for M. d'Estaing, I believe, has been seventy or eighty days, or perhaps more, in coming from Cadiz to Brest.

“ If these entreaties which I address to your Majesty seem to you to be of no weight, you should judge of what passes in my heart. * * *

“ It is especially at this moment, when I can still arrest the issuing of these fatal orders, that, in my opinion, it is my duty to your Majesty, most strongly to urge this. May I be more fortunate on this occasion than I have formerly been!

“ But it is unfortunate for me to be acquainted with the naval profession, since that acquaintance obtains me no confidence, and produces no results upon the plans of your Majesty. In truth, sire, my situation becomes too painful. I reproach myself with being unable to prevail with your Majesty. I doubt if any one man can do so. Condescend, as regards naval affairs, to form yourself an admiralty-council, or whatever your Majesty may deem best; but for myself, I feel that instead of growing stronger, I grow weaker every day. And, to speak the whole truth, a minister of marine, subjugated by your Majesty in naval affairs, serves you badly, and becomes useless to your arms, if not actually injurious to them.

“ It is in the bitterness of my soul, which in no wise diminishes either my devotion or my fidelity to your person, that I beg your Majesty to accept my profound respects.

(Signed)

“ DECRES.”

The Emperor, angry and yet touched, replied to him on the instant from Pont de Briques.

“ I beg you will send me in the course of the day a memorial upon this question:—As matters stand, if Villeneuve remain at Cadiz, what is he to do? Raise yourself to the height of the circumstances, and of the situation in which France and England are placed; do not write me another letter such as that which you have written, all that says nothing. For my part I have but one want—to succeed.” (22nd of August, Dépôt of the Leuvre.)

On the following day, the 23rd, Decrès submitted his plan to the Emperor. It was, in the first place, to adjourn the expedition till the winter, for it was too late to bring the fleet from Cadiz into the channel. They would be obliged to execute the enterprise in the midst of the equinoctial gales. Moreover, the Eng-

lish were warned. Every one had at length perceived the project of a junction between Boulogne and Brest. According to Decrès' opinion, it would be necessary to divide the squadrons, which were too large, into seven or eight squadrons, of five or six sail each. What Lallemand was at this very time doing, was the proof of what might be expected from these detached squadrons. They should be composed of the best officers and of the best ships, and sent out upon the ocean. They would drive the English to despair, by ruining their commerce, and form excellent sailors and naval commanders. Thence could be drawn the elements of a fleet for a grand ulterior project.

"That," said admiral Decrès, "is *the system of war which I would fain pursue.*"

"If, finally, in the winter," added he, "you wish for a fleet in the Channel, there are means of bringing one. You will have at Cadiz forty sail. Assemble there an army of embarkation, and give to this project the appearance of an expedition against India or Jamaica. Then divide the squadron into two parts. Select, among the vessels, the swiftest sailers; among the officers, those who, for a year, have proved themselves the boldest and most skilful; go out secretly, with only twenty sail, taking care to leave the others to attract the attention of the English; then let these twenty sail round Ireland and Scotland, and thence into the Channel. Summon Villeneuve and Gravina to Paris, reanimate their courage, and to a certainty they will execute this manœuvre."

On reading this plan, Napoleon entirely gave up the idea of recalling the fleet immediately from Cadiz, if, indeed, it was there. With his own hand he thus endorsed this despatch: "*To form seven squadrons, with the following destinations: Africa, Surinam, St. Helena, the Cape, the Windward Islands, the United States, the coasts of Ireland and Scotland, and the mouth of the Thames.*"* Then he read and re-read the despatches of Villeneuve, of Lauriston, and of the consular agent, who for a long time had watched, through a glass, the progress of the French squadron, until all sight of it was lost from the heights of Ferrol. In those despatches he sought, as in the book of destiny, a reply to this question: "Is Villeneuve steering for Cadiz or for Brest?" The uncertainty in which these despatches left him, irritated him still more than would the certainty of the squadron having gone to Cadiz. In that state of agitation, and especially as Europe was situated, it would have been the greatest of all services to inform him how the case really stood, for the news from the frontier of Austria became more alarming every instant. The Austrians now scarcely aimed at concealment; the troops were assembling in considerable force upon the Adige, and threatened the Inn and Bavaria.

* I transcribe these details from the document itself.

Now, if he did not strike a crushing blow upon London, which would make all Europe tremble and draw back, it was necessary that he should make forced marches upon the Rhine, to prevent the outrage preparing for him, that of being on his frontiers before him. In this urgent necessity of knowing the truth, he wrote several letters to admiral Decrès, from Pont-de-Briques to the camp, to learn his personal opinion as to the probable determination of Villeneuve. Decrès, fearing to irritate the Emperor too much, and at the same time conscientiously averse from deceiving him, replied each time in an almost directly contradictory manner, now saying yes, and then no, and partaking of the anxiety of his master, but evidently inclining towards the opinion that Villeneuve had gone to Cadiz. In fact, he had, himself, no doubt of it. It was then that Napoleon, that he might not be taken wholly unprepared, was divided between two plans, and passed several days in one of those ambiguous situations which are so insupportable to characters of his stamp; ready, at once, to cross the sea or to throw himself upon the Continent; to make a descent upon England, or a military march towards Austria. It was an especial trait in his character, when action became necessary, instantly to control himself, suddenly to subdue those gusts of passion to which, for an instant, he had abandoned his better judgment, as if to be the more entirely master of it at the moment when he needed it. After numerous perplexities, on the day of the 23rd, he gave the necessary orders for a double hypothesis. "My resolution is fixed," he wrote to M. de Talleyrand. "My fleets were lost sight of from the heights of cape Ortegale, on the 14th of August. If they come into the Channel, there is time yet; I embark and I attempt the descent; I go to London, and there cut the knot of all coalitions. If, on the contrary, my admirals fail in conduct or in firmness, I raise my ocean camps, I enter Germany with two hundred thousand men, and I do not stop until I have scored the game at Vienna, taken Venice, and all that she still possesses of Italy from Austria, and driven the Bourbons from Italy. I will not allow the Austrians and the Russians to assemble; I will strike them down before they can form their junction. The Continent being pacified, I will return to the ocean, and work anew for a maritime peace." Then, with his profound and incomparable experience of war, with that unparalleled discernment of that which was of the most or the least consequence to hasten forward in the arrangements, he gave his first orders for the Continental war, without, as yet, deranging any thing of his maritime expedition, which was still in constant readiness, as all still remained on board or alongside the vessels. He commenced with Naples and Hanover, the two parts furthest removed from his will. He ordered that there should be added to the division which was being organised at

Pescara, under general Reynièr, several regiments of light cavalry, and some batteries of horse-artillery, in order to form moveable columns in that country of guerillas. He sent orders to general St. Cyr, at the first sign of hostility to call in this division of Reynièr, join it to the division he had brought from Taranto, and to throw himself upon Naples with twenty thousand men, so as to prevent the descent into Italy of the Russians from Corfu, and of the English from Malta.

He then commanded prince Eugène, who, though viceroy of Italy, was under the military direction of marshal Jourdan, to assemble on the instant all the French troops distributed between Genoa, Bologna, and Verona, to direct them upon the Adige, to purchase artillery horses all over Italy, and to get a hundred guns horsed immediately. As the French troops were formed in divisions, and kept upon a war footing, these arrangements were easy to make, and prompt of execution. He ordered the recruits from the dépôts to be sent to them. He at the same time gave orders for baking large quantities of biscuit, for victualling the fortresses of Italy. Alexandria not being yet completed, he ordered that the citadel of Turin should serve as the magazine for Piedmont.

He made similar arrangements for Germany. On the same day, the 23rd, he despatched a courier for Bernadotte, who had succeeded general Mortier in the command of Hanover. He ordered him, under the pledge of the utmost secrecy, and without giving any outward sign of his new destination, to assemble at Göttingen, that is to say, at the extremity of that electorate, the greater part of his *corps d'armée*; to commence by despatching to that quarter the artillery and heavy baggage; to execute those movements so that they could not be clearly discerned for ten or twelve days, and, in order to procrastinate the doubt, to show himself in person at the opposite point, and, finally, to await further orders for putting himself in actual march. His idea was, if he should agree with Prussia, as he doubted not that he should, relatively to Hanover, to evacuate that kingdom, and to traverse, without permission, all the small states of central Germany, to carry into Bavaria the *corps d'armée* withdrawn from Hanover.

By the same courier he ordered general Marmont at the Texel, immediately to prepare his trains and *matériel*, so as to be able in three days to march with his *corps d'armée*, recommending him carefully to keep the secret, and to make no change in the embarkation of his troops until further orders. Finally, he made at Boulogne a first and only displacement of the troops under his own hand, that of the heavy cavalry and the dragoons. He had assembled far more cavalry than he really wanted, and, especially, far more than he could embark. He sent the cuirassiers of Nantouy a march to the rear, and assembled at St. Omer the foot and horse dragoons, under the command of Baraguay d' Hilliers.

To these he added a certain number of pieces of horse artillery, and instantly sent them on to Strasburg. He at the same time, ordered the assemblage at Alsace of all the heavy cavalry remaining in France, despatched the general-in-chief of artillery, Songis, to prepare a park of field-guns between Metz and Strasburg, and provided with funds for purchasing in Lorraine, in Switzerland, and in Alsace all the draught horses that could be procured. The same order was given for the infantry stationed near the eastern frontier. Five hundred thousand rations of biscuit were ordered at Strasburg. His numerous cavalry, accompanied by horse artillery, and supported by a species of infantry, that of the dragoons, might furnish a first support to the threatened Bavarians, who loudly demanded aid. Some regiments of infantry would speedily be ready to assist them. In fact, Bernadotte could reach Wurtzburg in ten or twelve marches. Thus, in a few days, without withdrawing any thing from his embarked forces, merely some divisions of heavy cavalry and dragoons, he was ready to support the Bavarians, upon whom Austria wished her first attack to fall.

These arrangements being made with the promptitude of a great character, he resumed a little tranquillity of mind, and resolved to await what the winds might bring him.

He was gloomy, absent, and harsh towards admiral Decrès, upon whose countenance he seemed to see imprinted all the opinions which had shaken Villeneuve, and he was incessantly upon the sea shore looking for some sudden arrival upon the horizon. Naval officers, stationed with their glasses upon the various points of the coast, were employed to observe all that was visible upon the sea, and to report to him. Thus he passed three days in that uncertainty which is the most intolerable to strong and ardent minds, which love decision and action. At length admiral Decrès, whom he continually questioned, declared to him that, in his opinion, seeing how long a time had passed, and the winds that had prevailed upon the coast, from the gulf of Gascony to the straits of Dover, and looking also at the moral condition of Villeneuve, he was persuaded that the fleets had sailed for Cadiz.

It was with deep grief, mingled with violent bursts of anger, that Napoleon at length gave up all hope of seeing his fleet arrive in the Straits. Such was his irritation, that a man for whom he entertained no ordinary friendship, the learned Monge, who almost every morning made a very military breakfast with him in the imperial hut on the sea shore, Monge, on seeing him in that disposition, discreetly retired, judging that his presence would be troublesome. He went to M. Daru, then principal secretary at war, and told him what he had seen. At the same instant M. Daru himself was called, and had to repair to the Emperor. He found him agitated, talking to himself, and not seeming to perceive the persons around him. Scarcely had M. Daru arrived,

and still stood silent and waiting for orders, when Napoleon went up to him, and addressing him as if he had been acquainted with every thing, said, "Do you know where Villeneuve is? He is at Cadiz!" Then he launched out into long and fierce invectives against the weakness and incapacity of all who surrounded him, said that he was betrayed by the cowardice of mankind, deplored the ruin of the most splendid, the most secure of all the plans he had ever conceived in his life, and displayed in all its bitterness the grief of genius abandoned by fortune. Suddenly mastering his agitation, he all at once calmed himself, and with a surprising facility recalling his mind from those closed ways of the ocean to the open roads of the Continent, he dictated, for several hours in succession, with an extraordinary precision and presence of mind, the plan which will be given in the following book. It was the plan of the immortal campaign of 1805. There was no longer the slightest trace of irritation either in his voice or in his countenance.*

The grand conceptions of genius had dissipated the griefs of his soul. Instead of attacking England directly, he was about to combat her by the long and sinuous route of the Continent, and he was about to find upon that route an incomparable grandeur previous to finding his ruin there.

Would he more surely have attained his end by the direct road, in other words, by the descent? That is a question which will often be asked both in our days and by future generations, and which it is not easy to solve. However, supposing Napoleon to have once effected a landing at Dover, we do not affront the English nation in believing that it would have been vanquished by the army and by the captain who, in eighteen months, conquered and subjected Austria, Germany, Prussia, and Russia. Not a man was added to that ocean army which at Austerlitz, at Jena, and at Friedland, beat the eight hundred thousand soldiers of the Continent. It must be added, too, that the territorial inviolability so long enjoyed by England, has not familiarised her with the danger of invasion, nor tested her means and courage to repel it; a circumstance which by no means diminishes the glory of her fleets and regular armies. It is therefore very improbable that she would have successfully withstood the soldiers of Napoleon, not yet exhausted by fatigue, and not yet decimated by war. An heroic resolution of her government, taking refuge, for instance, in Scotland, and leaving England to be ravaged until Nelson, with the English squadrons, could come and cut off all retreat from Napoleon, such a resolution, exposing Napoleon, the conqueror, to be made a prisoner in his own proper conquest, would, doubtless have brought about some singular conjunctures; but it

* I extract this account from a fragment of memoirs written by M. Daru: a copy of which is now in my possession, thanks to the kindness of his son.

it is beyond all probability to suppose, that it would have been adopted. We are firmly persuaded that had Napoleon reached London, England would have treated.

All the difficulty lay in the crossing of the Straits. Although the flotilla could pass in a summer calm, or in the fogs of winter, the passage was full of danger. Accordingly, Napoleon had planned the co-operation of a fleet to cover the expedition. But then it may be urged, the difficulty was, after all, coincident with the original one, that of being superior to the English on the sea. By no means. The point in question was, not to be superior, or even equal to them. All that he proposed was, by an able plan to bring a fleet into the Channel, by taking advantage of the chances of the sea, its immensity rendering encounters on it so uncertain. The plan of Napoleon, so often modified, and reproduced with so much fecundity, had every chance of success, in the hands of a firmer man than Villeneuve. Doubtless, Napoleon experienced here, under another form, the disadvantages of his naval inferiority. Villeneuve, keenly alive to that inferiority, became discouraged; but he was too much discouraged, and in a manner to affect his honour in the eyes of posterity. After all, his fleet fought well at Ferrol; and if we suppose that he had fought before Brest the disastrous battle which he shortly afterwards lost at Trafalgar, Ganteaume would have run out; and as for losing that battle, would it not have been well lost, in order to secure the passage of the Channel? Nay, under such circumstances, could it be said to be lost? Villeneuve, then, acted wrongly, although he has been too much decried, as is usually the case with those who are unfortunate. A practical seaman, and unmindful, that by dint of energy and resolute courage, one can often supply what is deficient in *matériel*, he knew not how to elevate himself to the height of his mission, and attempt that which, in his situation, Latouche Tréville would assuredly have accomplished.

The enterprise of Napoleon, then, was no chimera; it was perfectly possible, as he had prepared it; and, perhaps, in the eyes of discerning judges, this unfinished enterprise will do him more honour than those which have been crowned with the most brilliant success. Neither was it a mere feint, as it has been supposed to be by some people, who discover depths where there are none: some thousands of letters of the ministers and the Emperor, put an end to all doubt on that point. It was a serious enterprise, followed up and matured for several years, with acreal passion. It has also often been asserted, that if Napoleon had not rejected Fulton's offer of steam navigation, he would have crossed the Straits. It is not possible, even now, to predict what part steam navigation will play in future warfare. That it will add to the strength of France against England is very probable. Whether it will, or not, render the Straits more easy to be crossed, will solely depend upon the efforts which France shall see fit to make

for securing a superiority in the employment of this wholly new power; that will depend upon her patriotism and her foresight. But with respect to the refusal of Napoleon, it may be affirmed that Fulton proposed to him an art in its infancy, and which at that moment would have rendered him no aid. Napoleon, then, did all that he could do. On this occasion there was not the shadow of a fault to reproach him with. It was, doubtless, the will of Providence that he should not succeed. Yet why? He who was not always in the right against his enemies, had, in this instance, the right upon his side.

END OF VOLUME THE FIFTH.

The only authorized Edition.

HISTORY
OF THE
CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE
OF
FRANCE UNDER NAPOLEON.

FORMING A SEQUEL TO
“THE HISTORY OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION.”

BY
M. A. THIERS,
MEMBER OF THE FRENCH ACADEMY AND OF THE INSTITUTE,
&c. &c. &c.

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BOOK XXII.

ULM AND TRAFALGAR.

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HISTORY
OF
THE CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE
OF
FRANCE
UNDER
N A P O L E O N.

BOOK XXII.

ULM AND TRAFALGAR.

IT was an egregious fault to unite Genoa with France, on the very eve of the expedition against England, and thus to furnish Austria with the last reason that must decide her to war. It was provoking and drawing upon one's self a formidable coalition at a moment when one had need of absolute peace upon the Continent, in order to have the utmost freedom of action against England. Napoleon, it is true, had not foreseen the consequences of the union of Genoa; his error consisted in despising Austria too much, and in believing her to be incapable of acting, whatever liberty he might take with her. Though he has been justly censured for this union, effected under such circumstances, still it was in reality a fortunate event. No doubt, had admiral Ville-neuve been able to sail up the Channel, and to appear off Boulogne, there would be reason to regret for ever the derangement of the execution of the most gigantic plan; but as that admiral did not arrive, Napoleon, reduced once more to inaction, unless he had been rash enough to cross the Strait without the protection of a fleet, Napoleon would have found himself in extreme embarrassment. This expedition, so frequently announced, and which had miscarried thrice successively, would at last have exposed him to a sort of ridicule, and would have exhibited him to the eyes of Europe as in a real state of impotence in opposition to England. The continental coalition, furnishing him with a field of battle which he needed, repaired the fault that he had committed by

coming itself to commit one, and drew him most seasonably from an indecisive and unpleasant situation. The chain which links together the affairs of this world is sometimes a very strange one. Frequently, the judicious combination fails, and that which is faulty succeeds. This, however, is not an absolute motive for declaring all prudence vain, and for preferring to it the impulses of caprice in the government of empires. No, we ought always to prefer calculation to impulse in the conduct of affairs; but we cannot help acknowledging that the designs of man are overruled by the designs of Providence, more sure, more profound, than his. It is a reason for modesty, not for abdication, to human wisdom.

One must have had a close view of the difficulties of government, one must have felt how difficult it is to form great determinations, to prepare them, to accomplish them, to move men and things, in order to appreciate the resolution which Napoleon took on this occasion. The mortification of witnessing the miscarriage of the Boulogne expedition having once passed off, he turned his whole attention to his new plan of continental war. Never had he greater resources at his disposal; never had a wider field of operations opened to his view. When he commanded the army of Italy, he found his movements bounded by the plain of Lombardy and the circle of the Alps; and, if he thought of extending his views beyond that circle, the alarmed prudence of Carnot, the director, stepped forward to check him in his combinations. When, as First Consul, he conceived the plan of the campaign of 1800, he was obliged to humour lieutenants who were still his equals; and if, for example, he devised for Moreau a plan which would probably have been attended with the most fortunate consequences, he was stopped by the timid spirit of that general; he was forced to allow him to act in his own sure but limited manner, and to confine himself within the sequestered field of Piedmont. It is true that he signalised his presence there by an operation which will for ever remain a prodigy of the art of war, but still his genius, in striving to expand itself, had met with obstacles. For the first time he was free, free as Cæsar and Alexander had been. Such of his companions in arms, whose jealousy or whose reputation rendered them troublesome, had excluded themselves from the lists by their imprudent and guilty conduct. He had left him none but lieutenants submissive to his will, and combining in the highest degree all the qualities necessary for the execution of his designs. His army, weary of long inaction, eager for glory and battle, trained by ten years of war and three of encampment, was prepared for the most difficult enterprises, for the most daring marches. All Europe was open to his combinations. He was in the West, on the shores of the North Sea and the Channel; and Austria, assisted by Russian, Swedish, Italian, and English forces, was in the East, pushing upon France masses which a sort of European conspiracy had

placed at her disposal. The situation, the means, every thing, were grand. But if France had never been better able to cope with sudden and serious dangers, so never had the difficulty been equally great. That army, so prepared that we may affirm such another never existed, that army was on the shores of the Ocean, far from the Rhine, the Danube, the Alps, which explains why the continental powers had suffered it to assemble without remonstrating, and it was necessary to transport it all at once to the centre of the continent. There was the problem to be resolved. We shall see how Napoleon managed to traverse the space that separated him from his enemies, and to throw himself among them at the most suitable point for dissolving their formidable coalition.

Although he had persisted in believing that the war was not so near at hand as it really was, he had completely settled the preparations and the plan. Sweden was making armaments at Stralsund in Swedish Pomerania; Russia, at Revel, in the Gulf of Finland. Two strong Russian armies were alleged to be concentrating themselves, one in Poland, in order to hurry away Prussia, the other in Galicia, to assist Austria. It was not merely suspected but known with certainty that two Austrian armies were forming, one of 80,000 men in Bavaria, the other of 100,000 men in Italy, both connected by a corps of 25 or 30 thousand in Tyrol. Lastly, Russians, assembled at Corfu, English at Malta, and symptoms of agitation in the court of Naples, left no room to doubt that some attempt would be made towards the south of Italy.

Four attacks then were preparing: the first, in the North, from Pomerania, on Hanover and Holland, was to be executed by Swedes, Russians, and English; the second, in the East, by the valley of the Danube, assigned to Austrians and Russians united; the third in Lombardy, reserved for Austrians alone; the fourth on the South of Italy, was to be undertaken rather later by a force composed of Russians, English, and Neapolitans.

Napoleon had as complete a comprehension of this plan as if he had been present at the military conferences of M. de Winzingerode at Vienna, to which we have already adverted. There was but one more circumstance yet unknown to him, likewise to his enemies—should they gain Prussia? Napoleon did not think so. The coalesced powers hoped to effect this by intimidating king Frederick William. In this case, the attack in the North, instead of being an accessory attempt, greatly cramped by the neutrality of Prussia, would become a threatening enterprise against the empire, from Cologne to the mouths of the Rhine. This, however, was not at all probable, and Napoleon considered only the two grand attacks from Bavaria and Lombardy as serious, and regarded those preparing in Pomerania and towards the kingdom of Naples as at most deserving of some precautions.

He resolved to direct the bulk of his forces into the valley of the Danube, and to frustrate all the secondary attacks by the manner in which he should repulse the principal. His profound conception was based on a very simple fact, the distance of the Russians, which would be likely to make them arrive late to the assistance of the Austrians. He thought that the Austrians, impatient to fall upon Bavaria, and to occupy, according to their custom, the favourite position of Ulm, would, by acting in that manner, add to the distance which naturally separated them from the Russians; that the latter would consequently appear late in line, ascending the Danube with their principal army united to the Austrian reserves. Crushing the Austrians before the arrival of the Russians, Napoleon then purposed to fall upon the latter, deprived of the aid of the principal Austrian army, and intended to employ the expedient, extremely easy in theory, extremely difficult in practice, to beat his enemies one after the other.

In order to its success, this plan required a particular mode of moving his army to the theatre of operations, that is to say, to the valley of the Danube. If, after the example of Moreau, Napoleon should ascend the Rhine, for the purpose of crossing it at Strasburg and Schaffhausen, and were then to debouch by the defiles of the Black Forest between the Suabian Alps and the Lake of Constance, and thus attack in front the Austrians posted behind the Iller, from Ulm to Memmingen, he should not completely fulfil his object. Even in beating the Austrians, as he was more certain than ever of doing with the army trained in the camp of Boulogne, he should drive them before him upon the Russians, and should cause them, weakened merely, to form a junction with their northern allies. It behoved him, therefore, as at Marengo, and still more than at Marengo, to turn the Austrians, and not to be satisfied with beating them, but to surround them, so as to send them all prisoners into France. Then Napoleon could throw himself upon the Russians, who would have no other support but the Austrian reserves.

To this end, a perfectly simple march occurred to his mind. One of his corps d'armée, that of marshal Bernadotte, was in Hanover, a second, general Marmont's, in Holland, the others at Boulogne. He conceived the idea of making the first descend through Hesse, into Franconia, upon Würzburg and the Danube; of making the second advance along the Rhine, taking advantage of the facilities afforded by that river, and of uniting it at Mayence and Würzburg with the corps coming from Hanover. While these two great detachments were to descend from north to south, Napoleon resolved to transport by a movement from west to east, from Boulogne to Strasburg, the corps encamped on the shores of the Channel, to feign with these latter a direct attack by the Black Forest, but in reality to leave that Forest on the right, to pass to the left through Würtemberg, in order to join in Franconia the corps of Bernadotte and Marmont, to cross the Danube below

Ulm, in the environs of Donauwerth, to get thus into the rear of the Austrians, to surround them, to take them, and, after getting rid of them, march upon Vienna to meet the Russians.

The position of marshal Bernadotte coming from Hanover, of general Marmont coming from Holland, was an advantage, for it took one of them but seventeen days, the other only fourteen or fifteen, to reach Würzburg, on the flank of the hostile army encamped at Ulm. The movement of the troops starting from Boulogne for Strasburg required about twenty-four days, and this was to fix the attention of the Austrians on the ordinary debouché of the Black Forest. In the space of twenty-four days, that is to say about the 25th of September, Napoleon might therefore have arrived at the decisive point. By adopting an immediate resolution, by concealing his movements as long as possible, by his further stay at Boulogne, by circulating false reports, by disguising his intentions with that art for deceiving an enemy which he possessed in a supreme degree, he could have passed the Danube in the rear of the Austrians before they had any suspicion of his presence. If he succeeded, he should rid himself in the month of October of the first hostile army; he would employ that of November in marching upon Vienna, and in the environs of that capital he should meet with the Russians, whom he had never seen, whom he knew to be steady foot-soldiers, but not invincible, for Moreau and Massena had already beaten them, and he promised himself to beat them still more severely. Having reached Vienna, he should have got far beyond the Austrian army of Italy, which would become an urgent motive for that army to retreat.

The plan of Napoleon was to give Massena, the most energetic of his lieutenants, and the one who was best acquainted with Italy, the command of the French army on the Adige. It was to consist of no more than 50,000 men, but choice troops, for they had made all the campaigns beyond the Alps from Montenotte to Marengo. Provided that Massena could detain the archduke Charles on the Adige for a month, which seemed beyond doubt, with soldiers accustomed to conquer the Austrians, whatever might be their number, and under a general who never fell back, Napoleon, having arrived at Vienna, would relieve Lombardy as he had relieved Bavaria. He would draw the archduke upon himself, but at the same time he would draw Massena; and then, uniting the 50,000 men from the banks of the Adige with the 150,000 with whom he had marched along the Danube, he should find himself at Vienna at the head of 200,000 victorious French. Disposing directly of such a mass of forces, having thwarted the two principal attacks, those of Bavaria and Lombardy, what need he care about the two others prepared in the north and south, towards Hanover and towards Naples? Were all Europe in arms, he would have nothing to fear from the whole of its forces.

Still he omitted not to take certain precautions in regard to Lower Italy. General St. Cyr occupied Calabria with 20,000

men. Napoleon gave him instructions to march upon Naples and make himself master of that capital on the first symptom of hostility. It would, no doubt, have been more consistent with his principles not to cut the army of Italy in two, not to place 50,000 men under Massena on the banks of the Adige, and 20,000 under general St. Cyr in Calabria, to unite the whole, on the contrary, into one mass of 70,000 men, which, certain to conquer in the north of Italy, would have little to fear from the south. But he conceived that Massena, with 50,000 men and his character, would be sufficient to detain the archduke Charles for a month, and he deemed it dangerous to permit the Russians and the English to gain a footing at Naples, and to foment in Calabria a war of insurrection, which it would be difficult to extinguish. For this reason he left general St. Cyr and 20,000 men in the gulf of Tarento, with orders to march on the first signal to Naples, and to throw the Russians and the English into the sea, before they had time to establish themselves on the continent of Italy. As for the attack prepared in the north of Europe, at such a distance from the frontiers of the Empire, Napoleon was content to provide against it by merely continuing the negotiation begun at Berlin relative to the kingdom of Hanover. He had offered that kingdom to Prussia as the price of her alliance; but, having scarcely any hope of a formal alliance on the part of so timid a court, he proposed to place Hanover in its hands in pledge, if it would not receive it as a definitive gift. In either case, it would be obliged to keep the belligerent troops out of the country, and its neutrality would consequently suffice to cover the north of Europe.

Such was the plan conceived by Napoleon. Moving his corps d'armée by rapid and unexpected marches from Hanover, Holland, and Flanders, into the heart of Germany, passing the Danube, below Ulm, separating the Austrians from the Russians, enveloping the former, overthrowing the latter, then pushing on through the valley of the Danube to Vienna, and by this movement relieving Massena in Italy, he should soon have repulsed the two principal attacks directed against his Empire. His victorious armies being thus united under the walls of Vienna, he should no longer need to give himself any concern about an attempt in the south of Italy, which, besides, general St. Cyr would frustrate, and another in the north of Germany, which would be cramped on all sides by the Prussian neutrality.

Never had captain either in ancient or modern times conceived and executed plans on such a scale. Never, indeed, had a more mighty mind, possessing greater freedom of will, commanding means more prodigious, had to operate on such an extent of country. What is it, in fact, that we see on most occasions? Irresolute governments, deliberating when they ought to act, improvident governments, which think of organising their forces when they ought to be on the field of battle, and under them subordinate

generals, scarcely capable of stirring on the circumscribed theatre assigned to their operations. Here, on the contrary, genius, decision, foresight, absolute freedom of action, all concurred in the same man and to the same end. It is rarely that such circumstances are combined, but when they do meet together, the world has a master.

In the last days of the month of August, the Austrians were already on the banks of the Adige and the Inn, the Russians on the frontiers of Galicia. It seemed as if they should surprise Napoleon; but that was not the case. He gave all his orders at Boulogne on the 26th of August, but with the recommendation not to issue them till ten at night on the 27th. His object in this was to reserve for himself the whole of the 27th before he definitively renounced his grand maritime expedition. The courier despatched on the 27th would not reach Hanover before the 1st of September. Marshal Bernadotte, already forewarned, was to commence his movement on the 2nd of September, to have collected his corps on the 6th at Göttingen, and to reach Würzburg by the 20th. He had orders to collect in the fortress of Hameln the artillery taken from the Hanoverians, the military stores of all kinds, the sick, the dépôts of his corps d'armée, and a garrison of 6000 men, commanded by an energetic officer, who could be relied upon. This garrison was to be provisioned for a year. If an arrangement were concluded with Prussia for Hanover, the troops left at Hameln were immediately to rejoin Bernadotte's corps; if not, they were to remain in that fortress, and to defend it to the death, in case the English should send an expedition to the Weser, which the Prussian neutrality could not prevent. "I shall be," wrote Napoleon, "as prompt as Frederick, when he went from Prague to Dresden and Berlin. I will run fast enough to the relief of the French defending my eagles in Hanover, and fling into the Weser the enemies who shall have come from that quarter." Bernadotte had orders to traverse the two Hesses, to tell the governments of those two principalities that he was returning to France by Mayence, to force a passage if it were refused, but to march with money in his hand, to pay for every thing, and to observe rigid discipline.

On the same evening of the 27th of August, a courier set off with orders for general Marmont to march with 20,000 men and 40 pieces of cannon well horsed, to follow the banks of the Rhine to Mayence, and to proceed by Mayence and Frankfort to Würzburg. This order was to reach Utrecht on the 30th of August. General Marmont, having received a previous intimation, was to set himself in motion on the 1st of September, to arrive at Mayence on the 15th or 16th, and at Würzburg on the 18th or 19th. Thus these two corps from Hanover and Holland were to be amidst the Franconian principalities of the elector of Bavaria from the 18th to the 20th of September, and to form there a force of 40,000 men. As the elector had been recommended to retire to

Würzburg, if the Austrians should attempt to do him violence, he was sure of finding there a succour ready prepared for his person and for his army.

Lastly, on the evening of the 27th were issued the orders for the camps of Ambleuse, Boulogne, and Montreuil. These orders were to begin to be executed on the morning of the 29th. On the first day, the first divisions of each corps were to march by three different routes, on the second day the second divisions, on the third day the last; consequently they followed each other at twenty-four hours' distance. The three routes specified were—for the camp of Ambleuse, Cassel, Lille, Namur, Luxemburg, Deux-Ponts, Mannheim; for the camp of Boulogne, St. Omer, Douai, Cambrai, Mezieres, Verdun, Metz, Spire; for the camp of Montreuil, Arras, La Fère, Reims, Nancy, Saverne, Strasburg. As it would require twenty-four marches, the whole army might be upon the Rhine between the 21st and the 24th of September. That would be timely enough to be of use there; for the Austrians, unwilling to make any stir in order to be the more sure of surprising the French, had continued in the camp of Wels near Linz, and consequently could not be in line before Napoleon. Besides, the further they advanced upon the upper Danube, the nearer they approached to the frontier of France between the lake of Constance and Schaffhausen, the more chances Napoleon had of enveloping them. Officers, dispatched with funds to all the roads which the troops were to travel, were directed to get provisions prepared for them at every station. Formal and several times repeated orders, like all those given by Napoleon, enjoined that each soldier should be furnished with a great coat and two pair of shoes.

Napoleon, closely keeping his secret, which was entrusted to none but Berthier and M. Daru, said to those about him that he was sending 30,000 men to the Rhine. He wrote to the same effect to most of his ministers. He communicated nothing more to M. de Marbois, and merely directed him to collect as much money as possible in the chests at Strasburg, which the avowed mission of 30,000 men to Alsace was sufficient to account for. He ordered M. Daru to set out immediately for Paris, to go to M. Dejean, minister of the *matériel* of war, to write with his own hand all the accessory orders required by the displacing of the army, and not to let a single clerk into the secret. Napoleon resolved to stay himself six or seven days longer at Boulogne, the better to deceive the public in regard to his plans.

As all these corps were to traverse France, excepting that of marshal Bernadotte, which was to give itself out in Germany for a corps destined to recross the frontiers, it was certain that they must be in full march before they gave any signs of their presence, before these signs were transmitted to Paris, sent from Paris abroad, and that many days must elapse before the enemy could be acquainted with the breaking up of the camp of Bou-

logne. Besides, as the tidings of these movements could be accounted for by the mission of 30,000 men to the Rhine, of which no secret was made, they left the most perspicacious minds in doubt; and there was a great chance of being upon the Rhine, the Neckar, or the Mayn, while the army was supposed to be still on the shores of the Channel. Napoleon at the same time sent away Murat and his aides-de-camp, Savary and Bertrand, to Franconia, Suabia, and Bavaria. They had orders to explore all the roads leading from the Rhine to the Danube, to observe the nature of each of these roads, the military positions to be found upon them, the means of subsistence which they afforded; lastly, all the suitable points for crossing the Danube. Murat was to travel under a fictitious name, and, having finished his survey, to return to Strasburg, and there take the command of the first columns that should reach the Rhine.

To leave the Russians in ignorance of his resolutions as long as possible, Napoleon moreover recommended to M. de Talleyrand to delay the manifesto destined for the cabinet of Vienna, and the purport of which was to summon that cabinet to explain itself definitively. In reply to this summons he expected from it nothing but falsehoods, and, as for convicting it of duplicity before the face of Europe, it would be time enough to do that at the moment of the first hostilities. He despatched general Thiard, who had entered into the service of France on the return of the emigrants, to Carlsruhe, and charged him to negotiate an alliance with the grand duchy of Baden. He addressed offers of the like nature to Wurtemberg, alleging that he foresaw war, judging from the preparations of Austria, but never hinting how far he was ready to commence it. In short, it was to the elector of Bavaria alone that he communicated the whole secret of his plans. That unfortunate prince, hesitating between Austria, which was his enemy, and France, which was his friend, but the one near, the other distant, recollecting too that in preceding wars, invariably trampled upon by both, he had always been forgotten at the peace, this unfortunate prince knew not to which to attach himself. He was aware that, if he gave himself up to France, he might expect accessions of territory; but, still ignorant of the breaking up of the camp of Boulogne, he beheld her, at the period of which we are treating wholly occupied by her struggle with England, importuned by her German allies, and unable to assist them. Accordingly he was incessantly talking of an alliance to our minister, M. Otto, without ever daring to conclude one. This state of things was soon changed, in consequence of the letters of Napoleon. The latter wrote directly to the elector, informing him (as a secret of State entrusted to his honour) that he had deferred his plans against England, and should march immediately with 200,000 men into the heart of Germany. "You shall be succoured in time," he sent him word, "and the vanquished house of Austria shall be forced to compose for you a con-

siderable State with the wrecks of its patrimony."—Napoleon made a point of gaining that elector, who had 25,000 well organised soldiers, and magazines, abundantly supplied, in Bavaria. It would be an important advantage to snatch these 25,000 soldiers from the coalition and to secure them for himself. For the rest, the secret was not in danger, for that prince felt a real hatred for the Austrians; and, when once set at ease, he desired no better than to ally himself with France.

Napoleon then turned his attention to the army of Italy. He ordered the troops dispersed in Parma, Genoa, Piedmont, and Lombardy, to be assembled under the walls of Verona. He withdrew the command of those troops from marshal Jourdan, observing the greatest delicacy towards that personage, whom he esteemed, but whose character he deemed unequal to the circumstances, and who moreover was wholly unacquainted with the country situated between the Po and the Alps. He promised to employ him on the Rhine, where he had always fought, and directed Massena to set off without delay. The distance at which Italy was, caused the divulging of these orders to be attended with little danger, for it could not but be late.

These dispositions arranged, he devoted the remaining time that he had to pass at Boulogne in prescribing himself the most minute precautions for securing the flotilla from all attacks on the part of the English. It was natural to suppose that they would take advantage of the departure of the army to attempt a landing, and to burn the stores accumulated in the basins. Napoleon, who had not renounced the intention of returning soon to the coasts of the Ocean, after a successful war, and who moreover was most unwilling to expose himself to so mortifying an insult as the burning of the flotilla, enjoined the following precautions to the ministers Decrès and Berthier. The divisions of Etaples and Vimereux were to be united with those of Boulogne and all placed at the extremity of the basin of the Liane, out of reach of the enemy's projectiles. The same precaution could not be taken for the Dutch flotilla which was at Ambleteuse, but every thing was so arranged that the troops stationed at Boulogne could hasten to that point in two or three hours. Netting of a particular kind, attached to a heavy anchor, prevented the introduction of the incendiary machines which might be launched under the form of floating bodies.

Three entire regiments, including their third battalion, were left at Boulogne. To these were added twelve third battalions of the regiments which set out for Germany. The sailors belonging to the flotilla were formed into fifteen battalions of a thousand men each. They were armed with muskets, and officers of infantry appointed to train them. They were to do duty alternately either on board the vessels continuing afloat, or about those aground in the port. This assemblage of land troops and seamen formed a force of thirty-six battalions, commanded by generals

and a marshal, marshal Brune, the same who, in 1799, had thrown the Russians and the English into the sea. Napoleon gave orders for the construction of entrenchments on land all round Boulogne, to cover the flotilla and the immense magazines which he had formed. He desired that picked officers should be attached to each entrenched position, and that they should remain constantly at the same post, in order that, answering for its safety, they might study incessantly to improve its defences.

He then charged M. Decrès to assemble the naval officers, marshal Berthier to assemble the military officers, to explain to both the importance of the post confided to their honour, to console them for being left inactive while their comrades were gone to fight, to promise that they should be employed in their turn, that they should even have before long the glory of concurring in the expedition to England; for, after punishing the continent for its aggression, Napoleon would come back to the shores of the Channel, perhaps the next spring.

Napoleon was personally present at the departure of all the divisions of the army. It would be difficult to form any conception of their joy, of their ardour, when they learned that they were going to be employed in a great war. It was five years since they had been in battle; and for two and a half they had been waiting in vain for an opportunity to cross over to England. Old and young soldiers, become equals from living several years together, confident in their officers, enthusiasts for the chief who was to lead them to victory, hoping for the highest rewards from a system which had raised a fortunate soldier to the throne, full, in short, of the sentiment which at that period had superseded every other, the love of glory—all, old and young, ardently longed for war, battles, dangers, and distant expeditions. They had conquered the Austrians, the Prussians, the Russians; they despised all the soldiers of Europe, and did not imagine that there was an army in the world capable of resisting them. Broken to fatigue, like real Roman legions, they felt no horror of long marches which were to lead to the conquest of the continent. They set off singing and shouting "*Vive l'Empereur!*" begging for as speedy a meeting as possible with the enemy. It is true that, in those hearts, boiling over with courage, there was less pure patriotism than in the soldiers of '92; there was more ambition, but a noble ambition, that of glory, of rewards legitimately acquired, and a confidence, a contempt of dangers and difficulties, which constitute the soldier destined for great things. The volunteers of '92 were eager to defend their country against an unjust invasion; the veteran soldiers of 1805, to render it the first power in the world. Let us not make a distinction between such sentiments: it is praiseworthy to hasten to the defence of one's country when in danger; it is equally praiseworthy to devote one's self that it may be great and glorious.

After seeing with his own eyes his army commence its march,

Napoleon set out from Boulogne on the 2nd of September, and arrived on the 3rd at Malmaison. Nobody was informed of his resolutions; he was supposed to be still engaged with his plans against England: people merely felt uneasy respecting the intentions of Austria, and they accounted for the march of troops which began to be talked of by the mission already published of a corps of 30,000 men, which was to watch the Austrians on the upper Rhine.

The public, not correctly acquainted with facts, ignorant to what a point a profound English intrigue had knitted the bonds of a new coalition, censured Napoleon for having pushed Austria to extremity by placing the crown of Italy on his head, uniting Genoa to the Empire, and giving Lucca to the princess Elisa. They ceased not to admire him; they deemed themselves extremely fortunate in living under a government so firm, so just, as his; but they found fault with his excessive fondness for that in which he so highly excelled, his fondness for war. No one could believe that he was unfortunate under such a captain; but people heard talk of Austria, of Russia, of part of Germany, being in the pay of England: they knew not whether this new struggle would be of short or long duration, and they recollected involuntarily the distresses of the first wars of the Revolution. Confidence, however, predominated far over all other sentiments; but a slight murmur of disapprobation, extremely perceptible to the sensitive ears of Napoleon, was nevertheless heard.

What contributed more particularly to render the sensations experienced by the public the more painful was the extreme financial embarrassment. It was produced by different causes. Napoleon had persisted in his plan of never borrowing. "While I live," he wrote to M. de Marbois, "I will not issue any paper." (Milan, May 18, 1805.) In fact, the discredit produced by the assignats, the mandats, and all the issues of paper, still continued, and all-powerful, all-dreaded as the Emperor of the French then was, he could not have forced an annuity of 5 francs to be accepted for a capital of more than 50 francs, which would have constituted a loan at 10 per cent. Serious embarrassments, however, resulted from this situation, for the wealthiest country could not defray the expenses of war without throwing part of them upon the future.

We have already explained the state of the budgets. That of the year XII. (September, 1803 to September, 1804) estimated at 700 millions, exclusive of the costs of collection, had amounted to 762. Fortunately, the taxes had received from the public prosperity, which war did not interrupt under this powerful government, an increase of about 40 millions. The produce of the registration amounted to 18 millions, that of the customs to 16; in this increase of the revenue, there was still a deficit of 20 and odd millions to be provided for.

The ways and means of the year XIII. (September, 1804 to Sep-

tember, 1805) which ended at this moment, exhibited a still greater deficiency. The naval works were partly finished: it had been at first thought that the expenses of this year might be considerably reduced. Though those of the year XII. amounted to 762 millions, it was hoped that the year XIII. would not require more than 684 millions. But the past months exhibited thus far a monthly expenditure of about 60 millions, which supposed a yearly expenditure of 720. To meet this there were the taxes and the extraordinary resources. The taxes, which produced 500 millions in 1801, had risen, by the mere effect of the general wealth and without any change in the tariffs, to a produce of 560 millions. The indirect contributions recently established having yielded this year very nearly 25 millions, the voluntary donations of the communes and departments, converted into additional centimes, furnishing very little short of 20 millions more, the permanent revenue had reached 600 millions. It was necessary, therefore, to find 120 millions to complete the budget of the year XIII. The Italian subsidy of 22 millions would supply a part; but then the Spanish subsidy of 48 millions had ceased in December, 1804, in consequence of the brutal declaration of war which England had issued against Spain. The latter, thenceforward serving the common cause by her fleets, had no longer to serve it by her finances. The American fund, the price of Louisiana, was consumed. To supply the place of these resources, there had been added to the Italian subsidy of 22 millions a sum of 36 millions in new securities, a species of loan, the mechanism of which we have explained elsewhere; then, an alienation of national domains to the amount of 20 millions; and lastly, some reimbursements due from Piedmont and amounting to 6 millions. The whole made, with the ordinary imposts, 684 millions. From 36 to 40 millions more were therefore wanting to reach 720.

Thus there was an arrear of 20 millions for the year XII. and of 40 for the year XIII. But this was not all. The accounts, being still in a crude state, did not exhibit, as they now do, all the facts at a glance: there had just been discovered some balances of expenses not discharged, and some deficiencies in the receipts belonging to the service of preceding years, which constituted a further charge of about 20 millions. On adding all these deficits, 20 millions for the year XII., 40 for the year XIII., 20 recently discovered, one might estimate at about 80 millions the arrear that began to accrue since the renewal of the war.

Various means had been employed to provide for it. In the first place, a debt had been incurred with the Sinking Fund. The securities, of which a resource had been made, ought to have been repaid to that fund at the rate of 5 millions per annum. It ought to have been paid, at the rate of 10 millions per annum, for the 70 millions' worth of national domains which the law of the year IX. had assigned to it, to compensate the augmentation of the public debt. It had not been paid either of these two sums.

It is true that security had been given for them in national domains, and that it was not a very importunate creditor. The Treasury owed it about 30 millions at the end of the year XIII. (September, 1805).

Some other resources had been found in various improvements introduced into the service of the Treasury. If the State did not inspire in general any great confidence in financial matters, certain agents of the finances inspired much within the sphere of their official duties. Thus the central cashier of the Treasury, established in Paris, superintending all the remittances of funds between Paris and the provinces, issued bills upon himself or upon accountable persons, his correspondents, which were always paid in the open office; because the payments were made, even amidst those interruptions, with perfect punctuality. This species of bank had been able to put into circulation not less than 15 millions in bills taken as ready money.

Lastly, a real melioration in the service of the receivers-general had procured a resource of nearly the like amount. For the direct contributions imposed upon land and buildings, the value of which was known beforehand, and the payment fixed like a rent, the persons accountable were required to subscribe bills payable month by month into their chest, by the oft-mentioned title of *Obligations of the receivers-general*. But, for the indirect contributions, discharged irregularly, in proportion to the consumption or the transactions upon which they were imposed, it was necessary to wait till the produce was realised, before drawing upon the receivers-general what were called *Bills at sight*. Thus they enjoyed this part of the funds of the State for about fifty days. It was settled that, in future, the Treasury should draw upon them in advance, and every month, orders for two-thirds of the known amount of the indirect contributions (that amount was 190 millions); that the last third should remain in their hands to meet the variations of the returns and should be remitted to the Treasury only in the old accustomed form of *Bills at sight*. This more prompt payment of part of the funds of the State was equivalent to an aid of about 15 millions.

Thus by running into debt with the Sinking Fund, by creating the bills of the central cashier of the Treasury, by accelerating certain returns, there had been found resources for about 60 millions. Taking the deficit at 80 or 90, there would still be wanting about 30 millions. This had been supplied either by means of arrears with the contractors, that is to say with the famous company of the *United Merchants* whose supplies were not punctually paid for, or by discounting a larger amount in *obligations of the receivers-general* than ought to have been done.

Napoleon, who was unwilling to enter too far into this system of arrear, had devised while in Italy an operation, which, according to him, had nothing of the nature of a paper currency. Of the 300 or 400 millions' worth of national domains remaining in

1800, nothing was left in 1805; not that the whole of that valuable resource had been expended, but, on the contrary, because, with the view to its preservation, it had been applied to the endowment of the Sinking Fund, the Senate, the Legion of Honour, the Invalides, and the public Instruction. The few portions which were still seen figuring in the budgets composed a last remnant which was assigned to the Sinking Fund, in discharge of what was owing and of what was not paid to it. Napoleon had an idea to take back from the Legion of Honour and the Senate the national domains which he had assigned to them, to give them *rentes* instead, and to dispose of those domains for an operation with the contractors. Accordingly, *rentes* were actually delivered to the Senate and the Legion of Honour in exchange for their immoveables. For an income of 1000 francs in land there was granted them a revenue of 1750 francs in *rentes*; in order to compensate the difference between the price of the one and the other. The Senate and the Legion of Honour thus gained a considerable increase of their annual income. Possession was again taken of the national domains, and they began to be disposed of to the contractors at a price agreed upon. The latter, obliged to borrow of capitalists, who lent them funds for which they had no occasion, found in the immoveables a pledge by the aid of which they obtained credit and procured the means of continuing their service. It was the Sinking Fund to which this whole operation was committed, and which took from the redeemed *rentes* the sum necessary for indemnifying the Senate and the Legion of Honour. The State, in its turn, was obliged to indemnify it by creating for its profit a sum in *rentes* corresponding to that of which it had deprived itself. It was with these various expedients, some of them legitimate, as the improvements of service, others injurious, as the delays of payment to the contractors, and the resumption of the domains given to different establishments—it was with these expedients, we say, that means were found to supply the deficit produced during the last two years. At the present day, the floating debt which is provided for with *Bons royaux* would permit a charge four or five times as considerable to be contracted.

All this would have produced but a moderate embarrassment, if the state of commerce had been good; but that was not the case. The French merchants in 1802, reckoning upon the duration of the maritime peace, had embarked in considerable speculations, and sent out goods to all countries. The violent conduct of England, rushing upon our flag before the declaration of war, had caused them immense losses. Many houses had concealed their distress, and, making up their minds to great sacrifices, assisting each other with their credit, had got over the first blow. But the new shock resulting from the continental war could not fail to complete their ruin. Bankruptcies began already to take place in the principal commercial towns, and produced there gene-

ral distress. This was not the sole cause of the stagnation of business. Ever since the fall of the assignats, specie, though it soon made its appearance again, had always been insufficient, owing to a cause easy of comprehension. Paper money, though discredited from the very first day of its issue, had nevertheless performed the service of specie for some part of the exchanges, and had driven part of the metallic currencies out of France. The public prosperity, suddenly restored under the Consulate, had not lasted long enough to bring back the gold and silver which had been carried out of the country. The want of it was felt in all sorts of transactions. To procure it was at this period one of the incessant cares of commerce. The Bank of France, which had acquired rapid prosperity, because it furnished by means of its perfectly accredited notes a supplementary currency—the Bank of France had the greatest difficulty to keep in its coffers a metallic reserve proportioned to the issue of its notes. For this purpose, it had made praiseworthy efforts and drawn from Spain a prodigious sum in dollars. Unluckily, a drain, then opened for specie, carried it away as fast as it was brought in: this was the payment for colonial produce. Formerly, that is to say in 1788 and 1789, when we possessed St. Domingo, France drew from her colonies sugar, coffee, and other colonial productions to the amount of 220 million francs, of which she consumed 70 or 80 millions' worth and exported as much as 150, particularly in the form of refined sugar. If we consider the difference in the value of all things, a difference not less than double, between that time and the present, we shall conceive what an immense source of prosperity was dried up. It was necessary to go abroad for what we wanted, and to receive from our very enemies the colonial commodities which, twenty years before, we sold to all Europe. A considerable portion of our specie was carried to Hamburg, Amsterdam, Genoa, Leghorn, Venice, Trieste, to pay for the sugar and coffee which the English introduced there by means of the free trade or by smuggling. To Italy was sent much more than the 22 millions paid us by that country. All the mercantile men of the time complained of this state of things, and this subject was daily discussed at the Bank by the most enlightened men of business in France.

It was to Spain that all Europe was accustomed to apply for the metals. That celebrated nation, for which Columbus had procured ages of wealthy and fatal sloth by opening to it the mines of America, had suffered itself to run in debt through ignorance and negligence. The calamities of war were added to a vicious administration; it was then the most distressed of powers, and exhibited that so melancholy spectacle in all cases of opulence reduced to poverty. The loss of the galleons, intercepted by the English cruisers, was felt not only by Spain but by all Europe. Though the export of dollars was prohibited in the Peninsula, yet France contrived to extract them by smuggling, thanks to a

long contiguity of territory, and neighbouring countries frequently carried them out of France by the same means. This contraband trade was as solidly established and as widely extended as a lawful traffic. But at this period it was much obstructed by the interruption of the arrivals from America, and it is a singular fact that England herself suffered from that cause. The money hoarded in the cellars of the Spanish governors of Mexico and Peru, ceased to come either to Cadiz or Bayonne, to London or Paris. England was in want of the metals for all purposes, but particularly for the payment of the European coalition; for the colonial produce and other merchandize with which she supplied either Russia or Austria no longer sufficed to discharge the subsidies which she had engaged to pay them. Pitt had himself alleged this reason for contesting with the coalesced powers part of the sums which they demanded. After giving for next to nothing enormous quantities of sugar and coffee to the allies, the British cabinet sent them notes of the Bank of England. Some were actually found in the hands of Austrian officers.

Such were the principal causes of the commercial and financial distress. If the company of *United Merchants*, which then transacted all the business of the Treasury, supply of provisions, discount of *obligations*, discount of Spanish subsidy, had confined itself to the service which it had undertaken, it might, though not without difficulty, have supported the burden. It could no longer get the *obligations of the receivers-general* discounted at one half per cent. per month (6 per cent. per annum); it was as much as it could do to find capitalists who discounted them for itself at three quarters per cent. per month (9 per cent. per annum), which exposed it to an enormous loss. The Treasury, it is true, entered into an agreement with it, and, by indemnifying it for the usury practised by the capitalists, would have had means to facilitate the continuance of its service. But its chief director, M. Ouvrard, had based on this situation an immense plan, certainly very ingenious, and which would have been very advantageous too, if this plan had combined with the merit of invention the still more necessary merit of accurate calculation. As we have seen, the three contractors forming the company of *United Merchants* had divided the parts among them. M. Desprez, formerly cashier to a banker, enriched by his extraordinary skill in the traffic in paper, was charged with the discount of the paper of the Treasury. To M. Vanlerberghe, who was thoroughly acquainted with the corn-trade, was assigned the supply of provisions. M. Ouvrard, the boldest of the three, the most fertile in resources, had reserved the grand speculations for himself. Having accepted from France the paper with which Spain paid her subsidy, and promised to discount it, which had seduced M. de Marbois, he conceived the idea of forming a great connexion with Spain, the mistress of Mexico and Peru, from whose hands issued the metals, the object of universal ambition. He had gone to Madrid, where he found a court sad-

dened by the war, by the yellow fever, by a frightful dearth, and by the importunate demands of Napoleon, whose debtor it was. Nothing of all this appeared to surprise or to embarrass M. Ouvrard. He had charmed by his ease, by his assurance, the old people who reigned at the Escorial, as he had charmed M. de Marbois, by procuring for him the resources that he could not procure for himself. He had at first offered to pay the subsidy due to France for the end of 1803 and for the whole of the year 1804, which was a first relief that came very seasonably. He had then furnished several immediate aids in money, of which the court was in urgent need. He had undertaken, moreover, to ship corn for the Spanish ports, and to procure for the Spanish squadrons provisions which they were in want of. All these services had been accepted with cordial acknowledgments. M. Ouvrard wrote immediately to Paris, and through M. de Marbois, whose favour he possessed, he had obtained the permission usually refused to export from France some cargoes of wheat to Spain. These sudden arrivals had stopped the monopolising of corn in the ports of the Peninsula, and, by putting an end to the dearth, which consisted rather in a fictitious elevation of prices than in a scarcity of grain, M. Ouvrard had relieved, as by enchantment, the severest distresses of the Spanish people. This was more than enough to seduce and to captivate the not very clear-sighted administrators of Spain.

It will naturally be asked with what resources could the court of Madrid pay M. Ouvrard for all the services which it received from him. The means were simple. M. Ouvrard desired that the privilege of bringing over dollars from Mexico should be granted to him. He actually obtained the privilege of shipping them from the Spanish colonies, at the rate of 3 francs 75 centimes, while in France, in Holland, in Spain, they were worth 5 francs at least. This was an extraordinary profit, but assuredly well deserved, if M. Ouvrard could contrive to elude the British cruisers, and to transport from the new world to the old those metals which had become so precious. Spain, which was sinking under her distresses, was extremely happy to realise three fourths of her treasures with the sacrifice of the other fourth. It is not always that the sons of indolent and prodigal families make such advantageous bargains with the stewards who pay ransom for their prodigality.

But how bring over these dollars in spite of Pitt and the English fleets? M. Ouvrard was not more embarrassed by this difficulty than by the others. He conceived the idea of making use of Pitt himself by means of the most singular of combinations. There were Dutch houses, particularly that of Hope & Co., which had establishments both in Holland and England. He devised the scheme of selling them the Spanish dollars at a price which still ensured a considerable profit to his company. It was for these houses to persuade Mr. Pitt to allow them to come from Mexico.

As Pitt was in want of them for his own purposes, it was possible that he would permit a certain sum to pass, although he knew that he was to share it with his enemies. It was a kind of tacit contract, which the Dutch houses in partnership with English houses were to negotiate. Experience subsequently proved that this contract was practicable for a part, if not for the whole. M. Ouvrard had also an idea of employing American houses, which, with his delegation, and thanks to the neutral flag, could go and ship the dollars in the Spanish colonies and carry them to Europe. But the question was to ascertain how many of these dollars Pitt would suffer to be brought, and how many the Americans could bring by favour of their neutrality. If there had been time, such a speculation might have succeeded, have rendered important services to France and Spain, and afforded the company abundant and legitimate profits. Unfortunately, the necessities were extremely urgent. Out of an arrear of 80 or 90 millions, which the French Treasury was obliged to meet with expedients, there were about 30 millions which it owed to the company of *United Merchants*, and which it paid with immovables. It had therefore to bear this first charge. It had, moreover, to furnish this same French Treasury with the amount for a year at least of the Spanish subsidy; that is to say from 40 to 50 millions; it had to discount for it the *obligations* of the receivers-general; it had, lastly, to pay for the corn sent to the ports of the Peninsula and the provisions procured for the Spanish fleets. This was a situation which would not permit the company to await the success of hazardous and distant speculations. Until that success it was obliged to live by expedients. It had pawned to lenders the immovables received in payment. Having contrived, thanks to the complaisance of M. de Marbois, to gain almost complete possession of the portfolio of the Treasury, it extracted from it handfuls of *obligations of the receivers-general*, which it placed in the hands of capitalists, lending their money on pledge at usurious interest. It got part of these same *obligations* discounted by the Bank of France, which, induced by its intimate connexion with the government, refused nothing that was applied for in behalf of the public service. The company received the amount of these discounts in Bank notes, and the situation then resolved itself into an issue, more considerable from day to day, of these Bank notes. But, the metallic reserve not increasing in proportion to the mass of notes issued, the consequence was a positive danger; and it was the Bank, in reality, which had to sustain the weight of every body's embarrassments. Hence voices were raised in the bosom of the council of regency, requiring that a stop should be put to the assistance granted to M. Desprez, representing the company of the *United Merchants*. But other voices, less prudent and more patriotic, that of M. Perregaux in particular, declared against such a proposal, and caused the assistance applied for by M. Desprez to be granted.

The French Treasury, the Spanish Treasury, the company of *United Merchants*, which served to link them together, were like embarrassed houses, which lend each other their signature and assist one another with a credit which they do not possess. But, it must be confessed, the French Treasury was the least cramped of these three associated houses, and it was least liable to suffer much from such a partnership; for, in reality, it was with its sole resources, that is to say, with the *obligations of the receivers general* discounted by the Bank, that all demands were met, and that the Spanish armies as well as the French armies were fed. For the rest, the secret of this extraordinary situation was not known. The partners of M. Ouvrard, whose engagements with him have never been clearly defined, though those engagements have been the subject of long legal proceedings, knew not themselves the full extent of the burden that was about to crush them. Finding themselves already much cramped, they called loudly for M. Ouvrard, and induced M. Marbois, not very capable of judging with his eyes of all the details of a vast management of funds, deceived moreover by a dishonest clerk, had no suspicion to what an extent the resources of the Treasury were abandoned to the company. Napoleon himself, though he extended his indefatigable vigilance to every thing, perceiving in the services a real deficit of no more than about 60 millions, which could be supplied with national domains and different expedients, ignorant of the confusion which had crept in between the operations of the Treasury and those of the *United Merchants*, was not aware of the real cause of the embarrassments and uneasiness that began to be felt. He attributed the pressure prevailing everywhere to the false speculations of French commerce, to the usury which the possessors of capital strove to practise, and railed against men of business nearly in the same manner as he railed against *idéologues*, when he met with ideas that displeased him. Be this as it may, he would not suffer objections to the execution of his orders to be drawn from this state of things. He had demanded 12 millions in specie at Strasburg, and demanded them so imperatively that recourse was had to extreme means to procure them. He had required 10 more millions in Italy, and the company, obliged to buy them at Hamburg, transmitted them to Milan either in specie or in gold, across the Rhine and the Alps. Besides, Napoleon reckoned upon having struck such blows in fifteen or twenty days as to put an end to all embarrassments.

These resources obtained rightly or wrongly from the Treasury, he turned his attention to the conscription and the organisation of the reserve. The annual contingent was then divided into two halves of 30,000 men each, the first called into active service, the second left in the bosom of the population, but liable to be called to join the army on the mere summons of the government. There was still left a great part of the contingent of the years IX., X., XI., XII., and XIII.

These were grown men, whom the government could dispose of by decree. Napoleon called them all, but he determined also to anticipate the levy of the year XIV., comprehending the individuals who would attain the required age between the 23rd of September, 1805, and the 23rd of September, 1806; and as the use of the Gregorian calendar was to be resumed on the 1st of the following January, he directed the young men who would attain the legal age between the 23rd of September and the 31st of December, 1806, to be included in this levy. He resolved therefore to comprise in a single levy of fifteen months all the conscripts to whom the law should be applicable from the month of September, 1805, to the month of December, 1806. This measure would furnish him with 80,000 men, the last of whom would not have completely attained the age of twenty years. But he had no intention of employing them immediately in military service. He purposed to prepare them for the profession of arms by placing them in the third battalions, which composed the *dépôt* of each regiment. These men would thus have a year or two as well to acquire instruction as to gain their full strength, and would form, in fifteen or eighteen months, excellent soldiers, almost as well trained as those of the camp of Boulogne. This was a combination beneficial at once for the health of the men and for their military instruction; for the conscript of twenty, if sent immediately into the field, is soon in the hospital. But this combination, was practicable only for a government which, having an army completely organised to meet the enemy with, had no need of the annual contingent but by way of a reserve.

The Legislative Body not being assembled, time must have been lost in calling it together. Napoleon would not consent to such a delay, and conceived the idea of addressing himself to the Senate, on the ground of two motives: the first, the irregularity of a contingent which comprised more than twelve months and some conscripts under twenty years of age; the second, the urgency of the circumstances. It was overstepping the bounds of legality to act in this manner, for the Senate could not vote either any contribution in money or any contribution in men. It was invested with functions of a different order, such as to prevent the adoption of unconstitutional laws, to fill up gaps in the Constitution, and to watch the acts of the government having an arbitrary taint. To the Legislative Body belonged exclusively the voting of imposts and levies of men. It was a fault to violate that Constitution already too flexible, and to render it a great deal too illusory, by neglecting so easily to observe its forms. It was another fault, not to be more sparing of the employment of the Senate, which had been made the ordinary resource in all difficult cases, and to indicate but too clearly that more dependence was placed on its docility than on that of the Legislative Body. The arch-chancellor Cambacérès, who disliked excesses of power that were not indispensable, made these remarks, and main-

tained that it was necessary, at least for the observance of forms, to attribute by an organic measure the vote of the contingents to the Senate. Napoleon, who, without despising the views of prudence, deferred them to another time when he was in a hurry, would neither lay down a general rule nor postpone the levy of the contingent. In consequence, he ordered a *senatus consultum* grounded on two extraordinary considerations to be prepared: those considerations were the irregularity of the contingent, embracing more than an entire year and the urgency of the circumstances, which would not admit of the delay required for assembling the Legislative Body.

He thought, also, of having recourse to the national guards, instituted by virtue of the laws of 1790, 1791, and 1795. This third coalition having all the characteristics of the two former, though times were changed, though Europe was less adverse to the principles of France, but much more to her greatness, he conceived that the nation owed its government a concurrence as energetic, as unanimous, as formerly. He could not expect ardour, for the revolutionary enthusiasm no longer existed; but he could reckon upon perfect submission to the law on the part of the citizens, and on a deep sense of honour in such of them as the law should summon. He therefore ordered the reorganisation of the national guards, but aimed at the same time to render them more obedient and more soldier-like. To this end, he caused a *senatus consultum* to be prepared, authorising their reorganisation by imperial decrees. He resolved to reserve for himself the nomination of the officers, and to collect in the chasseur and grenadier companies the youngest and most warlike portion of the population. This he destined for the defence of fortresses, and for occasional assemblages at threatened points, such as Boulogne, Antwerp, La Vendée.

These different elements were disposed of in the following manner. Nearly 200,000 soldiers were marching to Germany; 70,000 defended Italy; twenty-one battalions of infantry, and more than fifteen battalions of seamen guarded Boulogne. We have already seen that the regiments were composed of three battalions, two for war, one for the *dépôt*, the latter charged to receive sick and convalescent soldiers, and to train the conscripts. A certain number of these third battalions had already been stationed at Boulogne. All the others were distributed from Mayence to Strasburg. Towards these three points were directed the men remaining to be levied for the years IX., X., XI., XII., and XIII., and the 80,000 conscripts for 1806. They were to be incorporated with the third battalions, in order to be trained and to acquire their full strength. The oldest, when they should be formed, were afterwards to be organised into marching corps, for filling the gaps which war should have made in the ranks of the army. This would be a reserve of 150,000 men, at least, guarding the frontier, and serving to recruit the corps. The national guards, supporting

this reserve, were to be organised in the North and the West, to be in readiness to hasten to the coasts, and in particular to repair to Boulogne and Antwerp, if the English should attempt to burn the flotilla, or to destroy the docks constructed on the Scheldt. Marshal Brune had already been appointed to command at Boulogne. Marshal Lefebvre was to command at Mayence, Marshal Kellermann at Strasburg. These nominations attested the admirable tact of Napoleon. Marshal Brune had a reputation acquired in 1799, by having repulsed a descent of the Russians and English. Marshals Lefebvre and Kellermann, old soldiers, who had been rewarded for their services by a place in the Senate and the honorary baton of marshal, were capable of superintending the organisation of the reserve, while their younger companions in arms were engaged in active warfare. They gave occasion, at the same time, to an infringement of the law, which forbade senators to hold public appointments. This law was extremely displeasing to the Senate, and it was very ingeniously evaded by calling some of its members to train the rear-guard of the national defence.

These arrangements completed, Napoleon directed the measures just enumerated to be carried to the Senate, and presented them himself in an imperial sitting held at the Luxembourg on the 23rd of September. He there spoke, in firm and precise terms, of the continental war, which had come upon him unawares, while he was engaged with the expedition against England, of the explanations demanded from Austria, of the ambiguous answers of that court, of its now demonstrated falsehoods, since its armies had passed the Inn on the 8th of September, at the moment when it was most strongly protesting its love of peace. He appealed to the attachment of France, and promised to have soon annihilated the new coalition. The Senators gave him strong tokens of assent, though, in the bottom of their hearts, they attributed the new continental war to the incorporations of States which had been effected in Italy. In the streets through which the imperial train had to pass, from the Luxembourg to the Tuileries, the popular enthusiasm, damped by distress, was less expressive than usual. Napoleon perceived and was piqued at it, and expressed some vexation to the arch-chancellor Cambacérés. He regarded it as an injustice done him by the people of Paris; but it seemed to inspire him with a determination to excite, before long, shouts of enthusiasm louder and more vehement than had yet rung so frequently in his ears; and he turned his thoughts, which had not time to dwell upon any subject, to the events that were preparing on the banks of the Danube. In haste to depart, he made a regulation for the organisation of the government in his absence. His brother Joseph was appointed president of the Senate; his brother Louis, in quality of constable, was to attend to the levies of men and the formation of the national guards. The arch-chancellor Cambacérés was en-

trusted with the presidency of the Council of State. All matters of business were to be discussed in a Council composed of the ministers and the grand dignitaries, under the presidency of the grand-electeur Joseph. It was settled that couriers, despatched every day, should carry to Napoleon a report on every affair, with the personal opinion of the arch-chancellor Cambacérés. The latter, apprehensive lest Joseph Bonaparte, presiding over the Council of the government, might be hurt at this allotment of the part of supreme critic to one of the members of that Council, made an observation on the subject to Napoleon; but Napoleon suddenly interrupted him, declaring that he would not deprive himself of the aid of most valuable abilities to humour any man's vanity. He persisted. His decisions were to be transmitted to Paris after he had received the report sent by the arch-chancellor. It was only in urgent cases that the Council was authorised not to wait for the decision of the Emperor, and to issue orders which each minister was to execute on his personal responsibility. Thus Napoleon reserved to himself the decision of all matters even during his absence, and made the arch-chancellor Cambacérés the eye of his government, while he was far away from the centre of the Empire.

All about him witnessed his departure with sorrow. They knew not yet the secret of his genius; they were not aware how much he would shorten the war. They feared that it might be long, and they were sure that it would be bloody. They asked themselves what would be the lot of France, if that head should chance to be struck by the bullet that pierced the breast of Turenne, or the ball that fractured the skull of Charles XII.? Besides, all who approached him, abrupt and absolute as he was, could not help loving him. It was, therefore, with deep regret that they saw him depart. He consented to be accompanied as far as Strasburg by the Empress, who was the more strongly attached to him the more fear she felt about the duration of her union with him. He took with him Marshal Berthier, leaving orders for M. de Talleyrand, with a few clerks, to follow the head-quarters at a certain distance. Setting out from Paris on the 24th, Napoleon arrived at Strasburg on the 26th.

To the great astonishment of Europe, the army, which twenty days before was on the shores of the Ocean, was already in the heart of Germany, on the banks of the Mayn, the Neckar, and the Rhine. Never had march more secret, more rapid, been performed in any age. The heads of columns got sight of each other everywhere, at Würzburg, at Mayence, at Strasburg. The joy of the soldiers was at its height, and when they beheld Napoleon, they greeted him with shouts a thousand times repeated of "*Vive l'Empereur!*" That innumerable multitude of troops, infantry, artillery, cavalry, suddenly collected; those convoys of provisions, of ammunition, formed in haste; those long files of horses bought in Switzerland and in Suabia; in short, all these

movements of an army that was not expected a few days before, and which had suddenly made its appearance, presented an unparalleled spectacle, heightened by a military court, at once stern and brilliant, and by an immense concourse of persons curious to see the Emperor of the French setting out for war.

The coalition had hastened on its part, but it was not so well prepared as Napoleon, nor above all so active, though animated by the most ardent passions. It had been agreed between the coalesced powers that they should march their principal forces towards the Danube before winter, that Napoleon might not be able to take advantage of the difficulty of the communications during the bad season for crushing Austria separated from her allies. All the orders of the movement had, therefore, been given for the end of August and the beginning of September. In acting thus, the allies expected to be far in advance of Napoleon, and flattered themselves that they should have it in their power to commence hostilities at any moment which they should deem most seasonable. They had no conception that they should find the French transported so suddenly to the theatre of war.

A Russian force was collecting at Revel, and embarked in the first days of September for Stralsund. It was composed of 16,000 men under the command of general Tolstoy. Twelve thousand Swedes had preceded them to Stralsund. They were to march together through Mecklenburg into Hanover, and to be there joined by 15,000 English, who were to come up the Elbe and land at Cuxhaven. This would form an army of 43,000 men, destined to make an attack from the north. This attack was to be either principal or accessory, according as Prussia joined or did not join in it.

Two large Russian armies, of 60,000 men each, were advancing, the one through Galicia, under general Kutusof, the other through Poland, under general Buxhövdén. The Russian guard, 12,000 strong, picked men, under the grand-duke Constantine, followed the first. An army of reserve, under general Michelson, was forming at Wilna. The young emperor Alexander, hurried by levity into war, clear-sighted enough to perceive his error, but not possessing resolution enough to abandon or correct it by energy of execution—the emperor Alexander, haunted, though he would not avow it, by a secret dread, had not decided till very late upon making the last preparations. The corps of Galicia, which, under general Kutusof, was to come to the assistance of the Austrians, had not reached the frontier of Austria till towards the end of August. It had traversed Galicia from Brody to Olmütz, Moravia from Olmütz to Vienna; and Bavaria from Vienna to Ulm. This was a much greater distance than the French had to travel from Boulogne to Ulm, and the Russians were not such adepts at distant marches as the French. Europe, which has seen our soldiers march, well knows that never were any so expeditious.

The presage of Napoleon, therefore, was accomplished, and already the Russians were behindhand.

The second Russian army, placed between Warsaw and Cracow, in the environs of Pulawi, amounting, with the Russian guards, to 70,000 men, awaited the arrival of the emperor Alexander to receive his directions in regard to Prussia. That monarch had gone to Revel to see the embarkation of his troops before he set out for the army in Poland, and had proceeded to Pulawi, a beautiful residence of the illustrious family of Czartoryski, at some distance from Warsaw. He was there with his young minister for foreign affairs, prince Adam Czartoryski, to communicate the more readily with the court of Berlin.

In company with Alexander was prince Peter Dolgorouki, an officer just starting in the career of arms, full of presumption and ambition, an enemy of that coterie of young wits who governed the empire, striving to persuade the emperor that those young men were faithless Russians, who betrayed Russia to benefit Poland. The fickleness of Alexander gave prince Dolgorouki more than one chance of success. It was false that prince Adam, the most honourable of men, was capable of betraying Alexander. But he hated the court of Prussia, the weakness of which he took for duplicity; he wished, from a sentiment entirely Polish, that the design of using force with that court, if it did not adhere to the views of the coalition should be rigorously executed, that Russia should break with it, and that, trampling down its scarcely formed armies, the Russians should take from it Warsaw and Posen and proclaim Alexander king of reconstituted Poland. This was a perfectly natural wish for a Pole, but an inconsiderate one for a Russian statesman. Napoleon alone was sufficient to beat the coalition; how would it be if the forced alliance of Prussia were given to him?

Besides, it was requiring too much from the irresolute character of Alexander. He had sent his ambassador, M. d'Alopeus to Berlin, to make an appeal to the friendship of Frederick William, to demand of him in the first place a passage through Silesia for the Russian army, and then to insinuate that no doubt was entertained of the concurrence of Prussia in the meritorious work of European deliverance. The negotiator was even authorised to declare to the Prussian cabinet that there must be no hesitation, that neutrality was impossible, that if a passage were not granted with a good grace it would be taken by force. M. d'Alopeus was to be seconded by prince Dolgorouki, aide-de-camp of Alexander. The latter was instructed to let it be clearly perceived at Berlin that there was a fixed determination to win Prussia by caresses or to decide her by violence. Things had even been carried to such a length at Pulawi, that the manifesto which was to precede hostilities was drawn up.

While these strong representations were addressed to Prussia by the Russian agents, she found herself face to face with the

French negotiators, Messrs. Duroc and Laforest, commissioned by Napoleon to offer her Hanover. It will be recollected that the grand-marshal of the palace, Duroc, had left Boulogne to carry this offer to Berlin. The integrity of the young king had not been proof against it; neither had the sentiments of M. de Hardenberg, who was called in Europe the right-thinking minister. M. de Hardenberg perceived but one difficulty in this affair, that was, to find a form which should save the honour of his master in the eyes of Europe. Two months, July and August, had been spent in seeking this form. One had been devised which was ingenious enough. It was the same that the coalition had contrived on its part for commencing the war against Napoleon, that is to say, an armed mediation. The King of Prussia was, for the sake of peace, which, it was alleged, was needed by all the powers, to declare on what conditions the balance of Europe would appear to him sufficiently guaranteed, to state those conditions, and then give it to be understood that he should pronounce in favour of those who should admit them, against those who should refuse to admit them, which signified that he would make half-war along with France in order to gain Hanover. He was, in fact, to adopt in his declaration most of Napoleon's conditions, such as the creation of the kingdom of Italy, with separation of the two crowns at the period of a general peace, the annexation of Piedmont and Genoa to the Empire, the free disposal of Parma and Placentia left to France, the independence of Switzerland and Holland, lastly, the evacuation of Tarento and Hanover at the peace. There was no difficulty but as to the construction to be put upon the independence of Switzerland and Holland. Napoleon, who had then no view upon those two countries, would nevertheless not guarantee their independence in terms which would allow the enemies of France to effect a counter-revolution there. The discussions on this subject were prolonged till the end of the month of September, and the young king of Prussia was about to make up his mind to the violence with which he was threatened, when he clearly perceived from the march of the Russian, Austrian, and French armies that war was inevitable and near at hand. Terrified at this prospect, he fell back, and talked no more either about armed mediation or the acquisition of Hanover, as the price of that mediation. He returned to his ordinary system of neutrality of the north of Germany. Then Messrs. Duroc and Laforest offered him, agreeably to the orders of Napoleon, what the cabinet of Berlin had itself so often demanded, the delivery of Hanover to Prussia, by way of deposit, on condition that the latter should ensure the possession of it to France. But, gratified as King Frederick William would have been by the retreat of the French and the delivery to him of so valuable a deposit, he saw that he should be obliged to oppose the northern expedition, and he still refused. He made a thousand protestations of attachment to Napoleon, to his dynasty, to his govern-

ment, adding that, if he did violence to his sympathies, it was because he was defenceless against Russia on the side of Poland. To this Messrs. Duroc and Laforest replied by the offer of an army of 80,000 French, ready to join the Prussians. But this would still be war, and Frederick William rejected it under this new form. It was at this moment that M. d'Alopeus and prince Dolgorouki arrived at Berlin to require Prussia to declare herself for the coalition. The king was not less frightened at the demands of the one than at the proposals of the others. He replied by protestations exactly like those which he had addressed to the French negotiators. He was, he said, full of attachment for the young friend whose acquaintance he had made at Memel, but he should be the first to incur the vengeance of Napoleon, and he could not expose his subjects to such great dangers, without making himself culpable towards them. The Russian envoys, insisting, told him that the army collected between Warsaw and Cracow, was placed there expressly to succour him; and that it was a friendly forethought of the emperor Alexander; that the 70,000 Russians composing that army were about to cross Silesia and Saxony, on their way to the Rhine, to receive the first shock of the French armies. Frederick William was not to be persuaded by these reasons. The envoys then proceeded still further, and gave him to understand that it was too late; that, not doubting his adhesion, the Russian troops had been already ordered to pass through the Prussian territory. At this kind of violence, Frederick William could no longer contain himself. People were mistaken respecting his character. He was irresolute, which frequently gave him the appearance of weakness and duplicity; but, when driven to extremity, he became obstinate and choleric. Filled with indignation, he convoked a council, to which were summoned the old duke of Brunswick and marshal de Mollendorf, and, notwithstanding his parsimony, decided on putting the Prussian army upon the war footing. Seeing that he was on the point of suffering violence from both, he resolved to take his precautions, and ordered the assembling of 80,000 men, which would cost him 16 million Prussian dollars (64 million francs) to be taken partly from the revenues of the State, partly from the treasury of the great Frederick, a treasury drained during the preceding reign, but replenished during the present by dint of savings.

M. d'Alopeus, alarmed at these dispositions, hastened to write to Pulawi, to advise his emperor, with the most earnest entreaties, to humour the king of Prussia, if he wished not to have all the forces of the Prussian monarchy upon his hands.

When these tidings reached Pulawi, they shook the resolution of Alexander. Prince Adam Czartoryski had warmly urged him to decide not to give Prussia time to defend herself, and to take a passage instead of soliciting it for such a length of time. If Prussia turns to war, said prince Adam, let us declare Alexander

king of Poland and organise that kingdom, in the rear of the Russian armies. If, on the contrary, she complies, we shall have realised the plan of the coalesced powers and gained one more ally. But Alexander, enlightened by the correspondence of M. d'Alopeus, withstood the counsels of his young minister, sent his aide-de-camp Dolgorouki to Berlin to affirm to his royal friend that it had never been his intention to coerce his will, that, on the contrary, he had just given orders for his army to halt on the Prussian frontiers, that this was done in deference to him, but that affairs of such importance could not be settled by means of agents, and that therefore he requested an interview. Frederick William, fearing lest he should suffer as much compulsion from the caresses of Alexander as he could have done from his armies, would rather have declined this interview. His court, however, which leaned to the coalition and to war, and the queen, whose sentiments corresponded with those of the young emperor, persuaded him that he could not refuse it. The interview was fixed for the first days of October. Meanwhile Messrs. Duroc and Laforest were in Berlin, receiving all sorts of assurances of neutrality.

While the Russians were thus employing the month of September, Austria was making better use of that valuable time. She commissioned M. de Cobenzel to repeat incessantly in Paris that her sole desire was to negotiate and to obtain guarantees for the future state of Italy, and was meanwhile availing herself of the English subsidies with the utmost activity. She had, in the first place, assembled 100,000 men in Italy, under the archduke Charles. It was there that she placed her best general and her strongest army, to recover her most regretted provinces. Twenty-five thousand men, under the archduke John, who had commanded at Hohenlinden, guarded the Tyrol; 80 or 90 thousand men were destined to enter Bavaria, proceed to Suabia, and take the famous position of Ulm, where, in 1800, M. de Kray had so long detained general Moreau. The 50 or 60 thousand Russians under general Kutusof, coming to join the Austrian army, would form a mass of 140 or 150 thousand fighting men, which, it was hoped, would give the French occupation enough to afford the other Russian armies time to arrive, the archduke Charles time to reconquer Italy, and the troops sent to Hanover and Naples time to produce a useful diversion. It was the famous general Mack, the same who had formed all the plans of campaign against France, and who came, with great activity and a certain skill in military details, to replace the Austrian army on a war footing—it was this same general who had been appointed to the command of the army of Suabia in conjunction with the archduke Ferdinand.

Advantage had been taken of the towns belonging to Austria in that country to prepare magazines between the Lake of Constance and the upper Danube. The city of Memmingen, situated on the Iller, and forming the left of the position of which Ulm forms the right, was one of these places. Immense stores of pro-

visions had been collected there and some entrenchments thrown up, which could not have been done at Ulm, because it belonged to Bavaria.

All this had been accomplished by the last days of August. But Austria had, by a precipitation not usual with her, committed here an egregious blunder. The position of Ulm could not be occupied without crossing the Bavarian frontier. Besides, Bavaria possessed an army of 25,000 men, large magazines, the line of the Inn, and thus there were all sorts of reasons for being the first to seize such a valuable prey. Austria conceived the idea of acting towards her as Russia was doing towards Prussia, that is to say to surprise and hurry her away. It was easier, it is true, but the consequences, in case of failure, would be disastrous.

On the arrival of general Mack upon the banks of the Inn, prince de Schwarzenberg was sent to Munich to make the strongest solicitations to the elector on the part of the emperor of Germany. He was commissioned to urge him to pronounce in favour of the coalition, to unite his troops with those of Austria, to consent to their being incorporated into the imperial army, dispersed regiment by regiment in the Austrian divisions, to give up his territory, his magazines, to the allies, to join, in short, in the new crusade against the common enemy of Germany and Europe. The prince of Schwarzenberg was even authorised, in case of necessity, to offer to Bavaria in Salzburg, in the Tyrol itself, the fairest aggrandisements, provided that, on the reconquest of Italy by their joint arms, the collateral branches of the imperial house, which had been expelled from that country, could be re-established there.

When prince de Schwarzenberg arrived at Munich, the elector was in much the same situation as Prussia herself. M. Otto, the same who, in 1801, had so ably negotiated the peace of London, was our minister at Munich. Affecting, amidst that capital, to be neglected by the court, he had, nevertheless, secret interviews with the elector, and strove to prove to him that Bavaria existed solely through the protection of Napoleon. It is certain that, on this, as on many other occasions, she could not save herself from Austrian rapacity without the support of France. If, even in 1803, she had obtained a reasonable share of the Germanic indemnities, she owed it entirely to French intervention. M. Otto, by insisting on these considerations, had put an end to the hesitation of the elector, and had induced him to bind himself on the 24th of August by a treaty of alliance. It was a few days afterwards, on the 7th of September, that prince de Schwarzenberg made his appearance at Munich. The elector, who was very feeble, had about him a fresh cause for feebleness, in the electress his wife, one of those three beautiful princesses of Baden, who had ascended the thrones of Russia, of Sweden, and of Bavaria, and who all three were distinguished for their animosity against France. Of the three, the electress of Bavaria was the most vehement. She

fretted, she wept, she manifested extreme vexation, at seeing her husband chained to Napoleon, and rendered him more miserable than he would naturally have been from his own agitation. M. de Schwarzenberg, followed at the distance of two days' march by the Austrian army, and seconded by the tears of the electress, succeeded in shaking the elector and extorting from him a promise to give himself up to Austria. This prince, however, dreading the consequences of this sudden change, fearing general Mack, who was near at hand, and Napoleon too, though he was at a distance, thought it right to inform M. Otto of the circumstance, to excuse his conduct by alleging his unfortunate position, and to solicit the indulgence of France. M. Otto, being thus apprised of the fact, hastened to the elector, represented to him the danger of such a defection and the certainty of soon having Napoleon as conqueror at Munich, making peace by the sacrifice of Bavaria to Austria. Certain circumstances seconded the arguments of M. Otto. The requisition to dislocate the army and to disperse it among the Austrian divisions had roused indignation in the Bavarian generals and officers. News arrived, at the same time, that the Austrians, without waiting for the consent solicited at Munich, had passed the Inn, and public opinion was revolted by such a violation of the territory. People remarked publicly that, if Napoleon was ambitious, Pitt was not less so; that the latter had bought the cabinet of Vienna, and that, thanks to the gold of England, Germany was to be again trampled under foot by the soldiers of all Europe. Independently of these circumstances favourable to M. Otto, the elector had an able minister, M. de Montgelas, fired with ambition for his country, dreaming of securing for Bavaria in the nineteenth century those aggrandisements which Prussia had acquired in the eighteenth, seeking incessantly whether it was in Vienna or in Paris that there was most chance of obtaining them, and having finally concluded that it would be from the most innovating power, that is to say from France. He had, therefore, been in favour of the treaty of alliance signed with M. Otto. Touched, however, by the offers of prince Schwarzenberg, he was shaken for a moment under the influence of ambition, as his master had been under that of weakness. But he was soon brought back, and the solicitations of M. Otto, seconded by the public opinion, by the irritation of the Bavarian army, by the counsels of M. de Montgelas, once more gained the ascendancy. The elector was again won for France. In the agitated state of mind in which that prince was, he did every thing that he was advised to do. It was proposed that he should retire to Würzburg, a bishopric secularised for Bavaria in 1803, and that his army should follow him. He approved this proposal. In order to gain time, he informed M. de Schwarzenberg, that he was going to send to Vienna a Bavarian general, M. de Nogarola, a known partisan of Austria, commissioned to treat there. This done, the elector set out with his whole court, in the

night between the 8th and the 9th of September, and proceeded first to Ratisbon, and from Ratisbon to Würzburg, where he arrived on the 12th of September. The Bavarian troops collected at Amberg and at Ulm received orders to concentrate themselves at Würzburg. The elector, on leaving Würzburg, published a manifesto, denouncing to Bavaria and Germany the violence of which he was the victim.

M. de Schwarzenberg and general Mack, who had passed the Inn, thus saw the elector, his court, and his army, slip out of their hands, and found themselves objects of ridicule as well as of indignation. The Austrians advanced by forced marches, without being able to overtake the Bavarians, and everywhere found the opinion of the country exasperated against them. One circumstance contributed more particularly to irritate the people in Bavaria. The Austrians had their hands full of paper money, not current at Vienna without a great loss. They obliged the inhabitants to take this discredited paper as money. Thus a serious pecuniary injury was added to the galled national feelings to incense the Bavarians.

General Mack, after this pitiful expedition, for which, however, he was less responsible than the Austrian negotiator, marched for the upper Danube, and took the position which had long been assigned him, the right at Ulm, the left on Memmingen, the front covered by the Iller, which runs to Memmingen and falls into the Danube at Ulm. The officers of the Austrian staff had been for some years past incessantly extolling this position as the best that could be occupied for making head against the French debouching from the Black Forest. Here they had one of their wings supported on the Tyrol, the other on the Danube. They thought themselves, therefore, quite secure on both sides, and, as for their rear, they never gave it a thought, not imagining that the French could ever come by any other than the ordinary route. General Mack had drawn to him general Jellachich with the division of the Vorarlberg. He had 65,000 men immediately at hand, and, on his rear, to connect him with the Russians, general Kienmayer at the head of 20,000. This formed a total of 85,000 combatants. General Mack then was just where Napoleon had supposed and wished, that is to say on the upper Danube, separated from the Russians by the distance from Vienna to Ulm. The elector of Bavaria was at Würzburg, with his tearful court, with his army indignant against the Austrians, and in expectation of the speedy arrival of the French.

In order to form a complete idea of the state of Europe during this great crisis, all we have to do now is to cast our eyes on what was passing in the south of Italy. The supreme councillors of the coalition, unwilling that the court of Naples, watched by the 20,000 French under general St. Cyr, should compromise itself too early, had suggested to it a real treachery, which that court, blinded and demoralised by hatred, was not likely to be very

scrupulous about. It had been advised to sign a treaty of neutrality with France, in order to obtain the withdrawal of the corps which was at Tarento. When this corps should have retired, the court of Naples, less closely watched, would have, it was told, time to declare itself, and to receive the Russians and the English. The Russian general Lasey, a prudent and considerate man, was at Naples, commissioned to make secret preparations, and to bring in the allies when the moment should be deemed seasonable. There were 12,000 Russians at Corfu, besides a reserve at Odessa, and 6000 English at Malta. They reckoned further upon 36,000 Neapolitans, somewhat less wretchedly organised than usual, and on the levy *en masse* of the banditti of Calabria.

This treaty, proposed to Napoleon just before his departure from Paris, had appeared acceptable to him, for he did not conceive that so weak a court would risk with him the consequences of such a treachery. He imagined that the terrible example which he had made of Venice in 1797 would have cured the Italian governments of their propensity to knavery. In a treaty of neutrality, excluding the Russians and the English from the south of Italy, he found the advantage of being enabled to give Massena 20,000 more men, if the 50,000 under his command were not sufficient to defend the Adige.

He accepted, therefore, this proposal, and, by a treaty signed at Paris on the 21st of September, he consented to withdraw his troops from Tarento, on the promise made him by the court of Naples not to suffer any landing of the Russians and the English. On this condition, general St. Cyr had orders to march towards Lombardy, and queen Caroline and her weak husband were left at liberty to prepare a sudden levy of troops on the rear of the French.

Such was the situation of the allied powers from the 20th to the 25th of September. The Russians and the Swedes, charged with the attack on the north, joined at Stralsund, to combine with a landing of the English at the mouth of the Elbe; a Russian army was organising at Wilna, under general Michelson; the emperor Alexander, with his corps of guards and Buxhövdén's army, was at Pulawi, on the Vistula, soliciting an interview with the king of Prussia; another Russian army, under general Kutusof, had penetrated through Galicia into Moravia, to join the Austrians. This latter was parallel to Vienna, and was about to ascend the Danube. General Mack, a hundred leagues in advance, had taken position at Ulm, at the head of 85,000 men, awaiting the French at the outlet of the Black Forest. The archduke Charles was on the Adige with 100,000 men. The court of Naples was meditating a surprise, which was to be executed with the Russians from Corfu and the English from Malta.

Napoleon, as we have already seen, had arrived at Strasburg on the 26th of September. His columns had strictly followed his orders and pursued the routes which he had prescribed them.

Marshal Bernadotte, having furnished Hameln with stores, provisions, and a strong garrison, and left there the men least capable of taking the field, had set out from Göttingen with 17,000 soldiers, all fit to encounter any hardship. He had forewarned the elector of Hesse of his passage, with the formalities enjoined by Napoleon. He had at first met with a consent, afterwards with a refusal, to which he had paid no heed, and had crossed Hesse without experiencing any resistance. Officers of administration, preceding his corps, ordered provisions at every station, and, paying for every thing in ready money, found speculators eager to supply the wants of our troops. An army that carries its travelling expenses along with it, can live without magazines, without loss of time, without annoyance to the country through which it is passing, if that country is but moderately stocked with articles of consumption. With this auxiliary, Bernadotte traversed without difficulty the two Hesses, the principality of Fulda, the territories of the prince arch-chancellor, to Bavaria. He marched perpendicularly from north to south. He arrived on the 17th of September near Cassel, on the 20th at Giessen, on the 27th at Würzburg, to the great joy of the elector of Bavaria, who was dying of fright amidst the contradictory tidings of the Austrians and the French. A minister of the emperor of Germany had hastened to that prince, to make excuses for what had happened, and to endeavour to conciliate him. The Austrian minister knew nothing of the march of Bernadotte's corps, till the French cavalry appeared on the heights of Würzburg. He set out immediately, leaving the elector for ever, that is for the whole time that our prosperity lasted.

M. de Montgelas, the better to colour the conduct of his master, solicited from us a precaution far from honourable for Bavaria; which was to alter the date of the treaty of alliance concluded with France. That treaty was signed in reality on the 24th of August. M. de Montgelas expressed a wish to give it another date, that of the 23rd of September. This was assented to, and he was enabled to assert to his confederates at Ratisbon, that he had not given himself up to France till the day after the violences done him by Austria. -

General Marmont, ascending the Rhine, and availing himself of it for the conveyance of his *matériel*, had marched along the fine road which Napoleon had opened on the left bank of the river, and which is one of the memorable works of his reign. On the 12th of September he was at Nimeguen, on the 18th at Cologne, on the 25th at Mayence, on the 26th at Frankfurt, on the 29th in the environs of Würzburg. He brought a corps of 20,000 men, a park of 40 pieces of cannon well horsed, and a considerable supply of ammunition. These 20,000 men included a division of Dutch troops commanded by general Dumoneau. As for the 15,000 French who composed this corps, a fact unexampled in the history of the war will afford a correct idea of their quality. They

had just traversed part of France and Germany, and marched twenty successive days without halting: and on their arrival at Würzburg nine men only were missing. There was not a general who would not have deemed himself fortunate if he had lost no more than two or three hundred, for it is the entering upon a campaign, and the effects of the first marches, that try weakly constitutions, and cause men to lag behind.

Towards the end of September, then, Napoleon had, in the heart of Franconia, six days' march from the Danube, and threatening the flank of the Austrians, marshal Bernadotte with 17,000 men, general Marmont, with 20,000. To these forces must be added 25,000 Bavarians, collected at Würzburg, and animated with real enthusiasm for the cause of the French, which, for the moment, had become their own. They clapped their hands on seeing our regiments appear in sight.

Marshal Davout, with the corps that had marched from Ambleuse, marshal Soult, with that from Boulogne, marshal Ney, with that from Montreuil, traversing Flanders, Picardy, Champagne, and Lorraine, were on the Rhine on the 23rd and 24th of September, preceded by the cavalry, which Napoleon had set in motion four days before the infantry. All had marched with unparalleled ardour. Dupont's division, in passing through the department of the Aisne, had left behind about fifty men belonging to that department. They had gone to see their families, and by the day after the next they had all of them rejoined. After travelling 150 leagues, in the middle of autumn, without resting for a single day, this army had neither sick, nor stragglers, an unexampled circumstance, owing to the spirit of the troops and to a long encampment.

Marshal Augereau had formed his division in Bretagne. Setting out from Brest, passing through Alençon, Sens, Langres, Belfort, he had to cross France in its greatest breadth, and was to be on the Rhine a fortnight after the other corps. Thus, he was destined to act as a reserve.

Never was astonishment equal to that which filled all Europe on the unexpected arrival of this army. It was supposed to be on the shores of the Ocean, and, in twenty days, that is to say in the time required for the report of its march to begin to spread, it appeared on the Rhine, and inundated South Germany. It was the effect of extreme promptness in deciding, and of profound art in concealing, the determinations that were taken.

The news of the appearance of the French spread immediately, and produced in the Austrian generals no other idea than this, that the principal theatre of the war would be in Bavaria and not in Italy, since Napoleon and the army of the Ocean were proceeding thither. The only consequences were an application to augment the Austrian forces in Suabia, and an order, highly displeasing to the archduke Charles, to send a detachment from Italy into the Tyrol, which was then to proceed through the Vorarlberg to the

assistance of general Mack. But the real design of Napoleon continued to be a profound secret. The troops which had joined at Würzburg seemed to have no other errand but to pick up the Bavarians and to protect the elector. The principal force, placed at the upper Rhine, at the entrance of the defiles of the Black Forest, seemed destined to enter there. General Mack, therefore, was more and more confirmed every day in his idea of keeping the position of Ulm, which had been assigned to him.

Napoleon, having collected his whole army, gave it an organisation which it has ever since retained, and a name which it will for ever retain in history, that of the GRAND ARMY.

He divided it into seven corps. Marshal Bernadotte, with the troops brought from Hanover, formed the first corps, 17,000 strong. General Marmont, with the troops from Holland, formed the second, which numbered 20,000 men present under arms. The troops of marshal Davout, encamped at Ambleteuse, and occupying the third place along the coast of the Ocean, had received the designation of third corps, and amounted to an effective force of 26,000 fighting men. Marshal Soult, with the centre of the grand army of the Ocean, encamped at Boulogne and composed of 40,000 infantry and artillery, formed the fourth corps. Suchet's division was destined to be soon detached from it, in order to form part of the fifth corps, with Gazan's division and the grenadiers of Arras, which were henceforward known by the appellation of Oudinot's grenadiers, after the name of their gallant leader. This fifth corps was to consist of 18,000 men besides Suchet's division. It was assigned to the faithful and heroic friend of Napoleon, marshal Lannes, who had been recalled from Portugal to take part in the perilous expedition of Boulogne, and was now summoned to follow the emperor to the banks of the Morawa, the Vistula, and the Niemen. Under the intrepid Ney, the camp of Montreuil composed the sixth corps, and amounted to 24,000 soldiers. Augereau, with two divisions, 14,000 strong at most, placed last on the line of coast—he was at Brest—composed the seventh corps. The name of eighth corps was subsequently given to the Italian troops, when they came to act in Germany. This organisation was that of the army of the Rhine, but with important modifications, adapted to the genius of Napoleon and necessary for the execution of the great things which he meditated.

In the army of the Rhine, each corps, complete in all arms, formed of itself a little army, having every thing within itself and capable of giving battle. Hence these corps had a tendency to separate, especially under a general like Moreau, who commanded only in proportion to his genius and character. Napoleon had organised his army in such a manner that it was entirely in his hand. Each corps was complete in infantry only; it had the necessary artillery, and of cavalry just what was requisite to guard itself well, that is to say, some squadrons of hussars or chasseurs.

Napoleon reserved to himself to complete them afterwards by the aid of a reserve of those two arms, which he alone disposed of. According to the ground and circumstances, he withdrew from one to give to another, either a reinforcement of artillery or a mass of cuirassiers.

Above all, he made a point of keeping together under one chief, and in immediate dependence on his will, the principal mass of his cavalry. As it is with this that one observes the enemy by running incessantly around him, that one completes his defeat when he is staggered, that one pursues and envelops him when in flight, Napoleon resolved to reserve to himself exclusively this means of preparing victory, of deciding it, and of reaping its fruits. He had therefore collected into a single corps the heavy cavalry, composed of cuirassiers and carabincers, commanded by generals Nansouty and d'Haurpoul; to these he had added dragoons on foot as well as mounted, under generals Klein, Walther, Beaumont, Bourcier, and Baraguay d'Hilliers, and had given the command of the whole to his brother-in-law, Murat, who was the most dashing cavalry officer of that day, and who, under his orders, represented the *magister equitum* of the Roman armies. Batteries of flying artillery followed this cavalry, and procured for him, in addition to the might of swords, that of fires. We shall soon see it spreading over the valley of the Danube, upsetting the Austrians and the Russians, entering astonished Vienna pell-mell with them; presently, hastening back to the plains of Saxony and Prussia, pursuing to the shores of the Baltic and carrying off the entire Prussian army, or rushing at Eylau upon the Russian infantry, saving the fortune of Napoleon by one of the most impetuous shocks that ever armed masses have given or received. This reserve numbered 22,000 horsemen, of whom 6000 were cuirassiers, 9 to 10 thousand mounted dragoons, 6000 dragoons on foot, and a thousand horse artillery.

Lastly, the general reserve of the grand army was the imperial guard, the finest *corps d'élite* in the world, serving at once for a means of emulation and a means of reward for such soldiers as distinguished themselves; for they were not introduced into the ranks of this guard till they had proved their prowess. The imperial guard was composed, like the consular guard, of mounted grenadiers and chasseurs, much the same as a regiment, where the companies of *élite* only have been retained. It comprised, moreover, a fine Italian battalion, representing the royal guard of the king of Italy, a superior squadron of Mamelukes, the last memorial of Egypt, and two squadrons of *gendarmérie d'élite*, to perform the police duty of the head-quarters, in all 7000 men. Napoleon had added to it, in large proportion, the arm to which he was partial, because, on certain occasions, it made amends for all the others—artillery. He had formed a park of 24 pieces of cannon, manned and horsed with particular care, which made nearly four pieces to every thousand men.

The guard scarcely ever quitted the head-quarters; it marched almost always beside the Emperor, with Lannes' and Oudinot's grenadiers.

Such was the grand army. It presented a mass of 186,000 combatants really present under the colours. It numbered 38,000 horsemen, and 340 pieces of cannon. If we add to these Massena's 50,000 men, and general St. Cyr's 20,000, we shall have a total of 256,000 French spread from the gulf of Tarento to the mouths of the Elbe, with a reserve of 150,000 young soldiers in the interior. If we further add 25,000 Bavarians, 7 or 8 thousand subjects of the sovereigns of Baden and Wurtemberg ready to fall into line, we may say that Napoleon was going, with 250,000 French, 30 and odd thousand Germans, to fight about 500,000 men belonging to the coalition, 250,000 of whom were Austrians, 200,000 Russians, 50,000 English, Swedes, Neapolitans, having also their reserve in the interior of Austria, of Russia, and in the English fleets. The coalition hoped to join to them 200,000 Prussians. This would not be impossible, if Napoleon did not make haste to conquer.

It was, in fact, urgent for him to commence operations, and he gave orders for passing the Rhine on the 25th and 26th of September, after sacrificing two or three days to rest the men, to repair some damages to the harness of the cavalry, to exchange some wounded and jaded horses for fresh horses, a great number of which had been collected in Alsace, and lastly to prepare a large park and a considerable quantity of biscuit. His dispositions for turning the Black Forest, behind which general Mack, encamped at Ulm, was waiting for the French, were these.

If we fix our eyes upon that country so often traversed by our armies, and for that reason so frequently described in this history, we see the Rhine issuing from the Lake of Constance, running westward as far as Basle, then suddenly turning and running almost direct north. We see the Danube, on the contrary, rising from some petty springs very near the point where the Rhine issues from the Lake of Constance, taking its course to the east, and following that direction with very few deviations to the Black Sea. It is a chain of mountains of very moderate height, most improperly called the Suabian Alps, that thus separates the two rivers, and sends the Rhine to the seas of the North, the Danube to the seas of the East. These mountains turn their steepest declivities towards France, and subside by a gradual slope, in the plains of Franconia, between Nordlingen and Donauwerth. From their riven flank, clothed with woods, called by the general name of Black Forest, run to the left, that is to say, towards the Rhine, the Neckar and the Mayn; to the right, the Danube, which runs along the back of them, nearly bare of wood and formed into terraces. Through them run narrow defiles which you must necessarily traverse in going from the Rhine to the Danube, unless you choose to avoid those mountains, either by ascending the Rhine

to above Schaffhausen, or by travelling along the foot of them from Strasburg to Nordlingen and into the plains of Franconia, where they disappear. In the preceding war, the French had alternately taken two routes. Sometimes debouching from the Rhine, between Strasburg and Huningen, they had traversed the defiles of the Black Forest; sometimes ascending the Rhine to Schaffhausen, they had crossed that river near the Lake of Constance, and found themselves at the sources of the Danube, without passing through the defiles.

Napoleon, purposing to place himself between the Austrians who were posted at Ulm, and the Russians who were coming to their assistance, was obliged to take another route. Studying in the first place to fix the attention of the Austrians on the defiles of the Black Forest by the appearance of his columns ready to enter it, he meant then to proceed along the foot of the Suabian Alps, without crossing them, as far as Nordlingen, to turn, with all his united columns their lowered extremity, and to pass the Danube at Donauwerth. By this movement he should form a junction on the way with the corps of Bernadotte and Marmont, which would have already reached Würzburg, he should turn the position of Ulm, debouch on the rear of general Mack, and execute the plan long settled in his mind, and from which he expected immense results.

On the 25th of September, he ordered Murat and Lannes to pass the Rhine at Strasburg, with the reserve of cavalry, Oudinot's grenadiers, and Gazan's division. Murat was to proceed with his dragoons from Oberkirch to Freudenstadt, from Offenburg to Rothweil, from Freiburg to Neustadt, and thus appear at the head of the principal defiles, so as to induce a supposition that the army itself was to pass through them. Provisions were bespoken along this route, to complete the delusion of the enemy. Lannes was to support these reconnaissances by a few battalions of grenadiers, but, in reality, placed with the bulk of his corps in advance of Strasburg, on the Stuttgart road, he had orders to cover the movement of marshals Ney, Soult, and Davout, who were directed to cross the Rhine lower down. General Songis, who commanded the artillery, had thrown two bridges of boats, the first between Lauterburg and Carlsruhe for the corps of marshal Ney, the second in the environs of Spire for the corps of marshal Soult. Marshal Davout had at his disposal the bridge of Manheim. These marshals were to cross the valleys which descend from the chain of the Suabian Alps and to skirt that chain, supporting themselves one upon the other, so as to be able to assist each other in case of the sudden appearance of the enemy. All of them had orders to be provided with four days' bread in the soldiers' knapsacks, and four days' biscuit in the baggage-waggons, in case they should be obliged to make forced marches. Napoleon did not leave Strasburg till he saw his parks and his reserves move off under the escort of a division of infantry. He passed the Rhine on the 1st

of October, accompanied by his guard, after taking leave of the empress, who remained at Strasburg, with the imperial court, and the chancellery of M. de Talleyrand.

On reaching the territory of the grand-duke of Baden, Napoleon found the reigning family, which had come to meet and pay him homage. The old elector presented himself surrounded by three generations of princes. Like all the second and third-rate sovereigns of Germany, he had been desirous to obtain the boon of neutrality, an absolute chimera under such circumstances; for when the petty German powers are not able to prevent war by resisting the great powers which are intent on it, they must not flatter themselves that they can obviate its calamities by a neutrality which is impossible, because they are almost all in the obligatory track of the belligerent armies. Napoleon had offered them his alliance instead of neutrality, promising to settle to their advantage the questions of territory or of sovereignty, which separated them from Austria ever since the unfinished arrangements of 1803. The grand-duke of Baden concluded to accept that alliance, and promised to furnish 3000 men, besides provisions and means of conveyance, to be paid for in the country itself. Napoleon, after sleeping at Ettlingen, set out on the 2nd of October for Stuttgart. Before his arrival, a collision had well-nigh taken place between the elector of Wurtemberg and marshal Ney. That elector, known throughout Europe for the extreme warmth of his temper and disposition, was at that moment discussing with the minister of France the conditions of an alliance which he greatly disliked. But he insisted that, till the conclusion of this business, no French troops should enter either Louisburg, which was his country residence, or Stuttgart, which was his capital. Marshal Ney did consent not to enter Louisburg, but he ordered his artillery to be pointed against the gates of Stuttgart, and by these means obtained admission. Napoleon arrived opportunely to appease the anger of the elector. He was received by him with great magnificence, and stipulated with him an alliance, which has founded the greatness of that house, as similar alliances have founded that of all the princes of the south of Germany. The treaty was signed on the 5th of October, and contains an engagement on the part of France to aggrandise the house of Wurtemberg, and, on the part of that house, to furnish 10,000 men, besides provisions, horses, carriages, which were to be paid for when taken.

Napoleon stayed three or four days at Louisburg, to allow his corps on the left time to get into line. It was a most delicate position to brush, for forty leagues, the skirts of an enemy 80 or 90 thousand strong, without rousing him too much, and at the risk of seeing him debouch on a sudden upon one of his wings. Napoleon provided against this with admirable art and foresight. Three routes ran across Wurtemberg and terminated at those lowered extremities of the Suabian Alps, which it was necessary

to reach in order to arrive at the Danube between Donauwerth and Ingolstadt. The principal was that of Pforzheim, Stuttgart, Heidenheim, which skirted the very flanks of the mountains, and which was in communication, by a great number of defiles, with the position of the Austrians at Ulm. It was this that required to be traversed with the greatest precaution, on account of the proximity of the enemy. Napoleon occupied it with Murat's cavalry, the corps of marshal Lannes, that of marshal Ney, and the guard. The second, which, running from Spire, passed through Heilbronn, Hall, Ellwangen, and terminated in the plain of Nordlingen, was occupied by the corps of marshal Soult. The third, running from Mannheim, passing through Heidelberg, Neckar-Elz, and Ingelfingen, terminated at Oettingen. It was by this that marshal Davout marched. It approached towards the direction which the corps of Bernadotte and Marmont were to follow, in proceeding from Würzburg to the Danube. Napoleon arranged the march of these different columns so as that they should all arrive from the 6th and 7th of October in the plain extending along the Danube, between Nordlingen, Donauwerth, and Ingolstadt. But in this revolving movement, his left wheeling upon his right, the latter had to describe a less extensive circle than the former. He was therefore obliged to make his right slacken its pace, in order to give the corps of Marmont and Bernadotte, which formed the extreme left, marshal Davout's which came next to them, lastly, marshal Soult's, which came after marshal Davout's, and connected them all with the head-quarters, time to finish their revolving movement.

After waiting sufficiently, Napoleon set himself in march on the 4th of October, with the whole of his right. Murat, galloping incessantly at the head of his cavalry, appeared by turns at the entrance of each of the defiles which run through the mountains, merely showing himself there and then withdrawing his squadrons as soon as the artillery and baggage had made so much way as to have nothing to fear. Napoleon, with the corps of Lannes, Ney, and the guards, followed the Stuttgart route, ready to hasten with 50,000 men to the assistance of Murat, if the enemy should appear in force in one of the defiles. As for the corps of Soult, Davout, Marmont, and Bernadotte, forming the centre and the left of the army, their danger did not begin till the movement that was executing, by marching along the foot of the Suabian Alps, was finished, and they should debouch in the plain of Nordlingen. It was possible, in fact, that general Mack, being timely apprised, might fall back from Ulm upon Donauwerth, cross the Danube, and come to this plain of Nordlingen to fight, for the purpose of stopping the French. Napoleon had so arranged things that Murat, Ney, Lannes, and with them the corps of marshals Soult and Davout, at least, should converge together on the 6th of October between Heidenheim, Oettingen, and Nordlingen, in such a manner as to present an imposing mass to the

enemy. But till then his incessant study was to deceive general Mack so long that he should not think of decamping, and that the French might reach the Danube at Donauwerth before he had quitted his position at Ulm. On the 4th and on the 6th of October, every thing continued to wear the best aspect. The weather was splendid; the soldiers, well provided with shoes and great coats, marched merrily. One hundred and twenty-four thousand French advanced thus on a line of battle of 26 leagues, the right touching upon the mountains, the left converging towards the plains of the Upper Palatinate, capable of being collected in a few hours to the number of 90 or 100 thousand men on one or the other of their wings, and, what is more extraordinary, without the Austrians having the least idea of this vast operation.

“The Austrians,” wrote Napoleon to M. de Talleyrand and to marshal Augereau, “are on the debouchés of the Black Forest. God grant that they may remain there! My only fear is that we shall frighten them too much. . . . If they allow me to gain a few more marches, I hope to have turned them and to find myself, with my whole army, between the Lech and the Isar.”—He wrote to the minister of the police: “Forbid the newspapers of the Rhine to make any more mention of the army than if it did not exist.” To reach the points indicated to them, the corps of Bernadotte and Marmont were to cross one of the provinces which Prussia possessed in Franconia, that of Anspach. By drawing them nearer to the corps of marshal Davout, Napoleon could, in fact, have brought them closer to him, and thus avoided entering the Prussian territory. But the roads were already encumbered; to have accumulated more troops in them would have occasioned inconvenience for the order of the movement and for the supply of provisions. Besides, by contracting the circle described by the army, he would have diminished the chances of enveloping the enemy. Napoleon purposed to embrace in his movement the course of the Danube as far as Ingolstadt, in order to debouch as far as possible in the rear of the Austrians, and to be able to stop them, in case they should fall back from the Iller to the Lech. Not imagining, from the state of his relations with Prussia, that she could make any difficulty towards him, reckoning upon the custom established in the late wars of traversing the Prussian provinces in Franconia, because they were out of the line of neutrality, having received no intimation that a different course would be adopted in this, Napoleon made no scruple to borrow the territory of Anspach, and gave orders to Marmont’s and Bernadotte’s corps accordingly. The Prussian magistrates appeared on the frontier, to protest in the name of their sovereign against the violence that was done them. In reply the orders of Napoleon were produced, and the troops passed on, paying in specie for all that was taken, and observing the strictest discipline. The Prussian subjects, well paid for the bread and the meat with which they

supplied our soldiers, did not appear to be much irritated at the alleged violation of their territory.

On the 6th of October, our six corps d'armée had arrived with out accident beyond the Suabian Alps, marshal Ney at Heidenheim, marshal Lannes at Neresheim, marshal Davout at Oettingen, general Marmont and marshal Bernadotte on the Aichstädt road, all in sight of the Danube, considerably beyond the position of Ulm.

What, meanwhile, were general Mack, the archduke Ferdinand, and all the officers of the Austrian staff, about? Most fortunately, the intention of Napoleon was not revealed to them. Forty thousand men, who had passed the Rhine at Strasburg, and who had plunged at once into the defiles of the Black Forest, had confirmed them in the idea that the French would pursue the accustomed track. False reports of spies, artfully dispatched by Napoleon, had confirmed them still more in this opinion. They had heard, indeed, of some French troops spread in Wurtemberg, but they supposed that they were coming to occupy the petty States of Germany, and perhaps to assist the Bavarians. Besides, nothing is more contradictory, more perplexing, than that multitude of reports of spies or of officers sent on reconnoissance. Some of them place corps d'armée where they have met with detachments only, others mere detachments where they ought to have found corps d'armée. Frequently they have not seen with their own eyes what they report, and they have merely picked up the hearsays of terrified, surprised, or astonished persons. The military, like the civil, police, lies, exaggerates, contradicts itself. In the chaos of its reports the superior mind discerns the truth, while the weak mind is lost. And, above all, if any anterior prepossession exists, if one is disposed to believe that the enemy will come by one point rather than by another, the facts collected are all interpreted in a single sense, how far soever they may be from admitting of it. In this manner are produced great errors, which sometimes ruin armies and even empires.

Such was at this moment general Mack's state of mind. The Austrian officers had long extolled the position, which, supporting its right at Ulm, its left at Memmingen, faced the French debouching from the Black Forest. Authorized by an opinion which was general, and in obedience, moreover, to positive instructions, general Mack had established himself in this position. He had there his provisions, his military stores, and nothing would have persuaded him that he was not most conveniently placed there. The only precaution which he had taken upon his rear consisted in sending general Kienmayer, with a few thousand men, to Ingolstadt, to observe the Bavarians who had fled to the Upper Palatinate, and to connect himself with the Russians, whom he expected by the high road from Munich.

While general Mack, with a mind prepossessed with an opinion formed beforehand, remained motionless at Ulm, the six corps of

the French army debouched on the 6th of October in the plain of Nordlingen, beyond the mountains of Suabia, which they had turned, and on the banks of the Danube, which they were about to cross. On the evening of the 6th, Vandamme's division, belonging to marshal Soult's corps, outstripping all the others, reached the Danube, and surprised the bridge of Münster, a league above Donauwerth. On the 7th of October, the corps of marshal Soult took the bridge of Donauwerth itself, faintly disputed by a battalion of Collorede's, which, unable to defend, endeavoured in vain to destroy it. The troops of marshal Soult speedily repaired it, and passed over in the greatest haste. Murat, with his divisions of dragoons, preceding the right wing, formed of the corps of marshals Lannes and Ney, had proceeded to the bridge of Münster, already surprised by Vandamme. He claimed that bridge for his troops and those which were following him, left that of Donauwerth to marshal Soult's troops, passed instantly with a division of dragoons, and dashed off on the other side of the Danube, in pursuit of an object of great interest, the occupation of the bridge of Rain on the Lech. The Lech, which runs behind the Iller, nearly parallel to the latter, and falls into the Danube near Donauwerth, forms a position situated beyond that of Ulm, and, by occupying the bridge of Rain, the French would have turned both the Iller and the Lech, and left general Mack few chances of falling back to good purpose. It took but the time required for Murat's dragoons to gallop the distance to make themselves masters of Rain and the bridge over the Lech. Two hundred horse overturned all the patrols of Kienmayer's corps, while marshal Soult established himself in force at Donauwerth, and marshal Davout came in sight of the bridge of Neuburg.

Napoleon repaired the same day to Donauwerth. His hopes were now realised, but he did not consider himself completely sure of success till he had won the very last result of his admirable manœuvre. Some hundreds of prisoners had been already taken, and their reports were unanimous. General Mack was at Ulm on the Iller: it was his rear-guard, commanded by General Kienmayer, and intended to connect him with the Russians, which the French had just fallen in with and driven across the Danube. Napoleon immediately determined to take a position between the Austrians and the Russians, so as to prevent their junction. The first movement of General Mack's, had he been capable of a timely resolve, ought to have been to quit the banks of the Iller, to fall back upon the Lech, to pass through Augsburg, in order to join general Kienmayer on the Munich road. Napoleon, without losing a moment, ordered the following dispositions. He would not throw Ney's corps beyond the Danube, but left it on the roads running from Wurtemberg to Ulm, to guard the left bank of the Danube, by which we arrived. He directed Murat and Lannes to pass to the right bank by the two bridges which the French were masters of, those of Münster and Donauwerth, to

ascend the river, and to place themselves between Ulm and Augsburg, to prevent general Mack from retreating by the high road from Augsburg to Munich. The intermediate point which they had to occupy was Burgau. Napoleon ordered marshal Soult to leave the mouth of the Lech, where he was in position, to ascend that tributary of the Danube to Augsburg, with the three divisions of St. Hilaire, Vandamme, and Legrand. Suchet's division, the fourth of marshal Soult's, was already placed, under the command of Lannes. Thus marshal Ney, with 20,000 men on the left bank of the Danube, which had been abandoned, Murat and Lannes, with 40,000 on the right, which had just been taken possession of, marshal Soult, with 30,000 on the Lech, surrounded general Mack, by whatever outlet he might attempt to escape.

Turning his immediate attention from this point to others, Napoleon ordered marshal Davout to hasten and cross the Danube at Neuburg, and to clear Ingolstadt, towards which Marmont and Bernadotte were proceeding. The route followed by these latter was longer; they were two marches behind-hand. Marshal Davout was then to proceed to Aichach on the Munich road, to push general Kienmayer before him, and to form the rear-guard of the masses which were accumulating around Ulm. The corps of Marmont and Bernadotte had orders to quicken their pace, to cross the Danube at Ingolstadt, and to march for Munich, in order to replace the elector in his capital, barely a month after he had quitted it. It was for marshal Bernadotte, at this moment the companion of the Bavarians, that Napoleon reserved the honour of reinstating them in their country. By this disposition, Napoleon would present to the Russians coming from Munich Bernadotte and the Bavarians, then, in case of emergency, Marmont and Davout, who were to march, according to circumstances, either upon Munich or Ulm, to assist in the complete investment of general Mack.

On the following day, the 8th of October, marshal Soult ascended the Lech, on his way to Augsburg. He found no enemies before him. Murat and Lannes, destined to occupy the space comprised between the Lech and the Iller, ascended from Donauwerth to Burgau, through a country presenting some slight obstructions, covered here and there with woods, and traversed by several small rivers, tributaries of the Danube. The dragoons were marching at the head, when they met with a hostile corps, more numerous than any which they had yet seen, posted around and in advance of a large village called Wertingen. This hostile corps was composed of six battalions of grenadiers and three of fusileers, commanded by baron d'Auffenberg, of two squadrons of duke Albert's cuirassiers, and two squadrons of Latour's light horse. They had been sent on reconnaissance by general Mack, on the circulation of a vague rumour or the appearance of Frenchmen on the banks of the Danube. He still conceived that these French must belong to Bernadotte's

corps, posted, it was said, at Würzburg, to assist the Bavarians. The Austrian officers were at dinner when they were informed that the French were in sight. They were extremely surprised, refused at first to believe the report, but could not long doubt its accuracy, and they mounted their horses precipitately, to put themselves at the head of their troops. In advance of Wertingen, there was a hamlet named Hohenreichen, guarded by a few hundred Austrians, foot and horse. Sheltered by the houses of this hamlet, they kept up a galling fire, and held in check a regiment of dragoons which first arrived on the spot. The *chef d'escadron* Excellmans, the same who has since signalized his name by so many brilliant acts, then no more than aide-de-camp to Murat, had hastened up at the sound of the firing. He induced two hundred dragoons to dismount cheerfully, when, musket in hand, they rushed into the hamlet, and dislodged those who occupied it. Fresh detachments of dragoons had meanwhile come up; the Austrians were pressed more warmly; the assailants penetrated in pursuit of them into Wertingen, passed that village, and found, on a sort of plateau, the nine battalions formed into a single square, of small extent, but close and deep, having cannon and cavalry on its wings. The brave *chef d'escadron* Excellmans, immediately charged this square with extraordinary boldness, and had a horse killed under him. At his side colonel Meaupetit was upset by the thrust of a bayonet. But, vigorous as was the attack, there was no breaking this compact mass. Some time was thus spent, the French dragoons endeavouring to cut down the Austrian grenadiers, who returned their efforts with thrusts of the bayonet and the fire of their pieces. Murat at length came up with the bulk of his cavalry, and Lannes with Oudinot's grenadiers, both drawn in haste by the reports of the cannon. Murat immediately ordered his squadrons to charge the enemy's square, and Lannes directed his grenadiers upon the margin of a wood which was seen in the back-ground, so as to cut off the retreat of the Austrians. The latter, charged in front, threatened in rear, fell back at first in a close mass, but presently in disorder. If Oudinot's grenadiers could have reached the ground a few moments earlier, the whole of the nine battalions would have been made captive. Two thousand prisoners, several pieces of cannon, and several colours, were nevertheless taken.

Lannes and Murat, who had seen the *chef d'escadron* Excellmans at the point of the hostile bayonets, determined to send him to Napoleon with the news of the first success obtained, and the colours taken from the enemy. The Emperor received the young and dashing officer at Donauwerth, granted him rank in the Legion of Honour, and delivered the insignia to him in the presence of his staff, to give the greater *éclat* to the first rewards earned in this war.

On this same day, October the 8th, marshal Soult entered Augsburg, without striking a blow. Marshal Davout had crossed

the Danube at Neuburg, and proceeded to Aichach to take the intermediate position assigned to him, between the French corps going to invest Ulm, and those going to Munich to make head against the Russians. Marshal Bernadotte and general Marmont made preparations for passing the Danube towards Ingolstadt, with the intention of repairing to Munich.

Napoleon ordered the position of Ulm to be straitened. He enjoined marshal Ney to ascend the left bank of the Danube, and to make himself master of all the bridges over the river, in order to be enabled to act on both banks. He directed Murat and Lannes, on their side, to ascend the right bank, and to contribute with Ney to the closer investment of the Austrians. Next day, marshal Ney, prompt at executing the orders which he received, especially when those orders brought him nearer to the enemy, reached the bank of the Danube, and ascended it till he was opposite to Ulm. The first bridges that he met with were those of Günzburg. He charged Malher's division to take them.

These bridges were three in number. The principal was before the small town of Günzburg; the second above, at the village of Leipheim; the third below, at the small hamlet of Reisenburg. General Malher ordered them all to be attacked at once. He charged the staff-officer Lefol to attack that of Leipheim with a detachment, and general Labassée to attack that of Reisenburg with the 59th of the line. He reserved for himself, at the head of Marcognet's brigade, the attack of the principal bridge, that of Günzburg. The bed of the Danube not being regularly formed in this part of its course, it was necessary to cross a multitude of islands and petty channels, bordered with willows and poplars. The advanced guards rushed resolutely forward, forded all the waters that impeded their progress, and took two or three hundred Tyrolese, with major-general baron d'Aspre, who commanded at this point. Our troops soon arrived at the principal arm, over which was erected the bridge of Günzburg. The Austrians, on retiring, had destroyed part of the flooring of the bridge. General Malher would have had it repaired; but on the other bank were posted several Austrian regiments, a numerous artillery, and the archduke Ferdinand himself, who had hastened thither with considerable reinforcements. The Austrians began to comprehend how serious was the operation undertaken on their rear, and they resolved to make a strong effort to save at least the bridges nearest to Ulm. They poured a murderous fire of musketry and artillery upon the French. These, being no longer screened by woody islands, and remaining uncovered on the strand, endured this fire with extraordinary firmness. To ford the river was impossible. They clambered up the piles of the bridge for the purpose of repairing it with planks. But the workmen, picked off one by one by the balls of the enemy, could not accomplish it, and the French lines, exposed meanwhile to the fire of the Austrians, sustained a

heavy loss. General Malher made them fall back to the wooded islands, in order not to prolong a useless temerity.

This fruitless attempt had cost some hundreds of men. The two other attacks were made simultaneously. Impassable marshes had rendered that of Leipheim impracticable. That of Reisenburg had been more successful. General Labassée, having at his side colonel Lacuée, commandant of the 59th, had advanced with this regiment to the margin of the great arm of the Danube. Here also the Austrians had destroyed part of the planks of the bridge, but not so completely as to prevent our soldiers from repairing and passing it. The 59th crossed the bridge, took Reisenburg and the surrounding heights, in spite of at least treble their force. Its colonel, Lacuée, was killed there, fighting at the head of his soldiers. On seeing a French regiment thrown unsupported across the Danube, the Austrian cavalry hastened up to the assistance of the infantry, and most furiously charged the 59th, formed into a square. Thrice did it rush upon the bayonets of that brave regiment, and thrice was it stopped by the fire close to the muzzles of the guns. The 59th remained master of the field of battle after efforts the memory of which deserves to be perpetuated.

One of the three bridges being crossed, general Malher moved his whole division upon Reisenburg towards evening. The Austrians then did not care to persist in disputing Günzburg. They fell back upon Ulm in the night, leaving the French 1000 prisoners and 300 wounded. Great honours were paid to colonel Lacuée. The divisions of Ney's corps, assembled at Günzburg, attended his funeral on the 8th, and paid unanimous regrets to his memory. Marshal Ney placed Dupont's division on the left bank of the river, and sent Malher's and Loison's divisions to the right bank, to keep up the communication with Lannes.

Napoleon remained till the evening of the 9th at Donauwerth. He then set out for Augsburg, because that was the centre for collecting intelligence and for issuing directions. At Augsburg he was between Ulm on one side and Munich on the other, between the army of Suabia which he was about to envelop, and the Russians whose approach general rumour was proclaiming. His object in staying away from Ulm for a day or two was to concentrate the command there; and, from a reason of relationship much more than from a reason of superiority, he placed marshals Ney and Lannes under the orders of Murat, which highly displeased them, and produced sad bickering. These were embarrassments inseparable from the new system established in France. A republic has its inconveniences, which are sanguinary rivalships; and monarchy has its inconveniences which are family compliances. Thus Murat had at his disposal about 60,000 men, to keep general Mack in check under the walls of Ulm.

On his arrival at Augsburg, Napoleon found marshal Soult there with the fourth corps. Marshal Davout had established

himself at Aichach; general Marmont followed him; Bernadotte was on the road to Munich. The French army was in nearly the same situation as it had been at Milan, when, after miraculously crossing the St. Bernard, it was in the rear of general Melas, seeking to envelop him, but ignorant of the route by which it might catch him. The same uncertainty prevailed in regard to the plans of general Mack. Napoleon set about studying what he might be tempted to do in so urgent a danger, and was puzzled to guess; in fact, general Mack himself did not know it. You have greater difficulty to guess the intentions of an irresolute than of a resolute adversary, and if the uncertainty were not likely to ruin you to-morrow, it might serve you to deceive the enemy to-night. In this state of doubt, Napoleon attributed to general Mack the most reasonable design, that of retreating through the Tyrol. That general, in fact, if he directed his course to Memmingen, on the left of the position of Ulm, would have but two or three marches to make in order to reach the Tyrol by way of Kempten. He would thus connect himself with the army which was guarding the chain of the Alps, and with that which occupied Italy. He would save himself and contribute to form a mass of 200,000 men, a mass always formidable, what position soever it occupies on the general theatre of operations. He would, at any rate, escape a catastrophe for ever celebrated in the annals of war.

Napoleon, therefore, attributed to him this design, without dwelling upon another idea which general Mack might have conceived, and which he did conceive for a moment, that of fleeing by the left bank of the Danube, guarded by only one of the divisions of marshal Ney, Dupont's division. This desperate step was the least supposable, for it required extraordinary boldness. It could not be taken without crossing the route which the French had followed, and which was still covered with their equipages and their depôts; and it would perhaps expose those who had to execute it to the danger of meeting with them *en masse*, and fighting their way through them in order to retreat into Bohemia. Napoleon did not admit such a probability, and concerned himself only about barring the routes to the Tyrol. Accordingly, he ordered marshal Soult to ascend the Lech to Landsberg, for the purpose of occupying Memmingen, and intercepting the road from Memmingen to Kempten. He sent general Marmont's corps to Augsburg, to take the place of marshal Soult's. In that city he likewise established his guard, which habitually accompanied the head-quarters. There he awaited the movements of his different corps-d'armée, rectifying their march whenever that was needed.

Bernadotte, pushing the rear-guard of Kienmayer, entered Munich on the morning of the 12th, precisely a month after the invasion of the Austrians and the retreat of the Bavarians. He took about a thousand prisoners from the enemy's detachment, which he pushed before him. The Bavarians, transported with

joy, received the French with vehement applause. It was impossible to come either more expeditiously or more surely to the aid of their allies, especially when they had been a few days before at the extremity of the continent, on the shores of the Channel. Napoleon wrote immediately to the elector, to induce him to return to his capital. He invited him to come back with the whole Bavarian army, which would have been useless at Würzburg, and which was destined to occupy the line of the Inn conjointly with Bernadotte's corps. Napoleon recommended that it should be employed in making reconnaissances, because the country was familiar to it, and it could give the best intelligence respecting the march of the Russians, who were coming by the road from Vienna to Munich.

Marshal Soult, sent towards Landsberg, met with nothing there but prince Ferdinand's cuirassiers, who fell back upon Ulm by forced marches. So great was the ardour of our troops that the 26th chasseurs were not afraid to measure their strength with the Austrian heavy cavalry, and took from it an entire squadron, with two pieces of cannon. This rencounter evidently proved that the Austrians, instead of running away towards the Tyrol, were concentrating themselves behind the Iller, between Memmingen and Ulm, and that they would there find a new battle of Marengo. Napoleon prepared to fight it with the greatest possible mass of his forces. He supposed that it might take place on the 13th or 14th of October, but not being hurried, as the Austrians did not take the initiative, he preferred the 14th, that he might have more time for collecting his troops. He first modified the position of marshal Davout, whom he moved from Aichach to Dachau, so that this marshal, in an advantageous post between Augsburg and Munich, could, in three or four hours, either advance to Munich, to oppose, with Bernadotte and the Bavarians, 60,000 combatants to the Russians, or fall back towards Augsburg, to second Napoleon in his operations against the army of general Mack. Having taken these precautions on his rear, Napoleon made the following dispositions on his front, with a view to that supposed battle of the 14th. He ordered marshal Soult to be established on the 13th at Memmingen, pressing that position with his left, and connecting himself by his right with the corps which were about to be moved upon the Iller. He sent his guard to Weissenhorn, whither he resolved to proceed himself. He hoped in this manner to assemble 100,000 men in a space of ten leagues, from Memmingen to Ulm. The troops, in fact, being able in one day to make a march of five leagues and to fight, it was easy for him to collect on one and the same field of battle the corps of Ney, Lannes, Murat, Marmont, Soult, and the guard. Fate, however, reserved for him a totally different triumph from that which he anticipated, a newer triumph, and not less astonishing for its vast consequences.

Napoleon left Augsburg on the 12th, at 11 o'clock at night,

for Weissenhorn. On the road he fell in with Marmont's troops, composed of French and Dutch, overwhelmed with fatigue, laden at once with their arms, and their rations of provisions for several days. The weather, which had been fine till the passage of the Danube, had become frightful. Thick snow, melting as it fell, was converted into mud, and rendered the roads impassable. All the little streams which run into the Danube were overflowed. The soldiers proceeded through absolute bogs, frequently impeded in their march by convoys of artillery. Nevertheless, not a murmur was heard. Napoleon stopped to harangue them: he made them form a circle around him, explained to them the situation of the enemy, and the manœuvre by which he had surrounded them, and promised them a triumph as glorious as that of Marengo. The soldiers, intoxicated by his speech, proud of seeing the greatest captain of the age explain his plans to them, burst forth into the most vehement transports of enthusiasm, and replied by unanimous shouts of "*Vive l'Empereur!*" They resumed their march, impatient to assist in the great battle. Those who had heard the words of the Emperor repeated them to those who had not heard them, and they cried, with joy, that it was all over with the Austrians, and that they would be taken to the last man.

It was high time for Napoleon to return to the Danube, for his orders, misunderstood by Murat, would have led to disasters if the Austrians had been more enterprising.

While Lannes and Murat were investing Ulm on the right bank of the Danube, Ney, continuing *à cheval* on the river, had two divisions on the right bank, and one only, that of general Dupont, on the left bank. On approaching Ulm, to invest it, Ney had perceived the defect of such a situation. Enlightened by incidents of which he had a closer view, guided by a happy instinct for war, confirmed in his opinion by colonel Jomini, a staff-officer of the highest merit, Ney had discovered the danger of leaving but one division on the left bank of the river. Why, said he, should not the Austrians seize the opportunity for flight on the left bank, trampling under foot our equipages and our parks, which would certainly not oppose any great resistance to them? Murat would not admit that such a thing could happen, and, appealing to the misconstrued letters of the Emperor, who, expecting a serious affair on the Iller, ordered all the troops to be concentrated there, he was even on the point of concluding that it was wrong to leave Dupont's division on the left bank, since that division must be away from the place of action on the day of the great battle. This difference of opinion gave rise to a warm altercation between Ney and Murat. Ney was mortified to have to obey a superior, whom he thought below himself by his talents, if he was above him by the imperial relationship. Murat, filled with pride at his new rank, proud above all of being admitted to a more particular acquaintance with the intentions of Napoleon, made marshal Ney feel his official superiority, and at

last went so far as to give him absolute orders. But for mutual friends, these two lieutenants of the Emperor would have decided their quarrel in a manner not at all consistent with their position. This altercation led to the issue of contradictory orders to Dupont's division, and to a situation that was perilous for it. But, fortunately, while the dispute respecting the post fittest for it to occupy was going forward, it was extricated from the danger into which an error of Murat's had thrown it by an ever memorable battle.

General Mack, who could not entertain further doubt of his fate, had made a change of front. Instead of having his right at Ulm, he had his left there; instead of having his left at Memmingen, he had his right there. Still supported on the Iller, he turned his back to France, as if he had come from it, while Napoleon turned his on Austria, as if that had been the point from which he started. This would be the natural position of the two generals, one of whom has turned the other. General Mack, after drawing to him the troops dispersed in Suabia, as well as those which had returned beaten from Wertingen and Günzburg, had left some detachments on the Iller from Memmingen to Ulm, and had assembled the greater part of his forces at Ulm itself, in the entrenched camp which overlooks that city.

The reader is acquainted with the situation and the form of this camp, which has been already described in this history. At this point the left bank of the Danube is much higher than the right bank. While the right bank presents a marshy plain, slightly inclined towards the river, the left bank, on the contrary, presents a series of heights laid out terrace-fashion, and washed by the Danube, nearly in the same manner as the terrace of St. Germain is washed by the Seine. The Michaelsberg is the principal of these heights. The Austrians were encamped there to the number of about 60,000, having the city of Ulm at their feet.

General Dupont, who was left alone on the left bank, and who, agreeably to the orders of marshal Ney, was to approach nearer to Ulm on the morning of the 11th of October, had advanced within sight of that place by the Albeck road. It was the very moment which Murat and Ney, meeting at Günzburg, were spending in contention, and which Napoleon, hastening to Augsburg, was employing in making his general dispositions. General Dupont, on reaching the village of Haslach, from which the Michaelsberg is seen in its full extent, discovered there 60,000 Austrians in an imposing attitude. The last marches, performed in the worst weather and with extreme rapidity, had reduced his division to 6000 men. There had, however, been left him Baraguay d'Hilliers' dismounted dragoons, who, during the journey from the Rhine to the Danube, had been assigned not to Murat, but to marshal Ney. This was a reinforcement of 5000 men, which might have been of great service, if it had not remained at Languenau, three leagues in the rear.

General Dupont, having come in sight of the Michaelsberg and the 60,000 Austrians who occupied it, found himself before them, with three regiments of infantry, two of cavalry, and a few pieces of cannon. That officer, since so unfortunate, was seized at this sight by an inspiration, which would do honour to the greatest generals. He judged that, if he fell back, he should betray his weakness, and be soon surrounded by 10,000 horse, despatched in pursuit of him; that if, on the contrary, he performed an act of daring, he might deceive the Austrians, persuade them that he was the advanced-guard of the French army, oblige them to be circumspect, and thus gain time to retrieve the wrong step into which he had been led.

In consequence, he immediately made his dispositions for fighting. On his left he had the village of Haslach, surrounded by a small wood. There he placed the 32nd, which had become celebrated in Italy, and commanded, at this period, by colonel Darrieau, the 1st hussars, and part of his artillery. On his right, backed in like manner upon a wood, he placed the 96th of the line, commanded by colonel Meunier, and the 17th dragoons. A little in advance of his right, he had the village of Jungingen, surrounded also by a few clumps of wood, and he ordered it to be occupied by a detachment.

In this position general Dupont received the Austrians, detached to the number of 25,000, under the archduke Ferdinand, to fight a division of 6000 French. General Dupont, still under the influence of a happy inspiration on this occasion, soon perceived that his division would be destroyed by the musketry alone, if he suffered the Austrians to deploy their line and to extend their fire. Then, combining the daring of a vigorous execution with the daring of a great resolution, he ordered the two regiments of his right, the 96th of the line and the 9th light, to charge with the bayonet. At the signal given by him, these two brave regiments moved off, and marched with bayonet lowered, upon the first Austrian line. They overturned it, threw it into disorder, and took 1500 prisoners, who were sent to the left, to be shut up in the village of Haslach. General Dupont, after this feat, placed himself again in position with his two regiments, and awaited immoveably the sequel of this extraordinary combat. But the Austrians, not choosing to admit themselves to be beaten, returned to the attack with fresh troops. Our soldiers advanced a second time with the bayonet, repulsed the assailants, and again took numerous prisoners. Disgusted with these useless attacks in front, the Austrians directed all their efforts against our wings. They marched upon the village of Haslach, which covered the left of Dupont's division, and which contained their prisoners. The 32nd, whose turn was come to fight, vigorously disputed that village with them, and drove them from it, while the 1st hussars, vying with the infantry, made impetuous charges on the repulsed columns. The Austrians did not confine themselves to the attack

of Haslach; they made an attempt on the other wing, and endeavoured to take the village of Jungingen, situated on the right of general Dupont. Favoured by numbers, they penetrated into it and made themselves masters of the place for a moment. General Dupont, appreciating the danger, caused Jungingen to be attacked by the 9th, by which it was retaken. Again it was wrested from him, and again he retook it. This village was thus carried by main force five times consecutively, and in the confusion of these repeated attacks, the French made each time some prisoners. But while the Austrians were exhausting themselves in impotent efforts against this handful of soldiers, their immense cavalry, dashing away in all directions, fell upon the 7th dragoons, charged it several times, killed its colonel, the gallant St. Dizier, and obliged it to retire into the wood against which it was backed. A host of Austrian horse then spread itself over the surrounding plateaux, galloped to the village of Albeck, from which Dupont's division had started, took its baggage, which Baraguay d'Hilliers' dragoons ought to have defended, and thus picked up some vulgar trophies, a sad consolation for a defeat sustained by 25,000 men against 6000.

It became urgent to put an end to so perilous an engagement. General Dupont, having fatigued the Austrians by an obstinate fight of five hours, hastened to take advantage of the night to retire upon Albeck. Thither he marched in good order, preceded by 4000 prisoners.

If general Dupont, in fighting this extraordinary battle, had not stopped the Austrians, they would have fled into Bohemia, and one of Napoleon's most splendid combinations would have been completely frustrated. It is a proof that great generals ought to have great soldiers; for the most illustrious captains often need their troops to repair by their heroism either the hazards of war or the errors which genius itself is liable to commit.

This rencounter with a part of the French army produced stormy deliberations at the head-quarters of the Austrians. They were informed of the presence of marshal Soult at Landsberg; they supposed that general Dupont was not alone at Albeck, and they began to believe that they were surrounded on all sides. General Mack, on whom the Austrians have endeavoured to throw all the shame of their disaster, had fallen into a perturbation of mind easily to be conceived. Whatever judges who have reasoned after the event may say, it would have required nothing less to save him than an inspiration from Heaven, to reveal to him all at once the weakness of the corps which was before him, and the possibility, by crushing it, of retiring to Bohemia. The unfortunate general, who knew not what has since become known, and who had no reason to think that the French were so weak on the left bank, fell to deliberating with the illustrious companion of his melancholy fate, the archduke Ferdinand. He wasted precious time in agi-

tations of mind, and could not resolve either to flee towards Bohemia by cutting his way through Dupont's division, or to retreat towards the Tyrol by forcing a passage at Memmingen. The measure which to him appeared the safest was to establish himself still more solidly in the position of Ulm, to concentrate his army there, and there await, in a large mass difficult to be carried by assault, the arrival of the Russians by Munich, or of the archduke Charles by the Tyrol. He said to himself that general Kienmayer with 20,000 Austrians, general Kutusof with 60,000 Russians, would soon appear on the road from Munich; that the archduke John, with the corps of the Tyrol, and even the archduke Charles, with the army of Italy, could not fail to hasten to his succour by way of Kempten, and that then it would be Napoleon who would be in danger, for he would be pressed between 80,000 Austro-Russians, coming from Austria, 25,000 Austrians descending from the Tyrol, and 70,000 Austrians encamped below Ulm, which would make 175,000 men. But it would have been necessary that all these different junctions should be effected in spite of Napoleon, placed in the centre, with 160,000 French accustomed to conquer. In misfortune, one catches eagerly at the slightest glimmer of hope; and general Mack believed even the false reports made to him by the spies sent by Napoleon. These spies told him sometimes that a landing of English at Boulogne would recall the French immediately to the Rhine, sometimes that the Russians and the archduke Charles were debouching by the Munich road.

In difficult situations, subordinate persons become bold and talkative; they censure their superiors and form opinions of their own. General Mack had about him subordinates, who were nobles of high distinction, and who were not afraid to raise their voices. Some were for making off into Tyrol, others into Wurtemberg, and others into Bohemia. These last, who were right by accident, adduced the battle of Haslach to prove that the route to Bohemia was open. The usual effect of contradiction on an agitated mind is to weaken it still more, and to produce half-measures, always the most fatal of any. General Mack, in order to grant something to the opinions which he combated, took two very singular resolutions for a man who had decided to remain at Ulm. He sent Jellachich's division to Memmingen, to reinforce that post which general Spangen was guarding with 5000 men, with the intention of thus keeping himself in communication with the Tyrol. He despatched general Riese to occupy the heights of Elehingen, with an entire division, in order to extend himself on the left bank, and to attempt a strong reconnoissance on the communications of the French.

To remain at Ulm and wait for succours, and to fight a defensive battle there in case of emergency, he ought to have remained there *en masse*, and not to have sent corps to the two extremities of the line which he occupied, for that was the way to expose them

to be destroyed one after another. Be this as it may, general Mack directed general Riese to occupy the convent of Elchingen, which is situated on the heights of the left bank, quite close to Haslach, where the fight of the 11th had taken place. At the foot of these heights, and below the convent, was a bridge which Murat had sent a French detachment to occupy. The Austrians had previously attempted to destroy it. Murat's detachment, in order to cover itself on the approach of the troops of general Riese, completed its destruction by burning it. There were still left, however, the piles driven into the river, and which the water had saved from the conflagration. Thus the French army was without communication with the left bank otherwise than by the bridges of Günzburg, situated far below Elchingen. Dupont's division had retired to Langenau. Retreat was, therefore, open to the Austrians. Luckily they were ignorant of that.

It was during these transactions that Napoleon, leaving Augsburg in the night of the 12th of October, reached Ulm on the 13th. No sooner had he arrived than he visited on horseback, in terrible weather, all the positions occupied by his lieutenants. He found them extremely irritated against one another, and maintaining totally different opinions. Lannes, whose judgment was sound and perspicacious in war, had concluded, like marshal Ney, that, instead of intending to accept battle on the Iller, the Austrians were rather meditating an escape into Bohemia on the left bank, by fighting their way through Dupont's division. If Napoleon could entertain any doubts when at a distance from the spot, he had none whatever when on the spot itself. Besides, in ordering the left bank to be watched, and Dupont's division to be placed there, he went away without saying that one ought not to leave this division there without support, without securing, above all things, the means of passing from one bank to the other, for the purpose of succouring it if it were attacked. Thus the instructions of Napoleon had not been better understood than the situation itself. He coincided, therefore, entirely with marshals Ney and Lannes against Murat, and gave instructions for repairing immediately the egregious blunders committed during the preceding days. He resolved to re-establish the communications of the right bank with the left bank by the bridge nearest to Ulm, that of Elchingen. One might have descended as far as Günzburg which belonged to us, repassed the Danube there, and ascended again, with Dupont's division reinforced, to Ulm. But this would have been a very lengthened movement, which would have left the Austrians abundant time to escape. It was far preferable, at break of day on the 14th, to re-establish by main force the bridge of Elchingen, which was close at hand, and to cross in sufficient number to the left bank, while general Dupont, instructed to that effect, should ascend from Langenau towards Albeck and Ulm.

Napoleon gave his orders in consequence for the next day, the 14th. Marshal Soult had been moved to the extremity of the line

of the Iller towards Memmingen; general Marmont advanced intermediately on the Iller. Lannes, Ney, and Murat, united below Ulm, were to place themselves *à cheval* on both banks of the Danube, in order to give a hand to Dupont's division, alone on the left bank. But for this purpose it was requisite to re-establish the bridge of Elchingen. For Ney was reserved the honour of executing, in the morning of the 14th, the vigorous operation which was to put us again in possession of both banks of the river.

This intrepid marshal was deeply mortified by some indiscreet expressions used by Murat in the recent altercation which he had with him. Murat, as if impatient of too long arguments, had told him that he understood nothing of all the plans that were explained to him, and that it was his own custom not to make his till he was facing the enemy. This was the proud answer which a man of action might have addressed to an empty babbler. Marshal Ney, on horseback early in the morning of the 14th, in full uniform, and wearing his decorations, laid hold of Murat's arm, and shaking him violently before the whole staff and before the Emperor himself, said haughtily, "Come, prince, come along with me and make your plans in face of the enemy." Then, galloping to the Danube, he went, amidst a shower of balls and grape, having the water up to his horse's belly, to direct the perilous operation assigned to him.

This operation consisted in repairing the bridge, of which nothing was left but the piles without flooring, passing it, crossing a small meadow that lay between the Danube and the foot of the eminence, then making himself master of the village with the convent of Elchingen, which rose amphitheatrically, and was guarded by 20,000 men and a formidable artillery.

Marshal Ney, undaunted by all these obstacles, ordered an aide-de-camp of general Loison's, captain Coisel, and a sapper to lay hold of the first plank and carry it to the piles of the bridge, for the purpose of re-establishing the passage, under the fire of the Austrians. The brave sapper had a leg carried away by a grape-shot, but his place was immediately supplied. One plank was first thrown in the form of flooring, then a second and a third. Having finished one length, they proceeded to the next, till they had covered the last piles under a murderous fire of small arms, poured upon our labourers by skilful marksmen on the opposite bank. Immediately, the voltigeurs of the 6th light, the grenadiers of the 30th, and a company of carabineers, without waiting for the bridge to be made completely firm, threw themselves to the other side of the Danube, dispersed the Austrians who guarded the left bank, and cleared a sufficient space for Loison's division to come to their assistance.

Marshal Ney then ordered the 39th and the 6th light to cross to the other bank of the river. He directed general Villatte to put himself at the head of the 39th, and to extend himself on the

right in the meadow, in order to make the Austrians evacuate it, while he himself, with the 6th light, would take the convent. The 39th, stopped while passing the bridge by the French cavalry, which rushed across it with ardour, was prevented from getting over entire. The 1st battalion alone of that regiment was able to execute the order which it had received. It had to sustain the charges of the Austrian cavalry and the attack of three hostile battalions; it was even forced back for a moment, after an obstinate resistance, to the head of the bridge. But, being soon succoured by its second battalion, joined by the 69th and the 76th of the line, it recovered the lost ground, remained master of the whole of the meadow on the right, and obliged the Austrians to regain the heights. Meanwhile Ney, at the head of the 6th light, was pushing on through the steep and crooked streets of the village of Elchingen, under a downward fire from the houses, which were full of infantry. He wrested the village, house by house, from the hands of the Austrians, and stormed the convent, which is on the summit of the height. Arrived at this place, he had before him the undulated plateaux, interspersed with wood, on which Dupont's division had fought on the 11th. These plateaux extend to the Michaelsberg, above the very city of Ulm. Ney resolved to establish himself there, lest he might be tumbled into the Danube by an offensive return of the enemy. A large patch of wood came to the margin of the height, close up to the convent and the village of Elchingen. Ney determined to make himself master of it, in order to appuy his left there. He purposed, his left being well secured, to revolve upon it and to move forward his right. He threw into the wood the 69th of the line, which plunged into it in spite of a brisk fire of musketry. While a furious fight was kept up in that quarter, the rest of the Austrian corps was formed into several squares of two or three thousand men each. Ney ordered them to be attacked by the dragoons, followed by the infantry in column. The 18th dragoons made so vigorous a charge upon one of them as to break it and to compel it to lay down its arms. At this sight, the Austrians retired in great haste, and fled at first towards Haslach, and then proceeded to rally on the Michaelsberg.

Meanwhile, general Dupont, marching from Langenau towards Albeck, had fallen in with the corps of Werneck, one of those which had left Ulm on the preceding day, with the intention of pushing reconnaissances on the left bank of the Danube, and seeking means of retreat for the Austrian army. On hearing the cannon on his rear, general Werneck had turned back and proceeded to the Michaelsberg by the road from Albeck to Ulm. He arrived there at the very moment when Dupont's division was repairing thither on its side, and when marshal Ney was taking the heights of Elchingen. A new combat ensued at this point between general Werneck, who wished to get back to Ulm, and general Dupont, who wished, on the contrary, to prevent him.

The 32nd and the 9th light rushed in close column upon the infantry of the Austrians and repulsed it, while the 96th received in square the charges of their cavalry. The day closed amidst this fray, marshal Ney having gloriously reconquered the left bank, and general Dupont having cut off the retreat of Werneck's corps to Ulm. Three thousand prisoners and a great quantity of artillery had been taken. But what was still more important, the Austrians were definitively shut up in Ulm, and this time without any chance of escape, should even the happiest inspiration visit them at this last moment.

During these occurrences on the left bank, Lannes had approached Ulm on the right bank, general Marmont had advanced towards the Iller, and marshal Soult, pressing the extremity of the position of the Austrians, had taken Memmingen. The enemy was still engaged in palisading that city when marshal Soult arrived there. He had rapidly invested it, and obliged general Spangen to lay down his arms with 5000 men, the whole of his artillery, and a great number of horses. General Jellachich, hastening up, but too late, to the relief of Memmingen with his division, and finding himself in face of a corps-d'armée of 30,000 men, retired, not upon Ulm, fearing that he should not be able to regain it, but upon Kempten and the Tyrol. Marshal Soult immediately proceeded towards Ochsenhausen, to complete on all sides the investment of the fortress and the entrenched camp of Ulm.

Such was the situation at the close of day on the 14th of October. After the departure of general Jellachich and the different actions which had been fought, general Mack was reduced to 50,000 men. From this must be deducted Werneck's corps, separated from him by Dupont's division. That unfortunate general found himself, therefore, in a desperate position. There was no eligible course for him to pursue. His only resource was to rush sword in hand upon one of the points of the circle of iron in which he had been enclosed, and to perish or to open an outlet for himself. To throw himself upon Ney and Dupont would still have been the least disastrous step to take. To a certainty he would have been beaten, for Lannes and Murat would have hastened by the bridge of Elchingen to the assistance of Ney and Dupont, and there needed not such an assemblage of forces to conquer disheartened soldiers. Still the honour of the arms would have been saved, and, next to victory, that is the most important result that one can obtain. But general Mack persisted in his resolution of concentrating himself in Ulm, and waiting there for the succour of the Russians. He had to endure violent attacks from prince Schwarzenberg and the archduke Ferdinand. The latter, in particular, was determined to escape at any risk the misfortune of being made prisoner. General Mack produced the powers of the Emperor, which, in case of difference of opinion, conferred on him the supreme authority. This was enough to

render him responsible, not to make him be obeyed. The archduke Ferdinand resolved, thanks to his less dependent position, to withdraw himself from the authority of the general in chief. When night came on, he chose that gate of Ulm which exposed him to the least risk of encountering the French, and started, with six or seven thousand horse and a corps of infantry, with the intention of joining general Werneck and escaping through the Upper Palatinate to Bohemia. By uniting general Werneck's corps to the detachment which accompanied him he took from general Mack about 20,000 men, and left him in Ulm with 30,000 only, blockaded on all sides and forced to lay down his arms in the most ignominious manner.

It has been falsely alleged that the departure of the prince proved the possibility of escaping from Ulm. In the first place, it is most improbable that the whole army, with its artillery and its *matériel*, could slip away like a mere detachment, composed for the greater part of horse soldiers. But what happened a few days afterwards to the archduke Ferdinand proves that the army itself would have plunged into ruin in this flight. The grand fault lay in dividing itself. It ought to have remained or gone forth altogether—remained to fight an obstinate battle with 70,000 men; gone forth to rush with these 70,000 men upon one of the points of the investment, and there to find either death or that success which Fortune sometimes grants to despair. But to divide, some to flee with Jellachich to the Tyrol, others to escort the flight of a prince into Bohemia, others again to sign a capitulation at Ulm, was of all modes of proceeding the most deplorable. For the rest, experience teaches that, in these situations, the dejected human mind, when it has begun to descend, descends so low that among all courses it takes the worst. It is right to add that general Mack has since invariably asserted that he disapproved of this division of the Austrian forces and of these separate retreats.*

* The Austrians have never published any account of their operations in this first part of the campaign of 1805. Many works, however, have appeared in Germany, the writers of which have made a point of abusing general Mack and extolling the archduke Ferdinand, in order to account by the silliness of a single individual for the disaster of the Austrian army, and to diminish at the same time the glory of the French. These works are all inaccurate and unjust, and are grounded for the most part on false circumstances, the impossibility of which even is demonstrated. I procured with great difficulty one of the scarce copies of the defence presented by general Mack to the council of war, before which he was summoned to appear. This defence, of a singular form, in a tone of constraint, especially in what relates to the archduke Ferdinand, fuller of declamatory reflections than facts, has nevertheless furnished me with the means of ascertaining what were the intentions of the Austrian general, and rectifying a great number of absurd conjectures. I think, therefore, that I have arrived in this narrative at the truth, at least as nearly as one can reasonably hope to do in regard to occurrences which have not been verified in writing, even in Austria, and of which there are now scarcely any living witnesses. The principal personages are actually dead, and in Germany there has been a very natural, very excusable, motive for disfiguring the truth, that of sparing the national self-love by sacrificing a single man.

Napoleon passed the night between the 14th and 15th in the convent of Elchingen. On the morning of the 15th, he resolved to bring the affair to a close, and gave orders to marshal Ney to storm the heights of Michaelsberg. These heights, situated in advance of Ulm when you go along the left bank, overlook that city, which, as we have said, is seated at their foot, on the very margin of the Danube. Lannes had passed with his corps by the bridge of Elchingen, and flanked the attack of Ney. He was to take the Frauenberg, a neighbouring height to the Michaelsberg. Napoleon was on the ground, having Lannes near him, observing, on the one hand, the positions which Ney was going to attack at the head of his regiments, and on the other, casting his eyes down on the city of Ulm, situated in the bottom. All at once, a battery unmasked by the Austrians poured its grape-shot upon the imperial group. Lannes abruptly seized the reins of Napoleon's horse, to lead him out of the galling fire. Napoleon, who did not seek the fire, neither did he shun it, who approached it no nearer than was necessary in order to judge of things by his own eyes, placed himself in such a manner as to see the action with less danger. Ney set his columns in motion, climbed the entrenchments raised on the Michaelsberg, and carried them with the bayonet. Napoleon, fearing that Ney's attack would be too prompt, wished to slacken it, in order to give Lannes time to assault the Frauenberg and thus to divide the enemy's attention. "Glory is not to be divided," was Ney's answer to general Dumas who brought him the order to wait for the assistance of Lannes, and he continued his march, surmounted all obstacles, and reached with his corps the back of the heights just above the city of Ulm. Lannes, on his part, carried the Frauenberg, and, joining, they descended together to approach the walls of the place. In the ardour which hurried away the attacking columns, the 17th light, under the command of colonel Vedel, of Suchet's division, scaled the bastion of the place nearest to the river, and established itself there. But the Austrians, perceiving the hazardous position of that regiment, fell upon it, repulsed it, and took from it some prisoners.

Napoleon thought it right to suspend the combat, and to defer till the morrow the business of summoning the place, and, if it resisted, to take it by assault. In the course of this day, general Dupont, who had been ever since the preceding day in face of Werneck's corps, had again engaged him, to prevent his getting back to Ulm. Napoleon had sent Murat to see what was passing in that quarter, for he was extremely puzzled to conjecture, ignorant of the departure of a portion of the Austrian army. It soon became evident to him that several detachments had succeeded in stealing off by one of the gates of Ulm, the one that was the least exposed to the view and the action of the French. He immediately directed Murat, with the reserve cavalry, Dupont's divi-

sion, and Oudinot's grenadiers, to pursue to the utmost that part of the enemy's army which had escaped from the place.

Next day, the 16th, he ordered a few shells to be thrown into Ulm, and in the evening he enjoined M. de Segur, one of the officers of his staff, to go to general Mack and summon him to lay down his arms. Obligated to proceed in the dark, and in very bad weather, he had the greatest difficulty to get into the place. He was led, blindfold, before general Mack, who, striving to conceal his profound anxiety, was nevertheless unable to dissemble his surprise and his grief on learning the whole extent of his disaster. He was not fully acquainted with it, for he knew not yet that he was encompassed by 100,000 French, that 60,000 more occupied the line of the Inn, that the Russians, on the contrary, were at a great distance, and that the archduke Charles, detained on the Adige by marshal Massena, could not come. Each of these pieces of intelligence, which at first he would not believe, but which he was soon obliged to admit on the repeated and solemn assertion of M. de Segur, cut him to the heart. After much exclamation against the proposal to capitulate, general Mack began by degrees to endure the idea, on condition of waiting a few days for the succour of the Russians. He would be ready, he said, to surrender in eight days, if the Russians should not make their appearance before Ulm. M. de Segur had orders to grant him no more than five, or, at the utmost, six. In case of refusal, he was to threaten him with an assault, and the most rigorous treatment for the troops under his command.

This unfortunate general thought that it concerned his honour, already lost, to obtain eight days instead of six. M. de Segur retired to carry his answer to the Emperor. The parleys continued, and at length Berthier, having introduced himself into the place, agreed with general Mack to the following conditions. If, on the 25th of October, before midnight, an Austro-Russian corps capable of raising the blockade of Ulm did not make its appearance, the Austrian army was to lay down its arms, the men to be prisoners of war and to be conducted to France. The Austrian officers were to be at liberty to return to Austria, on condition of never again serving against France. Horses, arms, ammunition, colours, were all to belong to the French army.

This agreement was concluded on the 19th of October, but the convention was to be dated the 17th, which gave in appearance to general Mack the eight days demanded. That unfortunate man, having arrived at the Emperor's head-quarters and been received with the attentions due to adversity, affirmed repeatedly that he was not to blame for the disasters of his army, that he had established himself at Ulm by order of the Aulic Council, and that since the investment his force had been divided contrary to his express desire.

This, it will be seen was a new convention of Alexandria, without the dreadful bloodshed of Marengo.

Meanwhile Murat, at the head of Dupont's division, Oudinot's grenadiers, and the cavalry reserve, atoned for his recent fault by pursuing the Austrians with truly prodigious rapidity. He followed general Werneck and prince Ferdinand unremittingly, swearing not to let a single man escape. Setting out on the morning of the 16th of October, he had a rear-guard action with general Werneck in the evening, and took from him 2000 prisoners. Next day, the 17th, he took the road to Heidenheim, striving to harass the enemy's flanks by the rapid march of his cavalry. General Werneck and the archduke Ferdinand, having joined, made their retreat together. In the course of the day, the French passed Heidenheim and arrived at Neresheim at night, at the same time as the rear-guard of Werneck's corps. It was thrown into disorder and obliged to disperse in the woods. On the following day, the 18th, Murat, marching without intermission, followed the enemy towards Nordlingen. The regiment of Stuart, being enveloped, surrendered entire. General Werneck, finding himself surrounded on all sides, and unable to advance further with a harassed infantry, having no longer any hope, or even any wish, to escape, offered to capitulate. The capitulation was accepted, and this general laid down his arms with 8000 men. Three Austrian generals, taking with them part of the cavalry, resolved to escape, in spite of the capitulation. Murat sent an officer to them to summon them to execute their engagement. They would not listen to him, and went off to rejoin prince Ferdinand. Murat, intent on punishing such a breach of faith, pursued them with still greater activity on the following day. In the night, the great park, composed of 500 carriages, fell into the hands of the pursuers.

This route presented a scene of unparalleled confusion. The Austrians had thrown themselves upon our communications; they had taken a great number of our carriages, of our stragglers, and part of Napoleon's treasure. All that they had conquered for a moment was retaken from them, besides their artillery, their equipages, and their own treasure. There were to be seen soldiers and *employés* of both armies, running away in disorder, without knowing whether they were going, ignorant which was the victor and which the vanquished. The peasants of the Upper Palatinate ran after the fugitives, stripped them, and cut the traces of the Austrian artillery, to possess themselves of the horses. Murat, continuing his pursuit, arrived on the 19th at Gunzenhausen, the Prussian frontier of Anspach. A Prussian officer had the boldness to come and insist upon the neutrality, though the Austrian fugitives had obtained permission to pass through the country. Murat's only answer was to enter Gunzenhausen by main force, and to follow the archduke beyond it. Next day, the 20th, he passed through Nuremberg. The enemy, finding his strength exhausted, at length halted. An action ensued between the two cavalries. After numerous charges received and returned, the

squadrons of the archduke dispersed, and the greater part of them laid down their arms. Some infantry that was left also surrendered. Prince Ferdinand was indebted for the advantage of saving his person to the attachment of a subaltern, who gave him his horse. He gained, with two or three thousand horse, the road to Bohemia.

Murat thought that he ought not to push on any further. He had marched four days without resting, at the rate of more than ten leagues a day. His troops were harassed with fatigue. This pursuit, prolonged beyond Nuremberg, would have carried him beyond the circle of the operations of the army. Besides, all that prince Ferdinand had left was not worth an additional march. In this memorable expedition, Murat had taken 12,000 prisoners, 120 pieces of cannon, 500 carriages, 11 colours, 200 officers, 7 generals, besides the treasure of the Austrian army. He had, therefore, his ample share in this glorious campaign.

The plan of Napoleon was completely realised. It was the 20th of October, and in twenty days, without giving battle, by a series of marches and some combats, an army of 80,000 men was destroyed. None had escaped but general Kienmayer, with about a dozen thousand men, general Jellachich, with five or six thousand, prince Ferdinand, with two or three thousand horse. At Wertingen, Günzburg, Haslach, Munich, Elchingen, in the pursuit conducted by Murat, about 30,000 prisoners had been picked up.* There were left 30,000, who would soon be found in Ulm. These made a total of 60,000 men taken, with their artillery, consisting of 200 pieces of cannon, with four or five thousand horses, well adapted for remounting our cavalry, together with all the *matériel* of the Austrian army, and 80 colours.

The French army had a few thousand lame in consequence of forced marches, and it numbered at most 2000 men *hors de combat*.

Napoleon, satisfied respecting the Russians, had not been displeased to halt four or five days before Ulm, to give his soldiers time to rest themselves, and particularly to rejoin their colours; for the last operations had been so rapid that a certain number of them had been left behind. Our Emperor, said they, has found out a new way of making war; he no longer makes it with our arms but with our legs.

Napoleon, however, would not wait any longer, and he was desirous to gain the three or four days which were yet to run, in virtue of the capitulation signed with general Mack. He sent for him, and pouring some consolations into his heart, obtained from him a new concession, which was to deliver the place on the 20th, on condition that Ney should remain below Ulm till the 25th of October. General Mack conceived that he had performed

* Here is an approximative enumeration, but rather reduced than exaggerated, of these prisoners:—Taken at Wertingen, 2000; at Günzburg, 2000; at Haslach, 4000; at Munich, 1000; at Elchingen, 3000; at Memmingen 5000; in the pursuit by Murat, 12 to 13,000. Total, 29 or 30,000.

his last duties by paralysing a French corps till the eighth day. In truth, in the situation to which he was reduced, all that he could do was very little. He consented, therefore, to leave the place on the following day.

Accordingly, on the next day, October the 20th, 1805, an ever memorable day, Napoleon, placed at the foot of the Michaelsberg, facing Ulm, saw the Austrian army file away before him. He occupied an elevated slope, having behind him his infantry, drawn up in semicircle on the hill side, and, opposite, his cavalry deployed in a right line. The Austrians filed off between the two, laying down their arms at the entrance of this sort of amphitheatre. A large watch-fire had been made, near which Bonaparte posted himself to witness the ceremony. General Mack first came forward and delivered his sword to him, exclaiming with grief, "Here is the unfortunate Mack!" Napoleon received him, himself and his officers, with the greatest courtesy, and directed them to be ranged on either side of him. The Austrian soldiers, before they came into his presence, flung down their arms with a vexation honourable to them, and that feeling gave way only to the curiosity which seized them on approaching Napoleon. All devoured with their eyes that terrible conqueror, from whom their colours had received, for the last two years, such cruel affronts.

Napoleon, conversing with the Austrian officers, said to them loud enough to be heard by all, "I know not why we are at war. It was not my wish. I thought only of warring with the English, when your master came to provoke me. You see my army: I have 200,000 men in Germany; your soldiers who are prisoners will see 200,000 more, traversing France to come in aid of the first. I need not, you well know, have so many to conquer. Your master ought to think of peace, otherwise the fall of the house of Lorraine may possibly arrive. It is not new territories on the continent that I desire, it is ships, colonies, and commerce that I wish to possess, and this ambition is as profitable to you as to myself."

These words, delivered with some haughtiness, were met by silence only from those officers, and sorrow to think that they were deserved. Napoleon afterwards conversed with the most noted of the Austrian generals, and watched for five hours this extraordinary sight. Twenty-seven thousand men filed away before him. From three to four thousand wounded were left in the place.

On the following day, according to his custom, he addressed a proclamation to his soldiers. It was couched in the following terms :

"Imperial head-quarters, Elchingen,

"29 Vendemiaire, year XIV (21 October, 1805).

"Soldiers of the Grand Army.

"In a fortnight we have made a campaign: we have accomplished what we intended. We have driven the troops of the

house of Austria out of Bavaria, and reinstated our ally in the sovereignty of his dominions. That army, which, with equal ostentation and imprudence, came and placed itself on our frontiers, is annihilated. But what cares England? her object is attained; we are no longer at Boulogne!

“Out of the hundred thousand men who composed that army, sixty thousand are prisoners; they shall go and replace our conscripts in the labours of our fields. Two hundred pieces of cannon, ninety colours, all the generals, are in our power; not fifteen thousand men of that army have escaped. Soldiers, I had announced to you a great battle; but, thanks to the vicious combinations of the enemy, I have been enabled to obtain the same success without running any risk; and, what is unexampled in the history of nations, so great a result has diminished our force by no more than fifteen hundred men *hors de combat*.”

“Soldiers, this success is owing to your unbounded confidence in your Emperor, to your patience in enduring fatigues and privations of every kind, and to your extraordinary intrepidity.”

“But we shall not stop there; you are impatient to commence a second campaign. That Russian army, which the gold of England has brought from the extremities of the earth, shall share the same fate.”

“In this new struggle the honour of the infantry is more especially concerned. Here is to be decided, for the second time, that question which has been already decided in Switzerland and Holland, whether the French infantry is the second or the first in Europe. There are no generals here against whom I can have any glory to acquire: all my care will be to obtain victory with the least possible effusion of your blood. My soldiers are my children.”

The day after the surrender of Ulm, Napoleon set out for Augsburg, with the intention of reaching the Inn before the Russians, marching to Vienna, and, as he had resolved, frustrating the four attacks which were directed against the Empire by the single march of the grand army for the capital of Austria.

Wherefore are we obliged to follow up immediately this glorious recital with one that is so afflicting! In the very same days of the month of October, 1805, for ever glorious for France, Providence inflicted on our fleets a cruel compensation for the victories of our armies. History, on which is imposed the task of recording alternately the triumphs and the disasters of nations, and of imparting to curious posterity those same emotions of joy or grief which were felt in their time by the generations whose vicissitudes she relates—History must make up her mind to describe, after the marvels of Ulm, the terrific scene of destruction that was passing, at the same moment, off the coast of Spain, in sight of Cape Trafalgar.

The unfortunate Villeneuve, in leaving Ferrol, was agitated by the desire of proceeding to the Channel, in conformity with the

grand schemes of Napoleon; but he was urged by an irresistible impulse towards Cadiz. The news of the junction of Nelson with admirals Calder and Cornwallis had filled him with a sort of terror. This intelligence, true in some respects, for Nelson, on his return to England, had visited admiral Cornwallis off Brest, was false in the most important point, for Nelson had not stopped off Brest but had sailed for Portsmouth. Admiral Calder had been sent alone to Ferrol, and had not appeared there till after the departure of Villeneuve. They were, therefore, running after one another in vain, as is often the case on the wide expanse of the ocean; and Villeneuve, if he had persisted, would have found Cornwallis, separate both from Nelson and Calder, off Brest. He thus lost the grandest of opportunities, and caused France to lose it; though, indeed, it is impossible to say what would have been the result of that extraordinary expedition, if Napoleon had been at the gates of London, while the Austrian armies would have been on the frontiers of the Rhine. The rapidity of his blows, usually swift as lightning, would alone have decided whether forty days, from the 20th of August to the 30th of September, were sufficient for subjugating England, and for giving to France the conjoined sceptres of earth and ocean.

On leaving Ferrol, Villeneuve had not dared to tell Lauriston that he was going to Cadiz; but, when once at sea, he no longer concealed from him the apprehensions by which he was tormented, and which urged him to get away from the Channel and to steer for the furthest point of the Peninsula. On the earnest remonstrances of general Lauriston, who endeavoured to represent to him the full magnitude of the designs, of the miscarriage of which he would be the cause, he resumed for a moment the intention of steering for the Channel, and put the head of the ship to the north-east. But the wind, being right in his teeth, blowing precisely from the north-east, forbade this route, and he resolved definitively to steer for Cadiz, his heart harassed by a new apprehension, that of incurring the anger of Napoleon. He came in sight of Cadiz about the 20th of August. An English squadron of moderate force usually blockaded that port. Arriving at the head of the combined fleet, he might have taken this squadron, had he come rapidly upon it with his united strength. But, still haunted by the same terrors, he despatched an advanced guard, to ascertain whether there was not off Cadiz a naval force capable of giving battle; the English ships, taking the alarm, had time to sheer off. Admiral Ganteaume, in 1801, having failed in the object of his expedition to Egypt, at least took the Swiftsure. Villeneuve had not even the slight consolation to enter Cadiz bringing with him two or three English ships, as some indemnification for his useless campaign.

He naturally expected a violent explosion of anger on the part of Napoleon, and he passed some days in deep despair. Nor was he mistaken. Napoleon, on receiving from Lauriston, his aide-

de-camp, a detailed report of all that had taken place, regarding as an act of duplicity the double language held on leaving Ferrol, and as a sort of treason the ignorance in which Lallemand had been left of the return of the fleet to Cadiz, which exposed the latter to the danger of presenting himself singly before Brest, above all imputing to Villeneuve the frustration of the grandest design that he had ever conceived, applied to him, in the presence of the minister Decrès, the most disparaging expressions, and even called him a coward and a traitor. He was a good soldier and a good citizen; but too much discouraged by inexperience of the French naval service and by the imperfection of his *matériel*, and frightened at the complete disorganisation of the Spanish navy, he anticipated only certain defeat in any rencounter with the enemy, and he was inexpressibly grieved at the part of the vanquished to which he was necessarily doomed by Napoleon. He had not thoroughly comprehended that what Napoleon required of him was not to conquer, but to devote himself to destruction, provided that the Channel was opened. Or, very likely, if he had comprehended this terrible destination, he might not have been able to make up his mind to it. We shall presently see how soon he was to be led to the same sacrifice, and this time without any result that could shed lustre on his defeat.

Napoleon, in the torrent of great things which hurried him along, soon lost sight of admiral Villeneuve and his conduct. Nevertheless, before he set out for the banks of the Danube, he cast a last look at his navy, and on the way in which he should think fit to employ it. He gave orders for the separation of the Brest fleet, and for the division of that fleet into several squadrons, agreeably to the plan of M. Decrès, which consisted in avoiding great naval engagements, and meanwhile undertaking distant expeditions composed of a few ships, more likely to escape the English, and as injurious to their commerce as advantageous for the instruction of our seamen. He determined, moreover, to give general St. Cyr, who occupied Tarento, the support of the Cadiz fleet and the land-troops which it had on board. He calculated that this fleet, amounting to forty and even forty-six ships, after it should have rallied the Carthage division, would for some time have the mastery of the Mediterranean, as that of Bruix had formerly had, take the weak English squadron stationed off Naples, and furnish general St. Cyr with the useful aid of the 4000 soldiers whom it had been carrying about over all the seas. He ordered it, therefore, to leave Cadiz, to enter the Mediterranean, to call for the Carthage division, then to proceed to Tarento, and, in case the English squadrons should have united off Cadiz, not to let itself be shut up there, but to get out if it should be superior in number, for it was better to be beaten than disgraced by pusillanimous conduct.

These resolutions being taken by Napoleon, under the impression produced upon him by the timidity of Villeneuve, not suffi-

ciently matured, and above all not sufficiently contested by the minister Decrès, who durst no longer repeat what he feared he had gone too far in saying, were immediately transmitted to Cadiz. Admiral Decrès did not report to Villeneuve all the expressions of Napoleon, but, suppressing only the contumelious language, he repeated to him the animadversions made on his conduct from his leaving Toulon till his return to Spain, intimating that he must perform great things before he could recover the esteem of the Emperor. Informing him of his new destination, he ordered him to sail, and to proceed successively to Carthagena, Naples, and Tarento, to execute there the instructions which we have just detailed. Without enjoining him to sail at all hazards, he told him that the Emperor desired that the French navy, when the English were inferior in force, should never refuse to fight. There he stopped short, not daring to declare the whole truth to Villeneuve, or to renew his remonstrances with the Emperor to prevent a great naval engagement, which then had no longer the excuse of necessity. Thus all parties contributed their share to produce a great disaster, Napoleon by his anger, the minister Decrès by his concealment, and Villeneuve by his despair.

When on the point of setting out for Strasburg, Napoleon gave M. Decrès a last order relative to the naval operations—"Your friend Villeneuve," said he, "will probably be too cowardly to venture out of Cadiz. Despatch admiral Rosilly to take the command of the squadron, if it has not already sailed, and order admiral Villeneuve to come to Paris, to account to me for his conduct."—M. Decrès had not the courage to acquaint Villeneuve with this new misfortune, which deprived him of all means of redeeming his character, and merely informed him of the departure of Rosilly, without communicating the motive for it. He did not advise Villeneuve to sail before admiral Rosilly should reach Cadiz, but he hoped that this would be the case; and, in his embarrassment between an unfortunate friend, whose faults he was aware of, and the Emperor, whose resolutions he deemed imprudent, he too frequently committed the error of leaving things to themselves, instead of taking upon him the responsibility of directing them.*

Villeneuve, on receiving the letters of M. Decrès, guessed all that was not told him, and was as miserable as he had reason to be on account of the reproaches which he had incurred. What touched him most was the imputation of cowardice, which he well knew that he had never deserved, and which he fancied that he could perceive in the very reservations of the minister, his patron and his friend. He wrote in answer to M. Decrès: "The seamen

* Abundance of conjectures have been made respecting the causes which led to the sailing *en masse* of the fleet from Cadiz and the battle of Trafalgar. On this subject nothing is true but what is here stated. Our account is taken from the authentic correspondence of Napoleon and that of admiral Decrès and Villeneuve. All that can be said concerning that melancholy event is here given.

of Paris and the departments will be very unworthy and very silly if they cast a stone at me. Let them come on board our squadrons, and then they will see with what elements they are liable to have to fight. For the rest, *if the French navy has been deficient in nothing but courage, as it is alleged, the Emperor shall soon be satisfied, and he may reckon upon the most splendid success.*"

These bitter words contained the prognostic of what was soon to happen. Villeneuve made preparations for sailing again, landed the troops that they might rest themselves, and the sick that they might get well. He availed himself of the very reduced means of Spain to refit his ships, which had suffered from a long navigation, to procure at least three months' provisions; lastly, to reorganise the various departments of his fleet. Admiral Gravina, by his advice, got rid of his bad ships, and exchanged them for the best in the dockyard of Cadiz. The whole month of September was devoted to these duties. The fleet gained much in *matériel*; the *personnel* remained as it was. The French crews had acquired some experience during a navigation of nearly eight months. They were full of ardour and zeal. Some of the captains were excellent. But among the officers there was too great a number borrowed recently from commerce, and having neither the skill nor spirit of the imperial navy. Instruction, especially in regard to the artillery, was far too much neglected. Our seamen were not then such skilful gunners as in these later times, thanks to the special attention bestowed on this part of their military education. What our navy also wanted was a system of naval tactics adapted to the new mode of fighting the English. Instead of placing themselves in order of battle in two opposite lines, as formerly, of advancing methodically, each ship keeping her rank and taking for her antagonist the ship facing her in the opposite line, the English, directed by Rodney in the American war, and by Nelson in the war of the Revolution, had contracted the habit of advancing boldly, without observing any order but that which resulted from the relative swiftness of the ships, of dashing upon the enemy's fleet, breaking the line, and cutting off a portion to place it between two fires; in short, of not shrinking from the fray, at the risk of sending their shot into one another. The experience, the skill of their crews, the confidence which they owed to their successes, always ensured to them in these rash enterprises the advantage over their adversaries, less agile, less confident, though having as much bravery, and often more. The English, then, had effected at sea a revolution very much like that which Napoleon had effected on land. Nelson, who had contributed to this revolution, was not a superior and universal genius like Napoleon; far from it: he was even narrow-minded in things foreign to his art; but he had the genius of his profession; he was intelligent, resolute, and possessed in a high degree the qualities suited to offensive war, activity, hardihood, and judgment.

Villeneuve, who was endowed with spirit and courage, but not that firmness of mind which befits a military chief, was perfectly acquainted with the defects of our mode of fighting. On this subject he had written letters, full of good sense, to M. Decrès, who agreed with him in opinion, as all seamen did. But he thought it impossible to prepare, while on active service, new instructions, and to render them sufficiently familiar to his captains for them to be able to apply them in any speedy encounter. At the battle of Ferrol, however, he had opposed to the English, as the reader will no doubt remember, an unexpected manœuvre, highly approved by Napoleon and by M. Decrès. Admiral Calder, advancing in column upon the end of his line, with the intention of cutting it off, he had had the art to withdraw it with great promptness. But, when the battle had once begun, he had not known how to manœuvre; he had left part of his force inactive, and, when a forward movement of his whole line would have been sufficient for retaking the two disabled Spanish ships, he had not ventured to order it. Villeneuve, nevertheless, displayed in that battle real talents, in the judgment of Napoleon, but not decision equal to the intelligence which he possessed. Subsequently, he addressed no other instructions to his captains but to obey the signals which he should make in the moment of action, if the state of the wind admitted of manœuvring, and, if it did not, to do their best to get into the fire, and to seek an adversary. "You must not wait," said he, "for the signals of the admiral, who, in the confusion of a sea-fight, frequently cannot see what is passing, nor give his orders, nor, above all, find means to transmit them. Each must listen only to the voice of honour, and press on into the hottest of the fight. EVERY CAPTAIN IS AT HIS POST IF HE IS IN THE FIRE."

Such were his instructions, and, for the rest, Admiral Bruix himself, so superior to Villeneuve, had not addressed any others to the officers whom he commanded. If, in our great sea-fights, every captain had followed these simple directions, dictated by honour as much as by experience, the English would have numbered fewer triumphs, or paid dearer for them.

What particularly alarmed admiral Villeneuve was the state of the Spanish fleet. It was composed of fine large ships, one of them especially, the *Santissima Trinidad*, of 140 guns, the largest ever built in Europe. But these vast machines of war, which reminded one of the ancient splendour of the Spanish monarchy under Charles III., were, like the Turkish ships, superb in appearance, useless in danger. The penury of the Spanish arsenals had not allowed them to be properly rigged, and the weakness of the crews was distressing. They were manned by an assemblage of people of all sorts, picked up at random in the maritime towns of the Peninsula, untrained, unaccustomed to the sea, and incapable in all respects of coping with the old sailors of England, though the generous Spanish blood flowed in their veins. The

officers, for the most part, were no better than the seamen. Some of them, however, such as admiral Gravina, vice-admiral Alava, captains Valdez, Churruca, and Galiano, were worthy of the most glorious times of the Spanish navy.

Villeneuve, most determined to prove that he was not a coward, employed the month of September and the first days of October in introducing some system and better order into this compound of the two navies. He formed two squadrons, the one for battle, the other of reserve. He assumed himself the command of the squadron of battle, composed of twenty-one ships, and formed with it three divisions of seven ships each. He had under his immediate command the centre division; admiral Dumanoir, whose flag was hoisted in the *Formidable*, commanded the rear-division; vice-admiral Alava, who had his flag in the *Santa Anna*, commanded the van. The reserve squadron was composed of twelve ships and formed into two divisions of six ships each. Admiral Gravina was the commander of this squadron, and had under him, to direct the second division, rear-admiral Magon, in the *Algesirus*. It was with this squadron of reserve, detached from the line of battle and acting apart, that Villeneuve intended to parry any unforeseen manœuvres of the enemy, that is, if the wind permitted himself to manœuvre. In the contrary case, he trusted to the duty of honour imposed on all his captains to press into the fire.

The combined fleet, therefore, was composed of thirty-three ships, five frigates, and two brigs. In his impatience to sail, Villeneuve resolved, on the 8th of October (16 Vendemiaire), to take advantage of an east wind to get out of the road, for, to work out of Cadiz, you require winds from north-east to south-east. But three of the Spanish ships had just left the basin, and their crews had embarked on the preceding day: these were the *Santa Anna*, the *Rayo*, and the *San Justo*. Fit, at most, to sail with the fleet, they were incapable of keeping their place in a line of battle. This remark was urged by the Spanish officers. Villeneuve, to cover his responsibility, resolved to assemble a council of war. The bravest officers of the two fleets declared that they were ready to go wherever it was required, to second the views of the Emperor Napoleon, but that to rush into the immediate presence of the enemy, in the state in which most of the ships were, would be a most perilous imprudence; that the fleet, on quitting the road, having had scarcely time to manœuvre for a few hours, would fall in with the English fleet, of equal or superior force, and would be infallibly destroyed; that it would be better to wait for some favourable opportunity, such as a separation of the English forces, produced by any cause whatever, and till then to complete the organisation of the ships which had been last manned.

Villeneuve sent the result of this deliberation to Paris, adding to the opinion of the council his own, which was contrary to

any great battle, in the actual state of the two fleets. But he sent these useless documents, as if to make his quiet resignation the more conspicuous; and he added that he had taken the resolution to sail with the first east wind that should allow him to get out of the road with the fleet.

He waited therefore with impatience for a propitious moment for quitting Cadiz at all risks. He had at length before him that formidable Nelson, whose image, pursuing him over all the seas, had caused him to fail of fulfilling the most important of missions through fear of meeting with him. And now he no longer feared his presence, though it was more to be dreaded than ever, because his mind, worked up by despair, longed for danger, almost for defeat, in order to prove that he was right in avoiding an encounter with the British fleet.

Nelson, after touching for a moment at the British shores, which he was never to behold again, had sailed for Cadiz. He took with him one of the fleets which the Admiralty, penetrating, after the lapse of two years, the designs of Napoleon, had collected in the Channel. He was naturally conducted to Cadiz by the report spread over the ocean of the return of Villeneuve to the extremity of the Peninsula.

Nelson had at his disposal a naval force of about the same strength as Villeneuve, that is to say, 33 or 34 ships, but all seasoned by long cruises, and having that superiority over the combined fleet of France and Spain which blockading squadrons always have over blockaded squadrons. Not doubting, from the preparations of which he was accurately informed by Spanish spies, that he should soon catch Villeneuve on the passage, he observed his movements with the greatest attention, and addressed to the English officers, preparatory to the engagement which he foresaw, instructions made public since, and admired by all seamen.

He prescribed to them his favourite manœuvre, taking care to explain the motives for it.—To form in line, he said, occasioned the loss of too much time, for all ships were not alike affected by the wind, and then a squadron would have to regulate its movements by those of the worst sailers. An enemy who wished to avoid a battle would thus be allowed time to slip away. On this occasion, care must be taken not to let the combined French and Spanish fleet escape.—Nelson supposed that Villeneuve had been joined by Lallemand's division and perhaps by that of Carthagená also, which would have composed a squadron of 46 ships. He hoped himself to have 40, including those whose speedy arrival was announced; and the more numerous his fleet should be, the less would he attempt to draw it up in line. He therefore ordered two columns to be formed, one immediately under his own command, the other under the command of vice-admiral Collingwood, to bear down briskly on the enemy's line, without observing any order but that of swiftness, and to cut through

that line in two places, at the centre and towards the rear, and then to envelop the portions so cut off and to destroy them. That part of the enemy's fleet which you will have excluded from the fight, he added, grounding himself on the numerous experiences of the age, will scarcely be able to succour the part attacked, and you will have conquered before it arrives.—It was impossible to foresee with greater sagacity and accuracy the consequences of such a manœuvre. Nelson had previously impressed the idea upon the mind of each of his officers, and he expected from one moment to another the opportunity for realising it. That he might not intimidate his adversary too much, he had even taken care not to blockade Cadiz too closely. He merely stationed frigates to watch the road, and, for his own part, cruised with his ships of the line in the wide mouth of the Strait, tacking from west to east far out of sight of the coast.

Being informed of the real state of the forces of Villeneuve, who had not been joined either by Salcedo or Lallemand, he had not scrupled to leave four ships of the line at Gibraltar, to give one to admiral Calder, who had been recalled to England, and to send another to Gibraltar to take in water. This circumstance, known at Cadiz, confirmed Villeneuve in his resolution to sail. He conceived the English to be stronger, for he supposed them to have 33 or 34 ships, and he was rejoiced to learn that they had not so many. He even believed that they numbered fewer than they really had, that is to say 23 or 24.

Meanwhile, the last despatches from Paris, announcing the coming of admiral Rosilly, arrived at Cadiz. At first this gave Villeneuve no great concern. The idea of serving honourably under an officer, his superior in age and rank, and behaving like a valiant lieutenant at his side, soothed his mind, oppressed by the weight of too great a responsibility. But admiral Rosilly was already at Madrid, and no despatch from the minister had explained to Villeneuve the lot reserved for him under the new admiral. Villeneuve soon began to think that he was purely and simply displaced from the command of the fleet, and that he should not have the consolation of redeeming his character by fighting in the second rank in a conspicuous manner. Anxious to escape this dishonour, and availing himself of his instructions, which authorised him, nay, even made it a duty for him, to sail when the enemy should be inferior in force, he considered the advices recently received as an authorisation to weigh. He immediately made the signal for so doing. On the 19th of October (27 Vendemiaire), a slight breeze from the south-east having sprung up, he sent rear-admiral Magon out of the road with a division. Magon gave chase to a ship of the line and some frigates of the enemy's, and came to an anchor for the night outside the road. Next day, the 20th (28 Vendemiaire), Villeneuve himself weighed, with the whole fleet. The light and variable winds came from the east quarter. He put the ship's

head to the south, having the reserve squadron under admiral Gravina ahead and somewhat to larboard. The combined fleet consisted as we have said of 33 sail of the line, 5 frigates, and 2 brigs. It made a fine appearance. The French ships manœuvred well, but the Spanish, most of them at least, very ill.

Though the enemy was not yet in sight, the movement of his frigates gave reason to believe that he was not far off. One ship, the *Achille*, at length perceived him. but descried and signalled only 18 sail. For a moment the French flattered themselves that they should meet the English in far inferior force. A spark of hope glimmered in the mind of Villeneuve—the last that was to cheer his life.

He gave orders in the evening for the ships to get into line in order of swiftness, forming the line from the ship most to leeward, which signified that each ship was to take her place according to her speed, not according to her accustomed rank, and to get into line from that which had given way most to the wind. The breeze had varied. The heads of the ships were to the south-east, that is, towards the entrance of the Strait. The signal for battle was given on board all the ships of the fleet.

During the whole night there were seen and heard the signals of the English frigates, which, by rockets and cannon, acquainted Nelson with the direction of our course. At daybreak the wind was west, still light and variable, with a rolling sea, high waves but no breakers, the sun bright; the enemy was at length perceived formed into several groups, which appeared to some to be two in number, to others three. He was steering towards the French fleet, and still five or six leagues distant.

Villeneuve immediately ordered the line to be regularly formed, each vessel retaining the place which she had taken in the night, keeping as close as possible to her neighbour, and being on the starboard tack, a disposition in which the wind was received on the right, which was natural, since they had west winds to sail to the south-east from Cadiz to the Strait. The line was very ill-formed. The waves ran high, the breeze light, and the ships manœuvred with difficulty, a circumstance which rendered the inexperience of part of the crews the more to be regretted.

The reserve squadron, composed of twelve ships, sailed apart from the principal squadron. It had kept constantly to windward before the latter, which was an advantage, for by going with the wind it could always rejoin the other, taking such a position as was suitable for it to take, as for instance to place the enemy between two fires, when he should be occupied in fighting us. If ever there was a sufficient motive for the creation of a squadron of reserve, it was on this occasion. Admiral Gravina, whose mind was prompt and clear in the midst of action, made a signal to Villeneuve, applying for leave to manœuvre in an independent manner. Villeneuve refused it, for what reasons it is difficult to conceive. Perhaps he feared that the reserve squadron might be

compromised by its advanced position, and despaired of being able to succour it, since he was to leeward of it. This reason itself was not sufficient, for, if he was not sure that he should be able to go to it, he was at least sure that he could bring it to him; and, by making it return immediately into line, he deprived himself irretrievably of a moveable detachment very usefully placed for manœuvring; he lengthened without advantage his line already too long, since it consisted of 21 ships, and was about to be increased to 33. He nevertheless ordered admiral Gravina to rejoin and range himself in the line of the principal fleet. These signals were visible to the whole squadron. Real-admiral Magon, who was not less happily endowed than admiral Gravina, descrying the question and the answer on the masts of the two admirals, exclaimed that it was a blunder, and warmly expressed his vexation in such a manner as to be heard by all his officers.

About half-past eight o'clock, the intention of the enemy became more manifest. The different groups of the English squadron, less difficult to distinguish as they approached, now appeared to form but two. They clearly revealed Nelson's intention of breaking our line at two points. They advanced, with all sail hoisted, before the wind, peculiarly favoured in their plan of throwing themselves across our course, since they came with a west wind upon us, who formed a long line from north to south, a little inclined to east. The first column, placed to the north of our position, consisting of 12 ships commanded by Nelson, threatened our rear. The second, placed to the southward of the former, comprehending 15 ships commanded by admiral Collingwood, threatened our centre. Villeneuve, by that instinctive movement which always causes us to screen a threatened part, wished to go to the succour of his rear-guard, and at the same time to keep himself in communication with Cadiz, which was behind him to the north, that he might have a secure refuge in case of defeat. He therefore made the signal to wear all at once, each vessel by this manœuvre revolving upon herself, the line remaining as it was, long and straight, but ascending to the north, instead of descending to the south.

This manœuvre would not have any other advantage than that of bringing him nearer to Cadiz. Our fleet, ascending in a column towards the north, instead of descending towards the south, was to be assailed at two different points, but still assailed by two hostile columns, which were coming to break through it. It was a case to excite more regret than ever for the loss of the independent position, and to windward, which the squadron of reserve had shortly before occupied, a position which, at this moment, would have permitted it to manœuvre against one of the two groups of the English fleet. In this state of things, all that could be done was to close the line, to render it regular, and, if possible, to bring back to their post the ships which, having fallen to leeward, left gaps through which the enemy could pass.

But it was no easy matter for the ships that were out of line to get into it again, especially in the state of the wind, and with the inexperience of the crews. They might all have gone before the wind together for the purpose of trying to get into line with the leeward ships, which would have occasioned a general change of position and fresh irregularities greater than those which it was designed to correct. It was not deemed right to make it. The line, therefore, remained ill-formed, the distance not being equal between all the ships, several being either on the right, or astern of their post. The variable breeze, having acted more upon the rear and the centre, had produced a slight curvature in those divisions. Villeneuve had ordered the head-sails to be crowded with a view to enable the curved parts to straighten themselves. In this manner he multiplied signals for the purpose of bringing each ship into her place, and could scarcely succeed, notwithstanding the universal alacrity and obedience. The frigates, ranged on the starboard and to leeward of the squadron, each opposite to her admiral's ship, were rather too distant to render any other service than that of repeating signals.

At length, about eleven o'clock in the forenoon, the two hostile columns advancing, with the wind and all sail crowded, came up to our fleet. They followed each other in the order of swiftness, with the single precaution of putting their three-deckers at the head. They had seven and we four only, unfortunately Spanish, that is, less capable of rendering their superiority serviceable. Thus, though the English had but 27 ships and we 33, they had the same number of guns and consequently they were nearly equal in force. They had on their side experience of the sea, the habit of conquering, a great commander, and on that day even the favours of Fortune, since the advantage of the wind was for them. We lacked all these conditions of success, but we had a virtue, which can sometimes control Fate, the resolution to fight to the death.

The fleets were within cannon-shot. Villeneuve, by a precaution frequently ordered at sea, but far from desirable on this occasion, had given directions not to fire till the enemy was within good range. The English columns presenting a great accumulation of ships, each shot would have done considerable damage. Be this as it may, about noon, the southern column, commanded by admiral Collingwood, outstripping a little the northern, commanded by Nelson, reached the centre of our line at the position of the *Santa Anna*, a Spanish three-decker. The French ship *Fougueux* hastened to fire at the Royal Sovereign, the leading ship of the English column, carrying 120 guns, and the flag of admiral Collingwood. The whole French line followed this example, and opened a heavy fire upon the enemy's squadron. The damage done to it afforded reason to regret that the firing had not commenced before. The Royal Sovereign, continuing her movement, attempted to get between the *Santa Anna* and the *Fougueux* in order to pass between those two vessels, which were not sufficiently

close to each other. The *Fougueux* crowded sail to fill the gap, but did not arrive in time. The Royal Sovereign, passing astern of the *Santa Anna* and ahead of the *Fougueux*, poured into the *Santa Anna* a broadside from her larboard guns, double-shotted with ball and grape, raking her fore and aft, which made great havoc in the Spanish vessel. At the same moment she sent her starboard broadside into the *Fougueux*, but without much effect, while she received considerable damage from the latter. The other English ships of that column, which had closely followed their admiral, fell upon the French line from north to south, sought to cut it, by penetrating into the intervals, and to place it between two fires by proceeding towards its extremity. They were fifteen, and were engaged against sixteen. If then every one had done his duty, these 16 French and Spanish ships would have made head against the 15 English, independently of any succour from the van. But several ships, ill-managed, had already suffered themselves to be carried away from their post. The *Bahama*, the *Montanez*, the *Argonauta*, all of them Spanish, were either on the right, or astern of the place which they should have occupied in the line of battle. *L'Argonaute*, a French ship, did not follow a better example. On the contrary, the *Fougueux*, the *Pluton*, and the *Algesiras* were fighting with extraordinary vigour, and by their energy had drawn upon themselves the greater number of the enemy's ships, so that each of them was engaged with several at once. The *Algesiras* in particular, in which was rear-admiral Magon, was engaged hand to hand with the *Tonnant*, which he cannonaded with extreme violence, and made preparations for boarding. The *Prince of the Asturias*, commanded by Admiral Gravina, terminated our line, and, surrounded by enemies, avenged the honour of the Spanish flag for the misconduct of most of her companions.

Scarcely half an hour had elapsed from the commencement of the action, and the smoke which the subsiding breeze ceased to carry away, already enveloped the two fleets. From this dense cloud issued tremendous and continual thunders, while all around floated wrecks of masts and numbers of horribly mangled corpses.

The north column, commanded by Nelson, came up twenty or thirty minutes after that of Collingwood, to our centre, athwart the *Bucentaure*. There were at this part seven ships ranged in the following order: the *Santissima Trinidad*, having on board vice-admiral Cisneros, next to the *Bucentaure*, bearing the flag of admiral Villeneuve, both in line, and so close that the bowsprit of the latter touched the stern of the former; the *Neptune*, a French ship, the *San Leandro*, Spanish, both fallen to leeward, and having left a double vacancy in the line; the *Redoubtable*, precisely at her post and in the waters of the *Bucentaure*, but placed in regard to the latter at the distance of two ships; lastly the *San Justo* and the *Indomptable*, fallen to leeward, and leaving two more posts vacant between this group and the *Santa Anna*,

which was the first of the group attacked by Collingwood. Of these seven ships then, the *Santissima Trinidad* and the *Bucentaure* alone were in line, very close to each other, and the *Redoutable*, having two vacant posts ahead of her and two astern. Fortunately, not for the success of the battle but for the honour of our arms, there were here men whose courage was superior to all dangers. It was these three ships which alone, out of seven, remained at their posts, that had to bear the brunt of Nelson's entire column, composed of twelve ships, several of them three-deckers.

The *Victory*, in which Nelson had his flag, was to have been preceded by the *Temeraire*. The English officers, expecting to see their first ship furiously attacked, besought Nelson to permit the *Temeraire* to precede the *Victory*, that so invaluable a life as his might not be too much exposed. "By all means," replied Nelson, "let the *Temeraire* go first if she can." He then crowded all sail in the *Victory*, and thus kept at the head of the column. No sooner was the *Victory* within cannon-shot than the *Santissima Trinidad*, the *Bucentaure*, and the *Redoutable*, opened a tremendous fire upon her. In a few minutes they carried away one of her top-masts, cut up her rigging, and killed and wounded fifty of her crew. Nelson, who was seeking the French admiral's ship, imagined that he had discovered her, not in the gigantic Spaniard, the *Santissima Trinidad*, but in the *Bucentaure*, a French 80-gun ship; and he endeavoured to turn her by passing between her and the *Redoutable*. But an intrepid officer commanded the *Redoutable*; it was captain Lucas. Comprehending Nelson's intention from the manner of his ship, he had bent all his sails to catch the least breath of wind, and had been fortunate enough to come up in time, so that with his bowsprit he dashed against and shattered the ornamental work which crowned the stern of the *Bucentaure*. Nelson, therefore, found the space closed. He was not a man to draw back. He persisted, and unable to part with his prow the two ships so strongly locked together, he let the *Victory* fall with her side against that of the *Redoutable*. From the shock, and a relic of the breeze, the two ships were carried out of the line, and the way was again clear astern of the *Bucentaure*. Several English ships came up at once to surround the *Bucentaure* and the *Santissima Trinidad*. Others ascended along the French line, where ten ships were left without antagonists, fired a few broadsides at them, and immediately fell upon the French ships of the centre, three of which made an heroic resistance against their assailants.

The ten French ships of the van became therefore nearly useless, as Nelson had foreseen. Villeneuve ordered the flags signifying that any captain was not at his post if he was not in the fire, to be hoisted on his fore and mizen-mast. The frigates, according to rule, repeated the signal, which was more visible from their masts than from the admiral's, still shrouded in a cloud of smoke; and,

agreeably to the same rule, they added to the signal the numbers of the vessels which had remained out of fire, till those which were thus designated responded to the voice of honour.

While those were thus called to danger whom Nelson's manœuvre had separated from it, unexampled contest was going on at the centre. The *Redoubtable* had to fight not only the *Victory*, laid along her larboard side, but also the *Temeraire*, which had placed herself a little astern of her starboard side, and kept up a furious combat with these two foes. Captain Lucas, after several broadsides from his larboard guns, which had made terrible havoc on board the *Victory*, had been obliged to give up firing his lower tier, because in this part the protruding sides of the ships meeting prevented the use of those guns. The men who had thus become disposable he sent up into the tops and shrouds, to pour a destructive fire of grenades and musketry upon the deck of the *Victory*. At the same time, all his starboard guns were employed against the *Temeraire*, placed at some distance. To finish the contest with the *Victory*, he had given orders to board; but, his ship having only two decks and the *Victory* three, there was the height of one deck to climb, and a sort of ditch to cross in passing from one to the other; for the receding form of the ships left a vacancy between them, though they touched at the water line. Captain Lucas immediately ordered his yards to be brought to form a bridge for passing from ship to ship. Meanwhile the firing was continued from the tops and shrouds of the *Redoubtable* upon the deck of the *Victory*. Nelson, dressed in an old frock coat which he wore on days of battle, having captain Hardy, his flag-captain by his side, would not withdraw himself from the danger for a moment. His secretary had already been killed near him; captain Hardy had had a shoe-buckle carried away; and a chain-shot had swept off eight men at once. This great seaman, a just object of our hate and of our admiration, unmoved upon his quarter-deck, was observing this horrible scene, when a ball from the tops of the *Redoubtable* struck him on the left shoulder and lodged in his loins. Sinking upon his knees, he fell upon the deck, making an effort to support himself with his only hand. In falling, he said to captain Hardy, "They have done for me at last, Hardy."—"I hope not," replied the captain. "Yes," rejoined Nelson, "I have but a short time to live." He was conveyed to the place to which the wounded are carried, but he was almost insensible: he had, indeed, but a few hours to live. Rallying at times, he inquired how the battle went, and gave a piece of advice which soon proved his profound foresight. "Anchor," said he, "bring the fleet to an anchor."

His death produced extraordinary agitation on board the *Victory*. The moment was favourable for boarding. The gallant Lucas, at the head of a band of picked men, had already mounted upon the yards laid from one ship to the other, when the *Temeraire*,

never ceasing to second the Victory, fired a tremendous broadside of grape. Nearly two hundred French fell dead or wounded. These were almost all that were about to make the attempt to board. There were not hands enough left to persist in it. The men returned to the starboard guns and renewed an avenging fire against the *Temeraire*, which dismasted and did her prodigious damage. But, as if it was not enough to have two three-deckers to fight a ship of two decks, a new enemy came to join the former in crushing the *Redoutable*. The English ship *Neptune*, attacking her at the stern, poured into her broadsides which soon reduced her to a deplorable condition. Two masts of the *Redoutable* had fallen upon the deck; part of her guns were dismounted; one of her sides, nearly demolished, formed but one vast aperture; the helm was rendered unserviceable; while several shot-holes, just at the surface of the water, let it into the hold in torrents. The whole of the officers were wounded; ten midshipmen out of eleven were killed. Out of a crew of 640 men, 522 were *hors de combat*; 300 killed, 222 wounded. In such a state, this heroic ship could no longer defend herself. Her flag was hauled down, but, before she struck, she avenged on the person of Nelson the disasters of the French navy.

The Victory and the *Redoutable* having been carried out of the line in meeting, the way was clear for the enemy's ships, which came to surround the *Bucentaure* and the *Santissima Trinidad*. These two ships were still strongly linked together, for the *Bucentaure* had her bowsprit jammed in the stern gallery of the *Santissima Trinidad*. Ahead of them, *l'Heros*, which was the nearest of the ten ships that had remained inactive, had at first lent them some succour; but, after receiving a violent cannonade, she suffered herself to drive before the wind, and left the *Santissima Trinidad* and the *Bucentaure* to their deplorable fate. The *Bucentaure*, at the commencement of the action, had received from the Victory some broadsides, which, raking her from the stern, had done her much mischief. Soon afterwards she was surrounded by several English ships, which took the place of the Victory. Some laid themselves abaft the stern, others, turning the line, on her starboard side. She was thus attacked in rear and on the right by four ships, two of which were three-deckers. Villeneuve, as firm amidst the fire as irresolute under the anxieties of command, remained on his quarter-deck, hoping that, among so many French and Spanish ships that surrounded him, some one would come forward to succour their admiral. He fought with the utmost energy, and not without some hope. Having no enemies on the left, and several astern and on the right, in consequence of the movement which the English had made in passing within the line, he would have changed his position, to withdraw his stern, as well as his starboard tier of guns, which had sustained great damage, and turn his larboard side to the enemy. But, his bowsprit being fast in the gallery of the *Santissima Trinidad*, he

could not stir. He directed the *Santissima Trinidad* to be ordered, by word of mouth, to let herself drive, in order to produce a separation of the two ships. The order was not executed, because the Spanish ship, having lost her masts, lay absolutely immoveable on the water.

The *Bucentaure*, nailed to her position, was therefore obliged to endure a raking fire astern and on the right, without being able to use her starboard guns. However, nobly supporting the honour of the flag, she replied by a fire quite as active as that which she received. This combat had lasted an hour, when the flag-captain Magendie was wounded. Lieutenant Daudignon, taking his place, was wounded also, and succeeded in his turn by lieutenant Fournier. Before long the main-mast and the mizen-mast went by the board, and produced frightful confusion on deck. The flag was hoisted upon the fore-mast. Buried in a thick cloud of smoke, the admiral could not distinguish what was passing in the rest of the fleet. The smoke clearing off a little, he perceived the ships of the van still motionless, and ordered them, by hoisting his signals on his only remaining mast, to wear all at once, and to come into the fire. Enveloped afresh in that murderous cloud, which launched forth death and destruction, he continued the fight, foreseeing that he should be obliged in a few moments to quit his flag-ship, and to prosecute his duties in another. About three o'clock his third mast went by the board, and the deck was completely encumbered with wrecks.

The *Bucentaure*, with her starboard side torn to pieces, her stern demolished, her masts gone, was reduced to a sheer hulk. "My part in the *Bucentaure* is finished!" exclaimed the hapless Villeneuve; "I will try to charm Fortune on board another ship." He purposed then to get into a boat and go to the van to bring it himself to the fight. But the boats, placed on the deck of the *Bucentaure*, had been dashed to pieces by the successive fall of all the masts, and those which were on the bows had been riddled by balls. The *Santissima Trinidad* was hailed, and a boat applied for. Vain efforts! no human voice could be heard amidst this confusion. The French admiral, therefore, found himself confined to the hull of his ship which was ready to sink, no longer able to give orders or to make any attempt to save the fleet committed to his charge. His frigate, *l'Hortense*, which ought to have come to his assistance, never stirred, whether prevented by the wind or terrified by this appalling sight. The admiral had nothing left him but death, and more than once he had made up his mind to it. The chief of his staff, M. de Prigny, had just been wounded by his side. Nearly the whole of his crew were *hors de combat*. The *Bucentaure*, completely dismasted, riddled with balls, unable to use her guns, which were dismounted or obstructed by the wrecks of the rigging, had not even the cruel satisfaction of returning one of the blows which she received. It was a quarter past four; no assistance arriving, the

admiral was obliged to strike his flag. An English pinnace came to fetch him and to carry him on board the *Mars*. There he was received with the attentions due to his rank, his misfortunes, and his bravery—a slender compensation for so severe a calamity. He had at length found that disastrous fate which he had dreaded meeting, sometimes in the West Indies, sometimes in the Channel. He found it at the very spot where he expected to avoid it, at Cadiz, and he submitted to it, without the consolation of perishing for the accomplishment of a great design.

During this engagement, the *Santissima Trinidad*, surrounded by enemies, had been taken. Thus, of the seven ships of the centre attacked by Nelson's column, three, the *Redoubtable*, the *Bucentaure*, the *Santissima Trinidad*, had been overpowered without receiving assistance from the four others, the *Neptune*, the *San Leandro*, the *San Justo*, and the *Indomptable*. These latter, having fallen to leeward at the commencement of the action, could not get back into the fight. They had, therefore, no other means of being serviceable than to descend within the line, under the impulsion of a light breeze, which continued to blow from the west, and to join the sixteen ships attacked by Collingwood. One only, the French ship, the *Neptune*, commanded by a good officer, captain Maistral, executed this manœuvre, keeping always close to danger. He gave broadsides successively to the *Victory* and to the *Royal Sovereign*, and endeavoured to afford some assistance to the rear, engaged with Collingwood's column. The three others, the *San Leandro*, the *San Justo*, and the *Indomptable*, permitted themselves to be carried by the expiring breeze far away from the field of battle.

There were, however, still left the ten ships of the van, which, after exchanging a few shots with Nelson's column, had remained without antagonists. The signal which called them to the post of honour had found them already drifted to leeward, or unable to stir from the lightness of the breeze. *L'Heros*, placed nearest to the centre, after having supported for a moment, as we have seen, her two neighbours, the *Bucentaure* and the *Santissima Trinidad*, had suffered herself to drift by the slight breath of air which still prevailed, and the impulsion of which unluckily served only to carry her out of the fight. At any rate, blood had flowed upon the deck of that ship; but her gallant captain, Poulain, killed at the first onset, had taken away with him the spirit by which he was animated. The *San Augustino*, placed above the *Heros*, having lost her post very early, had been followed and taken by the English conquerors of the *Bucentaure*. The *San Francisco* fared no better. Ascending this line of the van, there came successively the *Mont Blanc*, the *Duguay-Trouin*, the *Formidable*, the *Rayo*, the *Intrepide*, the *Scipion*, and the *Neptune*. Admiral Dumanoir had repeated to them the signal to wear and to bear down upon the centre. Most of them had continued motionless, for want of knowing how to manœuvre,

or for want of the ability or the will to comply. At length, there were four which obeyed the signal of the commander of the division, by hoisting all their boats and employing them in assisting to wear. These were the *Mont Blanc*, the *Duguay-Trouin*, the *Formidable*, and the *Scipion*. Rear-admiral Dumanoir had prescribed to them a good manœuvre; this was, instead of wearing before the wind, which must carry them within the line, to wear against the wind, which, on the contrary, must carry them outside, and enable them, by letting themselves drift before it, to join in the fight whenever they thought proper.

Rear-admiral Dumanoir, on board the *Formidable*, which had won so much glory in the battle of Algeiras, with the *Scipion*, the *Duguay-Trouin*, and the *Mont Blanc*, prepared therefore to descend from north to south, along the line of battle. At that part to which he was proceeding, he should have it in his power to place the English between two fires. But it was late, three o'clock at least. He perceived almost everywhere disasters consummated, and, not having the resolution to share the general fate of the French fleet, he could be at no loss for good reasons for not involving himself inextricably. Having arrived opposite to the centre, he saw the *Bucefante* in the possession of the enemy, the *Santissima Trinidad* taken, the *Redoutable* conquered long before, and the English, though they had themselves suffered severely, running after the ships which had fallen to leeward. In his progress he sustained a very brisk fire, which damaged his four ships and rendered them less fit for action. Warmly received by Nelson's victorious column, and seeing nothing to assist, he continued his course, and came to the rear, where the sixteen French and Spanish ships engaged with Collingwood's column were fighting. There, by devoting himself, he might have saved some ships or added glorious deaths to those which were to console us for a great defeat. Disheartened by the fire which had just damaged his division, consulting prudence rather than despair, he did nothing of the kind. Treated by Fortune like Ville-neuve, he was soon doomed, for having endeavoured to avoid a glorious catastrophe, to be overtaken elsewhere by a useless disaster.

At this extremity of the line, which had been engaged the first with Collingwood's column, the French ships, the *Argonaute* alone excepted, fought with a courage worthy of immortal glory. And as for the Spanish ships, two, the *Santa Anna* and the *Prince of the Asturias*, gallantly seconded the conduct of the French.

After a conflict of two hours, the *Santa Anna*, which was the first of the rear, having lost all her masts, and inflicted on the Royal Sovereign almost as much damage as she had received, struck her flag. Vice-admiral Alava, severely wounded, had behaved nobly. The *Fougueux*, next neighbour to the *Santa Anna*, after making great efforts to assist her by preventing the

Royal Sovereign from forcing the line, had been deserted by the *Monarca*, the ship astern of her. Being then turned and attacked by two English ships, the *Fougueux* had disabled both of them. Engaged afterwards, side by side with the *Temeraire*, she had had to repel several attempts at boarding, and had lost about 400 out of 700 men. Captain Beaudouin, who commanded her, having been killed, lieutenant Bazin had immediately taken his place, and resisted two assaults of the English as valiantly as his predecessor. The enemy returning to the charge, and having gained possession of the fore-castle, the gallant Bazin, wounded and covered with blood, having but a few men left about him, and confined to the quarter-deck, found himself compelled to surrender the *Fougueux* after the most glorious resistance.

Astern of the *Fougueux*, on the very spot abandoned by the *Monarca*, the French ship, the *Pluton*, commanded by captain Cosmao, manœuvred with equal daring and dexterity. Hastening to fill the space left vacant by the *Monarca*, she had stopped short an enemy's ship, the *Mars*, which attempted to pass there, riddled her with shot, and was preparing to carry her by boarding, when a three-decker came up astern and cannonaded her. She had cleverly slipped away from this new adversary, and, turning her bows instead of her stern, had avoided the enemy's fire, while sending into her several furious broadsides. Returning to her first antagonist, and contriving to get the weather-gage, she had succeeded in raking her astern, carrying away two of her masts, and putting her *hors de combat*. Having got rid of these two assailants, the *Pluton* sought to hasten to the assistance of the French, who were overwhelmed by numbers, owing to the retreat of the ships unfaithful to their duty.

Astern of the *Pluton*, the *Algesiras*, bearing the flag of rear-admiral Magon, was engaged in a memorable fight, worthy of that which the *Redoutable* had sustained, and quite as sanguinary. Rear-admiral Magon, born in the Isle of France, of a family from St. Malo, was still young, and as handsome as he was brave. At the commencement of the action, he had called together his crew, and promised to give the man who should be first to head the boarders, a splendid shoulder-belt, presented to him by the Philippine Company. All were eager to earn such a reward from his hand. Behaving as the commanders of the *Redoutable*, the *Fougueux*, the *Pluton*, had done, rear-admiral Magon first carried the *Algesiras* forward to close the way against the English, who intended to cut the line. In this movement, he fell in with the *Tonnant*, an 80-gun ship, formerly French, taken by the English at Aboukir, and commanded by a courageous officer, captain Tyler. He approached very near to her, fired, and then, wearing, ran his bowsprit to a great depth into the shrouds of the enemy's ship. The shrouds, as every body knows, are those ladders of ropes, which, binding the masts to the hull of the ship, serve to steady and to ascend them. Thus locked to his antagonist,

Magon collected around him the stoutest of his crew, to lead them to board. But the same thing happened to them that had befallen the crew of the *Redoutable*. Already assembled on the deck and on the bowsprit, they were about to rush upon the *Tonnant*, when another English ship, lying athwart the *Algesiras*, poured into her several rounds of grape, which mowed down a great number of the boarders. It was then necessary, before prosecuting the attempt, to reply to the new enemy that had fallen upon her, and also to a third which had just joined the two others in cannonading the already shattered sides of the *Algesiras*. While thus defending himself against three ships, Magon was boarded by captain Tyler, who resolved, in his turn, to show himself on the deck of the *Algesiras*. He received him at the head of his crew, and he himself, with a boarding-axe in his hand, setting the example to his men, they repulsed the English. Thrice they returned to the charge, and thrice were they driven off the deck of the *Algesiras*. His flag-captain, Letourneur, was killed by his side. Lieutenant Plassan, who took the command, was immediately wounded also. Magon, whose brilliant uniform rendered him a conspicuous mark to the enemy, received a ball in the arm, which bled profusely. He took no heed of this wound, and continued at his post. But a second struck him on the thigh. His strength then began to fail him. As he could scarcely support himself on the deck of his ship, covered with wrecks and corpses, the officer who, after the death of all the others, had become flag-captain, M. de la Bretonnière, begged him to go down for a moment to the cock-pit, at least to have his wounds dressed, that he might not lose his strength along with his blood. The hope of being able to return to the combat decided Magon to listen to the solicitations of M. de la Bretonnière. He went down to the lower deck, supported by two sailors. But the sides of the ship being shattered, afforded a free passage to the grape-shot. Magon received a ball from a musketoon in his chest, and dropped dead immediately. This event filled his crew with consternation. They fought with fury, to avenge a commander whom they had alike loved and admired. But the three masts of the *Algesiras* were gone, and the guns dismantled or obstructed by the wrecks of the masts. Out of 641 men, 150 were killed, and 180 wounded. The crew, cooped up on the quarter-deck, held possession of only part of the ship. They were without hope, without resource: they poured a last discharge into the enemy, and surrendered that rear-admiral's flag which had been so valiantly defended.

Astern of the *Algesiras*, others were still engaged, though the day was far advanced. The *Bahama* had withdrawn, but the *Aigle* fought gallantly, and did not surrender till after severe losses and the death of her commander, captain Gourrège. The *Swiftsure*, which the enemy made a particular point of retaking, because she had been English, behaved with equal bravery, and

yielded only to numbers, having seven feet water in her hold. Beyond the *Swiftsure*, the French ship the *Argonaute*, after receiving some damage, sheered off. The *Berwick* fought honourably in her place. The Spanish ships, *Argonauta*, *San Nepomuceno*, and *San Ildefonso*, had quitted the field of battle. On the contrary, admiral Gravina, in the *Prince of the Asturias*, surrounded by the English ships which had doubled the extremity of the line, defended himself alone against them with extraordinary energy. Encompassed on every side, riddled with shot, he held out stoutly, and must have been overpowered, had he not been assisted by the *Neptune*, which we have seen exerting herself to get to windward to make herself useful, and by the *Pluton*, which, having succeeded in getting rid of her adversaries, had come to seek fresh dangers. Unfortunately, at the end of this fight, admiral Gravina received a mortal wound. Lastly, at the extremity of this long line, marked by flames, by floating wrecks of ships, by thousands of mutilated bodies, a last scene occurred to fill the combatants with horror, and our very enemies with admiration. The *Achille*, attacked on several sides, defended herself with obstinacy. Amidst the cannonade, a fire broke out in the ship. It would have been but natural to leave the guns and hasten to the fire, which already began to spread with alarming activity. But the sailors of the *Achille*, fearing that while they were extinguishing it, the enemy might profit by the inaction of their artillery to gain the advantage, chose rather to be invaded by the flames than to forsake their guns. Presently, volumes of smoke, issuing from the hull of the ship, frightened the English, and decided them to move away from this volcano, which threatened every moment to explode and to ingulph alike assailants and defenders. They left it, therefore, all alone amidst the abyss, and began to contemplate this spectacle, which, from one moment to another, must terminate in a horrible catastrophe. The French crew, already much thinned by the grape-shot, finding themselves delivered from their enemies, directed all their efforts to the extinction of the flames which were consuming their ship. But it was too late: they were forced to think of saving their lives. They threw into the sea every thing capable of floating, casks, masts, yards, and sought upon them a precarious refuge from the explosion expected every minute. Scarcely had a few of the sailors committed themselves to the sea, when the fire, having reached the powder, caused the *Achille* to blow up with a tremendous crash, which terrified the conquerors themselves. The English hastened to send off their boats to pick up the unfortunate men who had so nobly defended themselves. A very small number found means to save their lives. Most of them, remaining on board, were hurled into the air along with the wounded who encumbered the ship.

It was five o'clock. The fighting was over almost everywhere. The line, broken at first in two places, and presently in three

or four, from the absence of the ships which had not been able to keep in their positions, was ravaged from one extremity to the other. At the sight of that fleet, either destroyed or in flight, admiral Gravina, extricated by the *Neptune* and the *Pluton*, and having become commander-in-chief, gave the signal for retreat. Besides the two French ships which came to his assistance, and the *Prince of the Asturias*, which he was on board of, he was able to rally eight more, three French; the *Heros*, the *Indomptable*, and the *Argonaute*, and five Spanish, the *Rayo*, the *San Francisco de Assisi*, the *San Justo*, the *Montanez*, and the *Leandro*. These latter, we must confess, had saved themselves much rather than their honour. These were eleven which escaped from the disaster, besides the four with rear-admiral Dumanoir, which made a separate retreat—in all, fifteen. To this number must be added the frigates, which, placed to leeward, had not done what might have been expected of them to assist the fleet. Seventeen French and Spanish ships had been taken by the English; one had blown up. The combined fleet had lost six or seven thousand men, killed, wounded, drowned, or prisoners. Never had so vast a scene of horror been beheld upon the seas.

The English had obtained a complete victory, but a sanguinary, a dear-bought victory. Of the twenty-seven ships composing their fleet, almost all had lost masts; some were unfitted for service, either for ever, or till they had received considerable repairs. They had to regret the loss of about 3000 men, a great number of their officers, and the illustrious Nelson, more to be regretted by them than an army. They took in tow seventeen ships, almost all dismasted or near foundering, and an admiral prisoner. They had the glory of skill, of experience, combined with incontestable bravery. We had the glory of an heroic defeat, unequalled perhaps in history for the devotedness of the vanquished.

At nightfall Gravina stood away for Cadiz with eleven ships and five frigates. Rear-admiral Dumanoir, fearful of finding the enemy between him and France, steered towards the Strait.

Admiral Collingwood assumed the signs of mourning for his deceased commander, but he did not think proper to follow the injunction of that dying officer, and resolved, instead of anchoring the fleet, to pass the night under sail. The coast and the disastrous cape of Trafalgar, which has given name to the battle, were in sight. A dangerous wind began to spring up, the night to become dark, and the English ships, manœuvring with difficulty, on account of their damages, were obliged to tow or to escort seventeen captured ships. The wind soon increased in violence, and the horrors of a bloody battle were succeeded by a tremendous storm, as if Heaven had designed to punish the two most civilised nations of the globe, and the most worthy to rule it beneficially by their union, for the fury in which they had just been indulging. Admiral Gravina and his eleven ships had a secure and speedy retreat in Cadiz. But admiral Collingwood,

too far distant from Gibraltar, had but the bosom of the Ocean whereon to rest from the fatigues and the sufferings of victory. In a few moments night, more cruel than the day itself, mingled conquered and conquerors, and made them all tremble beneath a hand mightier than that of victorious man, the hand of Nature in wrath. The English were obliged to throw off the ships which they were towing, and to give up watching those which they had under their escort. Singular vicissitudes of naval warfare! Some of the prisoners, overjoyed at the terrific aspect of the tempest, conceived a hope of reconquering their ships and their liberty. The English who guarded the *Bucentaure*, finding themselves without assistance, gave up of their own accord our admiral's ship to the remnant of the French crew. These, delighted at being delivered by an appalling danger, set up jury-masts in their dismasted ship, fastened to them fragments of sails, and steered for Cadiz, propelled by the hurricane. The *Algesiras*, worthy of the unfortunate Magon, whose corpse she carried, resolved also to owe her deliverance to the storm. Seventy English officers and scamen guarded this noble prize. Shattered as she was, the *Algesiras*, recently built, bore herself up on the waves, in spite of her extensive damages. But her three masts were cut down; the main-mast fifteen feet from the deck, the fore, nine, and the mizen five feet. The ship which towed her, flung off the cable that held her prisoner. The English left in charge of her had fired guns to demand assistance, but obtained no answer. Then, addressing themselves to M. de la Bretonnière, they begged him to assist them with his crew in saving the ship, and with the ship the lives of all on board. M. de la Bretonnière, struck at this application by a gleam of hope, desired to confer with his countrymen shut up in the hold. He went to the French officers, and communicated to them his hope of wresting the *Algesiras* from her conquerors. They unanimously agreed to comply with the proposal that was made to them, and, when once in possession of the ship, to fall upon the English, to disarm them, to fight them to the last extremity amidst the horrors of that night, and afterwards to provide as they best could for their own safety. There were left 270 French, disarmed, but ready for any attempt to recover their ship from the hands of the enemy. The officers went about among them, and imparted their plan, which was received with transport. It was agreed that M. de la Bretonnière should first summon the English, and that, if they refused to surrender, the French, at a given signal, should fall upon them. The terrors of the tempest, the fears of the coast, which was not far off, were all forgotten: nothing was thought of but this new fight, a species of civil war, in presence of the incensed elements.

M. de la Bretonnière went back to the English, and told them that the state of neglect in which the ship was left amidst so great a danger had dissolved all their engagements; that from that moment the French looked upon themselves as free; and that, if their

guards conceived their honour interested in fighting, they could do so; that the French crew, though unarmed, would rush upon them at the first signal. Two French seamen, in their impatient ardour, actually fell upon the English sentinels, and received large wounds from them. M. de la Bretonnière repressed the tumult, and gave the English officers time for reflection. The latter, after deliberating for a moment, considering their small number, the cruelty of their countrymen, the common danger threatening the conquered and the conquerors, surrendered to the French, on condition that they should be again free as soon as they should reach the shore of France. M. de la Bretonnière promised to demand their liberty from his government, if they succeeded in getting into Cadiz. Shouts of joy rang through the ship: all hands fell to work; topmasts were sought out from among the spare stores; they were hoisted, fixed upon the stumps of the large masts, sails were fitted to them, and in this state the ship stood for Cadiz.

Daylight appeared, but, instead of bringing any improvement in the weather, it was worse than before. Admiral Gravina had returned to Cadiz with the remnant of the combined fleet. The English fleet was in sight of that port, accompanied by some of its prizes, which it kept at the muzzle of its guns. After struggling the whole day against the storm, the commanding officer, La Bretonnière, though without a pilot, but assisted by a seaman who was familiar with the waters of Cadiz, arrived at the entrance of the road. He had but a single bower anchor left and one thick cable, to resist the wind which blew with violence towards the coast. He threw out that anchor, and trusted himself to it, a prey at the same time to keen anxiety; for, if that gave way, the *Algesiras* must perish on the rocks. Unacquainted with the road, he had anchored near a formidable reef called Diamond Point. The night was passed in the most painful apprehension. At length day returned and shed a fearful light on that desolate beach. The *Bucentaure*, always unfortunate, had gone ashore there. Part of her crew had indeed been saved by the *Indomptable*, anchored not far off. The latter, which had sustained little damage, because she had fought but little, was secured by good anchors and good cables. During the whole day the *Algesiras* fired signals of distress, to claim assistance. A few boats perished before they could reach her. One only succeeded in bringing to her a very small grapple. The *Algesiras* remained at anchor near the *Indomptable*, applying to the latter to tow her, which she promised to do as soon as it was possible to get into Cadiz. Night again shrouded the sea and the two ships anchored one beside the other: it was the second since the fatal battle. The crew of the *Algesiras* looked with terror on the two weak anchors on which their salvation depended, and with envy on those of the *Indomptable*. The violence of the tempest increased, and all at once a thrilling shriek was heard. The *Indomptable*, her strong anchors having given way, came on suddenly, covered with her lanterns, having on

deck her crew in despair, passed within a few feet of the *Algesiras*, and struck with a horrible crash upon Diamond Point. The lanterns which lighted her, the cries which rang, were buried in the billows. Fifteen hundred men perished at once, for the *Indomptable* had on board her own crew nearly entire, that of the *Bucentaure*, sound and wounded, and part of the troops embarked in the admiral's ship.

After this afflicting sight and the painful reflections which it occasioned, the *Algesiras* saw day return and the storm abate. She entered at last the road of Cadiz, and, proceeding at random, grounded in a bed of mud, where she was thenceforward out of danger. Just reward of the most admirable heroism!

While these tragic adventures marked the miraculous return of the *Algesiras*, the *Redoutable*, the ship which had so gloriously fought the Victory, and from which proceeded the bullet that had killed Nelson, foundered. Her stern, undermined by the balls, had suddenly fallen in, and there had been scarcely time to take out of her 119 Frenchmen. The *Fougueux*, disabled, struck on the coast of Spain and was lost.

The *Monarca*, abandoned in like manner, had gone to pieces off the rocks of San Lucar.

The English had but few of their prizes left, and with the least damaged of their ships they kept at sea, within sight of Cadiz, constantly struggling against contrary winds, which had prevented them from regaining Gibraltar. At this sight the brave commander of the *Pluton*, captain Cosmao, could not repress the zeal with which he was animated. His ship was riddled, his crew reduced to half, but none of these reasons could stop him. Borrowing some hands from the *Hermione* frigate, he repaired his rigging in haste, and, exercising the command which belonged to him, for all the admirals and rear-admirals were dead, wounded, or prisoners, he made a signal to the ships capable of putting to sea to weigh, in order to take from Collingwood's fleet the French whom it was dragging away with it. The intrepid Cosmao accordingly sailed in company with the *Neptune*, which during the battle had done her best to get into the fire, and with three other French and Spanish ships, which had not had the honour of taking part in the battle of Trafalgar. They were five in all, accompanied by five frigates, which had also to make amends for their recent conduct. In spite of the foul weather, these ten ships approached the English fleet. Collingwood, taking them for so many ships of the line, immediately sent ten of his least damaged ships to meet them. In this movement some of the prizes were abandoned. The frigates availed themselves of the opportunity to seize and take in tow the *Santa Anna* and the *Neptune*. Cosmao, who had not sufficient force, and had against him the wind blowing towards Cadiz, returned, carrying off with him the two reconquered ships, the only trophy that he could gain after such disasters. That was not the only result of this

effort. Admiral Collingwood, apprehensive that he should not be able to keep his prizes, sunk or burned the *Santissima Trinidad*, the *Argonauta*, the *San Augustine*, and the *Intrepide*.

The *Aigle* escaped from the English ship, the *Defiance*, and ran aground off Port St. Mary. The *Berwick* was lost by an act of devotedness similar to that which had saved the *Algesiras*. Among the ships which accompanied captain Cosmao, there was one which could not get back: that was the Spanish ship, the *Rayo*, which perished between Rota and San Lucar.

The English admiral at length reached Gibraltar, carrying with him but four prizes out of seventeen, one French, the *Swiftsure*, and three Spanish; and he was afterwards obliged to sink the *Swiftsure* also.

Such was that fatal battle of Trafalgar. Inexperienced seamen, allies still more inexperienced, a lax discipline, a neglected *matériel*, everywhere precipitation, with its consequences; a commander too deeply impressed with these disadvantages, conceiving from them sinister presentiments, carrying these with him over all the seas, suffering their influence to thwart the great plans of his sovereign; that irritated sovereign underrating material obstacles, less difficult to surmount on land than at sea, mortifying by the bitterness of his reproaches an admiral whom he ought rather to have pitied than blamed; this admiral fighting from despair, and Fortune, cruel to adversity, refusing him even the advantage of the wind; half of a fleet paralysed by ignorance and by the elements, the other half fighting with fury; on one side a bravery founded on calculation and skill, on the other an heroic inexperience, sublime deaths, a frightful carnage, an unparalleled destruction; after the ravages of men, the ravages of the tempest; the abyss ingulphing the trophies of the conqueror; lastly, the triumphant chief buried in his triumph, and the vanquished chief projecting suicide as the only refuge from his affliction—such was, we repeat it, that fatal battle of Trafalgar, with its causes, its results, its tragic aspects.

From this great disaster there could, however, be drawn useful consequences for our navy. It was requisite to relate to the world what had happened. The combats of the *Redoubtable*, the *Algesiras*, the *Achille*, deserve to be recorded with pride, beside the triumphs of Ulm. Unsuccessful courage is not less admirable than successful courage: it is more touching. Besides, the favours of Fortune to us were great enough to permit us to avow publicly some of her severities. Then liberal rewards ought to have been bestowed on the men who had so worthily done their duty, and those to have been brought before a council of war, who, daunted by the horror of the scene, had kept out of the fire. And, had they even behaved well on other occasions, it would have been right to sacrifice them to the necessity of establishing discipline by terrible examples. Above all, government ought to find in this sanguinary defeat a lesson for itself; it ought

to impress it with the conviction that nothing should be hurried, particularly where the navy is concerned; it ought to make it abstain from presenting in line of battle squadrons not sufficiently tried at sea, and to apply itself meanwhile to train them by frequent and distant cruises.

The excellent king of Spain, without entering into all these calculations, wrapped up in one and the same measure rewards for the brave and for the cowards, unwilling to bring to light any thing but the honour done to his flag by the conduct of some of his seamen. It was a weakness natural to a court that had grown old, but a weakness arising from benignity. Our sailors, somewhat recruited after their hardships, had mingled with the Spanish seamen in the port of Cadiz, when they were informed that the king of Spain gave a step in rank to every Spaniard who had been present at the battle of Trafalgar, besides particular distinctions to those who had behaved best. The Spaniards, almost ashamed of being rewarded when the French were not, said to the latter that probably they would soon receive the recompense of their courage. This was not the case: the brave and the cowards among the French also shared the same treatment, and that treatment was oblivion.

When the news of the disasters of Trafalgar reached admiral Decrès, he was intensely grieved. That minister, notwithstanding his intelligence, notwithstanding his intimate acquaintance with naval matters, never had any thing but reverses to report to a sovereign who, in every other line, obtained only successes. He transmitted these melancholy details to Napoleon, who was already advancing with eagle's speed upon Vienna. Though bad tidings had scarcely power to affect a mind intoxicated with triumphs, the news of Trafalgar mortified Napoleon, and excited his profound displeasure. On this occasion, however, he was less severe than usual toward admiral Villeneuve, for that unfortunate chief had fought bravely, though very imprudently. Napoleon acted in this instance as men of the strongest as well as of the weakest minds frequently act; he strove to forget this vexation, and to make others forget it. He desired that little should be said about Trafalgar in the French newspapers, and that it should be mentioned as an imprudent fight, in which we had suffered more from the tempest than from the enemy. He resolved neither to reward nor to punish, which was a cruel injustice, unworthy of him and of the spirit of his government. At that time there was something passing in his mind which contributed powerfully to produce this so niggardly conduct: he began to despair of the French navy. He was devising a more sure, a more practicable way of fighting England; this was to fight her in the allies whom she paid; to take the continent from her, to exclude from it her commerce and her influence. It was natural for him to prefer this method, in the employment of which he excelled, and which, well managed, would certainly have conducted him to the

aim of his efforts. From that day, Napoleon thought less of the navy, and wished every body else to think less of it too.

With respect to the battle of Trafalgar, Europe itself was willing enough to observe that silence which he desired. The mighty resonance of his steps on the continent drowned the echoes of the cannon of Trafalgar. The powers who had the sword of Napoleon at their breast were but little cheered by a naval victory, profitable to England alone, without any other result than a new extension of her commercial domination, a domination which they disliked and tolerated only from jealousy of France. Besides, British glory did not console them for their own humiliation. Trafalgar, then, eclipsed not the splendour of Ulm, and, as we shall presently see, lessened none of its consequences.

BOOK XXIII.

AUSTERLITZ.

Effect produced by the News from the Army—Financial Crisis—The Chest of Consolidation suspends its Payments in Spain, and contributes to increase the Embarrassments of the Company of the *United Merchants*—Assistance afforded to that Company by the Bank of France—Too extensive Issue of Notes of the Bank, and suspension of its Payments—Numerous Failures—The Public, alarmed, confides in Napoleon, and expects from him some signal Act to restore Credit and Peace—Continuation of the Events of the War—State of Affairs in Prussia—The alleged Violation of the Territory of Anspach furnishes a Pretext for the War Party—The Emperor Alexander avails himself of it to repair to Berlin—He induces the Court of Prussia to make eventual Engagements with the Coalition—Treaty of Potsdam—Departure of M. de Haugwitz for the French Head-quarters—Grand Resolution of Napoleon on learning the new Dangers with which he is threatened—He hastens his Movement upon Vienna—Battle of Caldiero in Italy—March of the Grand Army through the Valley of the Danube—Passage of the Inn, of the Traun, of the Ens—Napoleon at Linz—Movement which the Archdukes Charles and John were able to make in order to stop the March of Napoleon—Precautions of the latter on approaching Vienna—Distribution of his Corps d'Armée on both banks of the Danube and in the Alps—The Russians pass the Danube at Krems—Danger of Mortier's Corps—Battle of Dirnstein—Davout's Battle at Mariazell—Entry into Vienna—Surprise of the Bridges of the Danube—Napoleon designs to take Advantage of it to cut off the Retreat of general Kutusof—Murat and Lannes sent to Hollabrünn—Murat, deluded by the Proposal of an Armistice, gives the Russian Army time to escape—Napoleon rejects the Armistice—Sanguinary Battle at Hollabrünn—Arrival of the French Army at Brünn—Admirable Dispositions of Napoleon for occupying Vienna, guarding himself against the Archdukes, towards the Alps and Hungary, and facing the Russians in Moravia—Ney occupies the Tyrol, Augereau, Suabia—Capture of the Corps of Jellachich and Rohan—Departure of Napoleon for Brünn—Attempt at Negotiation—Silly Pride of the Russian Staff—New Coterie formed about Alexander—It inspires him with the imprudent Resolution to give Battle—Ground chosen beforehand by Napoleon—Battle of Austerlitz fought on the 2nd of December—Destruction of the Austro-Russian Army—The Emperor of Austria at Napoleon's Bivouac—Armistice granted under the Promise of a speedy Peace—Commencement of Negotiation at Brünn—Conditions imposed by Napoleon—He insists on having the Venetian States to complete the Kingdom of Italy, the Tyrol and Austrian Suabia, to aggrandise Bavaria, Baden, and Wurtemberg—Family Alliances with these three German Houses—Resistance of the Austrian Plenipotentiaries—Napoleon, on his return to Vienna, has a long Interview with M. de Haugwitz—He resumes his Designs of Union with Prussia, and gives her Hanover, on condition that she shall ally herself definitively with France—Treaty of Vienna with Prussia—Departure of M. de Haugwitz for Berlin—Napoleon, having got rid of Prussia, becomes more exacting towards Austria—The Negotiations transferred to Presburg—Acceptance of the Conditions of France, and Peace of Presburg—Departure of Napoleon for Munich—Marriage of Eugene Beauharnais with the Princess Augusta of Bavaria—Return of Napoleon to Paris—Triumphal Reception.



BOOK XXIII.

AUSTERLITZ.

THE tidings from the banks of the Danube had filled France with satisfaction; those from Cadiz grieved her, but neither gave her any surprise. Every thing was hoped for from our land forces, constantly victorious ever since the commencement of the Revolution, and scarcely any thing from our fleets, so unfortunate for the last fifteen years. But consequences of minor importance only were attached to naval events; on the contrary, our prodigious successes on the continent were regarded as completely decisive. There people beheld hostilities kept at a great distance from our frontiers, the coalition disconcerted at its outset, the duration of the war greatly abridged, and the continental peace rendered speedy, bringing with it the hope of a maritime peace. Meanwhile, the army, pushing on towards Austria to meet the Russians, afforded a presage of new and great events, which were awaited with keen impatience. For the rest, confidence in the genius of Napoleon tempered all anxieties.

This confidence was needed to support credit, which was violently shaken. We have already described the embarrassing situation of our finances. An arrear, owing to the resolution of Napoleon to provide without loan for the expenses of the war; the embarrassments of the Spanish Treasury, extended to the French Treasury by the speculations of the company of the *United Merchants*; the portfolio of the Treasury given up entirely to that company, by the fault of an honest but deluded minister—such were the causes of that situation. They had finally produced the crisis which had long been foreseen. An incident had contributed to hasten it. The court of Madrid, which was debtor to the company of the *United Merchants* for the subsidy, the amount of which the latter had undertaken to discharge, for the cargoes of corn sent to the different ports of the Peninsula, for the supplies furnished for the Spanish fleets and armies—the court of Madrid had just had recourse in its distress to a disastrous measure. Being obliged to suspend the payments of the *Chest of Consolidation*, a species of bank dedicated to the service of the public debt, it had given a forced currency as money to the notes of that chest. Such a measure must necessarily cause all the specie to disappear. M.

Ouvrard, who, till he could bring over the piastres of Mexico, assigned to him by the court of Madrid, had no other means of supplying the wants of his partners but the cash which he was to draw from the Chest of Consolidation, found himself suddenly stopped short in his operations. There had been promised in particular to M. Desprez four millions of piastres, which he had promised in his turn to the Bank of France, in order to obtain from it the assistance that he needed. These four millions were no longer to be depended upon. On the sums to be drawn from Mexico, a loan of ten millions had been negotiated with the house of Hope, of which two at most could be hoped for, in time to be useful. These unfortunate circumstances had increased beyond measure the embarrassments of M. Desprez, who was charged with the operations of the Treasury, and of M. Vanlerberghe, who was charged with the supply of provisions, and the embarrassments of both had fallen back upon the Bank. We have already explained how they induced the Bank to discount either their own paper or the *obligations of the receivers-general*. The Bank gave them the amount in notes, the issue of which was thus increased in an immoderate manner. This would have been only an evil very speedily reparable if the promised piastres had arrived to bring back the metallic reserve of the Bank to a suitable rate. But things had come to such a point that the Bank had not more than 15,000,000 francs in its coffers, against 72 millions in notes issued and 20 millions in running accounts, that is to say against 92 millions demandable immediately. A strange circumstance, which had recently come to light, greatly aggravated this situation. M. de Marbois, in his unlimited confidence in the company, had granted a faculty entirely unexceptionable, which he had at first viewed only as a facility of service, and which had become the cause of a great abuse. The company having in its possession the greater part of the *obligations of the receivers-general*, since it discounted them to the Bank, having to pay itself for services of all kinds which it executed in different parts of the territory, found itself obliged to draw incessantly upon the chests of the Treasury; and, for the greater convenience, M. de Marbois had ordered the receivers-general to pay the funds which came into their hands to the mere receipt of M. Desprez. The company had immediately made use of this faculty. While, on the one hand, it endeavoured to procure cash at Paris by discounting with the Bank the *obligations of the receivers-general* of which it was possessed, on the other, it took from the chest of the receivers-general the money destined for the discharge of those same obligations, and the Bank, when they became due, on sending them to the receivers-general, found in payment nothing but receipts of Desprez's. Thus the Bank received paper in payment of other paper. In this manner it was led to so great an issue of notes with so small a reserve. A treacherous clerk, betraying the confidence of M. de Marbois, was

the principal cause of the compliances of which such a deplorable use was made.

This situation, unknown to the minister, not duly appreciated even by the company, which, in its embarrassment, not measuring either the extent of the operations in which it had been induced to engage, or the gravity of the acts which it committed—this situation revealed itself gradually by a universal scarcity of money. The public, in particular, eager after metallic specie, apprised of its rarity at the Bank, thronged to its offices to convert notes into cash. Malevolent persons joining those who were alarmed, the crisis soon became general.

Circumstances so aggravated produced avowals long delayed and distressing elucidations. M. Vanlerberghe, to whom any thing that there was blameable in the conduct of the company could not be imputed, for he was solely occupied with the corn-trade, without knowing to what embarrassments he was exposed by his partners—M. Vanlerberghe went to M. de Marbois, and declared to him that it was impossible for him to provide both for the service of the Treasury and for the victualling service, and that it was quite as much as he could do to continue the latter. He did not disguise from him that the supplies furnished for Spain, and still unpaid for, were the principal cause of his straitened situation. M. de Marbois, dreading lest the victualling service should be at a stand, encouraged, moreover, by some expressions of the Emperor, who, satisfied with M. Vanlerberghe, had intimated an intention of supporting him, granted to that contractor an aid of 20 millions. He placed them to the account of former supplies which the administrations of war and the navy had not yet paid for, and he gave them by returning to M. Vanlerberghe personal engagements of his to the amount of 20 millions, contracted on account of the service of the Treasury. But no sooner was this aid granted than M. Vanlerberghe came to apply for a second. This contractor had at his back a multitude of sub-contractors, who usually gave him credit, but who, no longer obtaining the confidence of the capitalists, could not make any further advances. He was, therefore, reduced to the last extremity. M. de Marbois, alarmed at these communications, soon received others still more serious. The Bank sent to him a deputation to acquaint the government with its situation. The piastres promised by M. Desprez were not forthcoming, and yet he applied for further discounts; the Treasury, on its part, wanted discounts, and the Bank had not two millions of crowns in its coffers against an amount of 92 millions demandable. What was it to do in such a predicament? M. Desprez declared, on his part, that he was at the end of his resources, especially if the Bank refused its assistance. He, too, confessed that it was the counter-check given by the affairs of Spain which threw him into these distressing embarrassments. It became unfortunately evident to the minister that M. Vanierberghe, supported on M. Desprez, M. Desprez upon the Treasury, and the Bank bore

the burden of the affairs of Spain, which was thus transferred to France herself by the rash combinations of M. Ouvrard.

It was too late to recede, and quite useless to complain. It was requisite for the government to extricate itself from this peril, and to that end to extricate those who had imprudently involved themselves in it; for to leave them to perish would be to run the risk of perishing with them. M. de Marbois did not hesitate in deciding to support Messieurs Vanlerberghe and Desprez; and he did right. But he could no longer venture to act on his sole responsibility, and a council of government, summoned at his instigation, met under the presidency of prince Joseph. Prince Louis, the arch-chancellor Cambacérés, and all the ministers attended. Some of the superior *employés* in the finances were sent for, and among others M. Mollien, director of the Sinking Fund. The council deliberated long on the subject. After much general and idle discussion, it was necessary to come to a conclusion, and each hesitated, in presence of a responsibility equally great, whatever course should be adopted, for it was as serious a matter to let the contractors sink as to support them. The arch-chancellor Cambacérés, who had sense enough to comprehend the exigencies of this situation, and influence enough to induce the Emperor to admit them, led a majority to decide in favour of an immediate aid to M. Vanlerberghe, to the amount of ten millions at first, and afterwards of ten more, when an approving answer should be received from head-quarters. As for M. Desprez, it was a question to be settled with the Bank, for that alone could assist the latter, by continuing to discount for him. But the means proposed by it to parry the exhaustion of its coffers and to keep up the credit of its notes, without which the establishment must fall, were taken into consideration. Nobody was of opinion that it was possible to give them a forced cash currency, both on account of the impossibility of establishing a paper money in France, and on account of the impossibility of prevailing upon the Emperor to consent to such a resolution. But certain measures designed to render payments slower and the drain of specie less rapid, were adopted. The ministry of the Treasury and the prefect of the police were left to arrange the detail of these measures with the Bank.

M. de Marbois had some very warm discussions with the council of the Bank. He complained of the manner in which it had managed its affairs—a very unjust reproach; for if it had been embarrassed, it was solely through the fault of the Treasury. Its portfolio contained nothing but excellent commercial paper, the regular payment of which became for the moment its only effective resource. It had even diminished its discounts to individuals so far as to reduce its portfolio below the ordinary proportions. It had nothing in disproportionate quantity, but M. Desprez' paper and *obligations of the receivers-general*, which brought back no money. It was suffering, therefore, for the sake of the government itself. But the bankers who directed it were in general so

devoted to the Emperor, in whom they loved, if not the glorious warrior, at least the restorer of order, that they allowed themselves to be treated by the agents of power with a harshness which at this day the most vulgar companies of speculators would not endure. On their part, it is true, this was the effect of patriotism rather than of servility. To support the government of the Emperor was in their eyes an imperative duty to France, whom he alone preserved from anarchy. They would not feel irritated at very undeserved reproaches, and they showed a devotedness to the cause of the Treasury worthy of serving for an example under similar circumstances. The following measures were adopted as most capable of alleviating the crisis.

M. de Marbois was to send off post, into the departments nearest to the capital, clerks with orders to the paymasters to give up all the funds which were not indispensably required for the service of the *rentes*, of the pay of the salaries of the functionaries, and to transmit these funds to the Bank. It was hoped that in this manner five or six millions in specie would be brought in. Orders were given to the receivers-general who had not delivered to M. Desprez all the sums in their chests, to pay them immediately into the Bank. The clerks sent out were likewise directed to ascertain whether some of these accountable persons were not employing the funds of the Treasury for their private interest. To these means of bringing in cash were added others for preventing the drain of it. Notes beginning to fall in value, the public hurried to the Bank, impatient to convert them into money. Had not stockjobbers and ill-disposed persons interfered, a loss of 1 or 2 per cent. which notes were sustaining, would have been sufficient to induce the mass of holders to demand their conversion into specie. The Bank was authorised not to convert into money more than five or six hundred thousand francs' worth of notes per day. This was all the specie that was needed when confidence existed. Another precaution was taken in order to retard payments: this was to count the money. The applicants for payment would gladly have dispensed with this formality, for they were not afraid that the Bank would cheat the public by putting a piece short in a bag of a thousand francs. The cashiers, with an affectation of accuracy, nevertheless took the trouble to count them. It was decided, moreover, that cash should be given for a single note only to one and the same person, and that each should be admitted in turn. At length, the concourse increasing every day, a last expedient was devised, that of distributing numbers to the holders of notes, in the proportion of five or six hundred thousand francs, which were intended to be paid per day. These numbers, deposited at the *mairies* of Paris, were to be distributed by the *maires* among persons notoriously unconnected with the commerce in money, and having recourse to the payment of their notes merely for the purpose of satisfying real wants.

These measures put an end at least to the material disturbance

about the offices of the Bank, and reduced the issue of specie to the most urgent wants of the population. Jobbers, who sought to extract specie from the Bank, to make the public pay 6 or 7 per cent. for it, were thwarted in their manœuvres. It was nevertheless a real suspension of payment under the guise of a more cautious system. It was unfortunately inevitable. Under these circumstances, it is not the measure itself which is to be blamed, but the anterior conduct which rendered it necessary.

The clerks sent out procured the remittance of two millions at most. The daily expiry of commercial effects brought more notes than crowns, for traders paid in specie only when they had sums of less than 500 francs to pay. The bank resolved therefore to buy piastres at any price in Holland, and thus take to its own account part of the costs of the crisis. Thanks to these conjoint means, the embarrassment would soon have been surmounted, had not M. Desprez suddenly cometo plead still greater necessities, and to solicit further aid.

This banker, charged by the company to furnish the Treasury with the funds necessary for the service, and for this purpose to discount the *obligations of the receivers-general*, the *bills at sight*, &c., had engaged to do this discount at a half per cent. per month, that is to say at 6 per cent. per annum. The capitalists having refused to discount them for him at less than 1 per cent. per month, that is at 12 per cent. per annum, he was exposed to ruinous losses. He had devised a scheme for sparing himself these losses, which was to pledge the *obligations* and the *bills at sight* to lenders, and to borrow on these securities instead of getting them sub-discounted. The speculators, desirous to make an advantage of the circumstance, had at last refused to renew this species of operations, in order to oblige him to give up the securities of the Treasury, and thus to obtain them at a low price. "The embarrassments of the place," wrote M. de Marbois to the Emperor, "afford many people a pretext for employing them like corsairs towards the *United Merchants*, and I know great patriots who have withdrawn 12 or 14 hundred thousand francs from the agent of the Treasury, in order to make a better bargain." (Letter of the 28th of September—Depôt of the Secretary of State's office.)

M. Desprez, who had already received an aid of 14 millions from the Bank, wished to obtain 30 immediately, and 70 in the month of Brumaire: consequently, -he wanted a sum of 100 millions. This situation, avowed at the Bank, caused an absolute consternation there, and produced an explosion of complaints on the part of men who were not disposed to espouse the fortune of the government, be it what it might. They asked what M. Desprez was, and by what title such great sacrifices were claimed for him. The commercial world was ignorant of the partnership subsisting between him and the company of contractors, which was labouring at once for Spain and for France. But the directors of the Bank, though ignorant of

his real situation, proposed to oblige the minister to avow him as the agent of the Treasury, were it only to have one security the more. The minister, apprised of their intention, had sent a note in his own handwriting to the president of the regency to say that M. Desprez was acting only on behalf of the Treasury. From an oversight, M. de Marbois had neglected to sign this note. He was required to sign it. He complied, and it was impossible to deny that they were in presence of the Emperor himself, the creator of the Bank, the saviour and master of France, begging them not to reduce his government to extremity by refusing the resources which it had urgent need of.

The voice of patriotism prevailed, and this result was chiefly owing to M. Perregaux, the celebrated banker, whose influence was always exerted for the benefit of the State. It was decided that all necessary aid should be afforded to M. Desprez; that the obligations which served for borrowing upon pledge, and which he had avoided discounting to spare himself too great losses, should be discounted, no matter at what rate, whether they belonged to M. Desprez or to the Bank; that he should take upon himself this operation, as more capable than any other to execute it; that the losses should be borne, half by the company and half by the Bank; that metals should be bought at Amsterdam and Hamburg, at joint cost; and that M. Desprez should be requested not to renew his engagements, in order to put an end to such a situation. It was lastly resolved to diminish the discounts to commerce, to devote all the existing resources to the Treasury, and to issue no notes but for it. The daily payment of commercial paper had brought back a considerable quantity of notes, which it was at first proposed to destroy, but which were soon put into circulation again, to satisfy the wants of M. Desprez. The first issue was even far surpassed, and it was raised to 80 millions, besides the 20 millions of current accounts. But the extraordinary purchases of piastres, and the effective discount of the *obligations*, procured the five or six hundred thousand francs per day, which were indispensable for satisfying the public; and there appeared a flattering prospect of getting over this crisis without compromising the services, and without bringing bankruptcy upon the contractors, which would have led to that of the Treasury itself.

There was, however, no preventing individual bankruptcies, which, following one another in rapid succession, added greatly to the national dejection. The failure of M. Recamier, a banker renowned for his integrity, his extensive business, and the high style in which he lived, and who fell a victim to circumstances, much more than to his financial conduct, produced the most painful sensation. Malevolent persons attributed it to business transactions with the Treasury, which had no existence. Many failures of less importance followed that of M. Recamier, both in Paris and in the provinces, and produced a sort of panic terror. Under a government less firm and less

powerful than that of Napoleon, this crisis might have been attended with the most serious consequences. But people relied upon his fortune and upon his genius; nobody felt any uneasiness about the maintenance of public order; they looked every moment for some grand stroke which should raise sinking credit; and that detestable species of speculators who aggravate all situations by founding their calculations on the depreciation of assets, durst not venture upon the game of lowering, for fear of the victories of Napoleon.

All eyes were fixed upon the Danube, where the destinies of Europe were about to be decided. Thence were to proceed the events that could put an end to that financial and political crisis. People hoped for them with full confidence, especially after seeing in a few days a whole army taken, almost without striking a blow, by the sole effect of a manœuvre. One circumstance of this very manœuvre, however, had just produced an unfortunate complication with Prussia, and given us reason to fear an additional foe. This circumstance was the march of marshal Bernadotte's corps through the Prussian province of Anspach.

Napoleon, in directing the movement of his columns upon the flank of the Austrian army, had not considered for a moment that any objection would be made to passing through the provinces which Prussia possessed in Franconia. In fact, according to the convention of neutrality stipulated by Prussia with the belligerent powers, during the last war, the provinces of Anspach and Bayreuth had not been comprehended in the neutrality of the north of Germany. The reason was simple, namely, that these provinces, lying in the obligatory route of the French and Austrian armies, it was almost impossible to withdraw them from their passage. All that could be required was that they should not become a theatre of hostilities, that they should be traversed rapidly, and that both parties should pay for what they took there. If Prussia had desired that a different system should be adopted on this occasion, she ought to have said so. Besides, when, quite recently, she had entered into negotiations of alliance with France, when she had proceeded in this track so far as to listen to and assent to the offer of Hanover, she scarcely had a right to change the old rules of her neutrality, in order to render them more stringent for France than in 1796. This would have been inconceivable: on this point, therefore, she had kept a silence, which, decently, she would not have ventured to break, especially to declare that, in full negotiation of an alliance, she was determined to be less condescending to us than in times of extreme coldness. Be this as it may, Napoleon, grounding himself on the old convention and on an appearance of friendship which he could not but believe, had not considered the passage through the province of Anspach as a violation of territory. What proves his sincerity in regard to this point is that strictly he might have made shift without borrowing the roads of that

province; and that, by keeping his columns closer to one another, it would have been very easy for him to avoid the Prussian territory, without losing many chances of enveloping general Mack.

But the situation of Prussia was daily becoming more embarrassing, between the emperor Napoleon and the emperor Alexander. The first offered him Hanover and his alliance; the second solicited of him a passage through Silesia for one of his armies, and seemed to declare to him that he must join in the coalition, either willingly or by force. As soon as he comprehended the true state of the case, Frederick William was seized with an extraordinary agitation. That prince, sometimes swayed by the avidity natural to the Prussian power, which impelled him towards Napoleon, sometimes by court influences which drew him towards the coalition, had made promises to every body, and had thus involved himself in an embarrassing position from which he saw no outlet but war with Russia or with France. He was exasperated in the highest degree at this, for he was dissatisfied both with others and with himself, and he could not contemplate war without apprehension. Indignant, however, at the violence with which Russia threatened him, he had ordered 80,000 men to be placed on the war footing. In this state of things, news of the alleged violation of the Prussian territory reached Berlin. This was a new subject of vexation to the King of Prussia, because it diminished the force of the arguments which he was opposing to the urgent representations of Alexander. It is true that there were reasons for opening the province of Anspach to the French, which did not exist for opening Silesia to the Russians. But in moments of effervescence, it is not justice of argument that prevails; and, on learning at Berlin the passage of the French through the territory of Anspach, the court cried out that Napoleon had offered an unworthy insult to Prussia in treating her as he was accustomed to treat Naples or Baden; that she could not possibly submit to it without dishonouring herself; that, for the rest, if they were not to have war with Napoleon, they should be obliged to have it with Alexander, for that prince would not suffer them to act in so partial a manner towards him, to refuse him what had been granted to his adversary; and, finally, that, if they were forced to choose, it would be extremely strange, most unworthy of the sentiments of the king, to espouse the cause of the oppressors of Europe against its defenders. Frederick William, it was added, had always professed other sentiments at Memel in his confidential intercourse with his young friend Alexander. Such was the way in which people talked openly at Berlin, and particularly in the royal family, swayed by a queen, affectionate, beautiful, and stirring.

Frederick William, though sincerely irritated at the violation of the territory of Anspach, which deprived him of his best argument against the urgent solicitations of Russia, behaved as men false through weakness are accustomed to do: he made a resource

of his anger, and pretended to be more irritated than he was. His conduct towards the two representatives of France was ridiculously affected. Not only did he refuse to receive them, but M. de Hardenberg would not admit them into his cabinet to hear their explanations. Messieurs de Laforest and Duroc were laid under a sort of interdict, and cut off from all communication even with the private secretary, M. Lombard, through whom passed the confidential communications when the question either of German indemnities or of Hanover was under discussion. The secret intermediate agents usually employed declared that, in the state of the king's mind in regard to the French, they durst not see any of them. All this anger was evidently assumed. The intention was to draw from it a solution of the embarrassments in which Prussia had involved herself; to be able to tell France that the engagements made with her were broken through her own fault. These engagements, renewed so often and substituted for various plans of alliance which had failed, consisted in promising formally that the Prussian territory should never subserve any aggression against France, that Hanover itself should be secured against all invasion. The French having forcibly passed through the Prussian territory, it was proposed thence to conclude that they had given Prussia a right to open it to whomsoever she pleased. Here was an outlet miraculously discovered to escape from the difficulties of all kinds accumulated around her. In consequence, it was resolved to declare that Prussia was, by the violation of her territory, released from every engagement, and that she granted a passage to the Russians through Silesia, in compensation of the passage taken through Anspach by the French. The intention was to do much better than to get out of a great embarrassment; it was hoped to obtain a profit from all this. It was decided to seize Hanover, where no more than 6000 French were left shut up in the fortress of Hameln, and to colour that invasion by a spurious pretext, that of providing against fresh violations of territory, for an Anglo-Russian army was marching for Hanover, and by occupying it Prussia prevented the theatre of hostilities from being transferred to her provinces, by which Hanover was enclosed on all sides.

The king summoned an extraordinary council, to which the duke of Brunswick and marshal Mollendorf were called. M. de Haugwitz, drawn from his retirement for these momentous circumstances, attended it also. There the resolutions which we have just recapitulated were agreed upon, but they were left for a few days enveloped in a sort of cloud, to terrify still more the two representatives of France. Though neither they nor their master were thought to be easily frightened, it was imagined that, at a moment when Napoleon had so many enemies on his hands, the fear of adding Prussia to them, which would have rendered the coalition universal, as in 1792, would act powerfully upon their minds.

Messieurs de Laforest and Duroc had long applied in vain for an interview with M. de Hardenberg. At length they saw him, found in him the studied attitude of a man who is making an effort to repress his indignation, and obtained from him, amidst many bitter complaints, nothing but the declaration, that the engagements of Prussia were broken, and that she should thenceforth be guided solely by the interest of her own safety. The cabinet suffered the resolution of opening Silesia to the Russians, and of occupying Hanover with a Russian army, upon pretext of preventing the flames of war from spreading to the very heart of the kingdom, to reach by degrees the ears of the two French negotiators. It seemed to intimate that France ought to deem herself fortunate to get off so easily.

All this was very unworthy of the uprightness of the king and the power of Prussia. However, after this first explosion, forms began to improve, not only because it was part of the Prussian plan to soften down, but also because the astonishing successes of Napoleon had suggested serious reflections to all courts.

What was passing in Berlin had been carried to Pulawi with the speed of lightning. Alexander, who had desired to see Frederick William before France had given Prussia causes of complaint, could not but be still more desirous to do so afterwards. He hoped to find that prince disposed to receive all kinds of influences. Instead, therefore, of fixing upon such a place of meeting that the distance to be travelled should be equally divided, Alexander performed the entire journey himself, and proceeded immediately to Berlin.

Frederick William on hearing of the arrival of the czar, was sorry that he had made so much fuss, and thus drawn upon himself a flattering but compromising visit. Napoleon commenced the war in a manner so rapid and decisive as to hold out little encouragement to a connexion with his enemies. However, it was not possible to refuse the attentions of a prince for whom one professed such a warm affection. The necessary orders were, therefore, given for receiving him with all befitting ceremony. On the 25th of October, Alexander made his entry into the Prussian capital, amidst the thunder of the cannon, and between files of the royal Prussian guard. The young king hastening to meet him, embraced him cordially amidst the applause of the people, who, having at first been favourable to the French, began to allow themselves to be hurried away by the impulsion of the court, and by the assertion, a thousand times repeated, that Napoleon had violated the territory of Anspach out of contempt for Prussia. Alexander had promised himself to employ on this occasion all the means of seduction that he possessed to bring the court of Berlin into his interests. He did not fail to do so, and began with the beautiful queen of Prussia, who was easy to gain, for, sprung from the house of Mecklenburg, she shared all the passions of the German nobility against the French Revolution.

Alexander paid her a sort of chivalrous worship, which might be taken at pleasure for a mere homage rendered to her merit, or for a much warmer sentiment. Though at that time very attentive to a distinguished lady of the Russian nobility, Alexander was a man and a prince to feign on a seasonable occasion a sentiment useful to his views. There was nothing, however, in these demonstrations that was capable of offending either decorum or the jealous susceptibility of Frederick William. He had not been two days in Berlin before the whole court was full of him, and extolled his gracefulness, his intelligence, his generous ardour for the cause of Europe. He had paid particular attentions to all the relations of the great Frederick: he had visited the duke of Brunswick and marshal Mollendorf and honoured in them the chiefs of the Prussian army. The young prince Louis, who was remarkable for his violent hatred of the French and an ardent passion for glory—prince Louis, gained over beforehand to the cause of Russia, manifested more vehemence than usual. A sort of general fascination gave up the court of Prussia to Alexander. Frederick William perceived the effect produced around him, and began to be alarmed at it. He waited with painful anxiety for the proposals that were to spring from all this enthusiasm, and he kept silence for fear of hastening the moment of the explanations. We have already said that, in his extreme embarrassment, he had summoned to him his old counsellor de Haugwitz, whose mind, too acute for his own, sometimes annoyed him by its very superiority, but whose shrewd, evasive policy always inclined to a neutrality, perfectly suited him. They both deplored the fatal concatenation of things, which, under the impassioned and unequal direction of M. de Hardenberg, had brought Prussia to a point from which there was absolutely no outlet. M. de Hardenberg, at first the friend and creature of M. de Haugwitz, soon the jealous rival of that statesman, had begun by following his policy, which consisted in keeping himself neuter between the two European parties, and in making the most of that neutrality; but he had done so with his impassioned character, sometimes overturning on one side, sometimes on the other, favourable to the French when the question concerned Hanover, to such a degree as to be disposed to give himself wholly up to them, and, since the affair of Anspach, so hurried away by the general movement, that he was ready to go halves with Russia in making war upon them. M. de Haugwitz, censuring, but with delicacy, an ungrateful disciple, said that Prussia had been too French a few months before and that now she was too Russian. But how was she to extricate herself from the dilemma? how escape from the grasp of the young emperor? The difficulty increased hourly, and it was not to be resolved by incessantly eluding it. Time was precious for Alexander, for every day that elapsed brought tidings of a new success of Napoleon's on the Danube, and a new peril for Austria, as well as for the Russian armies, which

had reached the Inn. He therefore addressed himself to the king of Prussia, and induced his minister for foreign affairs, the able and astute count de Haugwitz, to address him also. The theme which both of them developed may easily be inferred from what precedes. Prussia, said they, could not separate herself from the cause of Europe; she could not contribute by her inaction to render the common enemy triumphant; she had some respect paid her by him for the moment, and not a great deal, to judge from what had recently happened at Anspach, but she would soon be crushed when, delivered from Austria and Russia, he should have nobody else to settle with. Prussia, it is true, was a much nearer object for the attacks of Napoleon; but then an army of 80,000 men was marching to her assistance, and it had approached so near to her solely for that purpose. This army, assembled at Pulawi, on the frontier of Silesia, was not a threat but a generous attention on the part of Alexander, who had not desired to urge his friend into a serious war without offering him the means of defying its perils. Besides, Napoleon had many enemies on his hands; he would be in great danger on the Danube, if, while the united Austrians and Russians should oppose a solid barrier to him, Prussia were to throw herself upon his rear by Franconia; he would then find himself between two fires, and be infallibly overcome. In this very probable case, the common deliverance would be due to Prussia, and then there should be done for her all that Napoleon promised, all that he meant not to perform; then there should be given to her that complement of territory with which he had flattered the just ambition of the house of Brandenburg—Hanover. (Letters had actually been despatched to London to decide England to this sacrifice.) And it would be much better to receive so valuable a gift from the legitimate owner, as the price of the salvation of all, than from a usurper giving away the property of another as a reward for treachery.

To these representations was added a new influence; this was the presence of the archduke Anthony, who had travelled in the utmost haste from Vienna to Berlin. That prince came to report the disasters of Ulm, the rapid progress of the French, the perils of the Austrian monarchy, too great not to be common to all Germany, and he earnestly solicited the reconciliation at any price of the two principal German powers.

This diplomatic machination was too well planned for the unfortunate king of Prussia to escape from it. Nevertheless, he and M. de Haugwitz made an obstinate resistance, as if they had had a presentiment of the disasters that were soon to befall the Prussian monarchy. There were many interviews, many controversies, many bitter complaints. The king and his minister declared that the two emperors were bent on the ruin of Prussia, that they would ruin her to a certainty, for all Europe, were it united, would be incapable of withstanding Napoleon; that, if they did yield, it was because violence was done to their reason, their prudence, their

patriotism, and they should not fail to recriminate against the plan which had been laid to hurry them away, either with their good will or by force, a plan of which the Russian army collected on the frontier of Silesia was to be the instrument. To this the emperor Alexander replied by giving up his minister prince Czartoryski. Swayed by his natural inconstancy, he began already to listen much to the Dolgoroukis, who went about asserting everywhere that prince Czartoryski was a perfidious minister, betraying his emperor for the sake of Poland, of which he intended to make himself king, and striving, with this object, to set Russia upon Prussia. Alexander, who had not sufficient firmness for the plan that had been proposed to him, was alarmed, even at Pulawi, at the idea of marching against France, by passing over the body of Prussia, were even the crown of Poland to be the price of that temerity. Enlightened by M. d'Alopeus, excited by the Dolgoroukis, he said that an attempt had been made to lead him to commit a great fault, and he even keenly reproached prince Czartoryski, whose grave and austere character began to be annoying to him, because, with the freedom of a friend and an independent minister, he sometimes blamed his sovereign for his foibles and his fickleness.

By dint of application, of disavowals, and above all of accessory influences, such as the solicitations of the queen, the language of prince Louis, the cries of the young Prussian staff; the king was at length appeased, M. de Haugwitz overcome, and both led to enter into the views of the coalition. But, swayed as Frederick William was, he determined to reserve for himself a last resource for escaping from these new engagements; and, by the advice of M. de Haugwitz, he adopted a plan which could still hold forth some illusion to his vanquished integrity, and which consisted in a project of mediation, a grand hypocrisy employed at that time by all the powers to disguise the plan of coalition against France. It was the form which Prussia had thought of employing three months before, when the question of allying herself with France at the price of Hanover was under discussion; it was the form which she employed now, when discussing the question of allying herself with Alexander; and, unluckily for her honour, again at the price of Hanover.

It was agreed that Prussia, alleging the impossibility of living at peace between implacable adversaries, who did not even respect her territory, should decide to intervene for the purpose of forcing them to peace. So far, so good; but what were to be the conditions of this peace? Therein lay the whole question. If Prussia conformed to the treaties signed with Napoleon, and by which she had guaranteed the present state of the French empire, in exchange for what she had received in Germany, there was nothing to be said. But she was not firm enough to stop at this limit, which was that of honour. She agreed to propose as conditions of peace a new demarcation of the Austrian possessions in Lom-

bardy, which would extend the latter from the Adige to the Mincio (which must lead to a dismemberment of the kingdom of Italy) an indemnity for the king of Sardinia, and, besides these, the conditions usually admitted by Napoleon himself, in case of a general pacification, that is to say the independence of Naples, of Switzerland, of Holland. This was a formal violation of the reciprocal guarantees which Prussia had stipulated with France, not in plans of alliance which had miscarried, but in authentic conventions, signed on occasion of the German indemnities.

The Russians and the Austrians would have desired more, but, as they knew that Napoleon would never consent to these conditions, they were certain, even with what they had obtained, to drag Prussia into the war.

There was another difficulty, which also they passed over, in order to remove all obstacles. Frederick William would not present himself to Napoleon in the name of all his enemies, especially England, after so much confidential communication with him against that power. He expressed, therefore, a desire to say not a single word relative to Great Britain in the declaration of mediation, intending, he said, to interfere only in regard to the peace of the continent. This again was assented to, as it was still thought that there was sufficient in what had been agreed upon to plunge him into the war. Further, he required a last precaution, the most captious and the most important of all, the postponement for a month of the term at which Prussia should be obliged to act. On the other hand, the duke of Brunswick, always consulted, always heard without appeal, when the matter in hand related to military affairs, declared that the Prussian army would not be ready till the first days in December, and on the other M. de Haugwitz recommended delay, to see how things went on the Danube between the French and the Russians. With a captain such as Napoleon, events could not lag, and, in gaining a month only, there was a chance of being extricated from embarrassment by some unforeseen and decisive solution. It was settled, therefore, that, at the expiration of a month, reckoning from the day on which M. de Haugwitz, commissioned to propose the mediation, should have left Berlin, Prussia should be required to take the field, if Napoleon had not returned a satisfactory answer. It would be easy to add a few days to that month, by retarding the departure of M. de Haugwitz upon various pretexts, and, besides, Frederick William trusted to that negotiator, to his prudence and his address, that the first words exchanged with Napoleon should not render the rupture inevitable and immediate.

These conditions, unworthy of Prussian honour, for they were contrary, we repeat it, to formal stipulations, the price of which Prussia had received in fine territories, contrary especially to an intimacy which Napoleon must have believed to be sincere—these conditions were inserted in a double declaration, signed at Potsdam

on the 3rd of November. The text of it has never been published, but Napoleon found means subsequently to learn its purport. This declaration has retained the title of treaty of Potsdam. No doubt Napoleon had committed faults in regard to Prussia: while caressing her and benefiting her much, he had let slip more than one occasion to bind her irrevocably. But he had loaded her with solid favours, and he had always behaved honourably in his transactions with her.

Alexander and Frederick William were residing at Potsdam. It was in this beautiful retreat of the great Frederick, that they reciprocally heightened each other's enthusiasm, and concluded that treaty so contrary to the policy and the interests of Prussia. The able count de Haugwitz was deeply grieved at it, and excused himself in his own eyes for having signed it solely in the hope of eluding its consequences. The king, bewildered, confounded, knew not whither he was going. To complete his perturbation of mind, Alexander, in concert it is said with the queen, and probably in consequence of her fondness for studied scenes, desired to see the little vault which contains the remains of the great Frederick in the Protestant church of Potsdam. There, at the bottom of this vault, hollowed out of a pillar of the church, narrow, simple even to negligence, lay two wooden coffins, the one that of Frederick William I., the other the great Frederick's. Alexander went thither with the young king, shed tears, and, clasping his friend in his arms, swore to him and begged him to swear an oath of everlasting friendship on the coffin of the great Frederick. Never were they to separate either their cause or their fortunes. Tilsit was destined ere long to show the solidity of such an oath, probably sincere at the moment when it was taken.

This scene, related in Berlin, published throughout all Europe, confirmed the opinion that there existed a close alliance between the two young monarchs.

England, apprised of the change of things in Prussia, and of the negotiations so happily conducted with that court, regarded it as a capital event, which might decide the fate of Europe. She despatched immediately lord Harrowby himself, the minister for foreign affairs, to negotiate. The cabinet of London was not difficult with the court of Berlin; it accepted its accession, no matter at what price. It consented that England should not even be mentioned in the negotiation which count de Haugwitz was about to undertake in the camp of Napoleon, and it kept subsidies ready for the Prussian army, not doubting that she would take part in the war at the end of a month. With respect to the aggrandisements of territory promised to the house of Brandenburg, it was disposed to concede much, but it did not depend on the English cabinet to give up Hanover, the highly-prized patrimony of George III: Mr. Pitt would cheerfully have sacrificed it, for the British ministers have always taken it into their heads to regard Hanover as a burden to England. But they would

sooner have persuaded king George to renounce the three kingdoms than Hanover. To make amends, an offer was made of something not so contiguous, it is true, to the Prussian monarchy, but more considerable—Holland itself.* That Holland, which all the courts declared to be the slave of France, and whose independence they claimed with such energy, was flung at the feet of Prussia to attach her to the coalition and to release Hanover. It is for the illustrious Dutch nation to judge what value it ought to set on the sincerity of European affections in regard to it.

These were so many points to be settled afterwards between the courts of Prussia and England. In the interim it was requisite to draw from the treaty of Potsdam its essential consequence, that is to say, the accession of Prussia to the coalition. The Austrians and the Russians urged the departure of M. de Haugwitz, and, while he was making his preparations, the emperor Alexander set out on the 5th of November, after a stay of ten days at Berlin, for Weimar, to see his sister, the grand-duchess, a princess of high merit, who lived in that city surrounded by the greatest geniuses of Germany, happy in that noble intercourse which she was worthy to enjoy. The parting of the two monarchs was, like their first meeting at the gates of Berlin, marked by embraces and demonstrations of friendship, which one of the parties at least seemed to wish to render conspicuous. Alexander set out for the army surrounded by the interest which usually attaches to such a departure. People saluted in him a young hero, ready to confront the greatest dangers, for the triumph of the common cause of kings.

Meanwhile, M. de Laforest, minister of France, Duroc, grand-marshal of the imperial palace, were totally forsaken. The court continued to treat them with affronting coldness. Though the most profound secrecy had been promised between the Russians and the Prussians relative to the stipulations of Potsdam, the Russians, unable to conceal their satisfaction, had told every body that Prussia was irrevocably bound to them. Their joy, indeed, revealed this plainly enough, and, joined to the military preparations which were making, to the bustle, rather unsuited to his age into which the old duke of Brunswick put himself, it attested the success which Alexander's presence at Potsdam had obtained. M. de Hardenberg, who shared with M. de Haugwitz the direction of the foreign affairs, scarcely showed himself to the French negotiators, but M. de Haugwitz had more frequent interviews with them. Being asked by them what importance ought to be attached to the Russian indiscretions, he defended himself against all the suppositions that were publicly circulated. He avowed a project which, he said, could have nothing new for them, that of a mediation. When they wished to learn whether that mediation was to be an armed one, which signified imposed, he evaded the question, saying that the re-

* It is on authentic documents that I found this assertion.

presentations of his court to Napoleon would be proportioned to the urgency of the moment. When, at last, they asked what were to be the conditions of this mediation, he replied that they would be just, discreet, conformable to the glory of France, and of this he had given the best proof by undertaking himself to carry them to Napoleon. He could not, the first time of his visiting that great man, expose himself to the hazard of being roughly repulsed.

Such were the explanations obtained from the cabinet of Berlin. The only thing which was evident was that Silesia was open to the Russians, as a punishment for the passage of our troops through the territory of Anspach, and that Hanover was about to be occupied by a Prussian army. As France had a garrison of 6000 men in the fortress of Hameln, M. de Haugwitz, without saying whether orders would be given for besieging that place, promised the greatest civility to the French, adding that he hoped for the same from them.

The grand-marshal Duroc, seeing nothing further to do in Berlin, set out for Napoleon's head-quarters. At this period, the end of October, and the beginning of November, Napoleon, having finished with the first Austrian army, was preparing to fall upon the Russians, according to the plan which he had conceived.

When he learned what was passing in Berlin, he was confounded with amazement, for it was in perfect good faith, and believing in the maintenance of the former custom, that he had ordered troops to pass through the provinces of Anspach. He could not think that the irritation of Prussia was sincere, and he was convinced that it was assumed to cover the weaknesses of that court towards the coalition. But nothing that he could conjecture on that subject was capable of shaking him, and on this occasion he displayed all the greatness of his character.

The reader is already acquainted with the general plan of his operations. In presence of four attacks directed against the French empire, one in the north, by Hanover, the second in the south, by Lower Italy, the two others from the east, by Lombardy and Bavaria, he had taken account of the last two only. Leaving to Massena the task of parrying that from Lombardy, and detaining the archdukes for a few weeks, he had reserved for himself the most important, that which threatened Bavaria. Taking advantage, as we have seen of the distance which separated the Austrians from the Russians, he had by an unexampled march enclosed the former, and sent them prisoners to France. Now he was about to march upon the second, and to hurl them back upon Vienna. By this movement Italy would be released, and the attacks prepared in the north and south of Europe would become insignificant diversions.

It was, however, in the power of Prussia to give serious obstructions to this plan by throwing herself, by way of Franconia or

Bohemia, upon the rear of Napoleon, while he was marching upon Vienna. An ordinary general, on the news of what was passing in Berlin, would have stopped short and fallen back, to take a position nearer to the Rhine, so as not to be turned, and would have awaited in this position, at the head of his collected forces, the consequences of the treaty of Potsdam. But, in acting thus, he would have rendered certain the dangers that were only probable; he would have given the two Russian armies of Kutusof and Alexander time to effect their junction, the archduke Charles time to pass from Lombardy into Bavaria, to join the Russians, the Prussians time and the courage to make unacceptable proposals and to enter the lists. He might in a month have had upon his hands 120,000 Austrians, 100,000 Russians, 150,000 Prussians, assembled in the Upper Palatinate or Bavaria, and been overwhelmed by a mass of forces double his own. To persist more than ever in his ideas, that is to say to march forward, to fling back to one extremity of Germany the principal armies of the coalition, to listen in Vienna to the complaints of Prussia, and to give her his triumphs for an answer—such was the wisest, though apparently the rashest, determination. Let us add that these great resolutions are made for great men, that ordinary men would sink under them; that, moreover, they require not only a superior genius but an absolute authority; for, to have the power of advancing or falling back according to circumstances, it is requisite to be the centre of all movements, of all intelligence, of all wills; it is requisite to be general and head of the empire; it is requisite to be Napoleon and emperor.

The language of Napoleon to Prussia was conformable to the resolution which he had just taken. So far from offering excuses for the violation of the territory of Anspach, he merely referred to anterior conventions, saying that, if these conventions had been set aside, he should have been informed of it; that, for the rest, these were mere pretexts; that his enemies, he clearly perceived, had the ascendancy in Berlin: that it no longer became him to enter thenceforward into friendly explanations with a prince for whom his friendship seemed to be of no value; that he should leave to time and events the business of answering for him, but that on a single point he should be inflexible, that of honour; that never had his eagles put up with an affront; that they were in one of the fortresses of Hanover, that of Hameln: that, if any attempt should be made to drag them out of it, general Barbou would defend them to the last extremity, and should be succoured before he would yield; that it was no new or alarming thing for France to have all Europe upon her hands; that he, Napoleon, would soon come, if he was called thither, from the banks of the Danube to the banks of the Elbe, and force his new enemies to repent, like the old ones, of having insulted the dignity of his empire. The order given to general Barbou, and communicated to the Prussian government, was as follows:

“TO THE GENERAL OF DIVISION, BARBOU.

“*Augsburg, October 24.*

“I know not what is preparing, but whatever may be the power whose armies should attempt to enter Hanover, were it even a power that has not declared war against me, you must oppose it. Not having forces sufficient to withstand an army, shut yourself up in the fortresses, and let nobody approach within gun-shot of those fortresses. I shall come to the relief of the troops shut up in Hameln. My eagles have never yet put up with an affront. I hope that the soldiers whom you command will be worthy of their comrades, and that they will know how to preserve honour, the best and most valuable property of nations.

“You must not surrender the place without an order from me, which shall be brought to you by one of my aides-de-camp.

“NAPOLÉON.”

Napoleon had gone from Ulm to Augsburg, and from Augsburg to Munich, to make there his dispositions for the march. Before we follow him into that long and immense valley of the Danube, surmounting all the obstacles thrown in his way by winter and the enemy, let us cast our eyes for a moment on Lombardy, where Massena was charged to make head against the Austrians till Napoleon had nullified their position on the Adige by advancing upon Vienna.

Napoleon and Massena were both thoroughly acquainted with Italy, since both had acquired glory there. The instructions given for this campaign were worthy of both. Napoleon had first laid it down as a principle that 50,000 French, appuyed on a river, had nothing to fear from 80,000 enemies whoever they might be; that, at any rate, he should only ask them to guard the Adige till, penetrating into Bavaria, (which forms the northern slope of the Alps, as Lombardy forms the southern) he had turned the position of the Austrians and obliged them to fall back; that for this it was necessary to keep together on the upper part of the river, the left wing to the Alps, according to the example which he had always given, to hurl back the Austrians into the mountains, if they should come by the gorges of the Tyrol; or, if they should pass the lower Adige, to let them do so, and only to keep themselves concentrated, and when they should have entered the marshy country of the lower Adige and of the Po, from Legnago to Venice, to rush upon their flank and drown them in the lagoons; that, by remaining thus in a mass at the foot of the Alps, they would have nothing to fear either from above or below; but that, if the enemy appeared to renounce the offensive, they must take it against him, carry by night the bridge of Verona over the Adige, and then proceed to the attack of the heights of Caldiero. The campaigns of Napoleon would furnish models for every mode of acting on this part of the theatre of war.

Massena was not a man to hesitate between the offensive and

the defensive. The first system of war was alone suited to his character and genius. He had arrived at such a degree of confidence that he did not conceive himself to be doomed to keep the defensive before 80,000 Austrians, even though commanded by the archduke Charles. In consequence, in the night between the 17th and the 18th of October, after having received news of the first movements of the grand army, he had advanced in silence towards the bridge of Château-Vieux, situated in the interior of Verona. That city, as the reader knows, is divided by the Adige into two parts. One belonged to the French, the other to the Austrians. The bridges were cut, and the approaches defended by palisades and walls. Having blown up the wall which barred the approach to the bridge of Château-Vieux, Massena, on reaching the bank of the river, had despatched a party of brave *voligeurs* in boats, some to ascertain whether the piles of the bridge were undermined, the others to throw themselves on the opposite bank. Certain that the piles were not undermined, he had caused a sort of passage to be made with thick planks, and then, crossing the Adige, had fought, the whole of the 18th, with the Austrians. The secrecy, the vigour, the promptness of this attack, had been worthy of Napoleon's first lieutenant in the campaigns of Italy. Massena found himself, by this operation, master of the course of the Adige, able, in case of need, to operate on both banks, and having scarcely any fear of being surprised by a passage by main force, for he was strong enough to interrupt such an operation at whatever point it might have been attempted. Before he took a determined offensive and advanced definitively into the Austrian territory, he wished to receive decisive tidings from the banks of the Danube.

These tidings arrived on the 28th of October, and filled the army of Italy with joy and emulation. Massena caused them to be communicated to his troops, accompanied with the discharge of the artillery, and resolved to march forward immediately. On the following day, the 29th of October, he took three of his divisions, Gardanne's, Duhesme's, and Molitor's, beyond the Adige, beat back the Austrians, and extended himself in the plain called St. Michael's, between the citadel of Verona and the entrenched camp of Caldiero. His design was to attack that formidable camp, though he had before him an army far superior in number, and appuyed on positions which nature and art had rendered extremely strong. The archduke, on his part, informed of the extraordinary successes of the French grand army, presuming that he should soon be obliged to retreat and march to the relief of Vienna, thought that he ought not to give up the ground as if vanquished. He purposed to gain a decisive advantage, which should enable him to retire quietly, and to take that route which was best suited to the general situation of the allies.

The two adversaries, then, were about to fall upon each other

with the greater violence, since they met both with the same resolution to fight to extremity.

Massena had before him the last steeps of the Tyrolese Alps, subsiding gradually into the plain of Verona, near the village of Caldiero. On his left the heights, called the heights of Colognola, were covered with entrenchments, regularly constructed, and armed with a numerous artillery. In the centre, and in the plain, was the village of Caldiero, through which ran the high road of Lombardy, leading through the Friule into Austria. At this point an obstacle presented itself, in grounds enclosed and built on, occupied by a great part of the Austrian infantry. Lastly, on his right, Massena saw spread out before him the flat and marshy banks of the Adige, traversed in all directions by ditches and dykes bristling with cannon. Thus, on the left, entrenched mountains; in the centre, a high-road bordered with buildings, marshes, and the Adige; everywhere works adapted to the ground, covered with artillery, and 80,000 men to defend them—such was the entrenched camp which Massena was to attack with 50,000 men. Nothing was capable of intimidating the hero of Rivoli, of Zurich, and of Genoa. On the morning of the 30th, he advanced in column on the high-road. On his left, he directed general Molitor to take the formidable heights of Colognola; with Duhesme's and Gardanne's divisions, he undertook himself the attack of the centre, along the high-road; and, as he judged that, to dislodge an enemy superior in number and position, it was necessary to threaten him with a serious danger on one of his wings, he directed general Verdier to proceed to the extreme right of the French army, there to cross the Adige with 10,000 men, to turn the left wing of the archduke, and then fall upon his rear. If this operation was well executed, it would be worth such a detachment, but it was hazardous to commit the passage of a river to a lieutenant; and those 10,000 men, if they were not well employed on the right, would be sorely missed at the centre.

At break of day, Massena, marching vigorously upon the enemy, overthrew him at all points. General Molitor, one of the ablest and firmest officers of the army, advanced coolly to the foot of the heights of Colognola, and ascended the first steps in spite of a tremendous fire. While colonel Teste, advancing at the head of the 5th of the line, was ready to climb them, count de Bellegarde, sallying from the redoubts with all his forces, came forward to overwhelm that regiment. General Molitor, instantly aware of the seriousness of the danger, without stopping to count the enemy, rushed upon general Bellegarde's column with the 6th of the line, the only regiment that he had at hand. He attacked that column with such violence, that he surprised it, and obliged it to halt. Meanwhile, colonel Teste had entered one of the redoubts and hoisted there the colours of the 5th, the

eagle of which was carried away by a ball. But the Austrians, ashamed to see their positions wrested from them by so small a number of men, returned to the charge and retook the redoubt. The French, at this point, remained opposite to the enemy's entrenchments, without being able to take them. It was miraculous to have dared so much with so few men, and without sustaining a defeat.

At the centre, prince Charles had placed the bulk of his forces. He had put at the head a reserve of grenadiers, in whose ranks fought three archdukes. Generals Duhesme and Gardanne, sweeping the high-road, and carrying, one after another, the enclosures that bordered it, had already arrived near Caldiero. The archduke Charles chose this moment for taking the offensive. He repulsed the assailants, and marched along the road in close column, at the head of the best Austrian infantry. This column continuing to advance, as did of old that of Fontenoy, had already passed the detachments of French troops spread on the right and left in the enclosures, came on to possess itself of Vago, which was to the French what Caldiero was to the Austrians, the appui of their centre. But Massena hastened to the spot. He rallied his divisions, placed all his disposable artillery in the road, and, facing the enemy, poured the grape-shot at point-blank range, upon the brave Austrian grenadiers, then ordered them to be charged with the bayonet and attacked on the flanks, and, after an obstinate fight, in which he was continually in the midst of the fire, like a common soldier, he forced the column to retreat. He pushed it beyond Caldiero, and gained so much ground as to penetrate into the first Austrian entrenchments. If, at this moment, general Verdier, accomplishing his mission, had crossed the Adige, or even had Massena had the 10,000 men uselessly employed at his extreme right, he would have taken the formidable camp of Caldiero. But general Verdier, mismanaging his operation, had thrown one of his regiments beyond the river, without having it in his power to support it, and had completely failed in his design of passing. Night alone parted the combatants, and covered with its shades one of the bloodiest fields of battle of the age.

It required the character of Massena to undertake and to come off from such a conflict without check. The Austrians had lost 3000 men, killed and wounded, and 4000 of them had been taken prisoners. The French had not lost more than 3000, killed, wounded, and prisoners. They bivouacked on the field of battle, mingled the one with the other, amidst terrible confusion. But, in the night, the archduke sent off his baggage and his artillery, and, next morning, occupying the French by means of a rear-guard, he commenced his retrograde movement. A corps of 5000 men, commanded by general Hillinger, was sacrificed to the interest of this retreat. It had been ordered down from the

heights to alarm Verona, on the rear of our army, while the archduke was setting himself in march. General Hillinger had not time to return from this demonstration, perhaps pushed too far, and was taken with his whole corps. Thus, in these three days, Massena had deprived the enemy of eleven or twelve thousand men, 8000 of whom were prisoners, and 3000 left *hors de combat*.

He immediately set out in close pursuit of the archduke. But the Austrian prince had in his favour the best soldiers of Austria, to the number of 70,000, his experience, his talents, winter, overflowed rivers, the bridges over which he broke down in retiring. Massena could not flatter himself with the hope of involving him in a catastrophe; nevertheless, he occupied him sufficiently by pursuing him, not to leave him the facility of manœuvring at pleasure against the grand army.

This other part of Napoleon's plan was therefore accomplished as punctually as the preceding; the archduke Charles, falling back upon Austria, was obliged to maintain a running fight while going to the succour of the threatened capital.

Napoleon had not lost a moment at Munich in making his dispositions. He was anxious to cross the Inn, to fight the Russians, and to disconcert the underhand manœuvres of Berlin by fresh successes as prompt as those of Ulm. The corps of general Kutusof, which he had before him, numbered scarcely 50,000 men on taking the field, though it was to have been far more numerous according to the promises of Russia. From Moravia to Bavaria this corps had left behind five or six thousand stragglers and sick, but it had been joined by the Austrian detachment of Kienmayer, which had escaped from the disaster of Ulm, before the investment of that place. M. de Meerfeld had added some troops to this detachment and taken the command of it. The whole together might amount to about 65,000 soldiers, Russian and Austrian. This was but little for saving the monarchy against 150,000 French, 100,000 of whom at least were marching in a single mass. General Kutusof commanded this army. He was an elderly man, had lost the sight of one eye in consequence of a wound on the head, very corpulent, indolent, dissolute, greedy, but intelligent; as active in mind as he was heavy in body, lucky in war, a clever courtier, and capable enough of commanding in a situation that required prudence and good fortune. His lieutenants were men of moderate talents, excepting three, prince Bagration and generals Doctorow and Miloradovich. Prince Bagration was a Georgian, of heroic courage, making amends by experience for the lack of early instruction, and always charged, whether at the advanced-guard or at the rear-guard, with the most difficult duty. General Doctorow was a discreet, modest, firm, and well-informed officer. General Miloradovich was a Servian, of brilliant valour, but absolutely destitute of military

knowledge, dissolute in manners, uniting all the vices of civilisation with all the vices of barbarism. The character of the Russian soldiers corresponded with that of their generals. They had a savage, ill-directed bravery. Their artillery was clumsy, their cavalry indifferent. Altogether, generals, officers, and soldiers, composed an ignorant army, but singularly formidable from its devotedness. The Russian troops have since learned the art of war by waging it with us, and have begun to add knowledge to courage.

General Kutusof had been ignorant till the last moment of the disaster of Ulm; for the archduke Ferdinand and general Mack, the day before their catastrophe, announced to him nothing but successes. The truth was not known till the arrival of general Mack, who came in person to report the destruction of the principal Austrian army. Kutusof, then despairing with reason of saving Vienna, did not disguise from the emperor Francis, who had hastened to the Russian head-quarters, that it was necessary to make a sacrifice of that capital. He would fain have withdrawn as speedily as possible from the danger which threatened himself, by passing to the left bank of the Danube, in order to join the Russian reserves coming through Bohemia and Moravia. The emperor Francis and his council, however, made a point of not sacrificing Vienna till at the last extremity, and flattered themselves that, by retarding the march of Napoleon by all the means which defensive war was capable of furnishing, time might be given to the archduke Charles to reach Austria, to the Russian reserves to arrive on the Danube, and to effect a general junction of the allied forces, for the purpose of fighting a battle, which might perhaps prove the salvation of the capital and of the monarchy. General Kutusof, in compliance with the desires of the principal ally of his master, promised to oppose to the French every resistance that did not go so far as to involve a general action; and, to slacken their movement, he determined to avail himself of all the tributaries of the Danube coming from the Alps and throwing themselves into that great river. For this purpose, it was sufficient to break down the bridges, and to obstruct by strong rear-guards the passages by main force which the French should attempt, passages difficult in a season when all the waters were high, and laden with flakes of ice.

Napoleon had made the following dispositions for his march: He was obliged to direct his course between the Danube and the chain of the Alps, by a route cramped between the river and the mountains. To advance with a numerous army by this narrow route would have been attended with difficulty of subsisting and danger for marching, for, besides the archduke Charles, who might pass from Lombardy into Bavaria, and throw himself upon our flank, there were in Tyrol about 25,000 men under the archduke John. Napoleon, therefore, took the wise precaution to commit to Ney's corps the conquest of the Tyrol. He directed

the marshal to leave Ulm, to ascend by Kempten, and to penetrate into the Tyrol, in such a manner as to cut in two the troops scattered through that long country. Those which were to the right of marshal Ney were to be flung back upon the Vorarlberg and the Lake of Constance, where Augereau's corps would arrive, after traversing the whole extent of France from Brest to Hunningen. Ney, deprived of Dupont's division, which had concurred with Murat in the pursuit of the archduke Ferdinand, was reduced to about 10,000 men. But Napoleon, trusting to his vigour and to the 14,000 men, whom Augereau was bringing, believed that he would have force enough for the task which he had to perform. The Tyrol thus occupied, he destined Bernadotte to penetrate into the country of Salzburg. He directed the latter to proceed from Munich towards the Inn, and to cross it either at Wasserburg or Rosenheim. General Marmont was to support Bernadotte. In this manner Napoleon ensured two advantages, that of covering himself completely towards the Alps, and that of gaining possession of the upper course of the Inn, which would prevent the Austro-Russians from defending its lower course against the main body of our army. As for himself, with the corps of marshals Davout, Soult, and Lannes, with the reserve cavalry and the guard, he should take in front the great barrier of the Inn, with the intention of crossing from Mühlendorf to Braunau. Murat had orders to set off on the 26th of October, with the dragoons of generals Walther and Beaumont, general d'Hautpoul's heavy cavalry, and a bridge equipage, to proceed direct to Mühlendorf, following the high road from Munich through Hohenlinden, and thus traversing the scenes of Moreau's glory. Marshal Soult was to support him at the distance of one march in rear. Marshal Davout took the route on the left, through Freisingen, Dorfen, and Neu-Oettingen. Lannes, who had contributed with Murat to the pursuit of the archduke Ferdinand, was to march still more to the left than Davout, through Landshut, Wilsburg, and Braunau. Lastly, Dupont's division, which had proceeded far in the same direction, descended the Danube, for the purpose of going to take Passau. Napoleon, with the guard, followed Murat and Soult on the high road from Munich.

Before he left Augsburg, Napoleon prescribed there a system of precautions to which we shall find him paying more and more attention, in proportion as the sphere of his operations increased, and in which he has never been equalled for the extent of his foresight and the activity of his care. The object of this system of precautions was to create upon his line of operation points of support, which should serve him alike to advance or to fall back, if he should be compelled to the latter course. These points of support, besides the advantage of presenting a certain force, were to have that of containing immense stores of all kinds, very useful to an army marching forward, indispensable for a retreating army.

He chose in Bavaria, on the Lech, Augsburg, which afforded some means of defence and the resources suited to a great population. He gave directions for the works necessary to secure it against a *coup de main*, and desired that corn, cattle, cloth, shoes, ammunition, and, above all, hospitals, should be found there. He ordered commissions for cloth and shoes to be given at Nuremberg, at Ratisbon, and at Munich, requiring the speedy execution of them, and paying for the articles, of which those made up were to be collected at Augsburg. As that city became the principal point of the route of the army, all the detachments were to pass through it in order to supply themselves with what they needed. These precautions taken, Napoleon set out to follow his corps, which preceded him by one or two marches.

The movements of his army were executed as prescribed by him. On the 26th of October, the whole of it was advancing towards the Inn. The Austro-Russians had not left a single bridge standing. But the soldiers, throwing themselves everywhere into boats, and crossing in large detachments, under musketry and grape, forced the enemy to evacuate the opposite bank, and set about repairing the bridges, seldom totally destroyed, owing to the precipitation of his retreat. Bernadotte, meeting with but few obstacles, passed the Inn on the 28th of October at Wasserburg. Marshals Soult, Murat, and Davout passed it at Mühlendorf and Neu-Oettingen. Lannes proceeded towards Braunau, and, finding the bridge broken down, sent a detachment to the other bank by means of some craft which had been seized. This detachment crossed the river and appeared at the gates of Braunau. What was the astonishment of our soldiers to find that place open, though in a perfect state of defence, completely armed, and provided with considerable resources! Immediate possession was taken, and from a fact so extraordinary it was inferred that the enemy was retreating with a precipitation bordering on disorder.

Napoleon, delighted with such an acquisition, hastened in person to Braunau, to ascertain the strength of the place and what benefit he might derive from it. Having inspected it, he ordered a great portion of the resources which he meant at first to collect at Augsburg, to be removed thither; judging it to be preferable for the use to which he destined it. He left a garrison there, and gave the command of it to his aide-de-camp Lauriston, who had returned from the naval campaign which he had made with admiral Villeneuve. It was not the mere command of a fortress that he committed to him; it was a government, comprising all the rear of the army. The wounded, the ammunition, the prisoners, the recruits, coming from France, the prisoners who were going thither, were all to pass through Braunau, under the superintendence of general Lauriston.

From the 29th to the 30th of October, the army had crossed the Inn, left Bavaria behind, and invaded Upper Austria. It was

no longer a burden to allies, but to the hereditary States of the imperial house. It was marching forward, covered against any movement of the archdukes by Bernadotte and Marmont at Salzburg, by Ney in the Tyrol. Napoleon, not losing a moment, resolved to proceed from the line of the Inn to that of the Traun. From the Inn to the Traun, you have, as everywhere in this country, the Danube on the left, the Alps on the right. It is a magnificent country, resembling Lombardy, only more stern, because it is to the north instead of to the south of the Alps, and would be as level as a plain, but for a large mountain called the Hausrück which rises abruptly in the midst of it. This mountain is peaked, totally detached from the Alps, and would form an island, if the country were covered with water. But, having passed the Hausrück, you have nothing before you but an undulating and wooded plain, extending to the bank of the Traun and called the plain of Wels. The Traun runs over gravel and among fine trees, and throws itself into the Danube near Linz, the capital of the province, militarily as important as the city of Ulm, and, for that reason, bristling, since our great wars, with fortifications on a new system.

Napoleon directed Lannes by Efferding upon Linz, marshals Davout and Soult, by the road to Ried and Lambach, upon Wels, along the foot of the Hausrück. Murat always preceded them with his cavalry. The guard followed with the head-quarters. Apprehending, however, that the plain of Wels might be chosen by the enemy for a field of battle, he directed Marmont to leave Bernadotte at Salzburg, and to rejoin the main body of the army, by passing behind the Hausrück, along the road through Strasswalchen and Wocklabrück to Wels, so as to take the Austro-Russians in flank, if they should be disposed to halt with the intention of fighting.

The 1st chasseurs came up with them in advance of Ried, charged them gallantly, and put them to the rout. The French marched upon Lambach, which the enemy made a show of defending, solely to gain time to save their baggage. Davout overtook them and had a brilliant rear-guard action with them, but preparations for a battle were nowhere perceived. The enemy covered himself with the Traun in passing it at Wels. We entered Linz without striking a blow. Though the Austrians had made use of the Danube for evacuating their principal magazines, they nevertheless left us valuable resources. Napoleon arrived and established his head-quarters at Linz on the 15th of November.

Being established in this town, Napoleon moved forward his corps-d'armée from the Traun to the Ens, which is easy, for the country between these two tributaries of the Danube offered no position of which the enemy could be tempted to avail himself. This country presents a slightly elevated plain, intersected by ravines, covered with wood, having two steep slopes, one forward, which you must ascend when you have passed the Traun, the

other at the further extremity, which you must descend, if you mean to pass the Ens. Not having defended it on the side next to the Traun, the Austro-Russians could not think of defending it on the side next to the Ens, since they would have been everywhere commanded. The Ens was therefore passed without obstacle.

Having his head-quarters at Linz and his advanced guards on the Ens, Napoleon made new dispositions for the continuation of this offensive march, performed, as we have said, upon a narrow road between the Danube and the Alps. The difficulty of advancing thus in a long column, the tail of which could never come to the assistance of the head, if it were surprised by the enemy, with the danger always to be apprehended of an attack in flank, if the archdukes should suddenly leave Italy and march into Austria—this difficulty, further increased by the scarcity of provisions, already consumed or destroyed by the Russians, required great precautions before reaching Vienna.

The most serious inconvenience of this march was certainly the possibility of a sudden appearance of the archdukes. The two belligerent masses, acting in Austria and in Lombardy, were moving from west to east, the one under Napoleon and Kutusof to the north of the Alps, the other to the south of them under Massena and the archduke Charles. Was it possible that the archduke Charles, suddenly stealing away from Massena, and leaving before him a mere rear-guard to delude him, should cross the Alps, pick up by the way his brother John with the corps in the Tyrol, and penetrate into Bavaria, either to join the Austro-Russians behind one of the defensive positions which are met with on the Danube, or merely to throw himself on the flank of the French grand army? Though possible, this was scarcely probable. The archduke Charles had two routes: the first, by the Tyrol, Verona, Trent, Inspruck, would have led him behind the Inn; the second, more circuitous, through Carinthia and Styria, by Tarvis, Leoben, and Lilienfeld, would have led him to the well-known position of St. Pölten, in advance of Vienna. With respect to the first, supposing that the archduke had decided at the very moment of Mack's capitulation, which took place on the 20th, which was not known at Verona by the French till the 28th, which could not be known by the Austrians before the 25th or the 26th—supposing that, before leaving Italy, the archduke had not chosen to fight a battle for the purpose of restraining the French army, he would have had from the 25th to the 28th to traverse the Tyrol and arrive upon the Inn, which Napoleon passed on the 28th and 29th. He would evidently not have time enough for such a march. As for the route through Styria, which he would have had it in his power to take after the battle of Caldiero, he would have had to traverse the Friule, Carinthia, and Styria, and to march a hundred leagues in the Alps, between the 30th of October, the day of the battle of Caldiero and the 6th or 7th of

November, the day on which Napoleon crossed the *Enns* to move forward. He would not have had time for such an operation either. If the archduke Charles could not anticipate Napoleon, upon one of the defensive positions of the Danube, for the purpose of opposing to him 150,000 united Austrians and Russians, he might, without anticipating him, suffer himself to be outstripped, on the contrary, and cross the chain of the Alps, to attempt a flank attack upon the grand army. No doubt, with soldiers accustomed to conquer, prepared for daring enterprises, capable of clearing their way anywhere, he would have had it in his power to make such an attempt, and to produce a sudden and serious derangement in the march of Napoleon, perhaps even to change the face of events, but running the risk himself of being enclosed between two armies, that of Massena and that of Napoleon, as had formerly happened to Suwarow in the *St. Gothard*. This would have been one of the most hazardous of resolutions, and one does not take such resolutions when one has in one's hands an army, which is the last resource of a monarchy.

Napoleon, nevertheless, conducted himself as if such a resolution had been probable. The only position which the enemy could occupy for covering Vienna, whether the army of Kutusof was there alone, or whether the archdukes were there with it, was that of *St. Pölten*. This position is well known. The Alps of Styria, pushing the Danube to the north, from *Mölk* to *Krems*, throw out a spur which is called the *Kahlenberg*, and which subsides only at the very brink of the river, where it leaves scarcely room for a road. As the *Kahlenberg* covers with its mass the city of Vienna, you must cross it breadthwise to reach that capital. In advance of this spur, half-way up, is a very spacious position, which has received its name from a large village situated near it, that of *St. Pölten*, and upon which a retreating Austrian army might fight a defensive battle with advantage. A branch of the high road from Italy to Vienna, running through *Lilienfeld*, terminates near *St. Pölten* and might bring the archdukes thither. A vast wooden bridge over the Danube, that of *Krems*, placed this position in communication with the two banks of the river, and would have permitted the Prussian and Austrian reserves to hasten thither through Bohemia. It was there consequently that Napoleon must have met with the conjoined forces of the allies, if such a junction of forces had been possible in advance of Vienna. He therefore took, in approaching this point, the precautions which might be expected of a general who has combined calculation and daring in a superior degree to any celebrated captains. Having general Marmont's corps on his right, he resolved to send him to *Leoben* by a road passable for carriages, which runs from *Linz* to *Leoben*, through Styria. General Marmont, if he received intelligence of the approach of the archdukes, was to fall back upon the grand army and to become the extreme right, or, if the archdukes proceeded directly from the *Friule* into Hun-

gary, to establish himself in Leoben in order to give a hand to Massena. Between this road, which Marmont was to take, and the high road along the Danube, which the bulk of the army was following, there was a mountain road, which, running through Waidhofen and St. Gaming, descended to Lilienfeld, beyond the position of St. Pölten, and thus furnished the means of turning it. This Napoleon directed marshal Davout's corps to pursue. The corps of Bernadotte was no longer necessary at Salzburg, since Ney occupied the Tyrol. Napoleon enjoined him to draw nearer to the army, detaching the Bavarians towards Ney's corps, which could not fail to be particularly gratifying to these latter, always extremely ambitious to possess the Tyrol. He reserved for himself, for the direct attack of the position of St. Pölten, the corps of marshals Soult, Lannes, and Bernadotte, besides Murat's cavalry and the guard; these were sufficient, the corps of Davout being sent to turn that position.

Napoleon did not stop there, but resolved to take some precautions on the left bank of the Danube. So far he had marched on the right bank only, taking no heed of the left bank. There was talk, however, of an assemblage of troops in Bohemia, formed by the archduke Ferdinand, who escaped from Ulm with some thousand horse. There was also a rumour of the approach of the second Russian army, conducted into Moravia by Alexander. It was necessary, therefore, to guard himself on this side also. Napoleon, who had detached the division of Dupont to Passau, ordered him to advance upon the left bank of the Danube, keeping up with the army and sending out reconnaissances upon the roads from Bohemia to learn what was passing there. The Dutch, who had left Marmont, were to join Dupont's division. Judging this not to be sufficient, Napoleon detached Gazan's division from the corps of Lannes, and made it march with Dupont's division on the left bank. He placed both under the command of marshal Mortier, and, not to leave them cut off from the grand army, which continued to occupy the right bank, he conceived the idea of forming, with the craft collected on the Inn, the Traun, the Ens, and the Danube, a numerous flotilla, into which he put provisions, ammunition, all the fatigued men, and which, descending the Danube with the army, could in an hour throw ten thousand men on the right or on the left, connected the two banks, and served at once for a medium of communication and of conveyance. At the head of this flotilla he put captain Lostanges, an officer of the seamen of the guard.

It was by such a combination of precautions that Napoleon provided against the inconvenience of that offensive march, performed upon a long and narrow road between the Alps and the Danube. He had thus on the summit of the Alps Marmont's corps, half-way up Davout's corps, at their foot, along the Danube, the corps of Soult, Lannes, and Bernadotte, and the cavalry of Murat; on the other side of the Danube Mortier's corps, and,

lastly, a flotilla to connect all the forces marching on both banks of the river, and to carry whatever it was difficult to drag along with them. It was with this imposing train that he approached Vienna.

At the moment when he was about to leave Linz, an emissary from the emperor of Germany arrived at the head-quarters. This was general Giulay, one of the officers taken at Ulm, since released, and who, having heard Napoleon speak of his pacific dispositions, had so represented the matter to his master as to make some impression upon him. In consequence, the emperor Francis sent him to propose an armistice. General Giulay did not explain himself clearly, but it was evident that he wished Napoleon to halt before entering Vienna; and yet he offered in return no guarantee of a speedy and acceptable peace. Napoleon consented, indeed, to treat of peace immediately with a plenipotentiary sufficiently accredited, and authorised to consent to the necessary sacrifices; but to grant an armistice without guarantee to obtain what was due to him as indemnification for the war, was giving the second Russian army time to join the first, and the archdukes time to join the Russians under the walls of Vienna. Napoleon was not the man to commit such a fault. He declared, therefore, that he would stop at the very gates of Vienna, and not pass them, if an envoy should come to him with sincere proposals of peace, but that otherwise he should proceed direct to his goal, which was the capital of the empire. M. de Giulay alleged the necessity of consulting with the emperor Alexander, before conditions acceptable by all the belligerent powers could be fixed. Napoleon replied, that the emperor Francis, who was in danger, would be wrong to make his resolutions dependent on the emperor Alexander, who was not there; that he ought to think of saving his monarchy, and to that end to arrange with France, leaving it to the French army to send the Russians home. Napoleon had not entered into any explanation respecting the conditions capable of satisfying him; still every body knew that he wanted the Venetian states. Those states formed the complement of Italy; he would not have provoked a war to acquire them; but, war having been raised by Austria, it was natural that he should claim this the legitimate price of his victories. He delivered, moreover, to M. de Giulay a mild and polite letter for the emperor Francis, at the same time sufficiently explicit, relative to the conditions of peace.

Before he set off, Napoleon received also a visit from the elector of Bavaria, who, unable to join him at Munich, came to Linz to express his gratitude, his admiration, his joy, and, above all, his hopes of aggrandisement.

Napoleon had stayed at Linz but three days, that is to say, precisely the time necessary for giving his orders. But his corps had never ceased marching; for, after passing the Inn, on the 28th and 29th of October, the Traun on the 31st, the Ens on the 4th and 5th of November, they advanced the same day upon Amstetten

and St. Pölten. At Amstetten, the Russians determined to have a rear-guard action in order to gain time to save their baggage. The high road to Vienna ran through a forest of firs. The Russians took position on a clearing in the forest, which left a certain space open on the right and left of the road. In the centre of this space, and in front of it, was drawn up the artillery of the Russians, supported by their cavalry; in rear, and backed upon the wood, their best infantry. Murat and Lannes, debouching with the dragoons and Oudinot's grenadiers, perceived these dispositions. It was the first time that they had met the Russians, and they were desirous to teach them how the French fought. They despatched the dragoons and the chasseurs at a gallop along the high road, to take the enemy's artillery and cavalry. Our brave horse, in spite of the grape-shot, had soon taken the guns, cut in pieces the Russian cavalry, and cleared the ground. But it was necessary to break the infantry backed upon the fir-wood. Oudinot's grenadiers undertook that task. After an extremely brisk fire of musketry, they advanced with bayonets fixed upon the Russians. The latter, displaying extraordinary bravery, fought hand to hand, and took advantage for a long time of the thickness of the wood to resist. At last our grenadiers forced them in this position and put them to flight, after killing, wounding, or taking about a thousand men.

Murat and Lannes, proceeding together, the first with his cavalry, always going, though overwhelmed with fatigue, the second with his formidable grenadiers, continued the pursuit of the enemy on the 6th, 7th, and 8th of November, without being able to overtake him anywhere. "The Russians," wrote Lannes to Napoleon, "run away faster than we follow them; those wretches will not even stop to fight." Arriving on the 8th before St. Pölten, Lannes and Murat found them in order of battle, putting on a bold look, as if they meant to make a serious affair of it. The two leaders of our advanced-guard, notwithstanding their ardour, durst not hazard a battle without the Emperor. Besides, they had not sufficient means for fighting one. The hostile troops remained in presence of each other the whole of the 8th. They were near the beautiful abbey of Mülk. That wealthy abbey, situated on the steep bank of the Danube, and overlooking the broad bed of the river, with its magnificent domes, presents one of the finest views in the world. It was reserved for the head-quarters of the Emperor. It contained abundant resources, especially for the sick and the wounded.

Murat was lodged at the château of Mittrau, with a count de Montecuculli. There he learned, from various reports, that the Russians had no intention to make a stand at St. Pölten. They had actually taken a very important resolution. After having delayed the march of the French, either by breaking down the bridges or by rear-guard fights, and complied with the wishes of the emperor of Austria, who was desirous that the high road to Vienna should be disputed as long as possible, the Russians con-

ceived that they had done enough, and thought of their own safety. They repassed the Danube at Krems, the point where that river, terminating its bend to the north, resumes its eastern direction. The motive which especially instigated this determination was the intelligence that part of the French army had passed to the left bank of the Danube. They had reason to apprehend, in fact, that Napoleon, throwing, by some unforeseen manœuvre, the bulk of his forces on the left bank, might cut them off from Bohemia and Moravia. In consequence, they crossed the Danube at Krems, and burned the bridge after they had passed it. The works which would have enabled them to defend it, and to insure its exclusive possession, being scarcely begun, they had no other resource but to destroy it. They effected their passage on the 9th, leaving, throughout the whole archduchy of Austria, frightful traces of their presence. They plundered, ravaged, even murdered, behaving like downright barbarians, so that the French were almost regarded as deliverers by the people of the country. Their conduct in particular towards the Austrian troops was any thing but friendly. They treated them with extreme arrogance, affecting to impute to them the disasters of this campaign. The language of the Russian officers and generals on this subject was insultingly offensive, and by no means deserved; for, if the Austrians showed less firmness than the Russian infantry, in all other respects they were far superior.

The Austrians, living on very bad terms with the Russians, separated from them, to go and concur in the defence of the bridges of Vienna; and M. de Meerfeld, with his corps, retired by the road from Steyer to Leoben. He marched, followed by marshal Marmont, on the road from Waidhofen to Leoben, and by marshal Davout on that from St. Gaming to Lilienfeld. The direct road to Vienna was, therefore, open to the French, and they had but two marches to make in order to be at the gates of that capital, and no enemy before them who could dispute their entry.

The temptation could not but be great for Murat. It was difficult for him to withstand the desire to dash forward and to show the Austrian capital his person, always the most conspicuous at reviews as in dangers. Never had an army from the West penetrated into this metropolis of the Germanic empire. Moreau in 1800, general Bonaparte in 1797, had signed armistices when nearly arrived there. The Turks alone had reached its walls without passing them. Murat could not resist this temptation, and marched on the 10th and the 11th for Vienna, urging marshals Soult and Lannes to accompany him. He took care, it is true, not to enter, and halted at Burkersdorf, in the mountainous defile of the Kahlenberg, two leagues from Vienna.

This was a useless and even a dangerous haste. A change so unforeseen as that which had just manifested itself in the march of the enemy, made it worth while to halt and wait for the Emperor's orders. Besides, it was preceding too far the corps of mar-

shal Marmont, as well as the flotilla destined to keep that corps in communication with the army, and running blindly between the Russians, who had passed to the other side of the Danube, and the Austrians who were beaten back into the mountains.

At this instant, in fact, peril threatened marshal Mortier, placed on the left bank of the Danube, and coming near Stein, into the presence of the Russians, who had crossed the river at Krems. The danger of marshal Mortier was not precisely imputable to Murat, though the latter had contributed to produce and to aggravate it by his precipitate movement upon Vienna, but to a negligence scarcely ever to be met with in the operations directed by Napoleon, and which, nevertheless did occur in this instance, for there are intervals even in the most unremitting and most indefatigable vigilance.

Distracted by a thousand things, Napoleon had omitted to follow one of his most invariable habits, which consisted in always assuring himself of the execution of his orders, after he had given them. He had prescribed, in a general manner, the union of Gazan's, Dupont's, and Dumonceau's divisions into a single corps, the formation of a flotilla under captain Lostanges, to connect the columns marching on the left bank with those marching on the right bank, and he had depended too much upon his lieutenants to make all these things harmonise. Murat had advanced too rapidly: Mortier, whether drawn along by Murat's movement, or whether he had not given general Dupont instructions sufficiently precise, had left the interval of a march between Gazan's division, which he had with him, and Dupont's and Dumonceau's divisions, which were to join him. The flotilla, difficult to collect, was left far behind.

Meanwhile, Napoleon, quick at discovering negligences, hastened to Mölk, and, guessing the danger of marshal Mortier, though not yet apprised of it, he stopped marshal Soult's corps, which Murat had wanted to take with him, and sent aides-de-camp to Murat and Lannes to slacken their movement. He was fearful not only of what might happen to the corps thrown upon the left bank of the Danube, but what might befall the advanced-guard itself, imprudently carried into the defiles of the Kahlenberg.

Nowhere are faults so speedily punished as in war, for nowhere do causes and effects so speedily follow each other. The Russians, guided, upon the Austrian territory, by an officer of the Austrian staff of the highest merit, colonel Schmidt, soon perceived the existence of a solitary French division on the left bank of the Danube and resolved to cut it off. Feeling secure, from the destruction of the bridge of Krems, which prevented the French army from coming to the assistance of the compromised division, not perceiving a mass of boats which might make amends for the want of a bridge, they halted to procure for themselves an apparently easy triumph. Gazan's division numbered scarcely 5000 men; the Russians, since their separation from the Austrians,

were still nearly 40,000. The ground was favourable to their designs. The Danube, at this point, runs between steep banks, contracted by the mountains of Bohemia on the one hand, and by the Alps of Styria on the other. From Dirnstein to Stein and to Krems, the road on the left bank, narrow, frequently hewn out of the rock, is bordered by the Danube and the mountains, which overlook the river. It is difficult for carriages. Marshal Mortier, who was marching upon it with Gazan's division, had, therefore, put into boats the only battery that he had at his disposal. The horses, led by hand, followed the division.

On the 11th of November, while Murat, on the right bank, was running to the gates of Vienna, Mortier, on the left bank, had passed Dirnstein, where are the ruins of a castle in which Richard Cœur de Lion was kept prisoner. At this point of Dirnstein, the mountains recede a little, and leave a space between their foot and the river. The road runs through this space, sometimes imbedded in the ground, sometimes raised above it by a causeway. The French division, having entered upon this road, perceived the smoke of the bridge of Krems, which was still burning. Presently it deserted the Russians, and conjectured that they had passed the Danube over this bridge. Without considering what there might be before it, impelled by the ardour common to the whole army, it thought only of pushing forward and of fighting. Mortier gave the order for it, which was instantly executed. An officer of artillery, since general Fabvier, who commanded the battery attached to Gazan's division, had his pieces landed and placed them in position. The Russians advanced in a close mass towards the French division. The fire of the artillery made dreadful havoc in their ranks. They rushed upon the guns to take them. The infantry of the 100th and 103rd regiments of the line defended them with extreme vigour. A most obstinate fight, hand to hand, ensued in this narrow road. The cannon were taken, but immediately retaken. No sooner were they wrested from the Russians, than they were fired at them, almost close to the muzzles, with terribly destructive effect. The French, posted on the slightest rising grounds, kept up a fire of musketry, which did not less execution than their artillery. The fight was kept up at this point for half a day, and, to judge from the wounded found on the morrow, the enemy must have sustained great loss. Fifteen hundred prisoners were taken. The French were at last left masters of the ground, and thought that they might rest themselves there.

They had advanced while fighting as far as Stein. The 4th light, spread over the heights which overlook the river, kept up a well-sustained tirailleur fire, which became every moment more and more brisk. The cause of it, which it had been at first difficult to account for, was soon explained. The Russians had turned the heights. With two columns, forming a mass of twelve or fifteen thousand men, they had descended on the rear of Gazan's division

and entered Dirnstein, through which this division had passed in the morning. It was, therefore, enveloped and separated from Dupont's division, which had been left a march behind. No part of the flotilla was to be seen on the Danube, and consequently they had very little hope of escape left them. Night was approaching; the situation was frightful, and no doubt they should have a whole army upon them. In this extremity, evident to all eyes, not one, either officer or soldier ever thought of capitulating. To die to the last man rather than surrender was the only alternative which presented itself to these brave fellows, so heroic was the spirit which animated this army! Marshal Mortier thought like his soldiers, and like them he was resolved to perish rather than surrender his marshal's sword to the Russians. He therefore ordered them to march in close column and to force their way with the bayonet, while retreating to Dirnstein, where they should be rejoined by Dupont's division. It was dark. The battle which they had fought with the Russians in the morning was renewed in the obscurity of night, but in an opposite direction. Again they were engaged hand to hand in this narrow road, the men being so close that they frequently seized each other by the throat. While fighting in this manner, the French gained ground towards Dirnstein. However, after penetrating through several masses of enemies, they began to despair of accomplishing their object, or of opening themselves a passage that was incessantly closed again. Some of Mortier's officers, perceiving no further chance of saving themselves, proposed to him to embark alone, and to withdraw his person at least from the Russians, that such a trophy as a marshal of France might not be left in their hands.

"No," replied the illustrious marshal, "we must not forsake such brave fellows. We must be saved or perish with them."

There he was, sword in hand, fighting at the head of his grenadiers, and making repeated assaults to get back to Dirnstein, when, all at once, a most violent firing was heard in the rear of Dirnstein. Hope instantly revived, for, according to all probabilities, this must be Dupont's division arriving. In fact, that brave division, which had marched all day, had learned in advancing, the dangerous situation of marshal Mortier, and was hastening to his assistance. General Marchand, with the 9th light, supported by the 96th and 32nd regiments of the line, the same that had distinguished themselves at Haslach, plunged into that gorge. Some pushed on direct for Dirnstein, others entered the ravines which descend from the mountains, to drive back the Russians. A battle, quite as obstinate as that which the soldiers of Gazan's division were at this moment fighting, ensued in these defiles. At length, the 9th light penetrated to Dirnstein, while marshal Mortier was entering on the opposite side. The two columns rejoined and recognised each other, by the fire-light.

The soldiers embraced one another, overjoyed at having escaped such a disaster.

The losses were cruel on both sides, but the glory was not equal, for 5000 French had resisted more than 30,000 Russians, and had saved their colours by fighting their way through. These are examples which ought for ever to be recommended to a nation. Soldiers who have resolved to die can always save their honour, and frequently succeed in saving their liberty and their lives.

Marshal Mortier found in Dirnstein the 1500 prisoners whom he had taken in the morning. The Russians lost, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, about 4000 men. In that number was colonel Schmidt. The enemy could not sustain a more severe loss, and they soon had reason to regret it bitterly. The French numbered 3000 men *hors de combat*, either killed or wounded. Half of the effective force of Gazan's division had fallen.

When Napoleon, who was at M \ddot{o} lk, learned the issue of this rencounter, he was relieved from the apprehensions which he had entertained of the entire destruction of Gazan's division. He was delighted with the conduct of marshal Mortier and his soldiers, and he sent the most signal rewards to the two divisions of Gazan and Dupont. He recalled them to the right bank of the Danube, to give time for their wounds to heal, and destined Bernadotte to succeed them on the left bank. He censured Murat for the unconnectedness which had prevailed in the different columns of the army. The character of Napoleon was indulgent, his mind stern. He preferred simple, solid, sedate bravery to brilliant bravery, though he employed all sorts, such as Nature presented them to him, in his armies. He was in general severe towards Murat, whose levity, ostentation, and restless ambition, he disliked, though at the same time he did justice to his excellent heart and his transcendent courage. "My cousin," he wrote to him, "I cannot approve of your manner of marching. You go like a hare-brained fellow, without weighing the orders that I send you. The Russians, instead of covering Vienna, have recrossed the Danube at Krems. This extraordinary circumstance ought to have suggested to you that you could not act without fresh instructions. Without knowing what plans the enemy may have, or inquiring what was my pleasure in this new order of things, you go and draw away my army towards Vienna. You have consulted only the petty vanity of entering Vienna. There is no glory but where there is danger. There is none in entering a defenceless capital." (*M \ddot{o} lk, the 11th of November.*)

Murat, on this occasion, expiated the faults of every body. He had, it is true, marched too rapidly; but, had he remained before Krems, without bridges and without boats, he would have been of no great assistance to Mortier, who had been compromised chiefly by the distance left between Dupont's and Gazan's di-

visions, and by the absence of the flotilla. Murat was deeply grieved. Napoleon, apprised by his aide-de-camp, Bertrand, of his brother-in-law's affliction, corrected by a few soothing expressions the effect of this harsh reprimand.

Napoleon, desirous at the moment of deriving advantage from the very fault of Murat, enjoined him, since he was in sight of Vienna, not to enter it, but to go along the walls and seize the great bridge of the Danube, which is thrown across that river, outside the suburbs. This bridge occupied, Napoleon further directed him to advance with all expedition upon the road to Moravia, in order to arrive before the Russians at the point where the road from Krems joins the high road to Olmütz. If he secured the bridge and marched rapidly, it might be possible to cut off the retreat of general Kutusof towards Moravia, and to subject him to a disaster nearly equal to that of general Mack. Murat had now an opportunity to repair his faults, and he seized it eagerly.

Still it was scarcely to be supposed that the Austrians had committed such a blunder as to leave standing the bridges of Vienna, which must render the French masters of both banks of the river, or that, if they had left them standing, they had not made every preparation for destroying them at the first signal. Nothing, therefore, was more doubtful than the operation wished for rather than ordered by Napoleon.

The Austrians had no intention to defend Vienna. That fine and large capital has a regular enclosure, that which resisted the Turks in 1683, and as, in time, the city increased too much to remain shut up in that space, and extensive suburbs arose all round it, the whole was encompassed with a wall of no great height, in the form of redans, surrounding the whole of the ground built upon. All this was but a slight defence, for the wall which covers the suburbs was easy to force; and, once master of the suburbs, one might, with a few shells, oblige the body of the place to surrender. The emperor Francis had charged count Würbna, a discreet and conciliatory man, to receive the French, and to concert with them for the peaceable possession of the capital. But it was decided that the passage of the river should be disputed.

Vienna is situated at a certain distance from the Danube, which runs to the left of that city, between wooded islands. The great bridge, of wood, crossing several arms of the river, forms a communication from one bank to the other. The Austrians had placed combustibles under the flooring of the bridge, and were ready to blow it up the moment that the French should make their appearance. They were posted on the left bank, with their artillery pointed, and a corps of seven or eight thousand men, commanded by count Auersperg.

Murat had approached near to the bridge, without entering the city, which, owing to the localities, it was easy to do. At this

moment the rumour of an armistice was universally circulated. Napoleon, having arrived at the palace of Schönbrunn, situated on the high road, before you come to Vienna, had been waited upon by a deputation of the inhabitants of that capital, who had hastened thither to implore his clemency. He received them with all the attentions due to an excellent people, and from civilised nations towards each other. He had also received and appeared to listen to M. Giulay, who came to repeat the overtures previously made at Linz. The idea of an armistice, appearing likely to lead to peace, had, therefore, spread rapidly. Napoleon had, at the same time, sent general Bertrand to renew the order to Murat and Lannes to get possession of the bridges if possible. Murat and Lannes needed no spurring. They had placed Oudinot's grenadiers behind the umbrageous plantations that border the Danube, and advanced themselves with some aides-de-camp to the *tête de pont*. General Bertrand and an officer of the engineers, colonel Dode de la Brunerie, had repaired thither also.

A wooden barrier closed this *tête de pont*. Orders were given to throw it down. Behind, at some distance, was posted an hussar, as vidette, who fired his carbine, and galloped off. He was followed over the long and sinuous line of the small bridges thrown across the several arms of the river, till his pursuers came to the great bridge over the principal arm. Instead of planks, nothing was to be seen but a bed of fascines spread on the flooring. At that very moment an Austrian sub-officer of artillery appeared with a match in his hand. Colonel Dode seized and stopped him just as he was about to fire the train communicating with the fireworks placed under the arches. In this manner the French officers reached the other bank: they addressed the Austrian artillerymen, told them that an armistice was signed, or on the point of being signed, that peace was negotiating, and desired to speak with the general commanding the troops.

The Austrians, taken by surprise, hesitated, and conducted general Bertrand to count Auersperg. Meanwhile, a column of grenadiers advanced by Murat's order. It could not be seen owing to the large trees by the river, and the windings of that route, which alternately crossed bridges and wooded islands. While awaiting their arrival, the French chiefs continued to converse with the Austrians under the mouths of their cannon. All at once the long-concealed column of grenadiers came in sight. The Austrians, beginning to perceive that they had been tricked, prepared to fire. Lannes and Murat, with the officers who accompanied them, rushed upon the gunners, talked to them, made them hesitate afresh, and thus gave the column time to come up. The grenadiers at length fell upon the cannon, seized them, and disarmed the Austrians.

Meanwhile, count Auersperg came up accompanied by general Bertrand and colonel Dode. He was painfully surprised to see the bridge in the hands of the French, and these collected in con-

siderable number on the left bank of the Danube. He had some thousands of infantry left to dispute the possession of what they had wrested from him. But the French officers repeated to him all the stories by which they had already lulled the guard of the bridge, and persuaded him that he ought to retire with his soldiers to a certain distance from the river. Besides, fresh French troops were every moment arriving, and it was too late to resort to force. M. Auersperg therefore withdrew, agitated, confounded, appearing scarcely to comprehend what had just occurred.

It was by means of this audacious trick, seconded by the unparalleled courage of those who played it, and with complete success, that the bridges of Vienna fell into our hands. Four years later, for want of these bridges, the passage of the Danube cost us sanguinary battles, which had well-nigh proved fatal to us.

The joy of Napoleon, on hearing of this success, was extreme. He thought no longer of snubbing Murat, but sent him off immediately, with the reserve cavalry, the corps of Lannes, and that of marshal Soult, to proceed by the road of Stockerau and Hollabrunn, to cut off the retreat of general Kutusof.

Having despatched these orders, he directed all his attention to the police of Vienna and the military occupation of that capital. It was a glorious triumph to enter that ancient metropolis of the Germanic empire, in the bosom of which the enemy had never appeared but as master. During the last two centuries considerable wars had been waged, memorable battles won and lost, but never had a great general been yet seen planting his standard in the capitals of mighty States. Men were obliged to go back to the times of the conquerors to find examples of such vast results.

Napoleon, for his part, took up his abode at the imperial palace of Schönbrunn. He gave the command of the city of Vienna to general Clarke, and left the police to the city militia. He ordered and enforced the observance of the strictest military discipline, and suffered no property to be touched but the public property, such as the chests of the government and the arsenals. The great arsenal of Vienna contained immense stores—100,000 muskets, 2000 pieces of cannon, ammunition of every kind. It was surprising that the emperor Francis had not caused it to be evacuated by means of the Danube. Possession was taken of all that it contained for the account of the army.

Napoleon then distributed his forces in such a manner as to guard the capital duly, and to observe the road from the Alps by which the archdukes might soon arrive, that of Hungary, by which they might come somewhat later, lastly, that of Moravia, on which the Russians were in force.

We have seen that he had despatched general Marmont by the Leoben road, to occupy the pass of the Alps, and marshal Davout by the road of St. Gaming, to turn the position of St. Pölten.

The latter laboriously climbed the steepest mountains, amidst the snow and ice of a precocious winter, and, thanks to the devotedness of the soldiers and the energy of the officers, he had surmounted all obstacles, when, near Mariazell, on the high road from Leoben to St. Pölten, he fell in with the corps of general Meerfeld in flight from general Marmont. An action of the same kind that Massena had formerly fought in the Alps, immediately ensued between the French and the Austrians. Marshal Davout overthrew the latter, took from them 4000 men, and drove the rest in disorder into the mountains. He then descended upon Vienna. General Marmont, on reaching Leoben, almost without striking a blow, halted there and waited for new instructions from the Emperor.

Events were not less favourable in the Tyrol and Italy. Marshal Ney, sent, after the occupation of Ulm, to take possession of the Tyrol, had luckily chosen the *debouché* of Scharnitz, the *Porta Claudia* of the ancients, for penetrating into it. This was one of the most difficult passes of that country, but it had the advantage of leading straight to Inspruck, amidst the dispersed troops of the Austrians, which, not expecting this attack, were scattered from the Lake of Constance to the sources of the Drave. Marshal Ney had not more than nine or ten thousand men, intrepid soldiers like their commander, and with whom any thing might be undertaken. He made them scale in the month of November the highest peaks of the Alps, in spite of the rocks which the inhabitants tumbled upon their heads; for the Tyrolese, strongly attached to the house of Austria, would not be subjects of Bavaria, to which they were threatened to be transferred. He stormed the entrenchments of Scharnitz, entered Inspruck, dispersed the surprised Austrians, and drove some of them into the Vorarlberg, the others into Italian Tyrol. General Jellachich and prince de Rohan were beaten back towards the Vorarlberg, and from the Vorarlberg towards the Lake of Constance, along the very route by which Augereau was coming. As though Fate had decreed that none of the wrecks of the army of Ulm should escape the French, general Jellachich, the same who at the surrender of Memmingen had evaded the pursuit of Marshal Soult, came full butt upon Augereau's corps. Seeing no chance of escape, he laid down his arms, with a detachment of 6000 men. The prince de Rohan, less advanced towards the Vorarlberg, had time to fall back. He made an audacious march through the cantonments of our troops, which, after the taking of Inspruck, were negligently guarding the Brenner, beguiled the vigilance of Loison, one of marshal Ney's divisionary generals, passed close to Botzen, almost before his eyes, and then fell upon Verona and Venice, while Massena was pursuing the rear of the archduke Charles. Massena had charged general St. Cyr, with the troops brought back from Naples, to blockade Venice, in which the archduke Charles had left a strong garrison. General St. Cyr,

astonished at the presence of a hostile corps on the rear of Massena, when the latter was already at the foot of the Julian Alps, marched with the utmost expedition, and enveloped the prince de Rohan, who was obliged, like general Jellachich, to lay down his arms. On this occasion general St. Cyr took about 5000 men.

Meanwhile, the archduke Charles was continuing his arduous retreat through the Friule and beyond the Julian Alps. His brother, the archduke John, passing from the Italian Tyrol into Carinthia, followed in the interior of the Alps a line exactly parallel to his. The two archdukes, despairing with reason of arriving in useful time at one of the defensive positions of the Danube, and judging it too rash to fall upon the flank of Napoleon, had decided to meet at Laybach, the one by Villach, the other by Udine, and then to proceed to Hungary. There they might with the utmost safety join the Russians who occupied Moravia, and, having effected their junction with these latter, they might resume the offensive, if the allied armies had not been compromised by any fault, and if the two sovereigns of Austria and Russia had still the courage to prolong the contest.

General Marmont, placed in advance of Leoben, on the crests which separate the valley of the Danube from that of the Drave, almost saw with mortification the troops of the archduke John filing away before him, and burned with impatience to fight them. But a precise order chained his ardour, and enjoined him to confine himself to guarding the defiles of the Alps.

Massena, after pursuing the archduke Charles as far as the Julian Alps, had halted at the foot of them, and conceived that he ought not to venture into Hungary in pursuit of the archdukes. He gave a hand to general Marmont, and waited for orders from the Emperor.

All these movements were finished by the middle of November, nearly at the same time that the grand army was performing its march upon Vienna. Assuredly, if one had devised a plan in the tranquillity of the closet, with the facilities which abound for tracing projects on the map, one would not have arranged matters with greater ease. In six weeks that army, passing the Rhine and the Danube, interposing between the Austrian posts in Suabia and the Russians arriving upon the Inn, had enveloped the one, beaten back the other, surprised the Tyrol by a detachment, then occupied Vienna, and turned the position of the archdukes in Italy, which had obliged the latter to seek refuge in Hungary. History nowhere presents such another spectacle: in twenty days from the Ocean to the Rhine, in forty from the Rhine to Vienna! And though separations of forces, so dangerous in war, are most frequently attended with reverses only; here corps had been seen detached to a distance, which, without running any risk, had accomplished their object, because at the centre a mighty mass, striking opportunely decisive blows at the principal bodies assem-

bled by the enemy, had imparted an impulsion to which every thing gave way, and had not left, either upon its rear or upon its wings, any consequences which might not easily be gathered: so that this dispersion was, in reality, nothing but a skilful distribution of accessories beside the principal action, regulated with wonderful precision. But, after admiring that profound, that incomparable art, which astonishes by its very simplicity, we must admire also in this manner of operating another condition, without which every combination, however judicious, may become a peril—that is, such a vigour in the soldiers and lieutenants that, when they were overtaken by an unforeseen accident, they knew how, by their energy, as the soldiers of general Dupont at Haslach, of marshal Mortier at Dirnstein, of marshal Ney at Elchingen, to give the supreme intelligence which directed them time to come to their assistance, and to repair the inevitable errors in even the best conducted operations. Let us repeat what we have already remarked—a great captain wants valiant soldiers, and valiant soldiers want in like manner a great captain. The glory ought to be theirs in common, as well as the merit of the great things which they accomplish.

Napoleon, at Vienna, would not feast himself there with the vain-glory of occupying the capital of the Germanic empire. He wanted to put an end to the war. If he can be reproached with having in his career abused fortune, he will never be reproached, like Hannibal, with not having known how to take advantage of it, and with having fallen asleep amidst the delights of Capua. He prepared, therefore, to speed his march against the Russians, in order to beat them in Moravia, before they had time to effect their junction with the archdukes. These, however, on the 15th of November, had proceeded no further than Laybach. They would have to make a very great circuit to reach Hungary, then to traverse it, and to enter Moravia towards Olmütz. This was a long march of more than 150 leagues to make. Twenty days would not have sufficed for it. Napoleon, at this period, was at Vienna, and had only 40 leagues to travel to reach Brünn, the capital of Moravia.

He drew nearer to him general Marmont, who was too far off, and assigned to him a position a little in rear, on the very summit of the Alps of Styria, in order to guard the high road from Italy to Vienna. He enjoined him, in case the archdukes should attempt to take that way back, to destroy the bridges, and to break up the roads, which, in the mountains, enables a corps that is not numerous to stop a superior enemy for some time. He forbade him to give way to the desire to fight, unless he was forced to do so. He drew Massena towards general Marmont, and put them into immediate communication with each other. The troops commanded by Massena thenceforward assumed the title of the eighth corps of the grand army. Napoleon placed the corps of marshal Davout all round Vienna; one division, that

of general Gudin, in rear of Vienna, towards Neustadt, where it could in a short time give a hand to Marmont; another, that of general Friant in the direction of Presburg, observing the *debouchés* of Hungary, the third that of general Bisson (which had become Caffarelli's division) in advance of Vienna, on the road to Moravia. Dupont's and Gazan's divisions were established in Vienna itself, to recover from their fatigues and their wounds. Lastly, marshals Soult, Lannes, and Murat marched towards Moravia, while marshal Bernadotte, having passed the Danube at Krems, followed the track of general Kutusof, and was preparing to rejoin, by the same route which that general had taken, the three French corps that were going to fight the Russians.

Thus Napoleon at Vienna, in the centre of a web skilfully spread around him, could give assistance wherever the slightest agitation might indicate the presence of the enemy. If the archdukes attempted any thing towards Italy, Massena and Marmont, in connexion with one another, were backed upon the Alps of Styria, and Napoleon, marching Davout's corps towards Neustadt, was in force to support them. If the archdukes advanced by way of Presburg and Hungary, Napoleon could despatch thither Davout's entire corps, a little after Marmont, who, at Neustadt, was not far off, and, in case of need, hasten thither himself, with the bulk of the army. Lastly, if it were necessary to make head against the Russians in Moravia, he could in three days unite with the corps of Soult, Lannes, and Murat, which were already there, that of Davout, easily withdrawn from Vienna, and that of Bernadotte, quite as easily brought back from Bohemia. He was, therefore, duly prepared on every side, and fulfilled in the highest degree the conditions of that art of war which, in conversation with his lieutenants, he defined in these terms: THE ART OF DIVIDING ONE'S SELF TO SUBSIST, AND OF CONCENTRATING ONE'S SELF TO FIGHT. Never have the precepts of that formidable art which destroys or founds empires been better defined or better practised.

Napoleon had hastened to avail himself of the conquest of the bridges of Vienna, to send marshals Soult, Lannes, and Murat beyond the Danube, in the hope of cutting off the retreat of general Kutusof, and arriving before him at Hollabrünn, where that general, who had passed the Danube at Krems, would strike off into the road to Moravia. General Kutusof directed his march towards Moravia, and not towards Bohemia, because it was upon Olmütz, the frontier of Moravia and Galicia, that the second Russian army was directing its course. While he was advancing upon Hollabrünn, having prince Bagration at the head, he was astonished and dismayed on learning the presence of the French on the high road which he designed to follow, and thus acquiring the certainty of being cut off. He then laid the same snare for Murat which Murat had laid for the Austrians, in order to take from them the bridges of the Danube. He had with him gene-

ral Winzingerode, the same who had negotiated all the conditions of the plan of the campaign. He despatched him to Murat to retail to him the inventions by which count Auersperg had been deceived, and which consisted in saying that there were negotiators at Schönbrunn on the point of signing a peace. In consequence, he directed an armistice to be proposed to him, the principal condition of which was to halt both of them on the ground which they occupied, so that nothing whatever should be changed by the suspension of the operations. If they were to be resumed, six hours' notice was to be given. Murat, artfully flattered by M. de Winzingerode, proud, moreover, of the honour of being the first intermediate agent of the peace, accepted the armistice, saving the approbation of the Emperor. We must add, in order to be just, that a consideration, which was not without weight, contributed greatly to lead him into this false step. The corps of marshal Soult was not yet on the ground, and he was fearful that, with his cavalry and Oudinot's grenadiers, he should not have a sufficient force to bar the way against the Russians. He despatched, therefore, an aide-de-camp to the head-quarters with the draft of the armistice.

Next day the commanders on both sides visited one another. Prince Bagration went to see Murat, and manifested great interest and curiosity respecting the French generals, and especially respecting the illustrious marshal Lannes. The latter, simple in his manners, without being on that account deficient in military courtesy, told prince Bagration that if he had been alone they should have been at that moment fighting instead of exchanging compliments. At this moment, in fact, the Russian army, covering itself with Bagration's rear-guard, which affected to keep motionless, marched rapidly behind this curtain and regained the road to Moravia. Thus Murat, duped in his turn, gave the enemy occasion to revenge himself for the bridge of Vienna.

Presently there arrived an aide-de-camp of the Emperor's, general Lemarrois, who brought a severe reprimand to Murat for the fault that he had committed,* and which gave an order, as

* " TO PRINCE MURAT.

" Schönbrunn, 25 Brumaire, year XIV.,

" November 16, 1805, eight in the morning.

" It is impossible to find terms to express my displeasure. You command only my advanced-guard and you have no right to make an armistice without my order. You cause me to lose the fruit of a campaign. Break the armistice immediately and march against the enemy. Send and declare to him that the general who signed that capitulation had no right to do it; that none but the emperor of Russia has that right.

" If, however, the emperor of Russia would ratify the said convention, I would ratify it; but it is only a stratagem. March; destroy the Russian army; you are in a position to take its baggage and its artillery. The aide-de-camp of the emperor of Russia is a . . . Officers are nothing when they have not powers: this had none. The Austrians let themselves be duped for the passage of the bridge of Vienna, you let yourself be duped by an aide-de-camp of the emperor."

well to him as to marshal Lannes, to attack immediately, whatever the hour might be at which this communication reached them. Lannes, however, took care to send an officer to prince Bagration to acquaint him with the orders which he had just received. Dispositions for attack were instantly made. Prince Bagration had seven or eight thousand men. Determined to cover completely the movement of Kutusof, he took the noble resolution to perish rather than stir from the spot. Lannes pushed his grenadiers upon him. The only disposition that was possible was that of two lines of infantry, deployed facing one another, and attacking on nearly level ground. For some time they exchanged a very brisk and very destructive fire of musketry, then charged with the bayonet, and, what is rare in war, the two masses of infantry marched resolutely towards each other, without either giving way before they met. They closed, and then, after a fight, man to man, Oudinot's grenadiers broke Bagration's foot-soldiers and cut them in pieces. They then disputed, till after nightfall, by the light of the flames, the burning village of Schöngraben, which was finally left in the hands of the French. The Russians behaved valiantly. They lost on this occasion nearly half their rear-guard, about 3000 men, more than 1500 of whom strewed the field of battle. Prince Bagration had proved himself by his resolution the worthy rival of marshal Mortier at Dirnstein. This sanguinary action was fought on the 16th of November.

The French advanced on the following days, taking prisoners at every step, and at length entered, on the 19th, the town of Brünn, the capital of Moravia. The place was found armed and provided with abundant resources. The enemy had not even thought of defending it. They thus abandoned to Napoleon an important position, where he commanded Moravia, and could at his ease observe and await the movements of the Russians.

Napoleon, on receiving intelligence of this last combat, resolved to proceed to Brünn, for, the news from Italy announcing the protracted retreat which the archdukes were making into Hungary, he concluded that it would be with the Russians that he should chiefly have to do. He made some slight changes in the distribution of marshal Davout's corps around Vienna. He despatched towards Presburg Gudin's division, which seemed to be no longer necessary on the road to Styria, since the retreat of the archdukes. He established Friant's division, belonging to the same corps, in advance of Vienna, on the road to Moravia. Bisson's division (which had for a moment become Caffarelli's) was detached from Davout's corps and marched to Brünn, to supply in Lannes corps the place of Gazan's division, left at Vienna.

Napoleon, on his arrival at Brünn, fixed his head-quarters there on the 20th of November. General Giulay, accompanied this time by M. de Stadion, came to visit him again, and to talk of peace more seriously than in his preceding missions. Napoleon expressed to both of them a desire to lay aside arms and return to

France, but did not leave them in ignorance of the conditions on which he should consent to do so. He would no longer, he said, allow Italy, divided between France and Austria, to continue to be a subject of jealousy and war between them. He was resolved to have the whole of it as far as the Isonzo, that is to say, he required the Venetian States, the only part of Italy which remained for him to conquer. He entered into no explanations respecting what he should have to demand for his allies, the electors of Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Baden; but he declared in general terms that he must secure their situation in Germany, and put an end to all the questions left pending between them and the emperor, since the new Germanic constitution of 1803. Messieurs de Stadion and de Giulay cried out vehemently against the hardness of these conditions. But Napoleon showed no disposition to depart from them, and he gave them to understand that, wholly engrossed by the duties of war, he had no desire to keep about him negotiators, who were in reality nothing but military spies, directed to watch his movements. He therefore recommended to them to go to Vienna, to M. de Talleyrand, who had just arrived there. Napoleon, caring little about the tastes of his minister, who was not fond either of business or of the fatigues of head-quarters, had first summoned him to Strasburg, then to Munich, and now to Vienna. He shifted to him those interminable parleys, which in negotiations always precede serious results.

During the conferences which Napoleon had held with the two Austrian negotiators, one of them, unable to contain himself, had dropped an imprudent word, from which it might evidently be inferred that Prussia was bound by a treaty with Russia and Austria. Something of that kind had been intimated to him from Berlin, but nothing so precise as what he had just learned. This discovery suggested new reflections, and rendered him more disposed to peace, without, however, inducing him to desist from his essential pretensions. It could not suit him to follow the Russians beyond Moravia, that is to say into Poland, for that would be running the risk of seeing the archdukes cut off his communications with Vienna. In consequence, he resolved to await the arrival of M. de Haugwitz and the further development of the military projects of the Russians. He was equally ready either to treat, if the proposed conditions seemed acceptable to him, or to cut in a great battle the Gordian knot of the coalition, if his enemies afforded a favourable occasion for it. He therefore suffered a few days to elapse, employing himself in studying with extreme care, and in making his generals study, the ground upon which he was, and upon which a secret presentiment told him that he might be fated to fight a decisive battle. At the same time, he rested his troops, worn out with fatigue, suffering from cold, sometimes from hunger, and having traversed in three months nearly 500 leagues. Hence the ranks of his soldiers were

much thinned, though fewer stragglers were seen among them than in the train of any army. The effectives had lost nearly one-fifth, since taking the field. All military men will acknowledge that this was very little after such fatigues. For the rest, whenever the army halted anywhere, the ranks were soon completed, owing to the anxiety of the men who remained behind to rejoin their corps.

The two emperors of Russia and Germany, on their part, meeting at Olmütz, employed their time in deliberating upon the course which they ought to pursue. General Kutusof, after a retreat, in which he had sustained only rear-guard defeats, nevertheless brought back no more than thirty and odd thousand men, already inured to fighting, but exhausted with fatigue. He had, therefore lost twelve or fifteen thousand killed, wounded, prisoners, or lame. Alexander, with Buxhövdén's corps and the imperial Russian guard, brought 40,000, which made about 75,000 Russians. Fifteen thousand Austrians, comprising the wrecks of Kienmayer's and Meerfeld's corps, and a fine division of cavalry, completed the Austro-Russian army beneath Olmütz, and made it amount to a total force of 90,000 men.*

This is a fit place for remarking how exaggerated were at that time the pretensions of Russia in Europe, on comparing them with the real state of her forces. She affected to hold the balance between the powers, and the real number of soldiers brought by her upon the fields of battle where the destinies of the world were decided, was as follows: She had sent from 45 to 50 thousand men, under Kutusof, she brought 40,000 under Buxhövdén and the grand-duke Constantine, and 10,000 under general Essen. If we set down those acting in the north with the Swedes and the English at 15,000, and those preparing to act towards Naples at 10,000, we shall have a total of 125,000 men, figuring in reality in this war, and 100,000 at most, if we are to believe the accounts of the Russians after their defeat. Austria had assembled more than 200,000, Prussia could bring into line 150,000, France, by herself, 300,000. We do not speak of soldiers rated on the effectives (which makes a difference of nearly half), but of soldiers present in the fire on the day of battle. Though the Russians were steady infantry, yet it was not with 100,000 men, brave and ignorant, that one could then pretend to control Europe.

The Russians, always extremely contemptuous towards their allies the Austrians, whom they accused of being cowardly soldiers, incapable officers, continued to commit horrible ravages in the country. The eastern provinces of the Austrian monarchy were afflicted with dearth. Necessaries ran short at Olmütz, and the

* The Russians made it amount to much less the day after their defeat, Napoleon to much more in his bulletins. After comparing a great number of testimonies and authentic accounts, we think that we here give the most accurate statement.

Russians procured themselves provisions, not with the dexterity of the French soldier, an intelligent, rarely cruel, marauder, but with the brutality of a savage horde. They extended their pillage to the distance of several leagues round, and completely laid waste the country which they occupied. Discipline, usually so strict among them, was visibly affected by it, and they appeared much dissatisfied with their emperor.

In the Austro-Russian camp, therefore, people were not disposed to take wise determinations. The levity of youth concurred with a feeling of great discomfort to impel them to act, no matter how, to change their place, were it merely for the sake of change. We have said that the emperor Alexander began to fall under new influences. He was not satisfied with the direction given to his affairs; for this war, notwithstanding the flatteries with which a coterie had surrounded him at Berlin, did not seem to turn out well, and, according to the custom of princes, he was glad to throw upon his ministers the results of a policy which he had himself decreed, but which he could not uphold with the perseverance that could alone correct its faultiness. What had occurred at Berlin had confirmed him still more in his dispositions. He should have committed very different faults, he said, if he had listened to his friends. By persisting to do violence to Prussia, he should have thrown her into the arms of Napoleon, whereas by his personal address he had induced that court to enter, on the contrary, into engagements which were equivalent to a declaration of war against France. Hence the young emperor would no longer listen to advice, for he fancied himself more clever than all his advisers. Prince Adam Czartoryski, honest, grave, having warm passions under a cold exterior, become, as we have seen, the troublesome censor of the weaknesses and the fickleness of his master, supported an opinion which could not fail to alienate him completely. According to this minister, the emperor had no business with the army. That was not his place. He had never served; he could not know how to command. His presence at the head-quarters, surrounded by young, giddy, ignorant, presumptuous men, would annul the authority of the generals, and at the same time their responsibility. In a war, into which they all entered with a certain apprehension, they desired nothing more than to have no opinion, to take nothing upon themselves, and to let hot-headed youth command, that they might no longer be responsible for the defeats which they expected. In this manner there would be nothing but the worst of commands for an army—that of a court. This war, moreover, would be fertile in lost battles, and to maintain it there was required perseverance, and perseverance depended on the magnitude of the means which should be provided. It was requisite, therefore, to leave the generals to act the part which belonged to them at the head of the troops, and for the emperor to perform his at the centre of the government, by upholding the public spirit, by administering with energy and ap-

plication, so as to furnish the armies with the necessary resources for prolonging the struggle, the only means, if not to conquer, at least to balance fortune.

It was impossible to express a sentiment either more sensible or more disagreeable to the emperor Alexander. He had tried to play a political part in Europe, but had not yet succeeded according to his wish. He found himself hurried into a contest which would have filled him with dismay, if the remoteness of his empire had not cheered him. He had need to drown his thoughts in the tumult of camps; he had need to silence the murmurs of his reason, by hearing himself called at Berlin, at Dresden, at Weimar, at Vienna, the saviour of kings. This monarch, moreover, asked himself whether he could not, in his turn, shine on fields of battle; whether, with his intelligence, he might not have higher inspirations there than those old generals, whose experience imprudent youth encouraged him too much to despise; lastly, whether he could not have his share in that glory of arms so dear to princes, and at that time exclusively decreed by fortune to a single individual and to a single nation.

In these ideas he was confirmed by the military coterie which already surrounded him, and at the head of which was prince Dolgorouki. This latter, in order to gain the better an ascendancy over the emperor, was desirous to draw him to the army. He strove to persuade him that he had the qualities for command, and that he had but to show himself in order to change the fortune of the war; that his presence would double the valour of the soldiers, by filling them with enthusiasm; that his generals were commonplace men without abilities; that Napoleon had triumphed over their timidity and their antiquated science, but that he would not triumph so easily over a young nobility, intelligent and devoted, led by an adored emperor. These warriors, such novices in the profession of arms, dared to maintain that at Dirmstein, at Hollabrunn, the Russians had conquered the French, that the Austrians were cowards, that there were no brave men but the Russians, and that if Alexander would but come and animate them with his presence, they should soon put a stop to the arrogant and undeserved prosperity of Napoleon.

The wily Kutusof ventured timidly to say that this was not absolutely the case; but, too servile to maintain courageously his own opinion, he took care not to contradict the new possessors of the imperial favour, and had the meanness to permit his old experience to be insulted. The intrepid Bagration, the vicious but brave Miloradovich, the discreet Doctorow, were officers whose opinion deserved some attention. None of these men was heeded. A German adviser of the archduke John at Hohenlinden, general Weirother, had alone a real authority over the military youth who surrounded Alexander. Since Frederick the Great, in the last century, had beaten the Austrian army by attacking it on one of its wings, the theory of oblique order, which Frederick had never

thought of, had been invented, and to this theory had been attributed all the successes of that great man. Since general Bonaparte had shown himself so superior in the high combinations of war, since he had been seen so often surprising, enveloping the generals opposed to him, other commentators made the whole art of war consist in a certain manœuvre, and talked about nothing but turning the enemy. They had invented, so they asserted, a new science, and for this science a word then new, that of *strategy*, and they hastened to offer it to the princes who would submit to be directed by them. The German Weirother had persuaded the friends of Alexander that he had a plan, one of the most excellent and most sure, for destroying Napoleon. It consisted in a grand manœuvre, by which they were to turn the emperor of the French, cut him off from the road to Vienna, and throw him into Bohemia, beaten and separated for ever from the forces which he had in Austria and in Italy.

The susceptible mind of Alexander was wholly won by these ideas, wholly under the influence of the Dolgoroukis, and showed no inclination to listen to prince Czartoryski when the latter advised him to return to Petersburg, and to govern there, instead of coming to fight battles in Moravia.

Amidst this mutual agitation of the young court of Russia, the emperor of Germany was scarcely thought of. Neither his army nor his person seemed to be held in any estimation. His army, it was said, had compromised at Ulm the issue of that war. As for himself, they were coming to his aid; he ought to deem himself fortunate in being assisted, and not interfere in any thing. It is true that he did not interfere in many things, and made no effort to stem this torrent of presumption. He looked for more lost battles, reckoned only upon time, if he then reckoned upon any thing, and weighed, without saying so, what the silly pride of his allies was worth. This prince, simple and unostentatious, possessed the two great qualities of his government, shrewdness and constancy.

It may easily be conceived in what manner the grave question which was to be resolved, that is whether it was right to give battle to Napoleon or not, would be treated by so many vain minds. Those admirable pictures which antiquity has bequeathed to us, and which represent the young Roman aristocracy doing violence by its silly presumption to the wisdom of Pompey, and obliging him to fight the battle of Pharsalia—those pictures have nothing more grand, nothing more instructive, than what was passing at Olmütz in 1805, about the emperor Alexander. Every body had an opinion on the question whether a battle was to be sought or shunned, and every body expressed it. The coterie, at the head of which were the Dolgoroukis, had no hesitation. According to it, not to fight would be a cowardice, and an egregious blunder. In the first place, there was no living any longer at Olmütz; the army was perishing there of want; it was

becoming demoralised. By remaining at Olmütz, they relinquished to Napoleon not only the honour of the arms, but also three-fourths of the Austrian monarchy, and all the resources in which it abounded. By advancing, on the contrary, they should recover at one blow the means of subsistence, confidence, and the ascendancy, always so powerful, of the offensive. And then, was it not plain that the moment for changing parts had arrived; that Napoleon, usually so prompt, so pressing when pursuing his enemies, had suddenly stopped short, that he hesitated, that he was intimidated, for, fixed at Brunn, he durst not come to Olmütz to meet the Russian army? It was what he thought at Dirnstein, at Hollabrünn; it was because his army was shaken like himself. It was known, beyond the possibility of doubt, that it was worn out with fatigue, reduced one half, a prey to discontent and ever murmuring.

Such was the language held by the young courtiers with incredible assurance. Some wise men, prince Czartoryski, in particular, quite as young, but far more considerate than the Dolgoroukis, opposed to them a small number of simple reasons that must have been decisive with minds which the strangest blindness had not completely bewildered. In taking no account of those soldiers who, after all, had remained masters of the ground at Dirnstein as well as at Hollabrünn, before whom the Russians had incessantly fallen back from Munich to Olmütz; by taking no account of that general who had conquered all the generals in Europe, the most experienced at least of all living captains, if he was not the greatest, for he had commanded in a hundred battles, and his present adversaries had never commanded in one; in taking no account either of these soldiers or of this general, there were two peremptory reasons for not being in haste. The first and the most striking was that, by waiting a few days longer, the month stipulated with Prussia would have elapsed, and that she would be obliged to declare herself. Who knows, in fact, if in previously losing a great battle one may not furnish her with occasion to release herself? By allowing, on the contrary, the term of a month to expire, 150,000 Prussians would enter Bohemia, Napoleon would be obliged to fall back without our having to run the risk of a battle with him. The second reason for delay is that, by giving a little time to the archdukes, they would arrive with 80,000 Austrians from Hungary, and one might then fight Napoleon in the proportion of two, perhaps three, to one. It was certainly difficult to live without provisions at Olmütz, but if it was true that they could not stay there a few days longer, the only thing that could be done was to march into Hungary to meet the archdukes. There they should find bread and a reinforcement of 80,000 men. By adding thus to the distances which Napoleon would have to traverse, they should oppose to him the most formidable of all obstacles. They had a proof of this truth in his inaction ever since he occupied Brünn. If he did not advance it was not because he was afraid to do so. In-

experienced soldiers only could pretend that such a man was afraid. If he did not advance, it was because he found the distance already very great. He was, in fact, forty leagues beyond, not his capital, but that which he had conquered, and, in removing to a distance from it, he felt it tremble under his hand.

What reply could be made to such reasons? Assuredly none. But with prejudiced minds the quality of reasons is of no effect. Evidence irritates instead of persuading them. It was decided, therefore, about Alexander that a battle must be fought. The emperor Francis assented to it on his part. He had every thing to gain from a speedy decision of the question, for his country was suffering cruelly by the war, and he was not sorry to see the Russians pitted against the French and affording occasion for an opinion to be formed of them in their turn. It was decided to leave the position of Olmütz, which was very good, on which it would have been easy to repulse an assailing army, how superior soever in number, for the purpose of going to attack Napoleon in the position of Brünn, which he had been carefully studying for several days.

The Russians marched in five columns by the road from Olmütz to Brünn in order to approach the French army. On arriving on the 18th of November at Wischau, one march from Brünn, they surprised an advanced-guard of cavalry and a small detachment of infantry, placed in that village by marshal Soult. Three thousand horse were employed to surround them, and then with a battalion of infantry the Russians penetrated into Wischau itself. About a hundred French prisoners were picked up there. The aide-de-camp Dolgorouki had the chief hand in this exploit. The emperor Alexander had been persuaded to be present, and was made to believe that this skirmish was war, and that his presence had doubled the valour of his soldiers. This slight advantage completely turned all the young heads of the Russian staff, and the resolution to fight was thenceforward irrevocable. Fresh observations of prince Czartoryski's were very unfavourably received. General Kutusof, under whose name the battle was to be fought, no longer commanded, and had the culpable weakness to adopt resolutions which he disapproved. It was agreed, then, to attack Napoleon in his position at Brünn, according to the plan which should be formed by general Weirother. Another march was made, and the Russians established themselves in advance of the mansion of Austerlitz.

Napoleon, who possessed extraordinary sagacity in guessing the designs of an enemy, was well aware that the allies were seeking a decisive engagement with him, and was highly pleased at it. His attention was nevertheless occupied with the projects of Prussia, which recent accounts from Berlin represented as definitively hostile, and with the movements of the Prussian army, which was advancing towards Bohemia. He had no time to lose: he wanted either an overwhelming battle or peace. He

had no doubt of the result of a battle; still peace would be the safer of the two. The Austrians proposed it with a certain appearance of sincerity, but always referring, on the subject of the conditions, to the approval of Russia. Napoleon would fain have discovered what was passing in the head of Alexander, and sent his aide-de-camp, Savary, to the Russian head-quarters, to compliment that prince, to get into conversation with him, and to ascertain precisely what he desired.

General Savary set out immediately, presented himself with a flag of truce at the advanced posts, and had some difficulty to gain access to the emperor Alexander. While he was waiting to be introduced, he had opportunities to judge of the dispositions of the young Muscovite nobles, of their silly infatuation, and of their desire to be present at a great battle. They counted upon nothing less than beating the French and driving their vanquished army to the frontiers of France. General Savary listened calmly to this language, was at length admitted to the emperor, delivered his master's message, found him mild and polite, but evasive, and far from capable of appreciating the chances of the present war. On the repeated assurance that Napoleon was animated with very pacific dispositions, Alexander inquired on what conditions peace would be possible. General Savary was not prepared to answer, and advised the emperor Alexander to send one of his aides-de-camp to the French head-quarters to confer with Napoleon. He affirmed that the result of this step would be most satisfactory. After much parleying, in which general Savary, in the warmth of zeal, said more than he was commissioned to do, Alexander sent with him prince Dolgorouki himself, the principal personage of the new coterie, which disputed the favour of the czar with Messieurs de Czartoryski, de Strogonoff, and de Novosiltzoff. This prince Dolgorouki, though one of the most vehement declaimers of the Russian staff, was nevertheless extraordinarily flattered to be charged with a commission to the emperor of the French. He accompanied general Savary, and was presented to Napoleon at a moment when the latter, having just finished the inspection of his advanced posts, had about him nothing to strike a vulgar mind. Napoleon listened to this young man, destitute of tact and discretion, who had picked up here and there some of the ideas with which the Russian cabinet feasted itself, and which we have recapitulated in explaining the plan of the new European balance of power, expressed them awkwardly, and lugged them in unseasonably. France, he declared, must, if she desired to have an immediate peace, and if she continued the war and was not successful, would be required to restore Belgium, Savoy, and Piedmont, to form defensive barriers around and against her. These ideas, clumsily expressed, appeared to Napoleon a formal demand of the immediate restitution of Belgium, ceded to France by so many treaties, and excited in him a violent irritation, which, however, he repressed, conceiving

that his dignity did not permit him to give vent to it before such a negotiator. He dismissed him drily, observing that they should settle elsewhere than in diplomatic conferences the quarrel which divided the policy of the two empires. Napoleon was exasperated, and could think of nothing but fighting to the last extremity.

Ever since the surprise at Wischau, he had drawn back his army into a position wonderfully well chosen for fighting. He manifested in his movements a certain hesitation which contrasted with the accustomed boldness of his proceedings. This circumstance, coupled with the mission of Savary, contributed still further to work upon the weak understandings which swayed the Russian staff. There was soon but one cry for war around Alexander. Napoleon is falling back, said they; he is in full retreat; we must rush upon him and overwhelm him.

The French soldiers, who were not deficient in intelligence, perceived, on their part, clearly enough that they should have to do with the Russians, and their joy was extreme. Preparations were made on both sides for a decisive engagement.

Napoleon, with that military tact which he had received from Nature, and which he had so greatly improved by experience, had adopted among other positions which he might have taken about Brünn, one which could not fail to insure to him the most important results, under the supposition that he should be attacked—a supposition which had become a certainty.

The mountains of Moravia, which connect the mountains of Bohemia with those of Hungary, subside successively towards the Danube, so completely that near that river Moravia presents but one wide plain. In the environs of Brünn, the capital of the province, they are not of greater altitude than high hills, and are covered with dark firs. Their waters, retained for want of drains, form numerous ponds, and throw themselves by various streams into the Morawa, or March, and by the Morawa into the Danube.

All these characters are found together in the position between Brünn and Austerlitz, which Napoleon has rendered for ever celebrated. The high road of Moravia, running from Vienna to Brünn, rises in a direct line to the northward, then, in passing from Brünn to Olmütz, descends abruptly to the right, that is to the east, thus forming a right angle with its first direction. In this angle is situated the position in question. It commences on the left towards the Olmütz road, with heights studded with firs; it then runs off to the right in an oblique direction towards the Vienna road, and after subsiding gradually, terminates in ponds full of deep water in winter. Along this position, and in front of it, runs a rivulet, which has no name known in geography, but which, in part of its course, is called Goldbach by the people of the country. It runs through the little villages of Girzikowitz, Puntowitz, Kobelnitz, Sokolnitz, and Telnitz, and, sometimes forming marshes, sometimes confined in channels, terminates in

the ponds above-mentioned, which are called the ponds of Satschau and Menitz.

Concentrated with all his forces on this ground, appuyed on the one hand upon the wooded hills of Moravia, and particularly upon a rounded knoll to which the soldiers of Egypt gave the name of the Santon, appuyed, on the other, upon the ponds of Satschau and Menitz—thus covering by his left the Olmütz road, by his right the Vienna road—Napoleon was in a condition to accept with advantage a decisive battle. He meant not, however, to confine his operations to self-defence, for he was accustomed to reckon upon greater results; he had divined, as though he had read them, the plans framed at great length by general Weirother. The Austro-Russians, having no chance of wresting from him the *point d'appui* which he found for his left in high wooded hills, would be tempted to turn his right, which was not close to the ponds, and to take the Vienna road from him. There was sufficient inducement for this step; for Napoleon, if he lost that road, would have no other resource but to retire into Bohemia. The rest of his forces, hazarded towards Vienna, would be obliged to ascend separately the valley of the Danube. The French army, thus divided, would find itself doomed to a retreat, eccentric, perilous, nay, even disastrous, if it should fall in with the Prussians by the way.

Napoleon was perfectly aware that such must be the plan of the enemy. Accordingly, after concentrating his army towards his left and the heights, he left towards his right, that is towards Sokolnitz, Telnitz, and the ponds, a space almost unguarded. He thus invited the Russians to persevere in their plans. But it was not precisely there that he prepared the mortal stroke for them. The ground facing him presented a feature from which he hoped to derive a decisive result.

Beyond the stream that ran in front of our position, the ground spread at first, opposite to our left, into a slightly undulated plain, through which passed the Olmütz road; then, opposite to our centre, it rose successively, and at last formed facing our right a plateau, called the plateau of Prätzen, after the name of a village situated half-way up, in the hollow of a ravine. This plateau terminated on the right in rapid declivities towards the ponds, and at the back in a gentle slope towards Austerlitz, the château of which appeared at some distance.

There were to be seen considerable forces; there a multitude of fires blazed at night, and a great movement of men and horses was observable by day. On these appearances, Napoleon had no longer any doubt of the designs of the Austro-Russians.* They

* There has been recently published a work translated from the Russian by M. Leon de Narischkine, which contains a great number of inaccurate

intended evidently to descend from the position which they occupied, and, crossing the Goldbach rivulet, between the ponds and our right, to cut us off from the Vienna road. But, for this reason, it was resolved to take the offensive in our turn, to cross the rivulet at the villages of Girzikowitz, and Puntowitz, to ascend to the plateau of Pratzen while the Russians were leaving it, and to take possession of it ourselves. In case we succeeded, the enemy's army would be cut in two; one part would be thrown to the left into the plain crossed by the Olmütz road; the other to the right into the ponds. Thenceforward the battle could not fail to be disastrous for the Austro-Russians. But, for this effect, it was requisite that they should not blunder by halves. The prudent nay even timid attitude of Napoleon, exciting their silly confidence, would induce them to commit the entire blunder.

Agreeably to these ideas Napoleon made his dispositions. Expecting for two days past to be attacked, he had ordered Bernadotte to quit Iglau on the frontier of Bohemia, to leave there the Bavarian division which he had brought with him, and to hasten by forced marches to Brünn. He had ordered marshal Davout to march Friant's and if possible Gudin's division towards the abbey of Gross Raigern, situated on the road from Vienna to Brünn, opposite to the ponds. In consequence of these orders Bernadotte marched and had arrived on the 1st of December. General Friant, being alone apprised in time, because general Gudin was at a greater distance towards Presburg, had set out immediately, and travelled in forty-eight hours the thirty-six leagues which separate Vienna from Gross Raigern. The soldiers sometimes dropped on the road, exhausted with fatigue; but at the least sound, imagining that they heard the cannon, they rose with ardour to hasten to the assistance of their comrades, engaged, they said, in a bloody battle. On the night of the 1st of December, which was extremely cold, they bivouacked at Gross Raigern, a league and a half from the field of battle. Never did troops on foot perform so astonishing a march; for it is a march of eighteen leagues a day for two successive days.

assertions, though proceeding from an author in a situation to be correctly informed. In this work it is alleged that, before the battle of Austerlitz the plan of general Weirother was communicated to Napoleon. This assertion is totally erroneous. Such a communication would imply that the plan, communicated long beforehand to the commanders of the different corps, could have been liable to be divulged. We shall see presently, from the report of an eye-witness, that it was not till the night preceding the battle that the plan was communicated to the commanders of corps. Besides, all the details of the orders and correspondence proved that Napoleon foresaw and was not apprised of the enemy's plan. Our resolution being to avoid all controversy with contemporary writers, we shall confine ourselves to the correction of this error, without noticing many others contained in the work in question, the real merit and to a certain point the impartiality of which we are ready to acknowledge.

On the 1st of December, Napoleon, reinforced by Bernadotte's corps and Friant's division, could number 65 or 70 thousand men, present under arms, against 90,000 men, Russians and Austrians, likewise present under arms.

At his left he placed Lannes, in whose corps Caffarelli's division supplied the place of Gazan's. Lannes, with the two divisions of Suchet and Caffarelli, was to occupy the Olmütz road, and to fight in the undulated plain outspread on either side of that road. Napoleon gave him, moreover, Murat's cavalry, comprising the cuirassiers of generals d'Hautpoul and Nansouty, the dragoons of generals Walther and Beaumont, and the chasseurs of generals Milhaud and Kellermann. The level surface of the ground led him to expect a prodigious engagement of cavalry on this spot. On the knoll of the Santon, which commands this part of the ground, and is topped by a chapel called the chapel of Bosenitz, he placed the 17th light, commanded by general Claparède, with eighteen pieces of cannon, and made him take an oath to defend this position to the death. This knoll was, in fact, the *point d'appui* of the left.

At the centre, behind the Goldbach rivulet, he ranged Vandamme's and St. Hilaire's divisions, which belonged to the corps of marshal Soult. He destined them to cross that stream at the villages of Girzikowitz and Puntowitz, and to gain possession of the plateau of Pratzén, when the proper moment should arrive. A little further, behind the marsh of Kobelnitz and the château of Kobelnitz, he placed marshal Soult's third division, that of general Legrand. He reinforced it with two battalions of tirailleurs, known by the names of chasseurs of the Po and Corsican chasseurs, and by a detachment of light cavalry, under general Margaron. This division was to have only the 3rd of the line and the Corsican chasseurs at Telnitz, the nearest point to the ponds, and to which Napoleon was desirous of drawing the Russians. Far in rear, at the distance of a league and a half, was posted Friant's division at Gross Raigern.

Having ten divisions of infantry, Napoleon, therefore presented but six of them in line. Behind marshals Lannes and Soult, he kept in reserve Oudinot's grenadiers, separated on this occasion from Lannes' corps, the corps of Bernadotte, composed of Drouet's and Rivaud's divisions, and, lastly, the imperial guard. He thus kept at hand a mass of 25,000 men, to move to any point where they might be needed, and particularly to the heights of Pratzén, in order to take those heights at any cost, if the Russians should not have cleared them sufficiently. He bivouacked himself amidst this reserve.

These dispositions completed, he carried his confidence so far as to make them known to his army in a proclamation imbued with the grandeur of the events that were preparing. It is subjoined, just as it was read to the troops, on the evening before the battle.

“Soldiers,

“The Russian army appears before you to avenge the Austrian army of Ulm. They are the same battalions that you beat at Hollabrunn, and that you have since been constantly pursuing to this spot.

“The positions which we occupy are formidable; and while they are marching to turn my right, they will present their flank to me.

“Soldiers, I shall myself direct your battalions. I shall keep out of the fire, if, with your usual bravery, you throw disorder and confusion into the enemy’s ranks. But, if the victory should be for a moment uncertain, you will see your Emperor the foremost to expose himself to danger. For victory must not hang doubtful on this day most particularly, when the honour of the French infantry, which so deeply concerns the honour of the whole nation, is at stake.

“Let not the ranks be thinned upon pretext of carrying away the wounded, and let every one be thoroughly impressed with this thought, that it behoves us to conquer these hirelings of England, who are animated with such bitter hatred against our nation.

“This victory will put an end to the campaign, and we shall then be able to return to our winter-quarters, where we shall be joined by the new armies which are forming in France, and then the peace which I shall make will be worthy of my people, of you, and of myself.

“NAPOLÉON.”

On this same day he received M. de Haugwitz, who had at length reached the French head-quarters, discerned in his wheedling conversation all the falseness of Prussia, and felt more convinced than ever of the necessity of gaining a signal victory. He received the Prussian envoy most graciously, told him that he was going to fight on the morrow, and that he would see him again afterwards, if he was not swept off by some cannon-ball, and that then it would be time to arrange matters with the cabinet of Berlin. He advised him to set out that very night for Vienna, and he gave him a letter to M. de Talleyrand, taking care to let him be conducted through the field of battle of Hollabrunn, which presented a horrible sight. It is right, he wrote M. de Talleyrand, that this Prussian should learn by his own eyes in what manner we make war.

Having passed the evening at the bivouac with his marshals, he resolved to visit the soldiers and to judge for himself of their moral disposition. It was the evening of the 1st of December, the eve of the anniversary of his coronation. The coincidence of these dates was singular, and Napoleon had not contrived it, for he accepted battle, but did not offer it. The night was cold and dark.

The first soldiers who perceived him, eager to light him on his way, picked up the straw of their bivouac and made it into

torches which they placed blazing on the top of their muskets. In a few minutes this example was followed by the whole army, and along the vast front of our position was displayed this singular illumination. The soldiers accompanied the steps of Napoleon with shouts of "*Vive l'Empereur!*" promising to prove on the morrow that they were worthy of him and of themselves. Enthusiasm pervaded all the ranks. They went as men ought to go into danger, with hearts full of content and confidence.

Napoleon retired to oblige his soldiers to take some rest, and awaited in his tent the dawn of that day which was to be one of the most glorious of his life, one of the most glorious in history.

Those lights, those shouts, had been early distinguished from the heights occupied by the Russian army, and in a small number of discreet officers they had produced a sinister presentiment. They asked one another if these were signs of an army disheartened and in retreat.

Meanwhile, the commanders of the Russian corps, assembled at the quarters of general Kutusof, in the village of Kreznowitz, were receiving their instructions for the following day. Old Kutusof was fast asleep, and general Weirother, having spread out a map of the country before those who did listen to him, read with emphasis a memorial containing the whole plan of the battle.* We have nearly explained it already in describing the

* We think it useful to quote here a fragment of the manuscript memoirs of General Langeron, an eye-witness, since he commanded one of the corps of the Russian army. Here follows the account of that officer.

"We have seen that on the 19th of November, (December the 1st.) our columns did not reach their destination till about ten o'clock at night.

"About eleven, all the commanders of those columns, excepting Princee Bagration, who was too far off, received orders to repair to general Kutusof's quarters at Kreznowitz, to have the dispositions for the battle of the following day read to them.

"At one in the morning, when we had all assembled, general Weirother arrived, unfolded upon a large table an immense and most accurate map of the environs of Brünn and Austerlitz, and read the dispositions to us in a loud tone, and with a self-sufficient air, which indicated a thorough persuasion of his own merit and that of our incapacity. He was like a college teacher reading a lesson to young scholars. Perhaps we really were scholars; but he was far from being a clever school-master. Kutusof, seated and half asleep when we arrived, at length fell into a sound nap before our departure. Buxhövdén, standing, listened but most assuredly comprehended not a word; Miloradovich held his tongue; Pribyschewski kept in the background, and Doctorow alone examined the map attentively. When Weirother had finished his lecture, I was the only one who spoke. 'General,' I said to him, 'this is all very well, but if the enemy should anticipate us and attack us at Prätzen, what are we to do then?'—'The case is not foreseen,' he replied. 'You know how daring Bonaparte is. If he could have attacked us, he would have done so to-day.'—'Then you do not think him strong?' I rejoined. 'It is much if he has 40,000 men.'—'In this case, he is plunging himself into ruin by awaiting our attack: but I look upon him to be too able to be imprudent, for if, as you wish and believe, we cut him off from Vienna, he will have no other retreat but the mountains of Bohemia. I con-

dispositions of Napoleon. The right of the Russians, under prince Bagration, faced our left, as it was destined to advance against Lannes, on both sides of the Olmütz road, to take the Santon from us, and to march direct for Brünn. The cavalry, collected into a single mass between the corps of Bagration and the centre of the Russian army, was to occupy the same plain in which Napoleon had placed Murat, and to connect the left of the Russians with their centre. The main body of the army, composed of four columns, commanded by generals Doctorow, Langeron, Pribyschewski, and Kollowrath, established at the moment on the heights of Pratzen, was to descend from them, to cross the swampy stream which has been previously mentioned, to take Telnitz, Sokolnitz, and Kobelnitz, to turn the right of the French, and to advance upon their rear, to wrest the Vienna road from them. The rendezvous of all the corps was fixed under the walls of Brünn. The archduke Constantine, with the Russian guard, nine or ten thousand strong, was to start from Austerlitz at day-break, and to place himself in reserve behind the centre of the combined army.

When general Weirother had finished his lecture to the commanders of the Russian corps, only one of whom, general Doctorow, was attentive, and only one, general Langeron, inclined to contradict, the latter ventured to make some objections. General Langeron, a French emigrant, who served against his country, who was a grumbler but a good officer, asked general Weirother, if he imagined that circumstances would turn out precisely as he had written, and showed himself strongly disposed to doubt it. General Weirother would never admit any other idea than that current in the Russian staff, namely that Napoleon was retreating, and that the instructions for this case were excellent. But general Kutusof put an end to all discussion by sending the commanders of the corps to their quarters, and ordering a copy of the instructions to be forwarded to each. That experienced chief knew in what estimation plans of battles conceived and arranged in that manner ought to be held, and yet he suffered the thing to be done, though it was in his name that the transaction took place.

By four in the morning Napoleon had left his tent, to judge with his own eyes if the Russians were committing the blunder into which he had been so dexterously leading them. He de-

jecture however, that he has a different design. He has put out his fires, and not a sound is heard in his camp.—That is because he is retiring or changing position; and, even supposing he takes that of Turas, he will spare us a great deal of trouble, and the dispositions will remain the same.

“Kutusof, having then wakened up, dismissed us, ordering us to leave an adjutant to copy the dispositions which lieutenant-colonel Toll, of the staff, was going to translate out of German into Russian. It was three in the morning, and we did not receive copies of these famous dispositions till near eight, when we were already on march.”

scended to the village of Puntowitz, situated on the bank of the brook which separated the two armies, and perceived the fires of the Russians nearly extinguished on the heights of Pratzen. A very distinguishable sound of cannon and horses indicated a march from left to right towards the ponds, the very way that he wished the Russians to take. Great was his joy on finding his foresight so fully justified; he returned and placed himself on the high ground where he had bivouacked, and where the eye embraced the whole extent of that field of battle. His marshals were on horseback at his side. Day began to dawn. A wintry fog covered the country to a distance, the most prominent points only being visible and rising above the mist like islands out of the sea. The different corps of the French army were in motion, and were descending from the position which they had occupied during the night to cross the rivulet which separated them from the Russians. But they halted in the bottom, where they were concealed by the fog and kept by the Emperor till the opportune moment for the attack.

A very brisk fire was already heard at the extremity of the line towards the ponds. The movement of the Russians against our left was evident. Marshal Davout had gone in all haste to direct Friant's division from Gross-Raigern upon Telnitz, and to support the 3rd of the line and the Corsican chasseurs, who would soon have upon their hands a considerable portion of the enemy's army. Marshals Lannes, Murat, and Soult, with their aides-de-camp surrounded the Emperor, awaiting his order to commence the combat at the centre and on the left. Napoleon moderated their ardour, wishing to let the Russians consummate the fault which they were committing on our right, so completely that they should not have it in their power to get back out of those bottoms which they were seen entering. The sun at length burst forth, and, dispelling the fog, poured a flood of radiance upon the vast field of battle. It was the sun of Austerlitz, a sun the recollections of which have been so frequently submitted to the present generation, that assuredly they will not be forgotten by future generations. The heights of Pratzen were cleared of troops. The Russians, in execution of the plan agreed upon, had descended to the bed of the Goldbach, to gain possession of the villages of Telnitz and Sokolnitz, situated along that rivulet. Napoleon then gave the signal for the attack, and his marshals galloped off to put themselves at the head of their respective corps d'armée.

The three Russian columns directed to attack Telnitz and Sokolnitz, had broken up at seven o'clock in the morning. They were under the immediate command of generals Doctorow, Langeron, and Pribyschewski, and under the superior command of general Buxhövdén, an officer of inferior abilities, inactive, puffed up by the favour which he owed to a court marriage, and who no more commanded the left of the Russian army than

general Kutusof commanded the whole. He marched himself along with general Doctorow's column, forming the extremity of the Russian line, and which would have to engage first. He paid no attention to the other columns, or to the harmony which ought to have been introduced into their different movements; which was very lucky for us; for, if they had acted together, and attacked Telnitz and Sokolnitz *en masse*, as Friant's division had not yet arrived at that point, they might have gained much more ground upon our right than it would have suited us to give up to them.

Doctorow's column had bivouacked, like the others, on the height of Prätzen. At the foot of this height, in the bottom which separated it from our right, there was a village called Augezd, and in that village an advanced guard under the command of general Kienmayer, composed of five Austrian battalions, and fourteen squadrons. This advanced guard was to sweep the plain between Augezd and Telnitz, while Doctorow's column was descending from the heights. The Austrians, eager to show the Russians that they could fight as well as they, attacked the village of Telnitz with great resolution. It was necessary to cross at once the rivulet running here in channels, and then a height covered with vines and houses. We had in this place, besides the 3rd of the line, the battalion of the Corsican chasseurs, concealed from view by the nature of the ground. These skilful marksmen, coolly taking aim at the hussars who had been sent forward, picked off a great number of them. They received in the same manner the Szekler regiment (infantry), and in half an hour strewed the ground with part of that regiment. The Austrians, tired of a destructive combat, and one that was productive of no result, attacked *en masse* the village of Telnitz, with their five united battalions, but were not able to penetrate into it, thanks to the firmness of the 3rd of the line, which received them with the vigour of a tried band. While Kienmayer's advanced guard was thus exhausting itself in impotent efforts, Doctorow's column, twenty-four battalions strong, led by general Buxhövdén, made its appearance, an hour later than was expected, and proceeded to assist the Austrians to take Telnitz, which the 3rd of the line was no longer sufficient to defend. The bed of the stream was crossed, and general Kienmayer threw his fourteen squadrons into the plain beyond Telnitz, against the light cavalry of general Margaron. The latter bravely stood several charges, but could not maintain its ground against such a mass of cavalry. Friant's division, conducted by marshal Davout, having not yet arrived from Gross Raigern, our right was greatly overmatched. But general Buxhövdén, after being long waited for, was obliged in his turn to wait for the second column, commanded by general Langeron. This latter had been delayed by a singular accident. The mass of the cavalry, destined to occupy the plain which was on the right of the Russians and on the left of the French, had mis-

conceived the order prescribing that it should take that position: it had therefore gone and taken post at Prätzen, amidst the bivouacs of Langeron's column. Having discovered its error, this cavalry, in repairing to its proper place, had cut and long retarded Langeron's and Pribyschewski's columns. General Langeron, having at length arrived before Sokolnitz, commenced an attack on it. But meanwhile general Friant had come up in the utmost haste, with his division, composed of five regiments of infantry and six regiments of dragoons. The 1st regiment of dragoons, attached for this occasion to Bourcier's division, was despatched at full trot upon Telnitz. The Austro-Russians, already victorious at this point, began to cross the Goldbach, and to press the 3rd of the light as well as Margaron's light cavalry. The dragoons of the first regiment, on approaching the enemy, broke into a gallop, and drove back into Telnitz all who had attempted to debouch from it. Generals Friant and Heudelet, arriving with the 1st brigade, composed of the 108th of the line and the voltigeurs of the 15th light, entered Telnitz with bayonets fixed, expelled the Austrians and Russians, and drove them pell-mell beyond the channels which form the bed of the Goldbach, and remained masters of the ground, after they had strewed it with dead and wounded. Unluckily, the fog, dispersed nearly everywhere, prevailed in the bottoms. It enveloped Telnitz as in a sort of cloud. The 26th light, of Legrand's division, which had come to the assistance of the 3rd of the line, perceiving indistinctly masses of troops on the other side of the stream, without being able to discern the colour of their uniform, fired upon the 108th, under the impression that it was the enemy. This unexpected attack staggered the 108th, which fell back, for fear of being turned. Taking advantage of this circumstance, the Russians and Austrians, having twenty-nine battalions at this point, resumed the offensive, and dislodged Heudelet's brigade from Telnitz, while general Langeron, attacking with twelve Russian battalions the village of Sokolnitz, situated on the Goldbach, a little above Telnitz, had penetrated into it. The two hostile columns of Doctorow and Langeron then began to debouch, the one from Telnitz, the other from Sokolnitz. At the same time general Pribyschewski's column had attacked and taken the château of Sokolnitz, situated above the village of that name. At this sight general Friant, who on that day, as on so many others, behaved like a hero, flung general Bourcier, with his six regiments of dragoons, upon Doctorow's column, at the moment when the latter was deploying beyond Telnitz. The Russians presented their bayonets to our dragoons; but the charges of our horse, repeated with the utmost fury, prevented them from extending themselves, and supported Heudelet's brigade, which was opposed to them. General Friant afterwards put himself at the head of Lochet's brigade, composed of the 18th and the 111th of the line, and rushed upon Langeron's column, which was

already beyond the village of Sokolnitz, drove it back to that place, entered it at its heels, expelled it again, and hurled it to the other side of the Goldbach. Having occupied Sokolnitz, general Friant committed it to the guard of the 48th, and marched with his 3rd brigade; that of Kister, composed of the 33rd of the line and the 15th light, to recover the château of Sokolnitz from Pribyschewski's column. He forced it to fall back. But while he was engaged with Pribyschewski's troops, in front of the château of Sokolnitz, Langeron's column, attacking anew the village dependent on this château, had well nigh overwhelmed the 48th, which, retiring into the houses of the village, defended itself with admirable gallantry. General Friant returned, and extricated the 48th. That brave general and his illustrious chief, marshal Davout, hastened incessantly from one point to another, on this line of the Goldbach, so warmly disputed, and with seven or eight thousand foot and 2800 horse, engaged 35,000 Russians. Indeed, Friant's division was reduced, by a march of thirty-six hours which it had performed, to 6000 men at most, and with the 3rd of the line formed no more than seven or eight thousand combatants. But the men who had lagged behind, arriving every moment at the report of the cannon, successively filled up the gaps made by the enemy's fire in its ranks.

During this obstinate combat towards our right, marshal Soult, at the centre, had attacked the position on which depended the issue of the battle. At a signal given by Napoleon, the two divisions of Vandamme and St. Hilaire, formed into close column, ascended at a rapid pace the acclivities of the plateau of Pratzen. Vandamme's division had proceeded to the left, St. Hilaire's to the right of the village of Pratzen, which is deeply imbedded in a ravine that terminates at the Goldbach rivulet, near Puntowitz. While the French were pushing forward, the centre of the enemy's army, composed of Kollowrath's Austrian infantry and the Russian infantry of Miloradovich, twenty-seven battalions strong, under the immediate command of general Kutusof and the two emperors, had come and deployed on the plateau of Pratzen, to take the place of Buxhövdén's three columns, which had descended into the bottoms. Our soldiers, without returning the fire of musketry which they sustained, continued to climb the height, surprising by their nimble and resolute step the enemy's generals, who expected to find them retreating.*

On reaching the village of Pratzen they passed on without halting there. General Morand putting himself at the head of the 10th light, went and drew up on the plateau. General Thiébault†

* Prince Czartoryski, placed between the two emperors, remarked to the emperor Alexander the nimble and decided step with which the French were ascending to the plateau, without returning the fire of the Russians. At this sight that prince lost all the confidence which he had till then felt, and conceived a sinister presentiment which never left him during the engagement.

† The same who died lately.

followed him with his brigade, composed of the 14th and 36th of the line, and, while he was advancing, suddenly received in rear a volley of musketry, which proceeded from two Russian battalions concealed in the ravine, at the bottom of which the village of Prätzen is situated. General Thiébault halted for a moment, returned at point-blank range the volley which he had received, and entered the village with one of his battalions. He dispersed and took the Russians who occupied it, and then returned to support general Morand, deployed on the plateau. Varé's brigade, the second of St. Hilaire's division, passing on its part to the left of the village, drew up facing the enemy, while Vandamme, with his whole division, took a position still further to the left, near a small knoll, called Stari Winobradi, which commands the plateau of Prätzen. Upon this knoll the Russians had posted five battalions and a numerous artillery.

The Austrian infantry of Kollowrath and the Russian infantry of Miloradovich were drawn up in two lines. Marshal Soult, without loss of time, brought forward St. Hilaire's and Vandamme's divisions. General Thiébault, forming with his brigade the right of St. Hilaire's division, had a battery of twelve pieces. He ordered them to be charged with balls and grape, and opened a destructive fire upon the infantry opposed to him. This fire, kept up briskly and directed with precision, soon threw the Austrian ranks into disorder, and they hurried in confusion to the back of the plateau. Vandamme immediately attacked the enemy drawn up opposite to him. His brave infantry coolly advanced, halted, fired several murderous volleys, and marched upon the Russians with the bayonet. It flung back their first line upon their second, put both to flight, and obliged them to retreat to the back of the plateau of Prätzen, leaving their artillery behind them. In this movement, Vandamme had left the knoll of Stari Winobradi, defended by several Russian battalions and bristling with artillery, on his left. He went back to it, and, directing general Schiner to turn it with the 24th light, he ascended it himself with the 4th of the line. In spite of a downward fire, he climbed the knoll, overturned the Russians who guarded it, and took their cannon.

Thus in less than an hour the two divisions of marshal Soult's corps had made themselves masters of the plateau of Prätzen, and were pursuing the Russians and Austrians, hurled pell-mell down the declivities of that plateau, which inclines towards the château of Austerlitz.

The two emperors of Austria and Russia, witnesses of this rapid action, strove in vain to rally their soldiers. They were scarcely listened to amidst that confusion, and Alexander could already perceive that the presence of a sovereign is not, in such circumstances, worth that of a good general. Miloradovich, always conspicuous in the fire, traversed on horseback that field of battle,

ploughed with balls, and strove to bring back the fugitives. General Kutusof, wounded on the cheek by a musket-ball, beheld the realisation of the disaster which he had foreseen, and which he had not the firmness to prevent. He had hastened to send for the Russian imperial guard, which had bivouacked in advance of Austerlitz, in order to rally his routed centre behind it. If this commander of the Austro-Russian army, whose merit was limited to great astuteness disguised by great indolence, had been capable of just and prompt resolutions, he would have hurried at this moment to his left, engaged with our right, drawn Buxhövden's three columns from the bottoms into which they had been plunged, brought them back to the plateau of Pratzen, and with a collected force of 50,000 men have made a decisive effort to recover a position, without which the Russian army must be cut in two. If even he had not succeeded, he might at least have retired in order upon Austerlitz by a safe road, and not have left his left backed upon an abyss. But, content to parry the evil of which he was an eye-witness, he did nothing more than rally his centre upon the Russian imperial guard, nine or ten thousand strong, while Napoleon, on the contrary, with his eyes riveted on the plateau of Pratzen, was bringing forward to the support of marshal Soult, already victorious, the corps of Bernadotte, the guard, and Oudinot's grenadiers, that is to say 25,000 choice troops.

While our right was thus disputing the line of the Goldbach with the Russians, and our centre was wresting from them the plateau of Pratzen, Lannes and Murat, on our left, were engaged with prince Bagration and all the cavalry of the Austro-Russians.

Lannes, with Suchet's and Caffarelli's divisions, deployed on both sides of the Olmütz road, was to march straight forward. On the left of the road, the same near which rose the Santon; the ground, on approaching the wooded heights of Moravia, was very uneven, sometimes hilly, sometimes intersected by deep ravines. There Suchet's division was placed. On the right, more level ground was connected by very gentle rises with the plateau of Pratzen. Caffarelli marched on that side, protected by Murat's cavalry, against the mass of the Austro-Russian cavalry.

At this point, a sort of Egyptian battle was anticipated, for here were seen eighty-two Russian and Austrian squadrons, drawn up in two lines, commanded by prince John of Lichtenstein. For this reason, Suchet's and Caffarelli's divisions presented several battalions deployed, and behind the intervals of these battalions, other battalions in close column, to appuy and flank the former. The artillery was spread over the front of the two divisions. General Killermann's light cavalry, as also the divisions of dragoons, were on the right in the plain, Nansouty's and d'Hautpoul's heavy cavalry in reserve in rear.

In this imposing order, Lannes moved off as soon as he heard

the cannon at Pratzen, and traversed at a foot pace, as though it had been a parade ground, that plain illumined by a bright winter's sun.

Prince John of Lichtenstein had not arrived upon the ground till late, owing to a mistake which had caused the Austro-Russian cavalry to run from the right to the left of the field of battle. In his absence, Alexander's imperial guard had filled the gap left between the centre and the right of the combined army. When he at length arrived, perceiving the movement of Lannes' corps, he directed the grand-duke Constantine's Hulans against Caffarelli's division. Those bold horse rushed upon that division, before which Kellermann was placed with his brigade of light cavalry. General Kellermann, one of our ablest cavalry officers, judging that he should be flung back upon the French infantry, and perhaps throw it into confusion, if he awaited, without moving, that formidable charge, drew back his squadrons, and making them pass through the intervals of Caffarelli's battalions, drew them up again on the left, in order to seize a favourable opportunity for charging. The Hulans, coming up at a gallop, no longer found our light cavalry, but encountered in its stead a line of infantry, which was not to be broken, and which, even without forming into square, received it with a murderous fire of musketry. Four hundred of these assailants were soon stretched on the ground in front of the division. The Russian general Essen was mortally wounded fighting at their head. The others dispersed in disorder to the right and left. Kellermann, who had reformed his squadrons on the left of Caffarelli, seizing the opportune moment, charged the Hulans, and cut in pieces a considerable number of them. Prince John of Lichtenstein sent a fresh portion of his squadrons to the assistance of the Hulans. Our divisions of dragoons dashed off in their turn upon the enemy's cavalry, and for a while nothing was to be seen but an awful fray, in which all the combatants were fighting hand to hand. This cloud of horsemen at length dispersed, and each rejoined his line of battle, leaving the ground covered with dead and wounded, mostly Russians and Austrians. Our two masses of infantry then advanced with firm and measured step upon the ground abandoned by the cavalry. The Russians opposed to them forty pieces of cannon, which poured forth a shower of projectiles. One discharge swept away the whole group of drummers of Caffarelli's first regiment. This fierce cannonade was returned by the fire of all our artillery. In this combat with great guns, general Valhabert had a thigh fractured by a ball. Some soldiers would have carried him away, "Remain at your post," said he, "I shall know how to die all alone; six men must not be taken away for the sake of one." The French then marched for the village of Blaziowitz, situated on the right of the plain, where the ground begins to rise towards Pratzen. Of this village, seated like all those of the country, in a deep ravine, nothing was to be seen

but the flames that were consuming it. A detachment of the Russian imperial guard had occupied it in the morning, till prince Lichtenstein's cavalry should arrive. Lannes ordered the 13th light to take it. Colonel Castex, who commanded the 13th, advanced with the first battalion in column of attack, and as soon as he arrived before the village, he was struck by a ball in the forehead. The battalion rushed forward, and revenged with the bayonet the death of its colonel. Blaziowitz was carried, and some hundreds of prisoners, picked up there, were sent to the rear.

At the other wing of Lannes' corps, the Russians, led by prince Bagration, strove to take the little eminence, called by our soldiers the Santon. They had descended into a valley which skirts the foot of this eminence, taken the village of Bosenitz, and exchanged balls to no purpose with the numerous artillery planted on the height. But the Russians did not care to encounter the musketry of the 17th of the line, too advantageously posted for them to dare to approach too near.

Prince Bagration had drawn up the rest of his infantry on the Olmütz road, facing Suchet's division. Being obliged to fall back, he retired slowly before the corps of Lannes, which marched without precipitation, but with imposing compactness, and kept constantly gaining ground. Blaziowitz being carried, Lannes caused the villages of Holubitz and Kruch, situated on the Olmütz road, to be taken also, and at length came upon Bagration's infantry. At this moment he broke the line formed by his two divisions. He directed Suchet's division obliquely to the left, Caffarelli's division obliquely to the right. By this diverging movement, he separated Bagration's infantry from prince Lichtenstein's cavalry, and threw back the first to the left of the Olmütz road, the second to the right, towards the slopes of the plateau of Prätzen.

That cavalry then determined to make a last effort, and rushed in a mass upon Caffarelli's division, which received it with its usual firmness, and brought it to a stand by the fire of its musketry. Numerous squadrons of Lichtenstein's, at first dispersed, then, rallied by their officers, were led back against our battalions. By order of Lannes, the cuirassiers of generals d'Hautpoul and Nansouty, who followed Caffarelli's infantry, filed away at full trot behind the ranks of that infantry, formed upon its right, deployed there, and dashed off at a gallop. The earth quaked under those four thousand horsemen cased in iron. They rushed sword in hand upon the mass of the new-formed Austro-Russian squadrons, overthrew them by the shock, dispersed and obliged them to flee towards Austerlitz, whither they retired, to appear no more during the engagement.

Meanwhile, Suchet's division had attacked prince Bagration's infantry. After pouring upon the Russians those quiet and sure volleys, which our troops, not less intelligent than inured to war,

executed with extreme precision, Suchet's division had advanced upon them with the bayonet. The Russians, giving way to the impetuosity of our battalions, had retired, but unbroken and without surrendering. They formed a confused mass bristling with muskets, which the French could only drive before them, without being able to take them prisoners. Lannes, having got rid of prince Lichtenstein's eighty-two squadrons, had hastened to bring back general d'Hautpoul's heavy cavalry from the right to the left of that plain, and directed it upon the Russians in order to decide their retreat. The cuirassiers, charging on all sides those obstinate foot-soldiers who were retiring in large bodies, had obliged some thousands of them to lay down their arms.

Thus, on our left, Lannes had fought a real battle by himself. He had taken 4000 prisoners. The ground around him was strewed with 4000 Russians and Austrians, dead or wounded.

But, on the plateau of Pratzen, the conflict was renewed between the enemy and the corps of marshal Soult, reinforced by all the reserves, which Napoleon brought up in person. General Kutusof, without having any idea, as we have observed, of calling to him the three columns of Doctorow, Langeron, and Pribyshewski, posted in the bottoms, thought only of rallying his centre upon the imperial Russian guard. The single brigade of Kamenski, belonging to Langeron's corps, hearing a very brisk fire on its rear, had halted, and then spontaneously fallen back, in order to return to the plateau of Pratzen. General Langeron, apprised of the circumstance, had come up to put himself at the head of this brigade, leaving the rest of his column at Sokolnitz.

The French, in this renewed combat at the centre, were about to find themselves engaged with Kamenski's brigade, with the infantry of Kollowrath and Miloradovich, and with the imperial Russian guard. Thiébault's brigade, occupying the extreme right of marshal Soult's corps, and separated from Varé's brigade by the village of Pratzen, found itself amidst a square of fires, for it had in front the reformed line of the Austrians, and on its right part of Langeron's troops. This brigade, consisting of the 10th light and of the 14th and 36th of the line, was soon exposed to the most serious danger. As it was deploying and forming itself into a square to face the enemy, adjutant Labadie, fearing that his battalion, under a fire of musketry and grape discharged at the distance of thirty paces, might be staggered in its movement, seized the colours, and, planting himself upon the ground, cried, "Soldiers, here is your line of battle!" The battalion deployed with perfect steadiness. The others imitated it, the brigade took position, and for some moments exchanged a destructive fire of musketry at half-range. These three regiments, however, would soon have sunk under a mass of cross-fires, had the conflict been prolonged. General St. Hilaire, admired by the army for his chivalrous valour, was conversing with generals Thiébault and Morand on the course proper to be pursued, when

colonel Pouzet of the 10th said, "General, let us advance with the bayonet, or we are undone." "Yes, forward!" replied general St. Hilaire. The bayonets were immediately crossed, and the men, falling upon Kamenski's Russians on the right and on Kollowrath's Austrians in front, precipitated the first into the bottoms of Sokolnitz and Telnitz, and the second down the back of the plateau of Pratzen, towards the Austerlitz road.

While Thiébauld's brigade, left for some time unsupported, extricated itself with such valour and success, Varé's brigade and Vandamme's division, placed on the other side of the village of Pratzen, had not near so much trouble to repulse the offensive return of the Austro-Russians, and had soon flung them to the foot of the plateau, which they strove in vain to ascend. In the ardour that hurried away our troops, the first battalion of the 4th of the line, belonging to Vandamme's division, had yielded to the temptation to pursue the Russians over the sloping ground covered with vines. The grand-duke Constantine had immediately sent a detachment of the cavalry of the guard, which, surprising that battalion among the vines, had overthrown it before it could form into square. In this confusion the colour-bearer of the regiment had been killed. A subaltern, endeavouring to save the eagle, had also been killed. A soldier had then snatched it out of the hands of the officer, and, being himself put *hors de combat*, had not been able to prevent Constantine's horse from carrying off the trophy.

Napoleon, who had come to reinforce the centre with the infantry of his guard, the whole corps of Bernadotte, and Oudinot's grenadiers, witnessed the rash proceeding of this battalion from the height on which he was posted. "They are in disorder yonder," said he to Rapp; "that must be set to rights." At the head of the Mamelukes and the horse chasseurs of the guard, Rapp instantly flew to the succour of the compromised battalion. Marshal Bessiéres followed Rapp with the horse grenadiers. Drouet's division of Bernadotte's corps, formed of the 94th and 95th regiments and of the 27th light, advanced in second line, headed by colonel Gerard, Bernadotte's aide-de-camp, and an officer of great energy, to oppose the infantry of the Russian guard.

Rapp, on making his appearance, drew upon him the enemy's cavalry, who were slaughtering our foot soldiers extended on the ground. This cavalry turned against him with four unhorsed pieces of cannon. In spite of a discharge of grape, Rapp rushed forward, and broke through the imperial cavalry. He pushed on, and passed beyond the ground covered by the wrecks of the battalion of the 4th. The soldiers of that battalion immediately rallied, and formed anew to revenge the check which they had received. Rapp, on reaching the lines of the Russian guard, was assailed with a second charge of cavalry. These were Alexander's horse-guards, who, headed by their colonel, prince Repnin, fell upon him. The brave Morland, colonel of the chasseurs of the

French imperial guard, was killed ; the chasseurs were driven back. But at this moment, the horse-grenadiers, led by marshal Bessières, came up at a gallop to the assistance of Rapp. This splendid body of men, mounted on powerful horses, was eager to measure its strength with the horse-guards of Alexander. A conflict of several minutes ensued between them. The infantry of the Russian guard, witnessing this fierce encounter, durst not fire, for fear of slaughtering its own countrymen. At length Napoleon's horse-grenadiers, veterans tried in a hundred battles, triumphed over the young soldiers of Alexander, dispersed them, after extending a number of them upon the ground, and returned conquerors to their master.

Napoleon, who was present at this engagement, was delighted to see the Russian youth punished for their boasting. Surrounded by his staff, he received Rapp, who returned wounded, covered with blood, followed by prince Repnin a prisoner, and gave him signal testimonies of satisfaction. Meanwhile, the three regiments of Drouet's division, brought by colonel Gerard, pushed the infantry of the Russian guard upon the village of Kreznowitz, carried that village, and took many prisoners. It was one o'clock; victory appeared no longer doubtful, for, Lannes and Murat being masters of the plain on the left, marshal Soult, supported by the whole of the reserve, being master of the plateau of Pratzen, there was nothing left to be done but to fall upon the right and fling Buxhövdén's three Russian columns, which had so vainly striven to cut us off from the road to Vienna, into the ponds. Napoleon, then leaving Bernadotte's corps on the plateau of Pratzen, and turning to the right with marshal Soult's corps, the guard, and Oudinot's grenadiers, resolved himself to seize the prize of his profound combinations, and proceeded by the route which Buxhövdén's three columns had taken when descending from the plateau of Pratzen, to attack them in rear. It was high time for him to arrive, for marshal Davout and his lieutenant-general Friant, hurrying incessantly from Kobelnitz to Telnitz to prevent the Russians from crossing the Goldbach, were almost knocked up. The brave Friant had had four horses killed under him in the fight. But, while he was making the last efforts, Napoleon suddenly appeared at the head of an overwhelming mass of forces. Prodigious confusion then took place among the surprised and despairing Russians. Pribyschewski's entire column, and half of Langeron's left before Sokolnitz, found themselves surrounded without any hope of escape, for the French were coming upon their rear by the routes which they had themselves pursued in the morning. These two columns dispersed; part were made prisoners in Sokolnitz; others fled towards Kobelnitz, and were enveloped near the marshes of that name. Lastly, a third portion made off towards Brünn, but was obliged to lay down its arms near the Vienna road, the same which the Russians had appointed for rendezvous in the hope of victory.

General Langeron, with the relics of Kamenski's brigade and some battalions which he had withdrawn from Sokolnitz before the disaster, had fled towards Telnitz and the ponds, near to the spot where Buxhövden was with Doctorow's column. The silly commander of the left wing of the Russians, quite proud of having, with twenty-nine battalions and twenty-two squadrons, disputed the village of Telnitz against five or six French battalions, continued motionless, awaiting the success of Langeron's and Pribyshewski's columns. His face, according to an eye-witness, exhibited evidence of the excess in which he was accustomed to indulge. Langeron, hastening to this point, related to him with warmth what was passing. "You see nothing but enemies everywhere," was the brutal answer of Buxhövden. "And you," replied Langeron, "are not in a state to see them anywhere." At this instant marshal Soult's column appeared on the slope of the plateau towards the ponds, advancing towards Doctorow's column to drive it into them. It was no longer possible to doubt the danger. Buxhövden, with four regiments, which he had most unskillfully left inactive about him, endeavoured to regain the route by which he had come, and which ran through the village of Augezd, between the foot of the plateau of Pratzten and the pond of Satschau. Thither he proceeded precipitately, ordering general Doctorow to save himself as he best could. Langeron joined him with the remains of his column. Buxhövden was passing through Augezd, at the very moment when Vandamme's division, descending from the height, arrived there on its side. He sustained in his flight the fire of the French, and succeeded in gaining a place of safety with a portion of his troops. The greater part, accompanied by Langeron's wrecks, was stopped short by Vandamme's division, which was in possession of Augezd. Then all together rushed towards the frozen ponds and strove to clear themselves a way there. The ice which covered these ponds, weakened by the warmth of a fine day, could not bear the weight of men, horses, and cannon. It gave way at some points beneath the Russians, who were ingulphed; at others it was strong enough to afford a retreat to the fugitives who thronged across it.

Napoleon, having reached the slopes of the plateau of Pratzten, towards the ponds, perceived the disaster, which he had so skillfully prepared. He ordered a battery of the guard to fire with ball upon those parts of the ice which still held firm, and completed the destruction of those who were upon it. Nearly 2000 perished beneath the broken ice.

Between the French army and these inaccessible ponds, was still left Doctorow's unfortunate column, one detachment of which had escaped with Buxhövden, and another found a grave under the ice. General Doctorow, left in this cruel situation, behaved with the noblest courage. The ground, in approaching the lakes, rose so as to offer a sort of appui. General Doctorow, backing himself against this rising ground, formed his troops into three

lines, placing the cavalry in the first line, the artillery in the second, and the infantry in the third. Thus deployed, he opposed a bold face to the French, while he sent a few squadrons in search of a route between the pond of Satschau and that of Menitz.

A last and a severe combat ensued on this ground. The dragoons of Beaumont's division, borrowed from Murat, and brought from the left to the right, charged Kienmayer's Austrian cavalry, which, after doing its duty, retired under the protection of the Russian artillery. The latter, sticking close to its guns, poured a shower of grape upon the dragoons, who endeavoured in vain to take it. Marshal Soult's infantry marched up, in its turn, to this artillery, in spite of a fire at point-blank range, took it and drove the Russian infantry towards Telnitz. Marshal Davout, on his part, with Friant's division, was entering Telnitz. The Russians, therefore, had no other retreat but a narrow pass between Telnitz and the ponds. Some rushed upon them pell-mell, and shared the fate of those who had preceded them. Others found means to escape by a route which had been discovered between the ponds of Satschau and Menitz. The French cavalry pursued them along this track, and harassed them in their retreat. The sun in the daytime had converted the clayey soil of these parts from ice into thick mud, into which men and horses sunk. The artillery of the Russians stuck fast in it. Their horses, fitted rather for speed than for draught, being unable to extricate the guns, were obliged to leave them there. Amidst this rout, our horses picked up 3000 prisoners and a great number of cannon. "I had previously seen some lost battles," says an eye-witness of this frightful scene, general Langeron, "but I had no conception of such a defeat."

In fact, from one wing to the other of the Russian army, no part of it was in order but the corps of prince Bagration, which Lannes had not ventured to pursue, being ignorant of what was passing on the right of the army. All the rest was in a state of frightful disorder, setting up wild shouts, and plundering the villages scattered upon its route, to procure provisions. The two sovereigns of Russia and Austria fled from that field of battle upon which they heard the French crying "*Vive l'Empereur!*" Alexander was deeply dejected. The Emperor Francis, more tranquil, bore the disaster with great composure. Under the common misfortune, he had at least one consolation: the Russians could no longer allege that the cowardice of the Austrians constituted all the glory of Napoleon. The two princes retreated precipitately over the plains of Moravia, amidst profound darkness, separated from their household, and liable to be insulted, through the barbarity of their own soldiers. The emperor Francis seeing that all was lost, took it upon him to send prince John of Liechtenstein to Napoleon, to solicit an armistice, with a promise to sign a peace in a few days. He commissioned him, moreover, to ex-

press to Napoleon his wish to have an interview with him at the advanced posts.

Prince John, who had well performed his duty in the engagement, could appear with honour before the conqueror. He repaired with the utmost expedition to the French head-quarters. The victorious Napoleon was engaged in going over the field of battle, to have the wounded picked up. He would not take rest himself till he had paid to his soldiers those attentions to which they had such good right. In obedience to his orders, none of them had quitted the ranks to carry away the wounded. The ground was, in consequence, strewed with them for a space of more than three leagues. It was covered more especially with Russian corpses. The field of battle was an awful spectacle. But this sight affected our old soldiers of the Revolution very slightly. Accustomed to the horrors of war, they regarded wounds, death, as a natural consequence of battles, and as trifles in the bosom of victory. They were intoxicated with joy, and raised boisterous acclamations, when they perceived the group of officers which marked the presence of Napoleon. His return to the head-quarters, which had been established at the post-house of Posoritz, had the appearance of a triumphal procession.

That spirit, in which such bitter pangs were one day to succeed such exquisite joys, tasted at that moment the delights of the most magnificent and the most deserved success; for, if victory is frequently a pure favour of chance, it was in this instance the reward of admirable combinations. Napoleon, in fact, guessing with the penetration of genius, that the Russians designed to wrest the Vienna road from him, and that they would then place themselves between him and the ponds, had, by his very attitude, encouraged them to come thither; since, weakening his right, reinforcing his centre, he had thrown himself upon the heights of Pratzen, abandoned by them, cut them thus in two, and flung them into a gulf, which they could not get out of. The greater part of his troops, kept in reserve, had scarcely been brought into action, so strong did a just conclusion render his position, and so well also did the valour of his soldiers permit him to bring them forward in inferior number before the enemy. It may be said that, out of 65,000 French, 40 or 45 thousand at most, had been engaged; for Bernadotte's corps, the grenadiers, and the infantry of the guard had exchanged only a few musket-shots. Thus 45,000 French had beaten 90,000 Austro-Russians.

The results of the battle were immense: 15,000 killed or wounded, about 20,000 prisoners, among whom were 10 colonels and 8 generals, 180 pieces of cannon, an immense quantity of artillery and baggage waggons—such were the losses of the enemy and the trophies of the French. The latter had to regret about 7000 men killed and wounded.

Napoleon, having returned to his head-quarters at Posoritz,

there received prince John of Lichtenstein. He treated him as a conqueror full of courtesy, and agreed to an interview with the emperor of Austria on the day after the next, at the advanced posts of the two armies; but an armistice was not to be granted till the two emperors of France and Austria had met and explained themselves.

On the morrow, Napoleon transferred his head-quarters to Austerlitz, a mansion belonging to the family of Kaunitz. There he established himself, and determined to give the name of that mansion to the battle which the soldiers already called the battle of the three emperors. It has borne and will bear for ages the name which it received from the immortal captain who won it. He addressed to his soldiers the following proclamation:

“Austerlitz, 12 Frimaire.

“Soldiers,

“I am satisfied with you: in the battle of Austerlitz you have justified all that I expected from your intrepidity. You have decorated your eagles with immortal glory. An army of one hundred thousand men, commanded by the emperors of Russia and Austria, has been in less than four hours either cut in pieces or dispersed. Those who escaped your weapons are drowned in the lakes.

“Forty colours, the standards of the imperial guard of Russia, one hundred and twenty pieces of cannon, more than thirty thousand prisoners,* are the result of this ever-celebrated battle. That infantry, so highly vaunted and superior in number, could not withstand your shocks, and thenceforward you have no rivals to fear. Thus, in two months, this third coalition has been vanquished and dissolved. Peace cannot now be far distant, but, as I promised my people before I passed the Rhine, I will make only such a peace as gives us guarantees and ensures rewards to our allies.

“Soldiers, when all that is necessary to secure the welfare and the prosperity of our country is accomplished, I will lead you back to France: there you will be the object of my tenderest concern. My people will see you again with joy, and it will be sufficient to say, I was at the battle of Austerlitz, for them to reply, There is a brave man.

“NAPOLEON.”

It was necessary to follow the enemy, whom all accounts represented as being in disorderly retreat. In this confusion, Napoleon, misled by Murat, conjectured that the fugitive army was directing its course towards Olmütz and he had sent off the cavalry and the corps of Lannes to that point. But, on the following day, the 3rd of December, more accurate intelligence, collected by general

* The exact number was not yet known.

Thiard, apprised him that the enemy was proceeding by the road to Hungary for the Morava. Napoleon hastened to recall his columns to Nasiedlowitz and Göding. Marshal Davout, reinforced by the junction of Friant's whole division and by the arrival in line of Gudin's division, had lost no time, thanks to his nearer position to the Hungarian road. He set out in pursuit of the Russians and pressed them closely. He intended to overtake them before the passage of the Morava, and to cut off perhaps a part of their army. After marching on the 3rd, he was, on the morning of the 4th, in sight of Göding and nearly up with them. The greatest confusion prevailed in Göding. Beyond that place there was a mansion belonging to the emperor of Germany, that of Holitsch where the two allied sovereigns had taken refuge. The perturbation there was as great as at Göding. The Russian officers continued to hold the most unbecoming language respecting the Austrians. They laid the blame of the common defeat on them, as if they ought not to have attributed it to their own presumption, to the incapacity of their generals, and to the levity of their government. The Austrians, moreover, had behaved quite as well as the Russians on the field of battle.

The two vanquished monarchs were very cool towards each other. The emperor Francis wished to confer with the emperor Alexander, before he went to the interview agreed upon with Napoleon. Both thought that they ought to solicit an armistice and peace, for it was impossible to continue the struggle. Alexander was desirous, though he did not acknowledge it, that himself and his army should be saved as soon as possible from the consequences of an impetuous pursuit, such as might be apprehended from Napoleon. As for the conditions, he left his ally to settle them as he pleased. The emperor Francis alone having to defray the expenses of the war, the conditions on which peace should be signed concerned him exclusively. Some time before, the emperor Alexander, setting himself up for the arbiter of Europe, would have insisted that those conditions concerned him also. His pride was less exigent since the battle of the 2nd of December.

The emperor Francis accordingly set out for Nasiedlowitz, a village situated midway to the mansion of Austerlitz, and there, near the mill of Paleny, between Nasiedlowitz and Urschitz, amidst the French and the Austrian advanced posts, he found Napoleon waiting for him before a bivouac fire kindled by his soldiers. Napoleon had had the politeness to arrive first. He went to meet the emperor Francis, received him as he alighted from his carriage and embraced him. The Austrian monarch, encouraged by the welcome of his all-powerful foe, had a long conversation with him. The principal officers of the two armies, standing aside, beheld with great curiosity the extraordinary spectacle of the successor of the Cæsars vanquished and soliciting peace of the crowned soldier, whom the French Revolution had raised to the pinnacle of human greatness.

Napoleon apologised to the emperor Francis for receiving him in such a place. "Such are the palaces," said he, "which your Majesty has obliged me to inhabit for these three months."—"The abode in them," replied the Austrian monarch, "makes you so thriving, that you have no right to be angry with me for it."—The conversation then turned upon the general state of affairs, Napoleon insisting that he had been forced into the war against his will at a moment when he least expected it, and when he was exclusively engaged with England; the emperor of Austria affirming that he had been urged to take arms solely by the designs of France in regard to Italy. Napoleon declared that, on the conditions already specified to M. de Giulay, and which he had no need to repeat, he was ready to sign a peace. The emperor Francis, without explaining himself on this subject, wished to know how Napoleon was disposed in regard to the Russian army. Napoleon first required that the emperor Francis should separate his cause from that of the emperor Alexander, and that the Russian army should retire by regulated marches from the Austrian territories, and promised to grant him an armistice on this condition. As for peace with Russia, he added, that would be settled afterwards, for this peace concerned him alone.—"Take my advice," said Napoleon to the emperor Francis, "do not mix up your cause with that of the emperor Alexander. Russia alone can now wage only a *fancy war* in Europe. Vanquished, she retires to her deserts, and you, you pay with your provinces the costs of the war." The forcible language of Napoleon expressed but too well the state of things in Europe between that great empire and the rest of the continent. The emperor Francis pledged his word as a man and a sovereign not to renew the war, and above all to listen no more to the suggestions of powers which had nothing to lose in the struggle. He agreed to an armistice for himself and for the emperor Alexander, an armistice, the condition of which was that the Russians should retire by regulated marches, and that the Austrian cabinet should immediately send negotiators empowered to sign a separate peace with France.

The two emperors parted with reiterated demonstrations of cordiality. Napoleon handed into his carriage that monarch whom he had just called his brother, and remounted his horse to return to Austerlitz.

General Savary was sent to suspend the march of Davout's corps. He first proceeded to Holitsch, with the suite of the emperor Francis, to learn whether the emperor Alexander acceded to the proposed conditions. He saw the latter, around whom every thing was much changed since the mission on which he was sent to him a few days before. "Your master," said Alexander to him, "has shown himself very great. I acknowledge all the power of his genius, and, as for myself, I shall retire, since my ally is satisfied."—General Savary conversed for some time with the young czar on the late battle, explained to him how the French army,

inferior in number to the Russian army, had nevertheless appeared superior on all points, owing to the art of manœuvring which Napoleon possessed in so eminent a degree. He courteously added that with experience Alexander, in his turn, would become a warrior, but that so difficult an art was not to be learned in a day. After these flatteries to the vanquished monarch, he set out for Göding to stop marshal Davout, who had rejected all the proposals for a suspension of arms and was ready to attack the relics of the Russian army. To no purpose he had been assured in the name of the emperor of Russia himself that an armistice was negotiating between Napoleon and the emperor of Austria. He would not on any account abandon his prey. But general Savary stopped him with a formal order from Napoleon. These were the last musket-shots fired during that unexampled campaign. The troops of the several nations separated to go into winter-quarters, awaiting what should be decided by the negotiators of the belligerent powers.

Napoleon proceeded from the mansion of Austerlitz to Brünn, to which place he had required M. de Talleyrand to repair, in order to settle the conditions of the peace, which could be no longer doubtful, since the resources of Austria were exhausted; and Russia, eager to obtain an armistice, was drawing off her army in the utmost haste into Poland. While the war of the first coalition had lasted five years, that of the second coalition, two, the war raised by the third had lasted three months, so irresistible had become the power of revolutionary France, concentrated in a single hand, and so able and prompt was that hand to strike those whom it purposed to reach. The course of events had actually been such as Napoleon had marked out beforehand in his cabinet at Boulogne. He had taken the Austrians at Ulm almost without striking a blow; he had crushed the Russians at Austerlitz, and extricated Italy by the mere effect of his offensive march upon Vienna, and reduced the attacks on Hanover and Naples to mere acts of imprudence. The latter, in particular, after the battle of Austerlitz was but a disastrous folly for the house of Bourbon. Europe was at the feet of Napoleon, and Prussia, hurried away for a moment by the coalition, was soon destined to find herself at the mercy of the captain whom she had offended and betrayed.

Still it required great skill to negotiate, for, if our enemies, recovering from their terror, and abusing the engagements into which they had obliged Prussia to enter, forced her to intervene in the negotiations, they might still, being three to one, dispute the conditions of the peace, and rob the conqueror of part of the advantages of the victory. Napoleon, therefore, determined that the negotiations should be carried on at Brünn, far from M. de Haugwitz, whom he had sent to Vienna, and whom he obliged to stay there by promising to meet him in that capital.

While the armies were engaged in fighting, Messieurs de Giulay and de Stadion had held conferences at Vienna with M. de Talleyrand, and they had desired to negotiate in common for

Russia and Austria, under the mediation of Prussia. Since the arrival of M. de Haugwitz, they had politely but earnestly urged him to execute the convention of Potsdam, judging that, if Prussia were comprehended in the negotiation, she would be obliged either to enforce the conditions of peace settled at Potsdam or take part in the war. M. de Haugwitz had refused to treat in that manner, on the ground of the nature of his mission, which obliged him not to take his seat in a congress, but to treat directly with Napoleon, in order to bring him into the ideas adopted by the Prussian cabinet. Besides, M. de Talleyrand had cut short these pretensions by declaring that Austria alone would be admitted to the negotiation. He signified this resolution at Vienna on the 2nd of December, the very day on which the battle of Austerlitz was fought.

That battle being won, and the armistice demanded and granted at the bivouac of the conqueror, the separate negotiation was a condition accepted beforehand. Napoleon required, as we have related, that it should be opened immediately at Brünn with M. de Talleyrand. He caused it to be intimated that he consented to admit M. de Giulay to treat, but not M. de Stadion, formerly ambassador of Austria in Russia, full of the prejudices of the coalition, and raising, from the very nature of his genius, incessantly recurring difficulties. He pointed out for negotiator prince John of Lichtenstein, who had pleased him by his frank and military manners. The latter was immediately sent to Brünn with M. de Giulay. The emperor Francis being at Holitsch, it was possible to communicate with him in a few hours, and to settle very promptly any contested points. The negotiation was, therefore, opened at Brünn, between Messieurs de Talleyrand, de Giulay, and de Lichtenstein. Napoleon, after he had fixed the basis, purposed to repair immediately to Vienna, to wring from M. de Haugwitz a confession of the weaknesses and the falseness of Prussia, and to make him bear the punishment for them.

But what were to be the bases of the peace? This was what Napoleon and M. de Talleyrand discussed at Brünn, and what had been the subject of frequent and profound conversations between them.

The moment was perilous for the wisdom of Napoleon. Victorious in three months over a powerful coalition, having seen the most renowned soldiers of the continent flee before his soldiers, though inferior in number, was he not likely to acquire from his power an exaggerated sentiment, and to conceive a contempt for all European resistances? During the Consulate, when he wished to conciliate France and Europe, he had been seen at home indulging parties, abroad overcoming Austria by victories, Russia by delicate caresses, Prussia by the skilfully employed bait of Germanic indemnities, England by the state of exclusion to which he had reduced her, pacifying the world in an almost miraculous manner, and displaying the most admirable

of abilities, that of the force which knows how to restrain itself. But he had soon been seen also irritated by the ingratitude of parties, no longer keeping measures with them, and striking cruelly in the person of the duke d'Enghien. He had been seen, exasperated at the provoking jealousy of England, throwing down the gauntlet which she had picked up, and collecting all human means to overwhelm her. Now, the powers of the continent, having without sufficient motive called him away from his struggle with England, and having drawn upon themselves defeats which were absolute disasters, was he not to deal with them as with his other enemies, and set aside those courtesies indispensable even to might, and which constitute the whole art of politics? Would a man who could always draw from his genius and the bravery of his soldiers such an event as Marengo or Austerlitz be accountable to any one on earth?

M. de Talleyrand, to whose character and to the part which he played during this reign we have already adverted, again made on this occasion some efforts to moderate Napoleon, but without much success. Fonder of pleasing than contradicting, having, in regard to European politics, inclinations rather than opinions, incessantly patronising Austria, doing ill offices to Prussia, from an old tradition of the cabinet of Versailles, he had rendered himself suspected of complaisance for the one and aversion for the other, and had not that credit with his sovereign which a firm and convinced mind could have obtained. However, on this as on other occasions, if he had not the merit of securing the ascendancy for moderation, he had that of recommending it.

M. de Talleyrand, on the day after the battle of Austerlitz, gave to the intoxicated conqueror of Europe such advice as this.

It was requisite, according to him, to treat Austria with moderation and generosity. That power, considerably diminished during the last two centuries, ought to be much less an object of our jealousy than formerly. A new power ought to take its place in our prepossessions—that was Russia, and against this latter Austria, so far from being a danger, was a useful barrier. Austria, a vast aggregation of nations foreign to each other, as Austrians, Slavonians, Hungarians, Bohemians, Italians, might easily fall to pieces, if the bond, already feeble, that held together the heterogeneous elements of which it was composed, were to be further weakened; and its wrecks would have more tendency to attach themselves to Russia than to France. We ought, therefore, to desist from inflicting blows upon Austria, nay, to indemnify her for the new losses which she was about to sustain, and to indemnify her in a manner beneficial to Europe, which was not only possible, but easy.

M. de Talleyrand proposed an ingenious combination, but premature, indeed, in the then state of Europe: it was to give Austria the banks of the Danube, that is to say, Wallachia and Moldavia.

These provinces, he said, would be worth more than Italy itself; they would console Austria for her losses, alienate her from Russia, render her, in regard to the latter, the bulwark of the Ottoman empire, as she already was that of Europe. These provinces, after embroiling her with Russia, would embroil her with England, and make her thenceforward the obliged ally of France.

As for Prussia, there was no need to put one's self out of the way on her account: we were at liberty to treat her as we pleased. It was decidedly a false, faint-hearted court, on which no reliance was to be placed. In order to please it, we ought not again to estrange Austria, the only ally whom we could think of in future.

Such were the opinions of M de Talleyrand on this occasion. The advice to spare Austria, to console her, nay even to indemnify her with well chosen equivalents, was excellent; for the true policy of Napoleon ought to have been to conquer and to spare every body on the morrow of the victory. But the counsel to treat Prussia slightly was pernicious, and proceeded from a false policy, to which we have already adverted. Assuredly, it would have been desirable to have it in our power to give the provinces of the Danube to Austria, and above all to make her consider them as a sufficient compensation for her losses in Italy; but it is doubtful whether she would have assented to such a combination; for Wallachia and Moldavia, by alienating Russia and England from her, would have rendered her dependent on us. It is doubtful, besides, if one could at this period have distributed European territories so freely as was done two years later at Tilsit. Be this as it may, in determining to sway Italy, it was necessary to make up one's mind to find Austria an enemy, whatever consideration might be shown for her: and then what ally would there be to choose? We have already observed more than once that, embroiled with England from the desire of equality at sea, with Russia from the desire of supremacy on the continent, unable to derive any benefit from disorganised Spain, what was left us but Prussia—Prussia, vacillating, it is true, but much more from the scruples of her sovereign than from the natural falseness of her cabinet—Prussia, having no interest contrary to ours, since she had not yet the Rhenish provinces, already compromised in our system, having her hands full of the spoils of the Church received from us, wishing for nothing better than to receive more of them, and ready to accept any conquest that would chain her for ever to our policy?

It was an egregious mistake, therefore, not to wish to spare Austria, but to believe that we could attach her seriously and so strongly that there was no longer any danger in ill-treating or neglecting Prussia.

Napoleon did not share the errors of Talleyrand, but he committed others, from the passion for dominion, which the hatred

of his enemies, and the prodigious success of his armies began to excite in him beyond all reasonable bounds.

He had not sought a quarrel on the continent: they had come, on the contrary, to divert him from his grand enterprise against England, to declare war against him. Those who had begun that war, and who had got beaten, ought, according to him, to bear the consequences. He resolved, therefore, to obtain by the peace the complement of Italy, that is to say, the Venetian States, then in the possession of Austria, and likewise the definitive solution of the Germanic questions in favour of his allies, Bavaria, Baden, Wurtemberg.

On these two points Napoleon was peremptory, and it was not wrong of him to be so. He wanted Venice, the Friule, Istria, Dalmatia, in short Italy as far as the Julian Alps, and the Adriatic with both its coasts, which would ensure him an action upon the Ottoman empire. As to Germany, he purposed first to confine Austria within her natural frontiers, the Inn and the Salza, to take from her the territories which she possessed in Suabia, and which were designated by the title of Hither Austria, territories which afforded her the means of annoying the German States in alliance with France, and of making, whenever she pleased, military preparations on the upper Danube. He meant to deprive her of the communications of the Tyrol with the Lake of Constance and Switzerland, that is to say, off the Vorarlberg. He even intended, if possible, to wrest from her the Tyrol, which gave her possession of the Alps and an ever sure passage into Italy. But this last point was difficult to be obtained, because the Tyrol was an old possession of Austria's, as dear to her affections as valuable to her interests. It was inflicting on Austria a loss of about four millions of subjects out of twenty-four, and of fifteen million florins out of a revenue of one hundred and three. These were, therefore, cruel sacrifices to require of her.

With all that he purposed to take from her in Germany, Napoleon intended to complete the patrimony of the three German States which had been his auxiliaries—Bavaria, Baden, and Wurtemberg. He intended also to procure for himself by means of these three States an action on the Diet, a road to the Danube, and to show in a signal manner that his alliance was beneficial to those who embraced it.

He purposed also to resolve favourably for those allied princes the question of the immediate nobility, and to abolish that nobility, which created them enemies in their dominions. He meant likewise to resolve all questions of paramountship, and to suppress by that means a great number of rights of the feudal kind, very slavish and onerous to the Germanic States.

Lastly, Napoleon proposed, in order to attach solidly to himself the three princes of South Germany, to add the bond of

mátrimony to the bond of benefit. He wanted princes and princesses to unite with members of his dynasty. He calculated on finding them in Germany, and on thus joining to princely establishments the influence of family alliances.

Prince Eugene de Beauharnais was dear to his heart. He had made him viceroy of Italy: he was seeking a wife for him. He had cast his eyes on the daughter of the elector of Bavaria, a remarkable princess, and worthy of him for whom she was destined. As he reserved the greater part of the spoils of Austria for Bavaria, which the situation and the dangers of that electorate sufficiently justified, he wished that part of those spoils should be the dowery for the French prince.

But the princess Augusta was promised to the heir of Baden, and her mother, the electress of Bavaria, a violent enemy of France, alleged that engagement for rejecting an alliance which she disliked. General Thiard, having contracted intimacies with several of the minor German courts, while serving in the army of Condé, had been sent to Munich and Baden to remove the obstacles which opposed the projected unions. That officer, a clever negotiator, had made use of the countess of Hochberg, who was united by a left-handed marriage with the reigning elector of Baden, and who had need of France to obtain the acknowledgment of her children. Through the influence of this lady, he had induced the court of Baden to a very delicate step, namely, to desist from all views on the hand of the princess Augusta of Bavaria. This point gained, the elector and the electress of Bavaria were left without pretext for refusing an alliance which brought them a dowry of the Tyrol and part of Suabia.

This was not the only German union which Napoleon thought of. The heir of Baden, from whom the princess Augusta of Bavaria had just been taken, was yet to be provided for. Napoleon destined for him Mademoiselle Stephanie de Beauharnais, a person endowed with grace and a superior understanding, and whom he intended to create imperial princess. He charged general Thiard to conclude this match also. Lastly, the old duke of Wurtemberg had a daughter, the princess Catherine, whose noble qualities have since been conspicuously called forth by adversity. Napoleon wished to obtain her for his brother Jerome. But a marriage contracted by the latter in America, without the authorisation of his family, was an obstacle which could not yet be removed. It was necessary, therefore, to defer this last establishment. To all the aggrandisements of territory, which he was preparing for the houses of Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Baden, Napoleon purposed to add the title of king, leaving to those houses the place which they had in the Germanic confederation.

Such were the advantages which Napoleon intended to derive from his late victories. To require the whole of Italy was, on

his part, natural and consistent. To seek in the Austrian possessions in Suabia means of aggrandising the princes, his allies, was extremely judicious, for Austria was thus thrust back behind the Inn, and the alliance of France was rendered manifestly beneficial. To take the Vorarlberg from Austria, in order to give it to Bavaria, was also wise, for she was then separated from Switzerland. But to take the Tyrol from her, though it was a good combination in reference to Italy, was filling her heart with implacable resentment; it was reducing her to a despair, which, concealed for the moment, would break forth sooner or later; it was condemning one's self more than ever to a cautious policy, clever at finding and at keeping alliances, since it rendered the principal of the powers of the continent an irreconcilable foe. To resolve the question of the immediate nobility and several other feudal questions might be a useful simplification in regard to the internal organisation of Germany. But to aggrandise in an extraordinary degree the princes of Baden, Bavaria, and Wurtemberg, to connect them with France so closely as to render them suspected to Germany, was to create for them a false position, from which they would some day be tempted to extricate themselves by becoming unfaithful to their protector; it was making enemies of all the German princes who were not favoured; it was wounding in a new fashion Austria, already wounded in so many ways, and, what was still worse, disobliging Prussia herself; in short, it was interfering further than was becoming in the affairs of Germany, and raising up against one's self jealous spirits and petty ingrates. Napoleon ought not to have forgotten that he had caused cannon to be pointed at the gates of Stuttgart in order to break them open; that he was obliged at that moment to make use of a foreign woman to obtain a marriage at Baden, and almost to wring from the elector of Bavaria his daughter, who had been obtained only by appearing with the keys of the Tyrol in one hand and the sword of France in the other.

Napoleon, then, overstepped the true limit of French policy in Germany, in creating for himself allies too much detached from the German system, and by no means sure, because their position would be false. But it is difficult to observe moderation in victory; besides, he was a new monarch: he was an excellent head of a family; he wanted alliances and marriages.

Such were the ideas that served for the foundation of the instructions left with M. de Talleyrand for the negotiation commenced with Messieurs de Giulay and Lichtenstein. He added one condition for the benefit of the army, which was not less dear to him than his brothers and nieces; he demanded 100 millions, for the purpose of forming a provision not only for the officers of all ranks, but also for the widows and children of those who had fallen in battle; without losing time, he signed three treaties of alliance with Baden, Wurtemberg, and Bavaria.

He gave to Baden the Ortenau and part of the Brisgau, several towns on the shore of the Lake of Constance, that is to say 113,000 inhabitants, which was an augmentation of about one fourth to the territories of that house. He gave to the house of Wurtemberg the rest of the Brisgau, and considerable portions of Suabia, that is to say 183,000 inhabitants, which formed an augmentation of more than a fourth, and raised the population of that principality to nearly a million. Lastly, to Bavaria he gave the Vorarlberg, the bishoprics of Eichstädt and Passau, recently allotted to the elector of Salzburg, all Austrian Suabia, the city and bishopric of Augsburg, that is to say a million inhabitants, which raised Bavaria from two millions to three, and added a third to her possessions. The progress of the negotiations with Austria did not admit of any mention being yet made of the Tyrol.

To these princes were, moreover, attributed all the rights of sovereignty over the immediate nobility, and they were relieved from the feudal services claimed by the emperor of Germany on account of certain portions of their territories.

The elector of Baden, having the modesty to refuse the title of king, as too superior to his revenues, the title of elector was left him; but that of king was immediately conferred on the electors of Bavaria and Wurtemberg.

In return for these advantages, those three princes engaged to assist France in any war which she might have to wage in future in support of her state at this time, and in any which might result from the treaty about to be concluded with Austria. France, on her part, engaged, whenever it should be necessary, to take up arms to maintain these princes in their new situation.

These treaties were signed on the 10th, 12th, and 20th of December. They were delivered to general Thiard when he set off to negotiate the projected marriages.

Thus a portion of the territories of Austria had been disposed of beforehand, and without the consent of that power. But the conqueror gave himself little concern about the consequences to which this proceeding exposed him.

Napoleon, after attending to his wounded, after sending off for Vienna those at least who were capable of being removed, after despatching to France the prisoners and the cannon taken from the enemy, quitted Brünn, leaving M. de Talleyrand to discuss the prescribed conditions with Messieurs de Giulay and de Lichtenstein. He was impatient to have a long conversation at Vienna with M. de Haugwitz, and to dive to the bottom of the secret of Prussia.

M. de Talleyrand entered immediately into conference with the two Austrian negotiators. They strongly remonstrated when they were made acquainted with the pretensions of the French minister, and as yet there had been no explanation respecting the Tyrol; nothing had been said but about the desire to separate Austria from Italy and Switzerland to cut short all causes for rivalry and war.

Messieurs de Lichtenstein and de Giulay communicated, on their part, the conditions to which Austria was ready to consent. She saw clearly that she must relinquish the Venetian States, the possessions which she had in Suabia, and litigious pretensions between the Empire and the German princes. She consented, therefore, to cede Venice and the terra firma as far as the Isonzo; but she wished to keep Istria and Albania and to gain Ragusa, as débouchés necessary for Hungary. These were, besides, the last remains of the acquisitions obtained by the reigning emperor, and he made it a point of honour to preserve them.

As for the Tyrol, she was almost disposed to give that up, but by transferring it to the then elector of Salzburg, the archduke Ferdinand, who had been compensated in 1803 for Tuscany by the bishopric of Salzburg and the provostship of Berchtolsgraden. She wanted Salzburg and Berchtolsgraden in exchange, and moreover she required that the Vorarlberg, Lindau, and the shores of the Lake of Constance should be given to the same archduke, as dependencies of the Tyrol.

By this arrangement, Austria would have acquired Salzburg and kept the Tyrol and the Vorarlberg, in the person of one of her archdukes.

For the rest, she consented to cede the Austrian possessions in Suabia, likewise the Ortenau, the Brisgau, the bishoprics of Eichstädt and Passau. But she demanded for the princes of her house who would lose those possessions a large compensation, which will appear singularly devised, and show with what sentiments the members of the European coalition were animated towards one another—she demanded Hanover.

Thus this patrimony of the king of England, which Napoleon had been censured for offering to Prussia, and Prussia for accepting from Napoleon, which Russia came herself to propose to Prussia in order to detach her from France, Austria, in her turn, demanded for an archduke!

M. de Talleyrand, delighted to find such claims brought forward, made no remonstrance on hearing them expressed, and promised to communicate them to Napoleon.

Lastly, with regard to the contribution of 100 millions, Austria declared it impossible for her to pay ten, so completely was she exhausted. In compensation for such a sum, she offered to give up the immense *materiel* in arms and ammunition of all kinds, which were in the Venetian States, and which she would have had a right to carry away, if she had not stipulated to leave it.

After warm debates, which lasted but three or four days, since both parties were in haste to bring matters to a close, it was agreed that the prince de Lichtenstein should go to the emperor Francis at Holitsch, to obtain fresh instructions, as those with which he was furnished did not authorise him to subscribe to the sacrifices required by Napoleon.

M. de Talleyrand was to remain at Brünn till his return. It was a great fault of the Austrians to lose time; for what was passing at Vienna between Napoleon and M. de Haugwitz was about to place them in a still worse situation.

M. de Talleyrand, who from Brünn corresponded daily with Vienna, had informed Napoleon that he was not near settling with the Austrian negotiators. This resistance, which would have deserved serious attention if it had been combined with the resistance of Prussia, annoyed Napoleon. The archdukes were approaching Presburg, followed by 100,000 men. The Prussian troops were assembling in Saxony and in Franconia; the Anglo-Russians were advancing in Hanover. These conjoint circumstances did not alarm the victor of Austerlitz. He was ready, if need were, to fight the archdukes under the walls of Presburg, and then to fall upon Prussia by way of Bohemia. But it was beginning afresh a dangerous game with Europe, coalesced this time whole and entire, and he would not have been wise to expose himself to the risk for a few square leagues more or less. Though the position of Napoleon was that of an all-powerful conqueror, it did not dispense him from the duty of behaving like an able politician. It was Prussia that it particularly behoved his skill to keep sight of; for, profiting by the terror with which the recent events of the war had filled her, he might take her away from the coalition, attach her again to France, and add to the victory of Austerlitz a diplomatic victory not less decisive. He was, therefore, extremely impatient to see and to converse with M. de Haugwitz.

M. de Haugwitz, who had come to impose conditions on Napoleon, under the false appearance of an officious mediation, found him triumphant and almost master of Europe. No doubt, with firmness, union, perseverance, it would still be possible to make head against the Emperor of the French. But Russia had passed from the delirium of pride to the despondency of defeat. And, besides, all the allies, distrusting one another, communicated but little among themselves. M. de Haugwitz frequented incessantly and exclusively the French legation, and carried flattery to such a length as to wear every day in Vienna the *grand cordon* of the Legion of Honour,* never spoke but with admiration of Austerlitz and of the genius of Napoleon, and could not help feeling a strong agitation when thinking of the reception which he was about to meet with.

Napoleon, having arrived on the 13th of December at Vienna, sent the same evening for M. de Haugwitz to Schönbrunn, and gave audience to him in the cabinet of Maria Theresa. He knew not yet all that had taken place at Potsdam; he knew more, however, than when he saw M. de Haugwitz at Brünn, the day

* It is M. de Talleyrand who relates these particulars in one of his letters to Napoleon.

before the battle. He was informed of the existence of a treaty signed on the 3rd of November, by which Prussia engaged eventually to join the coalition. He was warm and easily irritated, but frequently he feigned anger rather than felt it. Striving on this occasion to intimidate his visitor, he reproached M. de Haugwitz most vehemently for having, he, the minister, who was the friend of peace, he who had placed his glory in the system of neutrality, who had even desired to convert that neutrality into a plan of alliance with France—he reproached him for having had the weakness to unite himself at Potsdam with Russia and Austria, for having contracted with those two powers engagements which could lead him to nothing but war. He complained bitterly of the duplicity of his cabinet, of the hesitations of his sovereign, of the empire of women over his court, and gave him to understand that, being now rid of the enemies whom he had upon his hands, he was at liberty to do what he pleased with Prussia. He then asked with vehemence what the Prussian cabinet wanted, what system it calculated on pursuing, and seemed to require complete, categorical, immediate explanations upon all these points.

M. de Haugwitz, agitated at first, soon recovered himself, for he had not less presence of mind than intelligence. Amidst all this boisterous passion, he imagined that he could perceive that Napoleon, at bottom, was desirous of a reconciliation, and that, if the engagements entered into with the coalition were very speedily broken, this conqueror, apparently so incensed, would consent to be appeased.

M. de Haugwitz then gave his artful, specious, fawning explanations of the circumstances which had overpowered and hurried Prussia away; mentioned, not indiscreetly, those who had suffered themselves to be controlled by pure accident to such a degree as to depart from the true system which was suitable for their country; and concluded with insinuating plainly enough that all would be speedily repaired, and even that the alliance which had so often miscarried might become the instantaneous price of an immediate reconciliation.

Napoleon, casting a piercing look into the soul of M. de Haugwitz, perceived that the Prussians desired nothing better than to face about and come back to him. To all the blows that he had inflicted on Europe, he had taken pleasure in adding a piece of arch raillery; and he took it into his head to offer on the spot to M. de Haugwitz the plan which Duroc had been ordered to present at Berlin, that is so say, the formal alliance of Prussia with France, on the so oft-renewed condition of Hanover. This was certainly carrying the attempt upon the honour of the Prussian cabinet to a great length; for Napoleon proposed to it, for the sake of money, one may say, to dissolve the ties recently contracted over the coffin of the great Frederick; and he proposed to it, after deserting France at Potsdam for the benefit of Europe,

to desert Europe at Vienna for the benefit of France. Napoleon did not hesitate, and, while uttering this proposal, he kept his eyes long fixed on the face of M. de Haugwitz.

The Prussian minister appeared neither angry nor surprised. He seemed delighted, on the contrary, to carry back from Vienna, instead of a declaration of war, Hanover, with the alliance of France, which was his favourite system. It should be observed, in excuse for M. de Haugwitz, that, having left Berlin at a moment when people there were flattering themselves that Napoleon would not reach Vienna, he had seen, even in this supposition, the duke of Brunswick and marshal Mollendorf uneasy about the consequences of a war against France, and insisting that no declaration should be issued before the end of December. Now Napoleon had taken Vienna, crushed all the allies at Austerlitz, and it was only the 13th of December. M. de Haugwitz had reason to apprehend that the conqueror might make a rapid incursion into Bohemia and fall like lightning upon Berlin. He thought himself fortunate, therefore, in terminating with a conquest a situation which threatened to terminate in a disaster. As for fidelity towards the coalesced powers, he treated them as they treated each other. Besides, for the line of conduct which he had pursued at Vienna, we must find fault not so much with him as with those who, in his absence, had entangled Prussia in a defile having no outlet. He accepted, therefore, the offer of Napoleon, without further consideration.

The latter, gratified to see that his proposal was successful, said to M. de Haugwitz, "Well then, the thing is decided, you shall have Hanover. You will give me in return some patches of territory that I want, and sign a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, with France. But, on your arrival in Berlin, you will impose silence on the coteries; you will treat them with the contempt which they deserve; you will make the policy of the ministry predominate over that of the court."—The allusions of Napoleon pointed to the queen, to prince Louis, and to those about them. He then enjoined Duroc to confer with M. de Haugwitz, and to prepare immediately the draft of the treaty.

No sooner was this arrangement concluded than Napoleon, delighted with his work, wrote to M. de Talleyrand, desiring him not to bring matters to a conclusion at Brünn, to protract the negotiation for a few days longer, for he was certain of settling with Prussia, which he had conquered at the price of Hanover, and thenceforward he had no need to concern himself either about the threats of the Anglo-Russians against Holland, or the movements of the archdukes from the direction of Hungary. He added that he would now peremptorily insist on the Tyrol, on the war contribution more resolutely than ever, and that, for the rest, he must leave Brünn and come to Vienna. The negotiation was too far from him at Brünn; he wished to have it nearer, at Presburg for instance.

It was on the 13th of December when Napoleon had the inter-

view with M. de Haugwitz. The treaty was drawn up on the 14th, and signed on the 15th at Schönbrunn. The principal conditions were the following.

France, considering Hanover as her own conquest, ceded it to Prussia. Prussia, in return, ceded to Bavaria the margravate of Anspach, that province, which it was so difficult to avoid passing through when at war with Austria. She ceded, moreover, to France the principality of Neufchatel, and the duchy of Cleves, containing the fortress of Wesel. The two powers guaranteed all their possessions; that is to say, Prussia guaranteed to France her present limits, with the new acquisitions made in Italy and the new arrangements concluded in Germany; and France guaranteed to Prussia her state at that time, including the additions of 1803 and the new addition of Hanover. It was an absolute treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, which moreover bore that formal title, a title repudiated in all anterior treaties.

Napoleon had demanded Neufchatel, Cleves, and particularly Anspach, which he meant to exchange with Bavaria for the duchy of Berg, in order to have endowments to confer on his best servants. To Prussia these were very small sacrifices, and to him valuable means of reward; for, in his vast designs, he would not be great without making all about him great—his ministers, his generals, as well as his relations.

This negotiation was a master-stroke: it covered the allies with confusion; it placed Austria at the discretion of Napoleon; and, above all, it secured to the latter the only desirable and possible alliance, the alliance of Prussia. But it contained a serious engagement, the engagement to wring Hanover from England, which might some day be found extremely troublesome, as it was to be apprehended that it might prevent a maritime peace, if sooner or later circumstances rendered such a peace possible.

Napoleon wrote immediately afterwards to M. de Talleyrand that the treaty with Prussia was signed, and that he must leave Brünn, if the Austrians did not accept the conditions which he meant to impose upon them.

M. de Talleyrand, who would have been glad if peace had been already concluded, who disliked above all to maltreat Austria, was deeply vexed. As for the Austrian negotiators, they were thunderstruck. They brought from Holitsch fresh concessions, but not so extensive as those which had been required of them. They knew that Prussia, in order to obtain Hanover, exposed them to the loss of the Tyrol, and, notwithstanding the danger of further delay, and of seeing Napoleon make perhaps fresh demands, a danger of which M. de Talleyrand took pains to convince them, they were obliged to refer to their sovereign.

They parted, therefore, at Brünn, promising to meet again at Presburg. The abode at Brünn had become unwholesome from the effluvia exhaled by a soil crowded with corpses and a town filled with hospitals.

M. de Talleyrand returned to Vienna and found Napoleon ready to renew the war if his terms were not agreed to. He had actually ordered general Songis to repair the *matériel* of the artillery, and to augment it at the expense of the arsenal of Vienna. He had even addressed a severe reprimand to Fouché, the minister of police, for having allowed peace to be announced too soon as certain.

One very recent circumstance had contributed to incense him more. He had just received intelligence of what was occurring at Naples. That senseless court, after stipulating (by the advice of Russia, it is true) a treaty of neutrality, had all at once thrown off the mask and taken up arms. When informed of the battle of Trafalgar and the engagements contracted by Prussia, queen Caroline had concluded that Napoleon was ruined, and had determined to send for the Russians. On the 19th of November, a naval division had landed on the coast of Naples 12,000 Russians and 6,000 English. The court of Naples had engaged to add 40,000 Neapolitans to the Anglo-Russian army. The plan was to raise Italy in the rear of the French, while Massena was at the foot of the Julian Alps and Napoleon almost on the frontiers of ancient Poland. That court of emigrants had given way to the habitual weakness of emigrants, which is to believe always what they wish and to act accordingly.

Napoleon, when apprized of this scandalous violation of faith pledged, was at once irritated and pleased. His resolution was taken; the queen of Naples should pay with her kingdom for the conduct which she had pursued, and leave vacant a crown which would be extremely well placed in the Bonaparte family. Nobody in Europe could tax with injustice the sovereign act that should strike this branch of the house of Bourbon; and, as for its natural protectors, Napoleon had no need to care about them.

Meanwhile, the Austrian negotiators at Brünn had endeavoured to obtain the insertion in the treaty of peace of some article which should cover the court of Naples, of whose secret, though yet unknown to Napoleon, they were apprized. But the latter, when once informed, gave a positive order to M. de Talleyrand not to listen to any thing on that subject—I should be too weak, said he, were I to put up with the insults of that wretched court of Naples. You know with what generosity I have treated it; but that is over now; queen Caroline shall cease to reign in Italy. Happen what will, never mention it in the treaty. That is my absolute will.

The negotiators were waiting at Presburg for M. de Talleyrand. He repaired thither. The negotiations were held at the advanced posts of the two armies. The archdukes had approached Presburg: they were within two marches of Vienna. Napoleon had collected there the greater part of his troops. He had brought Massena by the route of Styria. Nearly 200,000 French were concentrated around the capital of Austria. Napoleon, extremely

incensed, had determined to resume hostilities. But it would have been too great a folly on the part of the court of Vienna to permit that, especially after the defection of Prussia, and in the disheartened state of the Russian cabinet. Great as were the sacrifices required of the Austrian cabinet, though affecting at first to repel the idea, it had made up its mind to submit to them.

It was therefore agreed that Austria should give up the State of Venice, with the provinces of the terra firma, such as Friule, Istria, and Dalmatia. Trieste and the Bocca di Cattaro were also to be ceded to France. These territories were to be annexed to the kingdom of Italy. The separation of the crowns of France and Italy was anew stipulated but with a vagueness of expression, which left the faculty of deferring that separation till the general peace or till the death of Napoleon.

Bavaria obtained the Tyrol, the object of her everlasting longing, the German Tyrol as well as the Italian Tyrol. Austria, in return, obtained the principalities of Salzburg and Berchtolsghaden, given in 1803 to the archduke Ferdinand, previously grand-duke of Tuscany; and Bavaria indemnified the archduke by ceding to him the ecclesiastical principality of Wurzburg, which she likewise had obtained in 1803 in consequence of the secularisations.

The territory of Austria was thus rendered more compact; but, with the Tyrol, she lost all influence over Switzerland and Italy, and the archduke Ferdinand, removed into the centre of Franconia, ceased to be under her immediate influence. The State granted to that prince was not, as before, a mere dependency of the Austrian monarchy.

To this indemnity, found in the country of Salzburg, was added for Austria the secularisation of the possessions of the Teutonic Order, and their conversion to hereditary property in favour of any of the archdukes whom she should point out. The importance of these possessions consisted in a population of 120,000 inhabitants, and a revenue of 150,000 florins.

The electoral title of the archduke Ferdinand was upheld, and transferred from the principality of Salzburg to the principality of Würzburg.

Austria, recognising the royalty of the electors of Wurtemberg and Bavaria, consented that the sovereigns of Baden, Wurtemberg, and Bavaria, should have the same prerogatives over the immediate nobility in their territories as the emperor had over the immediate nobility in his. This was equivalent to the suppression of that nobility in the three States in question, for, the powers of the emperor over that nobility being complete, those of the three princes became equally so.

Lastly, the imperial chancellery renounced all rights of feudal origin in the three States favoured by France.

The approbation of the Diet was, however, formally reserved. France effected in this manner a social revolution in a considerable part of Germany; for she centralized power there for the benefit

of the territorial sovereign, and put an end to all external feudal dependence. She continued also the system of secularisations, for with the Teutonic Order disappeared one of the last two ecclesiastical principalities remaining, and the only one then left was that of the prince arch-chancellor, ecclesiastical elector of Ratisbon. Conformably with what had previously been done, this secularisation also was effected for the benefit of one of the principal courts of Germany.

Austria, definitively excluded from Italy, despoiled by the loss of the Tyrol of the commanding positions which she had in the Alps, thrust back behind the Inn, deprived of every advanced post in Suabia, and of the feudal rights which subjected the States of South Germany to her, had sustained immense losses, material and political. She lost, as we have already observed, four millions of subjects out of twenty-four, fifteen millions of florins out of a revenue of 103.

The treaty was well conceived for the peace of Italy and Germany. There was only one objection to be made to it, namely, that the vanquished, too ill-treated, could not submit sincerely. It was for Napoleon, by great discretion, by judicious alliances, to leave Austria without hope and without means of revolting against the decisions of victory.

At the moment of signing such a treaty, the hands of the plenipotentiaries hesitated. They stood out on two points, the war contribution of 100 millions and Naples. Napoleon had reduced the contribution demanded to 50 millions, on account of the sums in the chests of Austria, to which he had already helped himself. As for Naples, he would not hear a word about her.

In order to overcome him, a proceeding of pure courtesy was devised, namely, to send to him the archduke Charles, a prince whose character and talents he honoured, and whom he had never seen. He was solicited to receive him at Vienna, and assented very cheerfully, but firmly resolved to abate nothing. It was expected that this prince, one of the first generals in Europe, explaining to him the resources which the Austrian monarchy still possessed, expressing the sentiments of the army, ready to sacrifice itself in rejecting a humiliating peace, joining adroit solicitations to these remonstrances, might perhaps soften Napoleon. Hence, when M. de Talleyrand urged the negotiators to bring the business to a conclusion, they replied that they should be accused of having betrayed their country, if they gave their signatures before the interview which Napoleon was to have with the archduke.

However, M. de Talleyrand having taken it upon himself to relinquish 10 millions more of the war contribution, they signed on the 26th of December the treaty of Presburg, one of the most glorious that Napoleon ever concluded, and certainly the best conceived; for, if France afterwards obtained more extensive territories, it was at the price of arrangements less acceptable to

Europe, and therefore less durable. The Austrian negotiators confined themselves to the recommendation of the reigning house of Naples to the generosity of the conqueror, in a letter signed by them both. The archduke visited Napoleon on the 27th, in one of the imperial palaces, was received by him with the respect due to his rank and his renown, conversed with him on the military art, which was perfectly natural between two captains of such merit, and then retired without having said a word about the affairs of the two empires.

Napoleon made preparations for leaving Austria immediately. He ordered 2000 pieces of cannon and 100,000 muskets, found in the arsenal of Vienna, to be shipped on the Danube; he despatched 150 pieces to Palma Nova, to arm that important fortress, which commanded the Venetian States of the terra firma. He regulated the return of his soldiers in such a manner that it should take place by short marches, for he would not have them go back as they had come, on the run. The necessary arrangements were made on the route for their abundant supply. He ordered two millions to be distributed forthwith among the officers of all ranks, that every one might immediately enjoy the fruits of the victory. Berthier was appointed to superintend the return of the army to the territory of France. It was to evacuate Vienna in five days, and to repass the Inn in twenty. It was stipulated that the fortress of Braunau should remain in the hands of the French till the complete payment of the contribution of 40 millions.

This done, Napoleon set out for Munich, where he was received with transport. The Bavarians, who were one day to betray him in his defeat, and to oblige the French army to fight its way through them at Hanau, covered with their applause, pursued with ardent curiosity, the conqueror who had saved them from invasion, constituted them into a kingdom, enriched them with the spoils of vanquished Austria. Napoleon, after attending the wedding of Eugene Beauharnais and the princess Augusta, after enjoying the happiness of a son whom he loved, the admiration of the people, eager to see him, the flatteries of an enemy, the electress of Bavaria, set out for Paris, where the enthusiasm of France awaited him.

A campaign of three months, instead of a war of several years, as it had at first been feared, the continent disarmed, the French empire extended to limits which it ought never to have passed, a dazzling glory added to our arms, public and private credit miraculously restored, new prospects of peace and prosperity opened to the nation, under a government powerful and respected by the world—that was what the people meant to thank him for by a thousand times repeated shouts of "*Vive l'Empereur.*" With these cries he was greeted even at Strasburg on crossing the Rhine, and they accompanied him to Paris, which he entered on the 26th of January, 1806. It was a second return from Marengo. Austerlitz was in fact for the Empire what Marengo had

been for the Consulate. Marengo had confirmed the consular power in the hands of Napoleon; Austerlitz secured the imperial crown upon his head. Marengo had caused France to pass in one day from a threatening situation to a tranquil and grand situation: Austerlitz, by crushing in a day a formidable coalition, produced a not less important result. For calm and reflecting minds, if any such were left in presence of these events, there was but one subject for fear—the inconstancy of Fortune, and what is still more to be dreaded, the weakness of the human mind, which sometimes bears adversity without quailing, rarely prosperity without committing great faults.

BOOK XXIV.

CONFEDERATION OF THE RHINE.

Return of Napoleon to Paris—Public Joy—Distribution of the Colours taken from the Enemy—Decree of the Senate ordaining the Erection of a triumphal Monument—Napoleon devotes his first Attention to the Finances—The Company of United Merchants is ascertained to be indebted to the Treasury the Sum of 141 Millions—Napoleon, dissatisfied with M. de Marbois, appoints M. Mollien to supersede him—Re-establishment of Public Credit—A Fund formed with the Contributions levied in conquered Countries—Orders relative to the Return of the Army, to the Occupation of Dalmatia, to the Conquest of Naples—Affairs of Prussia—Ratification of the Treaty of Schönbrunn given with Reservations—New Mission of M. de Haugwitz to Napoleon—The Treaty of Schönbrunn remodelled in Paris, but with more Obligations and fewer Advantages for Prussia—M. de Lucchesini is sent to Berlin to explain these new Changes—The Treaty of Schönbrunn, transformed into the Treaty of Paris, is at length ratified, and M. de Haugwitz returns to Prussia—Predominant Ascendency of France—Entry of Joseph Bonaparte into Naples—Occupation of Venice—Delay in the Delivery of Dalmatia—The French Army is halted on the Inn till the Delivery of Dalmatia, and distributed in the German Provinces most capable of subsisting it—Distress of the occupied Countries—Situation of the Court of Prussia, after the Return of M. de Haugwitz to Berlin—Mission of the Duke of Brunswick to St. Petersburg, to explain the Conduct of the Prussian Cabinet—State of the Court of Russia—Dispositions of Alexander since Austerlitz—Reception given to the Duke of Brunswick—Useless Efforts of Prussia to induce Russia and England to approve the Occupation of Hanover—England declares War against Prussia—Death of Mr. Pitt, and Accession of Mr. Fox to the Ministry—Hopes of Peace—Correspondence between Mr. Fox, and M. de Talleyrand—Mission of Lord Yarmouth to Paris in Quality of confidential Negotiator—Bases of a Maritime Peace—The Agents of Austria, instead of giving up the Bocca di Cattaro to the French, put it into the hands of the Russians—Threats of Napoleon against the Court of Vienna—Russia sends M. d'Oubril to Paris, with a Commission to prevent a Movement of the French Army against Austria, and to propose Peace—Lord Yarmouth and M. d'Oubril negotiate jointly at Paris—Possibility of a general Peace—Calculation of Napoleon tending to protract the Negotiation—System of the French Empire—Vassal Kingdoms, Grand-Duchies, and Duchies—Joseph King of Naples, Louis King of Holland—Dissolution of the Germanic Empire—Confederation of the Rhine—Movements of the French Army—Internal Administration—Public Works—The Column of the Place Vendôme, the Louvre, the Rue Imperiale, the Arc del' Etoile—Roads and Canals—Council of State—Institution of the University—Budget of 1806—Re-establishment of the Tax on Salt—New System of the Treasury—Re-organisation of the Bank of France—Continuation of the Negotiations with Russia and England—Treaty of Peace with Russia signed on the 20th of July, by M. d'Oubril—The Signature of this Treaty decides Lord Yarmouth to produce his Powers—Lord Lauderdale is associated with Lord Yarmouth—Difficulties of the

Negotiation with England—Some Indiscretions committed by the English Negotiators on the Subject of the Restitution of Hanover, excite great uneasiness at Berlin—False Reports inflame the Court of Prussia—New Infatuation at Berlin and Resolution to arm—Surprise and Distrust of Napoleon—Russia refuses to ratify the Treaty signed by M. d'Oubril, and proposes new Conditions—Napoleon refuses to admit them—General tendency to War—The King of Prussia insists on the French Army being withdrawn—Napoleon replies by insisting on the Prussian Army being withdrawn—Long Silence on both Sides—Both Sovereigns set out for the Army—War declared between Prussia and France.

BOOK XXIV.

CONFEDERATION OF THE RHINE.

WHILE Napoleon was staying a few days at Munich to celebrate the marriage of Eugene de Beauharnais with the princess Augusta of Bavaria; while he was stopping one day at Stuttgard, another at Carlsruhe, to receive the congratulations of his new allies, and to conclude family alliances there; the people of Paris were waiting with the utmost impatience to testify their joy and their admiration. France, thoroughly satisfied with the conduct of the public affairs, though no longer taking any part in them, seemed to have recovered the vivacity of the first days of the revolution to applaud the marvellous exploits of her armies and of her chief. Napoleon, who with the genius for great things combined the art to set them off, had sent before him the colours taken from the enemy. He had given orders for a distribution of them that was very skilfully calculated. He had divided them among the Senate, the Tribunate, the city of Paris, and the ancient church of Notre Dame, which had witnessed his coronation. He gave eight to the Tribunate, eight to the city of Paris, fifty-four to the Senate, fifty to the church of Notre Dame. During the whole of the campaign, he had never ceased to inform the Senate of all the events of the war, and, when peace was signed, he had hastened to communicate to it by a message the treaty of Presburg. In this manner he repaid by continual attentions the confidence of that great body, and, in acting thus, he was consistent with his policy; for he kept in a high rank those old authors of the revolution, whom the new generation was glad to get rid of, when the elections furnished it with the means of doing so. These were his own aristocracy, which he hoped to melt down by degrees into the old one.

These colours passed through Paris on the 15th of January, 1806, and were borne triumphantly along the streets of the capital, to be placed under the roofs of the edifices which were to contain them. An immense concourse collected to witness this spectacle.

The cool and unimpassioned Cambacérès himself says, in his

grave Memoirs, that the joy of the people resembled intoxication. And wherefore, indeed, should they rejoice if not on such occasions! Four hundred thousand Russians, Swedes, English, Austrians, were marching from all points of the horizon against France, two hundred thousand Prussians promising to join them, and, all at once, a hundred thousand French, starting from the coasts of the Ocean, traversing in two months a great part of the European continent, taking the first army opposed to them without fighting, inflicting redoubled blows on the others, entering the astonished capital of the ancient Germanic empire, passing beyond Vienna and going to the frontiers of Poland, to break in one great battle the bond of the coalition; sending back the vanquished Russians to their frozen plains, and chaining the disconcerted Prussians to their frontiers; the dread of a war which might be expected to last long terminated in three months; the peace of the continent suddenly restored, the peace of the seas justly hoped for; all the prospects of prosperity given back to France, delighted and placed at the head of the nations—for what should people rejoice, we repeat, if not for such marvels? And as at that time none could foresee the too speedy end of this greatness, or yet discern, in the too fertile genius that produced it, the too ardent genius also that was destined to compromise it, one sympathised in the public happiness without any mixture of sinister presentiments.

The men who are particularly affected by the material prosperity of States, the merchants, the capitalists, were not less moved than the rest of the nation. The great commercial houses, which in victory applauded the speedy return of peace—the great commercial houses were delighted to see the double crisis of public and private credit terminated in a day, and to have reason to hope anew for that profound tranquillity, which for five years the Consulate had conferred on France. The Senate, on receiving the colours destined for it, ordained by a decree that a triumphal monument should be erected to Napoleon the Great. Conformably with the wish of the Tribunate, this monument was to be a column surmounted by the statue of Napoleon. His birthday was placed among the national festivals, and it was, moreover, determined that a spacious edifice should be erected in one of the public places of the capital, to receive, along with a series of sculptures and paintings, dedicated to the glory of the French armies, the sword which Napoleon used at the battle of Austerlitz.

The colours destined for Notre Dame were delivered to the clergy of that cathedral by the municipal authorities. “These colours,” said the venerable archbishop of Paris, “suspended from the roof of our church, will attest to our latest posterity the efforts of Europe in arms against us, the great achievements of our soldiers, the protection of Heaven over France, the prodigious successes of our invincible Emperor, and the homage which he pays to God of his victories.”

It was amidst this profound and universal satisfaction that Napoleon entered Paris, accompanied by the Empress. The heads of the Bank, desirous that his presence should be the signal of the public prosperity, had waited till the day before his arrival to resume their payments in cash. Since the late events, reviving confidence had poured abundance of specie into its coffers. Of the temporary embarrassments of the month of December not a trace was left.

With Napoleon joy on account of success never interrupted business. His indefatigable spirit could unite at once business and pleasure. Having arrived in the evening of the 26th of January, on the morning of the 27th he was wholly absorbed in the cares of government. The arch-chancellor Cambacérès was the first personage of the Empire with whom he conversed on that day. After some moments given to the pleasure of receiving his congratulations, and seeing his prudence confounded by the prodigies of the late war, he spoke to him about the financial crisis, so speedily and so happily terminated. He believed, and with reason, the accuracy, the equity, of the reports of the arch-chancellor Cambacérès; he wished therefore to hear him before any other person. He was extremely irritated against M. de Marbois, whose gravity had always imposed upon him, and whom he had deemed incapable of carelessness in business. He was far from suspecting the high integrity of that minister, but he could not forgive him for having delivered up all the resources of the Treasury to adventurous speculators, and he was resolved to display great severity. The arch-chancellor contrived to pacify him, and to demonstrate that, instead of using rigour, it would be better to treat with the *United Merchants* for the transfer of all their assets, in order to wind up this strange transaction with the least possible loss.

Napoleon instantly summoned a council to the Tuileries, and desired to be furnished with a detailed report of the operations of the Company, which were still obscure to him. He required the attendance of all the ministers, and also of M. Mollien, director of the Sinking Fund, whose management he approved, and whom he thought to possess in a much higher degree than M. de Marbois the dexterity necessary for the administration of funds on a great scale. He sent an authoritative order to Messieurs Desprez, Vanlerberghe, and Ouvrard, and to the clerk who was accused of having deceived the minister of the Treasury, to come to the Tuileries.

All the persons who attended were intimidated by the presence of the Emperor, who did not conceal his resentment. M. de Marbois began reading a long report which he had drawn up relative to the subject under discussion. He had not read far before Napoleon, interrupting him, said, "I see how it is. It was with the funds of the Treasury and those of the Bank that the company of *United Merchants* calculated on providing supplies for France and Spain. And, as Spain had nothing to give but promises of piastres,

it is with the money of France that the wants of both countries have been supplied. Spain owed me a subsidy, and it is I who have furnished her with one. Now Messieurs Desprez, Vanlerberghe, and Ouvrard, must give up to me all they possess; Spain must pay me what she owes them, or I will shut up those gentlemen in Vincennes and send an army to Madrid."

Napoleon appeared cold and stern towards M. de Marbois—"I esteem your character," said he, "but you have been the dupe of men against whom I warned you to be upon your guard. You have given up to them all the effects in the portfolio, over the employment of which you ought to have been more watchful. I regret to find myself obliged to withdraw from you the administration of the Treasury, for, after what has happened, I cannot leave it to you any longer."—Napoleon then ordered the members of the Company, who had been summoned to the Tuileries to be introduced. Messieurs Vanlerberghe and Desprez, though the least reprehensible, melted into tears. M. Ouvrard, who had compromised the Company by hazardous speculations, was perfectly calm. He endeavoured to persuade Napoleon that he ought to permit him to wind up himself the very complicated affairs in which he had involved his partners, and that he should bring over from Mexico by way of Holland and England considerable sums, and far superior to those which France had advanced.*

It is probable that he would have managed the winding up of these affairs much better than any other person; but Napoleon was too incensed, and too impatient to get out of the hands of speculators, to trust to his promises. He left M. Ouvrard and his partners the alternative of a criminal prosecution or the immediate surrender of all they possessed, whether stores, paper securities, immoveables, or pledges received from Spain. They submitted to this cruel sacrifice.

This was sure to prove a ruinous liquidation for them, but they had rendered themselves liable to it by abusing the resources of the Treasury. The most to be pitied of the three was M. Vanlerberghe, who, without intermeddling in the speculations of his partners, had confined himself to the operations of a corn trade, carried on actively and honestly throughout all Europe, for the service of the French armies.†

* In justice to the memory of my deceased friend, M. Gabriel Julien Ouvrard, I feel called upon to state that, in his memoirs, published in 1826, he gives a very different version of these transactions and of his interview with Napoleon on the above occasion. M. Ouvrard expired in London on the 21st of October, 1846, aged 76 years. The manuscript memoirs which he has left, and which form the sequel of his published autobiography, are replete with interesting matter, and contain some startling disclosures respecting the French Revolution of 1830, and the intrigues which preceded, attended, and followed it. It is likely that the English public will soon be enabled to peruse in print these piquant revelations.—D. F. C.

† I borrow this account from the most authentic sources; in the first place, from the memoirs of prince Cambacères; next from the interesting and in-

On dismissing the council, Napoleon detained M. Mollien, and without waiting either for any observation from him or for his consent, he said, "You will to-day take the oath as minister of the Treasury."—M. Mollien, intimidated, though flattered by such confidence, hesitated to reply—"Have you any objection to be minister then?" added Napoleon, and required him to take the oath the same day.

It was requisite to get out of the embarrassments of all sorts created by the company of the *United Merchants*. M. de Marbois had already withdrawn the service of the Treasury from the hands of that Company, and had committed it for a few days to M. Desprez, who had continued it from that moment for the account of the State. He had finally intrusted it to the receivers-general, on moderate but temporary conditions. The course to be definitively pursued on this subject was not yet decided: nothing was fixed but the resolution not to charge speculators, how able or how upright soever they might be, with a service so extensive and so important as the general negotiation of the assets of the Treasury.

This service consisted, as we have seen, in discounting the *obligations of the receivers-general*, the *bills of the customs* and *coupes de bois*, papers which had all twelve, fifteen, and eighteen months to run. Till the institution of the company of the *United Merchants*, the only practice was to make partial and specific discounts of those papers, to the amount of twenty or thirty millions at a time. In exchange for the effects themselves, the funds proceeding from the discount were immediately received. It was gradually, under the growing empire of necessity, which soon supersedes confidence, that this service had successively been wholly relinquished to a single company, that the portfolio of the Treasury had been left in some measure at its discretion, and that, so great was the infatuation, the chests of accountable persons were placed at its disposal. Had the minister merely transferred to it specific sums in paper for equivalent sums in cash, allowing it to receive the amount of the discounted effects only when they became due, no confusion would have taken place between its affairs and those of the State. But there had been given up to the *United Merchants* so much as 470 millions at once, in *obligations of the receivers-general*, *bills at sight*, *bills of the customs*, which they had got discounted either by the Bank or by French and foreign bankers. At the same time, for greater convenience, they had been authorised to take directly from the chests of the receivers-general all the funds paid into them, to be afterwards accounted for; so that the Bank, as we have seen, when it pre-

structive memoirs of M. le comte Mollien, which are not yet published; and lastly, from the Archives of the Treasury. I have had in my hands, and read myself with great attention, the documents of the proceedings (*procès*), and especially a long and interesting report which the minister of the Treasury drew up for the Emperor. Here, then, I advance nothing but from official and incontestable evidence.

sented the effects which it had discounted and which were due, had found in the chests nothing but receipts of M. Desprez's, attesting that he had already been paid them. But these strange facilities had not stopped there. When M. Desprez, acting for the *United Merchants*, discounted the effects of the Treasury, he furnished the amount not in cash, but in paper, which he had been allowed to introduce, and which was called *M. Desprez's bills*. Thus the Company had been enabled to fill the chests of the State and of the Bank with these bills, and to create a circulating paper by the aid of which it had for some time met its speculations as well with France as with Spain.

The real fault of M. de Marbois had been to lend himself to this confusion of affairs, in consequence of which it was no longer possible to distinguish the property of the State from that of the Company. Add to this abusive complaisance, the dishonesty of a clerk, who alone was in the secret respecting the portfolio, and who had deceived M. de Marbois, by exaggerating continually to him the need that he had of the *United Merchants*; and we shall have an explanation of this incredible financial adventure. For this, that clerk had received one million, which Napoleon ordered to be thrown into the general mass of the assets of the Company. The terror excited by the Emperor was so great, that the parties readily confessed and restored every thing.

However, in order to be just towards every one, we must say, that Napoleon had himself a share in the faults committed on this occasion, by persisting in leaving M. de Marbois under the pressure of enormous charges, by deferring too long the creation of extraordinary means. It would have been requisite, in fact, that M. de Marbois should provide for a first arrear, resulting from anterior budgets and the insolvency of Spain, who, not paying her subsidy, was the cause of a fresh deficit of about 50 millions. It was under the weight of these different burdens, that this upright but too inconsiderate minister had become the slave of adventurous men, who rendered him some services, who might even have rendered him very great ones, if their calculations had been made with greater precision. Their speculations were, in fact, based on a real foundation, namely, the piastres of Mexico, which absolutely existed in the chests of the captains-general of Spain. But these piastres could not be so easily brought to Europe as M. Ouvrard had hoped, and this had led to the embarrassments of the Treasury and the ruin of the Company.

What proves the height of the confusion to which things had arrived, was the difficulty that was found to fix the amount of the debit of the Company to the Treasury. It was at first supposed to be 73 millions. A new examination raised it to 84. Lastly, M. Mollien, resolving on his entry into office, to make a strict investigation into the state of the finances, discovered that the Company had contrived to possess itself of the sum of 141 millions, for which it remained debtor to the State.

This enormous sum of 141 millions was made up in the following manner. The *United Merchants* had drawn directly from the chests of the receivers-general so much as 55 millions at once; and, by means of various repayments, their debt to the accountable persons was reduced on the day of the catastrophe to 23 millions. There were in the chest, to the amount of 73 millions, *bills of M. Desprez's*, a species of money, which M. Desprez gave instead of cash, and which was current so long as his credit, upheld by the Bank, remained intact, but which had now become worthless paper. The Company owed 14 millions more for *bills of the central cashier*. (We have adverted elsewhere to these effects, devised for the purpose of facilitating the movements of funds between Paris and the provinces.) These 14 millions, taken from the portfolio, had not been followed by any payment either of M. Desprez's bills or any other assets. M. Desprez, for his personal management during the few days of his particular service, remained debtor of 17 millions. Lastly, among the commercial effects with which the Company had furnished the Treasury, for various payments made at a distance, there was bad paper to the amount of 13 or 14 millions. These five different sums, of 23 millions, taken directly from the accountable persons, 73 millions in Desprez's bills, now worth nothing, 14 millions in *bills of the central cashier*, for which no equivalent had been furnished, 17 millions of M. Desprez's personal debit, lastly, 14 millions in protested bills of exchange, composed the 141 millions of the total debit of the Company.

The State, however, was not doomed to lose this important sum, because the operations of the Company, as we have just said, had a real foundation, the commerce in piastres, which had lacked nothing but precision in the calculations. It had furnished supplies to the French land and naval forces to the amount of 40 millions. The house of Hope had bought about ten millions' worth of those famous piastres of Mexico, and was at this moment transmitting the amount to Paris. The Company possessed, besides immoveable property, Spanish wool, corn, some good credits, the whole amounting to about 30 millions. These various sums, comprehended real effects to the worth of 80 millions. Thus 60 millions yet remained to be found in order to balance the debt. The equivalent of this sum really existed in the portfolio of the Company in credits upon Spain.

Napoleon, after obliging the *United Merchants* to give up to him all that they possessed, required that the French Treasury should be put into the Company's place in regard to Spain. He enjoined M. Mollien to treat with a particular agent of the prince of the Peace, M. Isquierdo, who had been for some time in Paris, and performed the functions of ambassador, much more than Messieurs d'Azara and Gravina, who had nothing but the title. The court of Madrid had no refusal to oppose to the

conqueror of Austerlitz; besides, it was really debtor to the Company, and consequently to France herself. Negotiations were, therefore, commenced with her, to secure the repayment of those 60 millions, which represented not only the subsidies left unpaid, but the provisions with which her armies had been supplied, and the corn which had been sent to her people.

The Treasury was likely, in consequence, to be entirely reimbursed, thanks to the 40 millions in anterior supplies, the 10 millions coming from Holland, the stores existing in the warehouses, the immoveables seized, and the securities which Spain was about to give, and part of which the house of Hope offered to discount. There remained, nevertheless, a double gap to fill, arising from the old arrear of the budgets, which we have estimated at 80 or 90 millions, and from resources which the Company had absorbed for its use. But every thing had become easy since the victories of Napoleon, and since the peace, which had been the fruit of them. The capitalists, who had ruined the Company, by requiring $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. per month, (that is to say, 18 per cent. per annum) to discount the effects of the Treasury, offered to take them at $\frac{3}{4}$ per cent., and soon began to dispute them with each other at $\frac{1}{2}$, that is to say at 6 per cent. per annum. The Bank, which had withdrawn part of its notes from circulation, since it had done with M. Desprez, which, besides, saw the metals ordered to be purchased all over Europe during the great distress pouring into its coffers—the Bank was enabled to discount all that was desired at a moderate, yet sufficiently advantageous rate. Though a certain amount of the effects of the Treasury, belonging to 1806, had been previously alienated for the use of the Company, the greater part of the effects corresponding to that service remained intact, and were about to be discounted on the best conditions. But victory had not only procured credit for Napoleon; it had also procured for him material wealth. He had imposed upon Austria a contribution of 40 millions; adding to this sum 30 millions, which he had taken directly from the chests of that power, the sum which the war had brought him in, may be computed at 70 millions. Twenty millions had been expended on the spot, for the subsistence of the army, but at the charge of the Treasury, with which Napoleon purposed to make a regulation, the spirit and dispositions of which we shall presently explain. There remained, then, 50 millions, which were coming, partly in gold and silver, in the artillery waggons, partly in good bills of exchange on Frankfort, Leipzig, Hamburg, and Bremen. As the garrison of Hameln was to return to France, in consequence of the cession of Hanover to Prussia, it was ordered to bring, along with the English *matériel* taken in Hanover, the produce of the bills of exchange due at Hamburg and Bremen. An imposition of 4 millions had been laid on the city of Frankfort, instead of the contingent which it should have furnished, like Baden, Wurtemberg, and Bavaria. France was, therefore,

about to receive, besides considerable effects, large quantities of the precious metals, and, in regard to specie as to every thing else, abundance was about to succeed the momentary distress, which the sincere alarms of commerce and the affected alarms of jobbers, had produced.

Napoleon, whose organising genius would never leave to things the character of accident, and tended incessantly to convert them into durable institutions, had projected a noble and beneficent creation, founded on the most legitimate profits of his victories. He had resolved to create with the war contributions a fund for the army, which he would not touch from any motive whatever, not even for his own use; for his civil list, administered with perfect order, was adequate to all the expenses of a magnificent court, and even to the formation of a particular fund. It was from this army fund that he proposed to take pensions for his generals, for his officers, for his soldiers, and for their widows and children. He desired not to enjoy his victories alone; he purposed that all those who served France and her vast designs should acquire not glory only, but prosperity; that those who, by dint of heroism, had got so far as to have no concern for themselves on the field of battle, should have none on account of their families. Finding, in the inexhaustible fertility of his mind, the art of multiplying the utility of things, Napoleon had invented a combination, which rendered that fund quite as profitable to the finances as to the army itself. What had hitherto been wanting was a lender, to lend to the government on good conditions. The army fund would be that lender, whose demands upon the State Napoleon would himself regulate. The army was to have 50 millions in gold and silver, besides 20 millions which the budget owed it for arrears of pay; and, lastly, besides a large amount in *matériel* of war conquered by it. The artillery waggons were bringing from Vienna 100,000 muskets, 2000 pieces of cannon. The whole of the *matériel* of war and contributions formed a sum of about 80 millions, of which the army was the proprietor, and which it could lend to the State. Napoleon purposed that all that was disposable should be paid over to the Sinking Fund, which should open a separate account, and employ this sum either in discounting *obligations of receivers-general, bills at sight, bills of customs*, when the capitalists should require more than 6 per cent., or in buying up national domains when they were at a low price, or even in taking *rentes*, if it thought fit to make a loan to fill up the arrear.

This combination, therefore, was to have the double utility of procuring for the army an advantageous interest for its money, and for the government all the sums that it should have need of, at a rate which would not be usurious.

Napoleon immediately gave orders for the execution of various important measures by means of the funds which he had at his disposal. One consisted in collecting a dozen millions in cash

at Strasburg, in case of the renewal of military operations; for, if Austria had signed the peace, Russia had not begun to negotiate, Prussia had not yet sent the ratification of the treaty of Schönbrunn, and England continued to be actively engaged in her diplomatic intrigues. He enjoined, moreover, that some millions should be kept in reserve at the Sinking Fund, and that the number of these millions should remain unknown, to be employed on a sudden, whenever speculators were disposed to be extortionate. He thought that the Treasury ought to take upon itself this sort of expense, as a man submits to that of a spare granary, in order to be provided against the seasons of dearth, and that the interest lost by this kind of hoard would be a useful sacrifice, and one by no means to be regretted. Lastly, the foreign moneys which were brought back requiring to be re-coined and converted into French money, he ordered them to be divided among the different mints, in proportion to the want of specie in each locality.

These first dispositions commanded by the moment being carried into effect, Napoleon desired that attention should be paid without delay to a new organisation of the Treasury, to a new constitution of the Bank of France, and gave this two-fold commission to M. Mollien, who had become minister of the Treasury. M. Gaudin, who still retained the portfolio of the finances, for we must bear in mind that, at this period, the Treasury and the Finances formed two distinct ministries—M. Gaudin received orders to present a plan for liquidating the arrear, for definitively equalising the receipts and the expenditure, in the double hypothesis of peace and war, even though for this purpose it should be necessary to recur to the imposition of new taxes.

After attending to the finances, Napoleon busied himself about bringing the army back to France, but slowly, so that it should not march further than four leagues a day. He had ordered that the wounded and the sick should be kept till spring in the places where they had received the first attendance, and that officers should stay with them to superintend their cure; and for this essential object he had recourse to the chests of the army. He had left Berthier at Munich with instructions to attend to all these details, and to preside over the exchanges of territory, always so difficult among the German princes. On this latter point Berthier was to concert with M. Otto, our representative at the court of Bavaria.

Napoleon then thought of taking measures against the kingdom of Naples. Massena, taking with him 40,000 men drawn from Lombardy, received orders to march through Tuscany and the southernmost part of the Roman State to the kingdom of Naples, without listening to any proposal of peace or armistice. Napoleon, uncertain whether Joseph, who had refused the vice-royalty of Italy, would accept the crown of the Two Sicilies, gave him only the title of his lieutenant-general. Joseph was not to

command the army; it was Massena alone who had that commission; for Napoleon, though he sacrificed the interests of policy to family considerations, did not so easily sacrifice to them the interests of military operations. But Joseph, once introduced into Naples by Massena, was to seize the civil government of the country and to exercise there all the powers of royalty.

General Molitor was at the same time despatched towards Dalmatia. On his rear he had general Marinont to support him. The latter was commissioned to receive Venice and the Venetian State from the hands of the Austrians. Prince Eugene had orders to go to Venice, and to take upon himself the administration of the conquered provinces, without yet annexing them to the kingdom of Italy, though they were subsequently to be united with it. Before he decided upon this definitively, Napoleon wished to conclude various arrangements with the representatives of the kingdom of Italy, which would have run counter to an immediate union.

Lastly, Napoleon, wishing to excite the spirit of his soldiers and to communicate that excitement to all France, ordered that the grand army should be assembled at Paris, to receive there a magnificent *fête*, which was to be given by the authorities of the capital. It was impossible to convey a better conception of the nation treating the army than by charging the citizens of Paris to treat the soldiers of Austerlitz.

While he was thus engaged in the administration of his vast empire, and attending to the concerns of peace, after having been engaged in those of war, Napoleon had also his eyes fixed on the consequences of the treaties of Presburg and Schönbrunn. Prussia, in particular, had to ratify a treaty most unforeseen by her, since M. de Haugwitz, who came to Vienna to dictate conditions, had submitted on the contrary to receive them, and, instead of any constraint imposed upon Napoleon, had brought back a treaty of alliance offensive and defensive with him, all this compensated, it is true, by a rich present, that of Hanover.

It would be difficult to form a conception of the astonishment of Europe, and of the different sentiments, satisfaction and chagrin, gratified avidity and confusion, which prevailed in Prussia when made acquainted with the treaty of Schönbrunn. Hints had frequently been thrown out to the public in Berlin that, at one time France, at another Russia, was offering to the king the electorate of Hanover, which, besides having the advantage of rounding the so irregularly defined territory of Prussia, had the advantage of securing to her the control of the Elbe and the Weser, as well as a decisive influence over the Hanseatic cities of Bremen and Hamburg. This offer, so frequently announced, was now a realised acquisition, a certainty. It was a subject of great satisfaction for a country which is one of the most ambitious in Europe. But, to counterbalance this gift, what confusion—we must not mince the matter—what disgrace, would attend the

conduct of the court of Prussia! While yielding against its will to the solicitations of the coalition, it had engaged to unite itself with it, if in a month Napoleon had not accepted the mediation of Prussia, and submitted to the conditions which she pretended to impose upon him, and this was equivalent to an engagement to declare war against him. And, all at once, finding Napoleon in Moravia, not embarrassed but all-powerful, she had turned to him, accepted his alliance, and received from his hand the fairest of the spoils of the coalition—Hanover, the ancient patrimony of the kings of England.

We must confess that honour is banished from the world, if such things are not punished with a signal reprobation. Accordingly, the Prussian nation, we must do it this justice, felt how severely such conduct was to be condemned, and, notwithstanding the value of the present brought by M. Haugwitz, received it with chagrin in its heart and humiliation on its brow. The disgrace, however, would have been effaced from the memory of the Prussians, and would have left place only for pleasure at the conquest, if other sentiments had not come and mingled with that of remorse, to poison the satisfaction which they ought to have felt. Though profoundly jealous of the Austrians, still the Prussians, seeing them beaten, felt themselves Germans; and, as Germans are not less jealous of the French than the Russians or the English, they beheld our extraordinary triumphs with mortification. Their patriotism, therefore, began to awake in favour of the Austrians, and this sentiment, united with that of remorse, filled the nation with intense discomfort. Of all the classes, the army was the one which manifested these dispositions the most openly. In Prussia, the army is not impassible as in Austria; it reflects the national passions with extreme vividness; it represents the nation much more than the army represents it in the other countries of Europe, France excepted; and it then represented a nation whose opinion was already very independent of its sovereigns. The Prussian army, which felt to a high degree the sentiment of German jealousy, which had hoped for a moment that the career of war would be opened to it, and which found it suddenly closed by an act difficult to be justified, censured the cabinet without reserve. The German aristocracy, which saw the Germanic empire ruined by the peace of Presburg, and the cause of the immediate nobility sacrificed to the sovereigns of Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Baden,—the German aristocracy, occupying all the high military ranks, contributed greatly to excite discontent in the army, and carried back the exaggerated expression of this discontent either to Berlin or to Potsdam. These passions burst forth more especially about the queen, and had converted her coterie into a focus of boisterous opposition. Prince Louis, who reigned in this coterie, launched out more than ever into chivalrous declamations. All is not done for the alliance of two countries, when their interests do not agree: the self-

love of both ought also to harmonise, and this last condition is not very easily realised. The Prussians were then the only people in Europe whose policy could agree with ours, but great indulgence would have been needed for the excessive pride of these heirs of the great Frederick, and, unluckily, the weak, ambiguous, sometimes dishonourable conduct of their cabinet did not command that respect which their susceptibility required.

Napoleon, after six years' fruitless relations with Prussia, had accustomed himself to have no consideration for her. He had recently proved it by passing through one of her provinces (authorised, it is true, by precedents) without even giving her notice. He had just proved it still more strongly, in appearing so little hurt by her wrongs, that, after the convention of Potsdam, when he would have had a right to be incensed, he gave her Hanover, thus treating her as fit only to be bought. She was, and ought to have been, deeply wounded by this proceeding.

The human conscience feels all the reproaches that it has deserved, especially when it is spared them. All the severe things to which she had exposed herself on the part of Napoleon, Prussia imagined that he had expressed. It was asserted in Berlin that he had said to the Austrian negotiators, when they propped themselves upon the support of Prussia.—“ Prussia! why she is to be had by the best bidder; I will give her more than you, and bring her over to my side.” He had thought so, perhaps said so to M. de Talleyrand, but he affirmed that he had not said so to the Austrians. Be this as it may, this expression was repeated everywhere in Berlin as true. The fault of Prussia in all this was not to have deserved the respect which she desired to obtain; that of Napoleon, not to grant it her without her having deserved it. One has not allies any more than friends, unless upon condition of sparing their pride as much as their interest, upon condition of perceiving their faults, nay of feeling them deeply, and not committing the like against them.

M. de Haugwitz, though he came with full hands, was therefore received with very different feelings, with anger by the court, with pain by the king, with a mixture of content and confusion by the public, and by nobody with complete satisfaction. As for M. de Haugwitz himself, he made his appearance without embarrassment before all these judges. He brought back from Schönbrunn what he had invariably advised, the aggrandizement of Prussia founded on the alliance of France. His only fault lay in having given way for a moment to the empire of circumstances, which subjected him to the grievous contrast of being now the signer of the treaty of Schönbrunn. But it was his unskilful successor, his ungrateful disciple, M. de Hardenberg, who had brought about these circumstances by so complicating the relations of Prussia, in the space of a few months, that she could not extricate herself from these complications but by clashing contradictions. Besides, M. de Haugwitz, if he had been hurried

away for a moment, had been less so than any body; and, after all, he had just saved Prussia from the abyss into which she had been well nigh plunged. Neither must it be forgotten that at Potsdam, seduced as the court was by the presence of Alexander, it had been strongly recommended to M. de Haugwitz not to hurry Prussia into a war before the end of December, and that, on the 2nd of December, he had found him whom he came to control or to fight, victorious, irresistible. He had been placed between the danger of a fatal war and a contradiction amply paid for: what would they have him do?—For the rest, he said, nothing was compromised. Grounding himself on the extraordinary nature and the unforeseen circumstances of the situation, he had entered with Napoleon into such engagements only as were conditional, subject more expressly than usual to the ratification of his court. People might, if they were as bold as they boasted of being, as alive to honour, as insensible to interest, as they pretended to be,—they might refuse to ratify the treaty of Schönbrunn. He had forewarned Napoleon; he had told him that, treating without having instructions, he treated without binding himself. They might choose between Hanover and war with Napoleon. The position was still the same as it had been at Schönbrunn, save that he had gained the month, which had been declared necessary for the organisation of the Prussian army.

Such was the language of M. de Haugwitz, exaggerated on a single point, namely where he alleged that he had been placed between the acceptance of Hanover and war. He would, in fact, have been able to reconcile Prussia with Napoleon without accepting Hanover. It is true that Napoleon would have distrusted this demi-reconciliation, and that from defiance to war it was but a step. The enemies of M. de Haugwitz censured him on another point. In keeping himself at Vienna, they said, less aloof from the Austrian negotiators, in making common cause with them, he would have been better able to withstand Napoleon, and to desert less ostensibly the European interests espoused at Potsdam, or not to desert them but with the consent of all. But that presupposed a collective negotiation, and to this Napoleon objected so strongly that to have insisted upon this point would have been another way to lead to a war. It was therefore war, and nothing but war, with a terrible adversary, before the fixed term of the end of December, against the well known wish of the king, and against the most positive interests of Prussia, that, as M. de Haugwitz alleged, had stared him in the face at Schönbrunn.

The embarrassment of this position, then, was much greater for others than for himself; and, besides, he had an imperturbable firmness, mixed with tranquillity and urbanity, which would have sufficed to support him in presence of his adversaries, had he even committed the blunders which he had not.

Thus M. de Haugwitz, without being disconcerted by the cries that rang around him, without even insisting on the adoption of

the treaty, as a negotiator attached to the work of which he was the author might have done, never ceased repeating that the cabinet was free, that it could choose, but with a perfect knowledge that it must choose between Hanover and war. He left to others the embarrassment of the contradictions of Prussian policy, and reserved for himself nothing but the honour of having brought back his country into the track, from which it ought never to have been made to swerve. Happy this minister had he continued in that line, and not subsequently marred that situation himself by inconsistencies, which ruined him, and well-nigh ruined his country.

The enthusiasts, whether sincere or affected, of Berlin, said that this gift of Hanover was a perfidious gift, which would involve Prussia in an everlasting war with England, and ruin the national commerce; that it was purchased, besides, by the sacrifice of fine provinces long attached to the monarchy, such as Cleves, Anspach, and Neufchatel. They asserted that Prussia, which, in ceding Anspach, Cleves, and Neufchatel, had ceded a population of 300,000 inhabitants to obtain one of 900,000, had made a bad bargain. According to them, if she had obtained Hanover without giving up any thing, without losing either Neufchatel, or Anspach, or Cleves, and even acquired something to boot, the Hanseatic cities, for instance, then there would be nothing to regret. The defection, thus paid for, would have been worth the while; but Hanover was nothing since they had it. At any rate, they added, Prussia was disgraced, covered with infamy in the eyes of Europe. The common country, Germany, was given up to foreigners. These last censures were more specious; but yet it might have been urged in reply that still worse things had been done in the last partition of Poland, and almost as bad in the recent partition of the Germanic indemnities. And yet nobody had cried shame upon them!

Moderate persons, very numerous among the wealthy population of Berlin, without repeating all these declamations, dreaded the reprisals of England upon Prussian commerce, were pained for the character of Prussia, felt real mortification at the triumph of the French armies over the German armies, but dreaded above all a war with France.

Such were at bottom the sentiments of the king, who, with the heart of a sound, patriotic, but moderate German, hesitated between these contrary considerations. He was racked with regret at the thought of the fault which he had committed at Potsdam, which reduced him to the necessity of an absolutely disgraceful inconsistency, the only objection that could be alleged against the fine present of Napoleon. And then, though he was not deficient in personal courage, he dreaded war as the greatest of calamities; he beheld in it the ruin of the treasure of Frederick, foolishly squandered by his father, carefully collected again by himself and already broken into by the late armament; above

all he beheld in it, with a sagacity which fear often imparts, the ruin of the monarchy.

Frederick William besought count Haugwitz to enlighten him with his intelligence, and count Haugwitz incessantly repeated to him, not knowing what else to say, that they had the choice between Hanover and war, and that, in his opinion, any war against Napoleon would be attended with disaster; that the Russian and Austrian armies were not inferior, whatever people might say, to the Prussian army, which would not do better, perhaps not so well as they, for at this moment it was much less habituated to war.

A council was held, to which were summoned the principal personages of the monarchy, Messieurs de Haugwitz, de Hardenberg, de Schulenburg, and the two most illustrious representatives of the army, marshal de Mollendorf and the duke of Brunswick. The discussion was very animated, though without any mixture of court passions; and, yielding to the force of the everlasting argument of count Haugwitz, which consisted in repeating that they could refuse Hanover if they chose to go to war, the council adopted a middle course, that is to say the very worst they could have done. They decided to adopt the treaty with modifications. M. de Haugwitz strongly opposed this resolution. He said that he had taken advantage of circumstances at Schönbrunn, and that he had obtained of Napoleon what he should not obtain a second time; that the latter would regard the modifications made in the treaty as a last success of the party inimical to France; that he would at last cease to reckon at all upon the Prussian alliance, that he would act in consequence, and that, holding himself to be disengaged by a ratification given with reservations, he would place Prussia between worse conditions and war.

M. de Haugwitz was not listened to. It was alleged that the modifications introduced, whether good or bad, saved the honour of Prussia, for they proved that they did not draw up treaties from the dictation of Napoleon. This reason, of so little value, made an impression upon those who had need to deceive themselves; and, after several alterations had been made in it, the treaty was adopted.

The first of these alterations plainly indicated the sentiments of those who had proposed them, and the nature of their embarrassment. The expression *offensive and defensive* given to the alliance contracted with France was struck out of the treaty, in order that the Prussian cabinet might appear before Russia with less confusion. Comments were added to explain in what cases it would deem itself obliged to make common cause with France. It demanded information concerning the late arrangements projected in Italy, and which were to be comprehended in the reciprocal guarantees stipulated by the treaty of Schönbrunn; for

it made a point of not formally approving what was about to be consummated at Naples, that is to say, the dethronement of the Bourbons, the clients and protégés of Russia.

These modifications signified that, though obliged to enter into the policy of France, Prussia would not enter frankly into it; that, above all, she would not enter into it so far as not to be able to explain her conduct at St. Petersburg and at Vienna. The intention was too visible to be favourably interpreted at Paris. To these modifications were added some others still less honourable. These were not written, it is true, in the new treaty, but M. de Haugwitz was commissioned to propose them verbally. The Prussian cabinet desired, in gaining Hanover, not to cede Anspach, which was the only concession of any importance required by Napoleon, and which formed the Franconian patrimony of the house of Brandenburg. It desired the annexation of the Hanseatic cities, a valuable accession from its commercial importance, and, in thus filling the measure of the greediness of the Prussian nation, it flattered itself that it should stifle the voice of honour in it and disarm the public opinion.

This done, M. de Laforest, minister of France, charged as such with the exchange of the ratifications, was sent for. This minister knew his sovereign too well to venture to ratify a treaty in which such alterations had been made. He refused at first to do so, but the solicitations addressed to him became so pressing, and M. de Haugwitz represented to him so forcibly the necessity of chaining the court of Berlin, to save it from its continual variations, and to snatch it from the suggestions of the enemies of France, that M. de Laforest consented to ratify the modified treaty, *sub spe rati*, a usual precaution in diplomacy, when one is desirous to reserve the pleasure of the sovereign.

It was, therefore, necessary to refer to Paris, to obtain the approval of these new tergiversations of the court of Prussia. M. de Haugwitz seemed to have succeeded with Napoleon, and he was considered as the fittest person to be sent to France to allay the storm that was foreseen. M. de Haugwitz long declined such a mission; but the king assailed him with such urgent entreaties, that he could not forbear to make up his mind to go to Paris, and to confront a second time that crowned and victorious negotiator, with whom he had treated at Schönbrunn. He set out, therefore, sending before him letters couched in the mildest and most obsequious language, to prepare for himself a less unfavourable reception than that which he had reason to apprehend.

Napoleon, when apprised of these last shuffling tricks of Prussian politics, saw in them what he could not help seeing, new weaknesses towards his enemies, new efforts to keep on good terms with them, while taking occasion at the same time to make some advantage by him. He felt, on account of this policy, less consideration than before, and, what was a great misfortune for Prussia and for France, he utterly despaired from

this time of a Prussian alliance. Add to this, that, upon reflection, he was sorry for what he had granted at Schönbrunn. The gift of Hanover, indeed, had been granted with too great precipitation, not that it could be better placed than in the hands of Prussia, but to dispose of it definitively was rendering the struggle with England more rancorous; it was adding to irreconcilable interests at sea irreconcilable interests on land, for old King George III. would have sacrificed the richest colonies of England rather than his German patrimony. Assuredly, if it was ascertained that England was for ever implacable, and could not be pacified but by force, it would then be right to go all lengths against her, and Hanover would be extremely well bestowed, if it were to cement a powerful and sincere alliance, capable of rendering continental coalitions impossible. But none of these suppositions appeared actually true. There were rumours of great discouragement in England, of the speedy death of Mr. Pitt, of the probable accession of Mr. Fox, and an immediate change of system. Napoleon, therefore, on learning the last proceedings in Prussia, was disposed to replace every thing on the old footing with her; that is to say, to restore Anspach, Cleves, and Neufchatel, and to take back Hanover from her, to be kept in reserve. At the point to which things had arrived, either through the fault of men or through the fault of events, the best thing that could be done was, in fact, to revert to terms of civility without intimacy, and to take back what each had given to the other. Napoleon in recovering Hanover, would have in his hands the means of treating with England, and of seizing the only occasion that was likely to present itself, for putting an end to an inauspicious war, the permanent cause of universal war.

This was his first idea, and would to Heaven that he had acted upon it! He gave instructions in this spirit to M. de Talleyrand. He desired that he might be represented to M. de Haugwitz, as more irritated than he was at the liberties taken with France; that France should be declared to be completely disengaged, and that she would keep herself free, either to take back Hanover, to make it a pledge of peace with England, or to place every thing on a new footing with Prussia, for concluding a more comprehensive and more solid treaty with her.*

* We quote the following letter which precisely expresses the idea of Napoleon on this occasion.

“ To M. de Talleyrand.

“ Paris, Feb. 4, 1806.

The ministry in England has been entirely changed since the death of Mr. Pitt; Mr. Fox has the portfolio of the foreign affairs. I desire you to present to me this evening a note founded on this idea :

“ The undersigned minister of foreign relations has received express orders from his Majesty the Emperor to inform M. de Haugwitz, at his first interview, that his Majesty cannot consider the treaty concluded at Vienna as existing, from default of ratification within the prescribed time; that his

M. de Haugwitz arrived at Paris on the 1st of February. He employed, both with M. de Talleyrand and with the Emperor, all the art with which he was endowed, and that art was great. He laid great stress on the embarrassments of his government, placed between France and coalesced Europe, inclining more frequently toward the first than hurried away sometimes towards the second by court passions; which must be comprehended and excused. He exhibited the Prussian government, painfully returning from the fault committed at Potsdam, needing for this to be supported, encouraged, by the courtesy of the French government; he so well depicted himself as the man who was striving alone in Berlin to bring back Prussia to France, and having a right on this account to be aided by the kindness of Napoleon, that the latter gave way, and unfortunately consented to renew the treaty of Schönbrunn, but on somewhat harder conditions than those which King Frederick William had just refused.

“I will not constrain you,” said Napoleon, to M. de Haugwitz; “I still offer you to replace things on their former footing, that is, to take back Hanover, and to restore Anspach, Cleves, and Neufchatel to you. But, if we treat, if I cede Hanover to you anew, I

Majesty does not allow to any power and least of all to Prussia—for experience proves that he must speak plainly and without circumlocution—a right to modify and interpret according to its own interest the different articles of a treaty; that it is not exchanging ratifications to have two different versions of the same treaty, and that the irregularity appears still greater if one considers the three or four pages of memorial added to the ratifications of Prussia; that M. de Laforest, his Majesty’s minister charged with the ratifications, would be culpable had he not himself observed all the irregularity of the proceeding of the court of Prussia, but that he had accepted the exchange only on condition of the approbation of the Emperor.

“The undersigned is, therefore, charged to declare that his Majesty does not approve it, in consideration of the sanctity due to the execution of treaties.

“But, at the same time, the undersigned is charged to declare that his Majesty is still desirous that the differences which have arisen in recent circumstances between France and Prussia should be amicably settled, and that the old friendship which existed between them should subsist as formerly; he is even desirous that the treaty of alliance offensive and defensive, if it is compatible with the other engagements of Prussia, should subsist between the two countries and ensure their connexion.”

This note, which you will present to me this evening shall be delivered tomorrow in the conference, and on no pretext whatever do I leave you at liberty to omit to deliver it.

You comprehend, yourself, that it has two objects: to leave me free to make peace with England, if, a few days hence, the accounts which I am receiving are confirmed, or to conclude a treaty with Prussia on a wider basis.

Let the wording be stern and plain, but you will add *viva voce* all the modifications, all the softenings, all the illusions, which shall make M. de Haugwitz believe that it is an effect of my temper which is irritated at this form, but that, at bottom, I am in the same sentiments as ever towards Prussia. My opinion is that, in the present circumstances, if Mr. Fox is really at the head of the foreign affairs, we cannot cede Hanover to Prussia but by a comprehensive system, capable of securing us from the fear of a continuance of hostilities.

shall not cede it on the same conditions, and I shall require you, moreover, to promise me to become a faithful ally of France. If Prussia is frankly, publicly on my side, I have no more European coalitions to fear, and, without a European coalition on my hands, I will soon settle matters with England. But I want nothing short of this certainty to induce me to make you a present of Hanover, and to feel convinced that I act wisely in giving it to you."

Napoleon was right, saving on one point, that was in making Prussia pay for Hanover by new compensations, in not giving it to her, on the contrary, on the most advantageous conditions; for there are no better allies than those who are fully satisfied. M. de Haugwitz, who was sincere in his desire to unite France and Prussia, promised Napoleon all that he required, and promised it with all the appearances of the greatest sincerity. To his promises he added some very pertinent insinuations respecting certain slights of Napoleon towards Prussia, the necessity of paying some regard to the dignity of the king, in the first place for the sake of the king himself, who, notwithstanding his timidity, was at bottom susceptible and irritable, and also for the sake of the nation and the army, which identified themselves with the sovereign, and took highly amiss whatever looked like a want of respect for him. M. de Haugwitz said that the violation of the territory of Anspach in particular had on this account an effect that was to be extremely regretted, and caused the nation to go halves with the court in the excitement which had led to the deplorable treaty of Potsdam.

These observations were just and striking. But, if Prussia needed to have respect paid her, Napoleon needed to be satisfied with her before he paid her respect, and to experience esteem before he showed it. Here was a double difficulty, which none had yet found means to surmount: would they be more successful after this accommodation? That was unfortunately very doubtful.

A second treaty, more explicit and more stringent than the former, was drawn up. Hanover was given to Prussia as formally as at Schönbrunn, but on condition of occupying it immediately and in right of sovereignty. A new and arduous obligation was the price of this gift: it consisted in closing the Weser and the Elbe against the English, and in closing those rivers as straitly as the French had done when they occupied Hanover. In exchange, Prussia granted the same cessions as at Schönbrunn; she gave the Franconian principality of Anspach, the remnant of the duchy of Cleves, situated on the right of the Rhine, and the principality of Neufchatel, forming one of the cantons of Switzerland. An advantage promised to the king of Prussia in the treaty of Schönbrunn was suppressed in this for the benefit of the king of Bavaria. According to the first treaty, the Franconian principality of Bayreuth, contiguous to that of Anspach, and to be retained by Prussia, was to be limited in a more

regular manner by taking out of that of Anspach a district containing 20,000 inhabitants. There was no further question about this district. Lastly, the obligations imposed upon Prussia were extended. She was obliged to guarantee not only the French empire as it was, with the new arrangements concluded in Germany and Italy, but she was further required to guarantee explicitly the future results of the war commenced against Naples, that is to say, the dethronement of the Bourbons and the then presumed establishment of a branch of the Bonaparte family on the throne of the Two Sicilies. This was certainly the most disagreeable of the recent conditions imposed upon Prussia, for it rendered the situation of the king towards the emperor Alexander more difficult than ever, on account of the professed protectorship of Russia in respect to the Bourbons of Naples. It is unnecessary to say that the guarantees were reciprocal, and that France promised to support Prussia with her armies, and to insure to her all her acquisitions past and present, including Hanover.

This second treaty was signed on the 15th of February.

Thus all that Prussia had gained by attempting to modify the treaty of Schönbrunn, was to be deprived of the additions of territory which were at first to have been added to Bayreuth, to be compelled to a very dangerous act, the closing of the Elbe and Weser, lastly to be obliged to avow publicly what was about to be consummated at Naples. The only results, in short, were more obligations and fewer advantages.

M. de Haugwitz could not have done better, unless he had placed things in their former state, which would assuredly have been preferable, for he would have spared Prussia the embarrassing engagements of a patched up and insincere alliance. It is true that he would then have deprived her of the illusion of a brilliant acquisition, extremely useful for covering in a moment all the meanness of Prussian policy. Be this as it may, M. de Haugwitz would not himself carry to Berlin this bitter fruit of the tergiversations of his court, and he resolved to send thither M. de Lucchesini, minister of Prussia in Paris. It did not suit him to solicit the adoption of a spoiled work, and to take upon himself alone the responsibility of the resolution which was proposed to be adopted. He wished to leave to his sovereign, to his colleagues, and to the royal family, who interfered in so indiscreet a manner in affairs of state, the business of choosing between the treaty of Schönbrunn, made a great deal worse, and war; for it was evident this time that Napoleon, put out of patience by a new rejection, if he did not take fire immediately, on account of a refused alliance, would treat Prussia in such a manner in all the European arrangements that war would very soon become inevitable.

He therefore sent M. de Lucchesini, whose superior he was, to Berlin, and for a few days took his place as minister at Paris. He charged him to carry the treaty to his court, to explain to it the exact state of things in France, to represent the real dispositions

of Napoleon, who was ready to become, according to the manner in which it behaved, either a powerful and sincere ally, though embarrassing from his spirit of enterprise, or a formidable enemy, if he was forced to regard Prussia as a second Austria. M. de Haugwitz did not commission M. de Lucchesini to solicit in his name the adoption of the new treaty. He wished for nothing more, for he was already disgusted with a task which had become too ungrateful, and with the fatigue of a responsibility that was too vexatious.

He remained therefore in Paris, treated with the highest distinction by Napoleon, studying attentively that extraordinary man, and persuading himself more and more every day of the justice of his own policy, and of the present and future interests which Prussia and France alike compromised by not knowing how to agree.

In Europe, every thing was going on according to the wishes of the fortunate victor of Austerlitz. The army which he had sent to Naples, under the apparent command of Joseph Napoleon, and under the real command of Massena, marched directly for the goal. The queen of Naples, striving once more to dispel the storm gathered by her faults, implored all the courts, and successively despatched cardinal Ruffo and the heir-apparent to the crown to meet Joseph, and to try to make a treaty, whatever might be the conditions. Joseph, bound by the imperative commands of his brother, refused cardinal Ruffo, received with respect the solicitations of prince Ferdinand, but did not halt for a moment in his march for Naples. The French army, 40,000 strong, passed the Garigliano on the 8th of February, and advanced, formed into three corps. One, that of the right, under general Reynier, went to blockade Gaeta; another, that of the centre, under marshal Massena, marched upon Capua; the third, that of the left, under general St. Cyr, directed its course through Apulia and the Abruzzi, towards the gulf of Tarento. On this intelligence, the English embarked with such precipitation, that they had well nigh brought their allies, the Russians, into danger. The former fled to Sicily, the latter to Corfu. The court of Naples took refuge at Palermo, after having completely emptied the public coffers and even those of the Bank. The prince royal, with the best troops that were left in the Neapolitan army, had betaken himself to the Calabrias. Two Neapolitan gentlemen were sent to Capua to treat for the surrender of the capital. A convention was signed, and Joseph, escorted by Massena's corps, appeared before Naples. He entered the city on the 15th of February, without any disturbance of order, the population of the *lazzaroni* having made no resistance.

The fortress of Gaeta, though included in the convention of Capua, was not surrendered by the prince of Hesse-Philippsthal, who was governor of it. He declared that he would defend himself there to the last extremity. The strength of this place, a sort of Gibraltar, connected only by an isthmus with the continent of

Italy, rendered it, in fact, capable of a long resistance. General Reynier carried the external positions with great boldness, and strove to coop up the enemy closely in the place, till he should be supplied with the *matériel* necessary for undertaking a regular siege.

Joseph, master of Naples, was only at the beginning of the difficulties which he had to encounter. Though he assumed as yet only the quality of Napoleon's lieutenant, he was not the less in all eyes the designated sovereign of the new kingdom. There was not a ducat in the chests; all the military stores had been carried off; the principal functionaries were gone. It was requisite to create at once finances and an administration. Joseph had good sense, mildness, but no part of that prodigious activity with which his brother Napoleon was endued, and which would have been necessary here to found a government.

He fell, nevertheless, to work. The *grandees* of the kingdom, more enlightened than the rest of the nation, as is the case in all countries at all civilised, had been ill-treated by the queen, who reproached them with being too much inclined to liberal opinions, and who kept them in fear of the *lazzaroni*, ignorant and fanatic, whom she incessantly threatened to let loose upon them: the usual conduct of royalty, which everywhere props itself upon the people against the aristocracy, when symptoms of resistance appear among the latter. The *grandees*, therefore, gave a good reception to the new government, for which they hoped for a discreetly reforming administration, and one determined to afford equal protection to all classes. Joseph, finding them animated with favourable sentiments, studied still more to draw them to him, and restrained the *lazzaroni* by the dread of severe executions. Besides, the name of Massena made disturbers tremble. A gale drove a Neapolitan frigate and cutter, with several transports, into Naples. In this manner some military stores and other things of considerable value were recovered. The forts were armed, contributions were levied, and a very clever Corsican, M. Salicette, sent by Napoleon to Naples, was placed at the head of the police. Joseph applied to his brother for assistance in money, to enable him to overcome these first difficulties.

Eugene, viceroy of upper Italy, had received the Venetian States from the hands of Austria. He had entered Venice, to the great satisfaction of the inhabitants of that ancient queen of the seas, who found in their annexation to an Italian kingdom, constituted on wise principles, a certain compensation for their lost independence. General Marmont's corps, descending from the Styrian Alps into Italy, had proceeded to the Isonzo, and formed a reserve ready to penetrate into Dalmatia, if this junction of forces should become necessary. General Molitor, with his division, had made a rapid march towards Dalmatia, to take possession of a country to which Napoleon attached great value, because it was contiguous to the Turkish empire. That general

had entered the town of Zara, the capital of Dalmatia. But he had still a great extent of coast to traverse before he reached the celebrated mouths of the Cattaro, the southernmost and the most important of the positions of the Adriatic, and he hastened his march, in order to awe by the terror of his approach the Montenegrins, who had long been in the pay of Russia.

For the rest, the court of Vienna, sighing for the retreat of the French army, was disposed to execute faithfully the treaty of Presburg. That court, exhausted by the last war, which was the third since the French Revolution, terrified by the blows which it had received at Ulm and at Austerlitz, had, undoubtedly not renounced the hope of raising itself again some day; but, for the present, it was resolved to introduce some order into its finances, and to let many years elapse before it again tried the fortune of arms. The archduke Charles, having again become minister of war, was directed to seek a new system of military organisation, which, without too great a reduction of force, should produce savings that could be no longer deferred. The government, therefore, lost no time in executing the late treaty of peace, in paying the contribution of 40 millions, either in specie or bills of exchange, in seconding the removal of the cannon and of the muskets taken at Vienna, that the successive retreat of the French troops might speedily be accomplished. This retreat was to terminate on the 1st of March, with the evacuation of Braunau.

Napoleon, who had left Berthier at Munich to superintend the return of the army, a return which he purposed to render slow and commodious, had enjoined that faithful performer of his orders to repair to Braunau, and not to restore that fortress till he had received positive intelligence of the delivery of the mouths of Cattaro. He had established marshal Ney, with his corps, in the country of Salzburg, that he might live there as long as possible at the expense of a province destined to become Austrian. He had established marshal Soult's corps on the Inn, *à cheval* on the archduchy of Austria and Bavaria, and living upon both. The corps of marshals Davout, Lannes, and Bernadotte, being too great a burden to Bavaria, whose inhabitants began to be weary of it, were marched towards the new countries ceded to the German princes our allies; and, as no term was fixed for the delivery of these countries, still dependent on litigious arrangements, there was a founded pretext for keeping them there for some time. Bernadotte's corps was therefore removed into the province of Anspach, ceded by Prussia to Bavaria. It there had space to extend itself and to subsist. Marshal Davout's corps was transferred to the bishopric of Eichstädt and the principality of Oettingen. The cavalry was divided among the different corps. Those which had not sufficient space to supply them with subsistence had permission to spread themselves among the petty princes of Suabia, whose existence was rendered problematical by

the treaty of Presburg, which required new changes in the Germanic constitution. The troops of Lannes, divided between marshal Mortier and general Oudinot, were quartered in Suabia. Oudinot's grenadiers proceeded through Switzerland towards the principality of Neuchâtel, to take possession of it. Lastly, Augereau's corps, reinforced by Dupont's division and general Dumonceau's Batavian division, was cantoned around Frankfurt, ready to march for Prussia, if the last arrangements concluded with her were not followed up by sincere and definitive proceedings.

These different corps were in excellent condition. They began to feel the effect of the rest which had been granted them; they were recruited by the arrival of young conscripts, incessantly setting out from the banks of the Rhine, where the depôts had been united under marshals Lefebvre and Kellermann. Our soldiers were fitter, if possible, for war, than before the late campaign, and excessively proud of their recent victories. They proved themselves humane towards the people of Germany, rather boisterous, it is true, prone to boast of their exploits; but, this noise over, sociable to the highest degree, and presenting a singular contrast to the German auxiliaries, who were much harder towards their countrymen than we ourselves were. Unfortunately, Napoleon, from a spirit of economy, useful to his army, detrimental to his policy, allowed the soldiers to be paid only part of their pay, retaining the remainder for their benefit, to be paid them subsequently after their return to France. He required that provisions should be furnished them by the countries in which they were encamped, in lieu of that part of their pay which was withheld, and this was a very heavy burden to the inhabitants. If the provisions had been paid for, the presence of our troops, instead of being a burden, would have become an advantage; and Germany, which knew that they had been brought upon its soil through the fault of the coalition, would have had on that account none but kindly feelings towards us. It was, therefore, an ill-judged saving, and the benefit resulting from it for the army was not equivalent to the inconveniences that were liable to arise from the sufferings of the occupied countries. Napoleon likewise caused the expenditure for clothing to be deferred, in order to new clothe the soldiers when they should repass the Rhine, and come to participate in the festivities which he was preparing for them. They, for their part, were perfectly satisfied, and cheerfully submitted to wear their old clothes, and to receive but little money, saying that, when they returned to France, they should have new clothes and plenty of savings to spend.

For the rest, if the people complained of the prolonged stay of our troops, the petty princes had finally invoked their presence as a benefit, for nothing was to be compared with the violence and the spoliations committed by the German governments, espe-

cially those which possessed any strength. The grand-duke of Baden and the king of Bavaria had laid their hands on the possessions of the immediate nobility, and, though they acted without any consideration, their haste was humanity compared with the violence of the king of Wurtemberg, who carried rapacity to such a length as to cause all the fiefs to be seized and plundered, as at the time when the cry in France was, *War with the mansions, peace with the cottages*. His troops entered the domains of princes, enclosed in his kingdom, upon pretext of seizing the possessions of the immediate nobility. Having a right to a portion only of the Brisgau, the king of Wurtemberg had occupied nearly the whole of it. But for the French troops, the Wurtembergers and the Badenens would have come to blows.

Napoleon had appointed M. Otto, minister of France, at Munich, and Berthier, major-general of the grand army, arbiters of the differences which he foresaw between the German princes, great and small. These latter had all hastened to Munich, whither the Diet of Ratisbon appeared to have transferred its seat, and there solicited the justice of France, and even the presence, how burdensome soever it might be, of French troops. On all sides arose inextricable disputes, which apparently it would be impossible to settle without new moulding the Germanic constitution. Meanwhile detachments of our soldiers held possession of the places in litigation, and every thing was referred to the arbitration of France and her ministers. At any rate, Napoleon did not make a handle of these disputes to prolong the stay of his troops in Germany, for he was impatient to order the return of the army, and to collect it around him at Paris; and for this he awaited only the entire occupation of Dalmatia, and the definitive answer of the court of Prussia.

That court, obliged to decide definitively upon the modified treaty of Schönbrunn, at length took its resolution. It accepted this treaty, which had become less advantageous since its double remodelling in Berlin and in Paris, and received, with confusion on its brow, with ingratitude in its heart, the gift of Hanover, which at any other time would have filled it with joy. What, indeed, could be done? There was no other course to take but to close the business by acceding to the proposals of France, or to make up its mind at once to war, war, for which the Prussian army boastingly cried out, and which its leaders, more considerate, and above all the king, dreaded as a ruinous experiment.

As for choosing war, it ought to have decided on this when Napoleon quitted Ulm, to bury himself in the long valley of the Danube, and to have fallen upon his rear, while the Austro-Russians, concentrated at Olmütz, were drawing him into Moravia. But the Prussian army was not ready then; and, after the 2nd of December, when count Haugwitz conversed with Napoleon, it was too late. It was much later now that the French, assem-

bled in Suabia and Franconia, had but a step to take to invade Prussia, now that the Russians were in Poland, and the Austrians in a completely disarmed state.

To accept the gift of Hanover on the conditions attached to it by France was, therefore, the only possible resolution. But this was a singular mode of commencing an intimate alliance. The treaty of the 15th of February was ratified on the 24th. M. de Lucchesini set out immediately for Paris with the ratifications. M. de Haugwitz, on his part, left Paris to return to Berlin, highly pleased with the personal treatment which he had received from Napoleon, promising him anew the faithful alliance of Prussia, but anticipating most arduous trials, at sight of all the difficulties which then swarmed in Germany, at the sight, more especially, of those petty German princes prostrate at the feet of France, to save themselves from the exactions with which they were overwhelmed by the more powerful or the more favoured princes.

On his arrival in Berlin, M. de Haugwitz found the king deeply dejected at his situation, deeply afflicted by the difficulties opposed to him by the court, more excited and more intemperate than ever. The audacity of the discontented was carried to such a length, that, one night, all the windows in the house of M. de Haugwitz were broken by rioters, who were generally believed to belong to the army, and who were publicly, but falsely, said to be agents of Prince Louis. M. de Haugwitz affected to disdain these manifestations, which, very insignificant in free countries, where one winks at while despising these excesses of the multitude, were strange and serious in an absolute monarchy, especially when they could be imputed to the army. The king considered them as a serious matter, and declared publicly his intention to be severe. He gave formal orders for a search after the culprits, whom the police, either from being implicated itself or powerless, did not succeed in discovering. The king, driven to extremity, manifested a firm and decided determination, which overawed the discontented, and particularly the queen. He gave the latter to understand that his resolution was taken, that the welfare of the monarchy had commanded him to take it, and that every body about him must assume an attitude conformable to his policy. The queen who, for the rest, was devoted to the interests of the king, her husband, was silent, and, for a moment, the court presented a decorous aspect.

M. de Hardenberg quitted the ministry. This personage had become the idol of the opposition. He had been the creature of M. de Haugwitz, his partisan, his imitator, and the most zealous advocate of the French alliance, particularly in 1805, when Napoleon, from his camp at Boulogne, offered Hanover to Prussia. Then M. de Hardenberg regarded it as the most brilliant of glories to ensure this aggrandisement to his country, and com-

plained to the French ministers of the hesitations of his sovereign, who was too backward, he said, in attaching himself to France. Since then, having seen that scheme miscarry, he had thrown himself, with the impetuosity of an intemperate character, into the arms of Russia, and, unable to extricate himself from this error, he loudly declaimed against France. Napoleon, informed of his conduct, committed a great fault in regard to him, which he repeated more than once, and which was to mention him in his bulletins, by making an offensive allusion to a Prussian minister, seduced by the gold of England. The imputation was unjust. M. de Hardenberg was no more seduced by the gold of the English, than was M. de Haugwitz by the gold of the French: it was most indecent in an official document, and bespoke too strongly the licence of the soldier conqueror. It was this attack which procured for M. de Hardenberg the immense popularity which he enjoyed. The king allowed him to retire with testimonies of consideration, which did not take the character of a political disgrace from this retirement.

But, while he removed M. de Hardenberg, Frederick William associated with M. de Haugwitz, a second, who was not much better: this was M. de Keller, whom the court considered as one of its own, and who gave himself out publicly as inspector over his superior. It was a sort of satisfaction granted to the party hostile to France; for, in absolute governments, rulers are frequently obliged to give way to opposition, just as in free governments. Frederick William did still more; he endeavoured to keep on good terms with Russia, to explain honourably to her the interested inconsistencies which he had committed.

Since Austerlitz, the cabinet of Berlin had been very chary of communications with St. Petersburg. After all the boastings of Potsdam, Russia could not but be ashamed of her defeat, and Prussia of the manner in which she had kept the oath sworn on the tomb of the great Frederick. Silence was for the moment the only fitting relation between the two courts. Russia, however, had once broken it to declare that her forces were at the disposal of Prussia, if the treaty of Potsdam, divulged, should bring a war upon her. Since that time she had said nothing, nor Prussia either.

It was requisite at last to come to an explanation. The king pressed the old duke of Brunswick to go to St. Petersburg, to oppose his glory to the censures which the conduct pursued at Schönbrunn and continued in Paris could not fail to call forth. This respectable prince, devoted to the house of Brandenburg, set out, therefore, notwithstanding his age, for Russia. He went not to declare frankly that Prussia had at length espoused the French alliance, which would have been difficult, but yet preferable to a continuation of ambiguities, already very pernicious: he went to say that if Prussia had taken Hanover it was that it might not be left in the hands of France, and to spare herself the

mortification and danger of seeing the French appear again in the north of Germany; that, if she had accepted the term alliance, it was to avoid war, and that this term was intended to signify nothing but neutrality; that neutrality was the best course for both of them; that Russia and Prussia had nothing to gain by war; that, by persisting in that system of implacable hostility against France, they fostered the commercial monopoly of England, and that it was not very sure that they were not also fostering the continental domination of Napoleon.

Such was the language which the duke of Brunswick was to hold at St. Petersburg.

We must return to the young emperor, who, hurried into war by vanity and against the secret whispers of his reason, had served at Austerlitz such a sorry apprenticeship to arms. He had given little cause for being talked of during the last three months, and had hidden in his distant empire the confusion of his defeat.

A general outcry was raised in Russia against the young men who, it was alleged, governed and compromised the empire. These young men, placed, some in the army, others in the cabinet, had fallen out with one another. The party of the Dolgoroukis accused the party of the Czartoryskis and reproached it with having ruined every thing by its misbehaviour towards Prussia. They would have done violence to her, said the Dolgoroukis; they had, therefore, estranged instead of drawing her nearer, and her refusal to join the coalition had prevented its success. It was in a particular interest that they had so acted, it was to wrest the Polish provinces from Prussia, and to reconstitute Poland, a mischievous dream, for which the Polish prince Czartoryski was evidently betraying the emperor.

Prince Czartoryski and his friends maintained with much more reason that it was those presumptuous soldiers, who could not wait at Olmütz for the expiration of the term fixed for the intervention of Prussia, that had insisted prematurely on giving battle, and opposing their twenty-five years' experience to the skill of the most consummate general of modern times—that it was these presumptuous and incapable soldiers who were the real authors of the disasters of Russia.

The old Russians, dissatisfied, condemned both the youthful parties; and Alexander, accused of allowing himself to be guided sometimes by the one, sometimes by the other, had become at this period an object of little consideration for his subjects.

He had been deeply dejected in the first days after his defeat, and, if Prince Czartoryski had not several times roused him to a sense of his own dignity, he would have manifested too plainly the profound despondency of his spirit. Prince Czartoryski, though he had his share in the inexperience common to the young men who governed the empire, was nevertheless consistent and serious in his views. He was the principal author of that system of European arbitration which had led Russia to take arms against

France. That system, which, with Russian statesmen, was in reality but a mask thrown over their national ambition, was with that young Pole a sincere and cordially embraced idea. He wished Alexander to persevere in it; and, if it was a great presumption in men so young to pretend to control Europe, especially in presence of the powers which were then disputing the empire over it, it was a still greater levity to give up so soon what had been so rashly undertaken.

Prince Czartoryski had addressed to the young emperor, once his friend and beginning to become again his master, noble and respectful remonstrances which would do honour to a minister of a free country, which must do him much more honour where resistance to power is an act of rare devotedness and destined to remain unknown. Prince Czartoryski, recapitulating to Alexander his hesitations, his weaknesses, said, "Austria is abased, but she detests her conqueror; Prussia is divided between two parties, but she will finally yield herself up to the German sentiment which predominates in her. In managing these powers, wait till the moment arrives when one or the other shall be ready to act. Till then you are out of reach: you can remain some time without making either peace or war, and thus wait till circumstances permit you either to resume arms or to retreat with advantage. Cease not to be allied with England, and you will oblige Napoleon to concede to you what is your due."

Deeply sensible of the greatness of Napoleon, since he had met him on the field of battle of Austerlitz, Alexander thus replied to prince Czartoryski: "When we pretend to assail this man we are children presuming to tackle a giant." And he added that, without Prussia it would be impossible to renew the war, for without her there was no chance of maintaining a successful war. Alexander had conceived a singular esteem for the Prussian army, for this single reason, that it had not yet been beaten by Napoleon. That army, in fact, was then the illusion and the hope of Europe. With that Alexander was ready to commence the struggle afresh, but not without it. As for England, he ceased to hope for any very efficacious support from her. He feared that, after the death of Mr. Pitt, announced as certain, after the accession of Mr. Fox, announced as near at hand, hatred of France would be extinguished, if not in the hearts of the English, at least in their policy. However, the remonstrances of prince Czartoryski, stimulating the pride of Alexander, had raised his spirit, and he was resolved, before he delivered his sword to Napoleon, to make him wait for it. But though useful, the lessons of his young censor were annoying to him, and that to such a degree as to induce him to seek, among the aged persons of his empire, a complaisant servant without capacity, to cover with a great age and to execute with submission his personal will. It was already said that his favour was fixed on general Budberg.

The conduct recommended by prince Czartoryski was, nevertheless, followed very punctually. Russia again placed herself in communication with Austria; she seemed to have forgotten the coolness of Holitsch, expressed to that court great sympathy in its misfortunes, and high consideration for the power that was yet left it; she even undertook to negotiate in London to obtain payment for her of a year's subsidy, though the war had lasted only three months. As for Prussia, she avoided every thing that could have offended her, abstaining, nevertheless, from approving her acts. The duke of Brunswick had arrived in the first days of the month of March. He was most cordially received, he was loaded with attentions, which seemed to be addressed to his person, to his age, to his military glory, and by no means to the court of which he was the representative. His reception was cooler when he began to converse on political affairs. He was told that Russia could not approve of the conduct of Prussia in accepting Hanover from the hand of the enemy of Europe; that, for the rest, the peace which she had made with France was a false peace, neither solid nor durable; that Prussia would soon be forced to adopt a resolution too long delayed, and at last to draw the sword of the great Frederick—"Then," said the emperor Alexander to the duke of Brunswick, "I will serve under your command, and glory in learning the art of war in your school."

An attempt, however, was made to commence with the old duke a negotiation destined to be kept profoundly secret. Upon pretext that the conditions would not be faithfully kept by France, it was proposed to conclude a sub-alliance with Russia, by means of which Prussia, if she were dissatisfied with her French ally, might have recourse to her Russian ally, and would have at her disposal all the forces of the Muscovite emperor. What was offered was nothing less than treason against France. The duke of Brunswick, wishing to leave behind at St. Petersburg dispositions favourable to Prussia, consented not to conclude such an engagement but to propose it to the king. It was agreed that this negotiation should be left open, and that it should be carried on secretly and unknown to M. de Haugwitz, through the medium of M. de Hardenberg, the same minister who was apparently disgraced, and who continued under hand to treat upon the most important affairs of the monarchy.

While Prussia was thus seeking to explain her conduct to Russia, she attempted also to excuse herself in London for the occupation of Hanover. Nothing was more singular than her manifesto to the Hanoverian people and her despatch to the court of London. To the Hanoverians she said that it was with pain she took possession of that kingdom—possession for which she paid by a severe sacrifice, that of her provinces on the Rhine, in Franconia, and in Switzerland; but that she did so to insure peace to Germany, and to spare Hanover the presence of foreign armies. After addressing to the Hanoverian people these words without frankness and without dignity, she said to the English cabinet that she did not take

Hanover from England, but that she received it from Napoleon, whose conquest Hanover was. She received it, she added, against her will, and as an exchange that was forced upon her for provinces which were the object of her keenest regret; that it was one of the consequences of the imprudent war which Prussia had always blamed, which had been undertaken contrary to her advice, and the consequences of which the allies must impute to themselves, for, in combating it unseasonably, they had raised up that colossal power which took from one to give to another, and which did violence as well to those whom it favoured with its gifts as to those whom it despoiled.

England was not to be satisfied with such reasons. She replied in a manifesto, in which she overwhelmed the court of Prussia with invectives, declared it miserably fallen under the yoke of Napoleon, unworthy of being listened to, and as contemptible for its greediness as for its dependence. Still the British cabinet, that it might not appear in the eyes of the nation to bring an additional enemy upon its hands, for an interest belonging exclusively to the royal family, said that it would have suffered this new invasion of Hanover, the inevitable result of the continental war, if Prussia had confined herself to a mere occupation; but that this power, having announced the closing of the rivers, had committed a hostile act, an act supremely injurious to English commerce, and that in consequence it declared war against her. Orders were given to all the ships of the royal navy to take all vessels sailing under the Prussian flag. Great was the consequent perturbation in Germany; for the vessels of the Baltic, usually covered themselves with that flag, which was more respected than the others by the lords of the sea.

The ascendancy of the battle of Marengo had reconciled England with Napoleon, the ascendancy of that of Austerlitz brought her back to him once more, for the victories of our land armies were means of disarming her quite as sure though less direct. The first of these victories had produced the resignation of Mr. Pitt, the second caused his death. This great minister, having resumed his seat in the cabinet in 1803, for no more than two years, appeared there only to drink deeply of mortifications. Having returned without Mr. Wyndham and Lord Grenville his former colleagues, without Mr. Fox, his recent ally, he had had to fight in parliament his old and his new friends, in Europe Napoleon, become emperor, and more powerful than ever. At his voice so well known to the enemies of France, the cry of arms had rung on all sides; a third coalition had been formed and the French army had been drawn away from Dover to Vienna. But this third coalition once dissolved at Austerlitz, Mr. Pitt had seen his plans frustrated, Napoleon at liberty to return to Boulogne, and the keen anxieties of England about to be renewed.

The idea of again seeing Napoleon on the shores of the Chan-

nel engrossed all minds in England. Reliance was still placed, it is true, on the immense difficulty of the passage, but people began to fear that nothing was impossible with the extraordinary man who shook the world; and they asked if it was worth while to risk such chances, for the sake of acquiring an island more, when they already had all India, when they held the Cape of Good Hope and Malta too firmly to be dispossessed of them. They said to themselves that the battle of Trafalgar had definitively insured the superiority of England on the seas, but that the European continent was left to Napoleon, that he was about to close all its outlets, that this continent, after all, was the world, and that one could not live cut off from it for ever; that the most splendid naval victories would not prevent Napoleon, taking advantage some day of some accidental circumstance, from leaving that continent to invade England. The system of war to the utmost extremity was, therefore, universally discredited among rational Englishmen, and, though that system was subsequently successful, yet they were then sensible of the danger which was great, too great for the advantages that might be gained by a prolonged struggle.

Now, as men are the slaves of Fortune, and readily take her momentary caprices for eternal, they were cruel towards Mr. Pitt: they forgot the services which for twenty years that minister had rendered to his country, and the degree of greatness to which he had raised it by the energy of his patriotism, and by the parliamentary talents by which he had subjugated the House of Commons. They considered him as vanquished and treated him as such. His enemies railed at his policy and the results which it had produced. They imputed to him the faults of general Mack, the precipitation of the Austrians in taking the field without waiting for the Russians, and the precipitation of the Russians in giving battle without waiting for the Prussians. All this they imputed to the vehement impatience of Mr. Pitt, they affected great sympathy for Austria, while they accused him of having ruined her, and of having ruined in her the only genuine friend of England.

Mr. Pitt, nevertheless, was a stranger to the plan of the campaign, and had participated in nothing but the coalition. It was he who had principally knitted it, and in knitting it he had prevented the Boulogne expedition. People gave him no thanks for it.

A singular circumstance had rendered the effect of Napoleon's late victory more painful. On the day after Austerlitz, as on the day after Marengo, it was asserted for a few moments, before the truth was known, that Napoleon had lost in a great battle twenty-seven thousand men and all his artillery. But accurate information had very soon been circulated, and the members of the opposition, getting the French bulletins translated and printed, distributed and sent them to the door of Mr. Pitt and the Russian ambassador.

In order to the enjoyment of all his glory, Napoleon would have had only to pass the Strait, and listen to what was said of him, of his genius, of his fortune. Melancholy vicissitudes of this world! what Mr. Pitt underwent at this period, Napoleon had to undergo later, and with a greatness of injustice and of passion proportioned to the greatness of his genius and of his destiny.

Twenty-five years' parliamentary conflicts, consuming conflicts, which wear out soul and body, had ruined the health of Mr. Pitt. An hereditary disorder, which business, fatigues, and recent vexations had rendered mortal, caused his premature end on the 23rd of January, 1806, after having governed his country more than twenty years, with as much power as can be exercised in an absolute monarchy; and yet he lived in a free country, and yet he enjoyed not the favour of his sovereign, and had to conquer the suffrages of the most independent assembly in the world.

If we admire those ministers who in absolute monarchies have the skill to chain for a long time the weakness of the prince, the instability of the court, and to reign in the name of their master over an enslaved country, what admiration ought we not to feel for a man, whose power, established over a free nation, lasted twenty years! Courts are extremely capricious no doubt: they are not more so than great deliberative assemblies. All the caprices of public opinion, excited by the thousand stimulants of the daily press, and reflected in a parliament where they assume the authority of the national sovereignty, compose that variable will, alternately servile and despotic, which it is necessary to captivate in order to reign one's self over that multitude of heads which pretend to reign. To hold sway there, it requires not only that art of flattery which wins success in courts, but also that very different art of public speaking, sometimes vulgar, sometimes sublime, which is indispensable to obtain a hearing from an assembly; it requires, further, that which is not an art, which is a gift, the temper with which one succeeds in quelling and controlling the excited passions. All these natural or acquired qualities Mr. Pitt possessed in the highest degree. Never in modern times has there existed a more able leader of an assembly. Exposed for a quarter of a century to the impetuous vehemence of Mr. Fox, to the cutting sarcasms of Mr. Sheridan, he bore himself up with imperturbable composure, spoke at all times justly, opportunely, temperately, and, when the ringing voice of his adversaries was joined by the still more powerful voice of events, when the French Revolution, incessantly disconcerting the most experienced statesman and general in Europe, flung across his way either Fleurus, or Zurich, or Marengo, he always knew how to restrain the excited minds of the British parliament by his firmness and by the pertinence of his answers. It is for this more particularly that Mr. Pitt was remarkable, for he had not, as we have elsewhere observed, either the organising genius or the profound

faculties of the statesman. With the exception of some financial institutions of disputed merit he created nothing in England; he was often mistaken respecting the relative strength of the European powers and the course of events, but to the talents of a great political orator he added ardent love of his country, and a passionate hatred of the French Revolution. Representing in England not the titled aristocracy, but the commercial aristocracy, which lavished its treasures upon him in the way of loans, he resisted the greatness of France and the contagion of democratic disorders with immoveable perseverance, and maintained order in his country without diminishing liberty. He left it burdened with debt, it is true, but quiet possessor of the seas and of India. He used and abused the strength of England, but she was the second power in the world when he died, and the first, eight years after his death. And what would the strength of nations be good for unless to endeavour to control one another! Vast dominations are among the designs of Providence. What a man of genius is to a nation, a great nation is to mankind. Great nations civilise, enlighten the world, and accelerate its progress in every way. Only it is necessary to counsel them to unite with strength the prudence which gives success to strength and the justice which honours it.

Mr. Pitt, so prosperous for eighteen years, was unfortunate in the last days of his life. We were avenged, we French, on that cruel enemy; for he had reason to conclude that we should be victorious for ever, to doubt the excellence of his policy, and to tremble for the futurity of his country. It was one of the least gifted of his successors, lord Castlereagh, who was destined to enjoy our disasters.

Amidst accusations the most diverse and the most violent, Mr. Pitt had the good fortune not to see his integrity assailed. He lived upon his emoluments, which were considerable, and without being poor, was reputed to be so. When his death was made known, one of the old ministerial majority proposed to pay his debts. This motion, being submitted to parliament, was received with respect, but resisted by his old friends, who had become his enemies, and particularly by Mr. Wyndham, who had so long been his colleague in the ministry. His noble antagonist, Mr. Fox, refused to support the motion, but with grief. "I honour," he exclaimed, in a tone that moved the assembled Commons, "I honour my illustrious adversary, and I account it the glory of my life to have been sometimes called his rival. But for twenty years I have opposed his policy, and what would the present generation say of me if it were to see me approving a proposal designed to be the last and the most signal homage to that policy, which I have believed, which I still believe, to be prejudicial to England." Every body comprehended the vote of Mr. Fox, and applauded the noble spirit of his language.

A few days afterwards, the motion having assumed another character, parliament unanimously voted 50,000*l.* sterling (1,250,000

frances) to pay Mr. Pitt's debts. It was decided that he should be buried at Westminster.

Mr. Pitt left vacant the offices of first lord of the treasury, chancellor of the exchequer, lord warden of the Cinque ports, chancellor of the university of Cambridge, and several others of less importance.

It was very difficult to supply his place, not in these different offices, for which numerous ambitions were ready to dispute, but in that of prime minister, in which there was something awful in presence of Napoleon, conqueror of the European coalition. One idea had taken possession of all minds immediately after the renewal of the war in 1803, and at the sight of the weak ministry of Mr. Addington, who then governed. The concerted opposition of Pitt and Fox against the Addington cabinet, rendered this coalition of talents more natural and more easy. Mr. Pitt desired it, but not so strongly as to overcome George III. He entered upon the ministry without Mr. Fox, and, by a sort of compensation, without his staunchest friends in the old Tory system, without lord Grenville and Mr. Wyndham, whom he had found too ardent to associate them again with himself.

These, left out by Mr. Pitt, had been gradually drawing nearer to Mr. Fox by the way of opposition, though, from the nature of their opinions, they were further from him than Mr. Pitt himself. A common struggle of two years had contributed to unite them, and few differences divided them when Mr. Pitt died. A general opinion called them together to the ministry, to replace by their combined talents the great minister whom the country had just lost; to endeavour to make peace by means of the friendly relations between Mr. Fox and Napoleon; and to continue the struggle with all the known energy of the Grenvilles and the Wyndhams, if they did not succeed in arranging with France.

If, in 1803, George III. had taken Mr. Pitt, whom he disliked, in order to dispense with Mr. Fox, whom he disliked still more, he was forced, after Mr. Pitt's death, to submit to the empire of public opinion, and to call into one and the same cabinet, Fox, Grenville, Wyndham, and their friends. Lord Grenville had the office of first lord of the treasury, that is to say, prime minister; Mr. Windham that which he had always occupied, the administration of war; Mr. Fox, the foreign affairs; Mr. Grey, the Admiralty. The other departments were distributed among the friends of these political personages, but in such a manner that Mr. Fox numbered most votes in the new ministry.

This cabinet, thus formed, obtained a great majority, notwithstanding the attacks of the ousted colleagues of Mr. Pitt, lord Castlereagh and Mr. Canning. It directed its immediate attention to two essential objects, the organisation of the army, and the relations with France.

As for the army, it was not possible to leave it as it had been since 1803, that is to say, composed of an insufficient regular

force, and of 300,000 volunteers, as expensive as they were ill disciplined. It was an organisation of emergency, devised for the moment of danger. Mr. Wyndham, who had always been sarcastic upon the volunteers, and maintained that nothing great could be done but with regular armies, which had furnished him with occasion to speak in magnificent terms of the French army—Mr. Windham could less than any other retain the present organisation. He proposed, therefore, a sort of disguised disbanding of the volunteers, and certain changes in the troops of the line, which were designed to facilitate the recruiting of the latter. We have already seen that the English army, like all mercenary armies, was recruited by voluntary enlistment. But this enlistment was for life, and rendered recruiting difficult. Mr. Wyndham proposed to convert it into temporary enlistment for a term of seven to twenty years, and to add to it considerable advantages of pay. He contributed thus to procure a much stronger organisation for the English army; but he had to contend with the prejudice which standing armies excite in all free nations, with the favour which the volunteers had acquired, and above all with the interests created by that institution; for it had been necessary to form a corps of officers for the volunteers, which government was now obliged to dissolve. An attempt had been made to set Mr. Wyndham at variance with his new colleague, Mr. Fox, who, participating in the popular prejudices of his party, had formerly shown a greater predilection for the institution of the volunteers than for the extension of the regular army. Notwithstanding all these obstacles, the ministerial plan was adopted. A large augmentation to the regular army was voted; till the complete development of the new system, it was to consist of 267,000 men, 75,000 of whom were local militia, and 192,000 troops of the line, distributed throughout the three kingdoms and the colonies. The total expence of the budget still amounted to about 83 millions sterling, that is, more than two thousand million francs, made up by taxes to the amount of 1500 millions and a loan, to be contracted in the course of the year, for 500.

It was with these mighty resources that England purposed to appear before Napoleon, in order to negotiate. From Mr. Fox, from his situation, from his friendly relations with the Emperor, were expected facilities which no other could possess for tendering pacific overtures. A fortunate accident, which Providence owed to that honest man, furnished him with a most honourable and most natural opportunity. A wretch, judging of the new English administration from the preceding, introduced himself to Mr. Fox, and offered to assassinate Napoleon. Mr. Fox indignantly ordered him to be seized by the door-keepers, and delivered up to the English police. He wrote immediately a very noble letter to M. de Talleyrand, denouncing the odious proposal which he had just received, and offering to place at his

disposal all the means for prosecuting the author, if his scheme appeared to involve any thing serious.

Napoleon was touched, as well he might be, at so generous a procedure, and ordered M. de Talleyrand to address to Mr. Fox such an answer as the latter deserved. "I have laid your excellency's letter before his majesty," wrote M. de Talleyrand. "There," he exclaimed, "I recognise the principles of honour and virtue which have always animated Mr. Fox. Thank him in my name, he added, and tell him that, whether the policy of his sovereign causes us to continue much longer at war, or whether as speedy an end as the two nations can desire is put to a quarrel useless for humanity, I rejoice at the new character which, from this proceeding, the war has already taken, and which is an omen of what may be expected from a cabinet, of the principles of which I am delighted to judge from those of Mr. Fox, who is one of the men most fitted to feel in every thing what is excellent, what is truly great."

M. de Talleyrand said nothing more, and this was sufficient to produce a continuation of communications so nobly commenced. Mr. Fox immediately answered by a frank and cordial letter, in which, without circumlocution, without diplomatic quirk, he offered peace on safe and honourable conditions, and by means as simple as they were prompt. The bases of the treaty of Amiens were much changed, according to Mr. Fox; they were so in consequence of the very advantages obtained by France and England, on the two elements which were the ordinary theatre of their successes. It was, therefore, necessary to seek new conditions, which should not hurt the pride of either of the two nations, and which should procure for Europe guarantees of future tranquillity and safety. These conditions, if both sides chose to be reasonable, were not difficult to be found. According to anterior treaties, England could not negotiate separately from Russia, but, till the latter could be consulted, it was allowable to commit to chosen agents the task of discussing the interests of the belligerent powers, and paving the way to their adjustment. Mr. Fox offered to appoint immediately the persons who should be charged with this mission, and the place where they were to meet.

This proposal delighted Napoleon, who, at bottom, wished for a reconciliation with Great Britain, for from her every war proceeded, like water from its source, and there were few direct means of conquering her, one alone excepted, extremely decisive, but extremely precarious, and practicable for him only, an invasion. He was sincerely rejoiced at this frank overture, and accepted it with the greatest cordiality.

Without entering into any explanation of the conditions, he intimated in his reply that France would not dispute much with England the conquests which she had made (she had retained

Malta, as it will be recollected, and taken the Cape,) that France, on her side, had said her last word to Europe in the treaty of Presburg, and that she claimed nothing further; that it would, therefore, be easy to lay down the bases, if England had not particular and inadmissible views relative to commercial interests. "The Emperor is persuaded," said M. de Talleyrand, "that the real cause of the rupture of the peace of Amiens was no other than the refusal to conclude a commercial treaty. Be assured that the Emperor, without refusing certain commercial advantages, if they are possible, will not admit of any treaty prejudicial to French industry, which he means to protect by all duties or prohibitions that can favour its development. He insists on having liberty to do at home all that he pleases, all that is deemed beneficial, without any rival nation having a right to find fault with him."

As for the intervention of Russia in the treaty, Napoleon directed a positive declaration to be made that he would not permit it. The principle of his diplomacy was that of separate peace, and this principle was equally just and ably conceived. Europe had always employed the medium of coalitions against France; it would be favouring them to admit of collective negotiations, for it would be lending one's self to the essential condition of every coalition, that which forbids its members to treat separately. Napoleon who, in war, strove to meet his enemies separated from each other, in order to beat them in detail, could do no other than strive in diplomacy to meet with them in the same position. Accordingly, he had opposed absolute refusals to all offers of negotiating collectively, and he was right, with the salvo to depart from this principle of conduct, in case Mr. Fox should be bound by engagements which would not permit him to treat without Russia. Napoleon, after he had laid down the principle of a separate negotiation, enjoined his minister to intimate further that he was ready to choose for the place of the negotiation, not that Amiens which reminded one of bases of peace henceforward abandoned, but Lille, and to send a minister plenipotentiary thither immediately.

Mr. Fox instantly replied that the first condition which had been agreed upon at the outset of these parleys was, that the peace should be equally honourable for both nations, and that it would not be so for England, if she treated without Russia, for she had formally engaged by an article of a treaty (that which had constituted the coalition of 1805) not to conclude a separate peace. This obligation was absolute, according to Mr. Fox, and could not be eluded. He said that, if France had a principle, that of not authorising coalitions by her manner of negotiating, England had another, that of not suffering herself to be excluded from the continent by lending herself to the dissolution of her continental alliances; that, on this point, people in England were quite as jealous as they could be in France on the subject of co-

alitions. Mr. Fox, who accompanied each of his official despatches with a private letter full of frankness and honour, an example which M. de Talleyrand followed on his side—Mr. Fox finished with saying that the negotiation would perhaps be stopped by an absolute obstacle, which he sincerely regretted, but that, at any rate, the war would be honourable and worthy of the two great nations which waged it. He added these remarkable words: “I am sensible to the highest degree, as I ought to be, to the obliging expressions which the great man whom you serve has used in regard to me. Regret is unavailing, but, if he could see, with the same eye that I behold it, the true glory which he would have a right to acquire by a just and moderate peace, what happiness would not result from it for France and for all Europe!

“C. J. FOX.”

“London, April 22, 1806.

Amidst this rancorous, one might say ferocious contest, when one reviews the sanguinary scenes which have marked it, the mind loves to dwell on that noble and kindly intercourse, to which a man as generous as he was eloquent gave rise for a moment, between the two greatest nations of the globe, and the heart is filled with painful, inconsolable regret.

Napoleon was himself deeply touched by the language of Mr. Fox, and he was sincerely desirous of peace. M. de Talleyrand, though mistaken in regard to the system of our alliances, was never wrong on the main point of the policy of the time, and he ceased not for a moment to believe that, at the height of greatness to which we had attained, peace was our primary interest. He found a courage to say this which he had not in general, and he earnestly pressed Napoleon to seize the unique occasion offered by the presence of Mr. Fox in office, to negotiate with Great Britain. For the rest, he had no difficulty to gain a hearing, for Napoleon was not less disposed than himself to profit by this alike fortunate and unexpected occasion.

Circumstances, moreover, assisted to overcome the obstacle which seemed to stop the negotiation at its outset. There was more than one reason to believe, from reports which came from the duke of Brunswick and from the consul of France at St. Petersburg, that Alexander, uneasy about the consequences of the war, mistrusting the silence of the British cabinet towards him, and the personal dispositions of Mr. Fox, wished for the re-establishment of peace. The consul of France had sent to Paris the chancellor of the consulate to report what he had learned, and every thing seemed to encourage a hope of opening a direct negotiation with Russia. In this case, Mr. Fox could no longer insist on the principle of a collective negotiation, since Russia would herself have set the example of renouncing it.

It was determined, therefore, to prosecute the parleys commenced by Mr. Fox, and for this purpose there was employed an

agent, whom a lucky chance had just presented. To the generous words exchanged with Mr. Fox were added proceedings not less generous. Ever since the apprehension of the English, ordered by Napoleon, at the time of the rupture of the peace of Amiens, by way of reprisals for the seizure of French vessels, many members of the highest families in England had been detained at Verdun. Mr. Fox had applied for the release of several of them on parole. His solicitations had been cheerfully complied with, and, though not daring to insist upon all of them in an equal degree, he had classed them according to the interest which he felt for them, Napoleon resolved to grant them all, and the English designated by him had been released without any exception. In return for this noble proceeding, Mr. Fox had selected, for the purpose of releasing them, the most distinguished prisoners taken at the battle of Trafalgar, the unfortunate Villeneuve, captain Lucas, the heroic commander of the *Redoubtable*, and many others, equal in number to the English set at liberty.

Among the prisoners restored to Mr. Fox was one of the richest and one of the cleverest English noblemen, Lord Yarmouth, afterwards Marquis of Hertford, a staunch Tory, but an intimate friend of Mr. Fox's, a decided partisan of peace, which enabled him to live abroad and enjoy the pleasures of the continent, of which he was deprived by the war. This young nobleman, acquainted with the most brilliant of the youth of Paris, in whose dissipations he partook, was well known to M. de Talleyrand, who liked the English nobility, especially such of them as had talents, elegance, and dissolute habits. Lord Yarmouth was pointed out to him as particularly connected with Mr. Fox, and as well worthy of the confidence of both governments. He sent for him, told him that the Emperor was sincerely desirous of peace, that they must set aside the ceremony of diplomatic forms, and come to a frank explanation upon the conditions acceptable on both sides; that these conditions could not be very difficult to find, since France would no longer dispute with England what she had conquered, that is to say, Malta and the Cape; that the question, therefore, was reduced to a few islands of little importance; that, in regard to France, she spoke out in a clear and straightforward manner; she desired that, besides her natural territory, the Rhine and the Alps, no power should henceforth contest with her the whole of Italy, including the kingdom of Naples, and her alliances in Germany, on condition of restoring their independence to Switzerland and Holland, as soon as peace should be signed; that, consequently, there was no serious obstacle to an immediate reconciliation of the two countries, since both must be disposed to concede the things just specified; that, relative to the difficulty arising from the form of the negotiation, collective or separate, they should soon find a solution of that, thanks to the inclination shown by Russia to treat directly with France.

There was one capital point on which no explanation was

given, but respecting which France gave to understand that in the end she should tell her secret, and tell it in such a manner as to satisfy the royal family of England—that was Hanover.

Napoleon had actually determined to restore it to George III., and it was the recent conduct of Prussia which had provoked him to this serious resolution. The hypocritical language of that court in its manifestoes, tending to represent it to the Hanoverians and to the English as an oppressed power which had been forced with the sword at its throat, to accept a fine kingdom, had transported him with anger. He was for tearing that moment the treaty of the 15th of February, and obliging Prussia to replace every thing on the former footing. But for the reflections which time and M. de Talleyrand suggested, he would have made a disturbance. Another more recent circumstance had contributed to detach him entirely from Prussia, that was the publication by Lord Castlereagh and Mr. Pitt's retiring colleagues, of the negotiations of 1805. The latter were intent on avenging the memory of their illustrious leader, by showing that he had had nothing to do with the military operations, though he had had the greatest share in the formation of the coalition of 1805, which had saved England, by causing the breaking up of the camp of Boulogne. But, in defending the memory of their leader, they had compromised most of the courts. Mr. Fox had reproached them with it in the House of Commons with extreme vehemence, and had attributed to them the change in all the relations of England with the European powers. There was in fact a universal outcry against English diplomacy in the cabinets, which found themselves denounced to France by this imprudent publication. On this occasion, an unlucky light had been thrown on the conduct of Prussia. Her hypocritical and recent declarations to England relative to Hanover, the hopes which she had held out to the coalition, before and after the events of Potsdam, were all divulged. Napoleon, without complaining, had ordered the insertion of these documents in the *Moniteur*, leaving every one to guess what he ought to think of them.

But the opinion of Napoleon in regard to Prussia was formed. He no longer considered her worth the trouble of a prolonged contest with England: he was determined to restore Hanover to the latter, and to offer Prussia one of two things, either an equivalent to Hanover to be found in Germany, or the restitution of what he had received from her, Anspach, Cleves, and Neufchatel. There the cabinet of Berlin would reap what it had sown, and would meet with no more fidelity than it had manifested. Still Napoleon was ignorant of the secret negotiation begun with Russia through the medium of the duke of Brunswick and M. de Hardenberg.

Without completely explaining, the French government gave Lord Yarmouth to understand that the peace would not depend

on Hanover, and he set out, promising to return soon with the secret of Mr. Fox's intentions.

A singular event, which for some days imparted to things a strong appearance of war, contributed on the contrary to turn them to peace, by accelerating the resolutions of the Russian cabinet. The French troops ordered to occupy Dalmatia, had hastened their march to the mouths of the Cattaro, to preserve them from the danger with which they were threatened. The Montenegrins, whose bishop and principal chiefs subsisted on the bounty of Russia, were greatly agitated on learning the approach of the French, and had sent for admiral Siniavin, the same who had conveyed from Corfu to Naples and from Naples to Corfu the Russians sent to overrun the south of Italy. That admiral, informed of the opportunity which offered to seize the mouths of the Cattaro, had hastily embarked a few hundred Russians, joined them to a body of Montenegrins who had descended from their mountains and appeared before the forts. An Austrian officer who occupied them, and a commissioner charged by Austria to surrender them to the French, declaring that they were constrained by a superior force, delivered them up to the Russians. This allegation of a superior force was wholly unfounded, for, in the forts of Cattaro there were two Austrian battalions very capable of defending them even against a regular army possessing the means of siege, of which the Russians were destitute. This perfidy was chiefly the deed of the Austrian commissioner, marquis de Ghislieri, a most artful Italian, blamed afterwards by his government, and put upon his trial for this dishonourable act.

When the report of this fact, transmitted to Paris by an extraordinary courier, reached Napoleon, he was extremely irritated, for he attached infinite importance to the mouths of the Cattaro, not so much on account of the advantages, though very positive, of their maritime position, as for their vicinity to Turkey, on which they enabled the holder to exercise an influence, either protective or repressive. But he was angry with the cabinet of Vienna alone, for it was that cabinet which ought to deliver the territory of Dalmatia to him, and which was the only debtor in regard to him. The corps of marshal Soult was on the point of repassing the Inn and evacuating Brannau. Napoleon ordered it to halt on the Inn, to re-arm Brannau, to re-establish itself, and to create an absolute *place d'armes* there. At the same time he declared to Austria that the French troops should turn back, that the Austrian prisoners on their march home should be detained, and that, if need were, that things should be carried so far as the renewal of hostilities, unless one of these two satisfactions were given him; either the immediate restitution of the mouths of the Cattaro or the despatch of an Austrian military force to retake them from the Russians in conjunction with the French. This second alternative was not the one that he should have liked least, for it would set Austria at variance with Russia. When

these declarations, made with the peremptory tone usual with Napoleon, had reached Vienna, they produced real consternation there. The Austrian cabinet was in no wise implicated in this treachery of an inferior agent. The latter had acted without order, thinking to please his government by a perfidy against the French. Letters were immediately despatched from Vienna to St. Petersburg, to inform the emperor Alexander of the new perils to which Austria found herself exposed, and to declare that, unwilling on any account to see the French again at Vienna, she would rather submit to the painful necessity of attacking the Russians in the forts of the Cattaro.

Admiral Siniavin, who had taken possession of the mouths of the Cattaro, had acted without orders, as well as the marquis de Ghisilieri who had delivered them. Alexander was grieved at the position in which his ally the emperor Francis had been placed; he was grieved at the position in which he was himself placed, between the embarrassment of restoring and that of retaining. He was more and more annoyed by the solicitations of his young friends, who talked to him incessantly about perseverance in conduct; he was uneasy respecting the negotiations begun by Napoleon with England; and, though the latter had at length broken the silence which she had observed during the ministerial crisis, he distrusted his allies, and was inclined to follow the general example and to reconcile himself with France. Accordingly, he took occasion from the very circumstance of the mouths of the Cattaro, which seemed rather an occasion for war than for peace, to commence a pacific negotiation. He had at hand the former secretary of the Russian legation at Paris, M. d'Oubril, who had conducted himself there to the satisfaction of both governments, and who had, moreover, the advantage of being well-known in France. He was directed to proceed to Vienna, and to apply there for passports to Paris. The ostensible pretext was to be business relating to the Russian prisoners, but his real errand was to treat of the affair of the mouths of the Cattaro, and to include it in a general settlement of all the questions which had divided the two empires. M. d'Oubril had orders to delay as long as possible the restitution of the mouths of the Cattaro, to give them up, nevertheless, if there were no means of preventing a renewal of hostilities against Austria; and to manage above all to re-establish an honourable peace between Russia and France. It will be thought honourable, he was told, if something, no matter what, is obtained for the two habitual protégés of the Russian cabinet, Naples and Piedmont; for the two empires had, for the rest, nothing to dispute with each other, and were carrying on merely a war of influence. Before he set off, M. d'Oubril conversed with the emperor Alexander, and it became manifest to him that this prince was visibly much more disposed to peace than the Russian ministry, which besides was tottering, and on the point of being dismissed. He set out, therefore, inclining to that side to which his master inclined. He was furnished with double powers, the one limited, the other complete,

and embracing all the questions that he could have to resolve. He had orders to concert with the English negotiator relative to the conditions of peace, but without requiring a collective negotiation, which, in fact, did away with the difficulties that had arisen between France and England.

M. d'Oubril set out for Vienna and by his presence restored composure to the emperor Francis, who feared that he should either see the French come back to his country, or that he should have to fight the Russians. The second alternative alarming him much less than the first, that prince had sent off an Austrian corps for the mouths of the Cattaro, with orders to second the French troops, if necessary. M. d'Oubril cheered him by showing his powers, and applied for passports through count Rausmouky, in order to proceed as speedily as possible to Paris.

Napoleon desired that an immediate and favourable answer should be given to the demand of M. d'Oubril, but at the same time he took care to make a distinction between the affair of the mouths of the Cattaro and that of the re-establishment of peace. The affair of the mouths of the Cattaro, according to what was said on his behalf, could not be the subject of any negotiation, since it related to an engagement of Austria's which remained unexecuted, and respecting which France had nothing to discuss with Russia. As to the re-establishment of peace, the French government was ready to listen most cheerfully to the proposals of M. d'Oubril, for it was sincerely desirous to put an end to a war, alike without object and without interest for the two empires. The passports of M. d'Oubril were immediately despatched to Vienna.

Napoleon thus saw Austria, exhausted by three wars, striving to avoid any new hostility against France; Russia disgusted with a contest too lightly undertaken, and determined not to prolong it; England, satisfied with her naval successes, thinking it not worth while to expose herself again to some formidable expedition; lastly, Prussia, stripped of all respect, of no value in the estimation of any one, and in this state, the whole world desirous to preserve or to obtain peace, on conditions, it is true, which were not yet clearly defined, but which, whatever they were, would leave France in the rank of the first power in the world.

Napoleon keenly enjoyed this situation, and had no inclination whatever to compromise it even to gain new victories. But he meditated vast projects, which he conceived that he could cause to spring naturally and immediately from the treaty of Presburg. These projects seemed to him to be so generally foreseen, that, upon the single condition of accomplishing them forthwith, he hoped to get them comprehended in the double peace which was negotiating with Russia and England. Then his empire, such as he had conceived it in his mighty mind, would be definitively constituted and accepted by Europe. These results obtained, he considered peace as the completion and the ratification of his

work, as the prize due to his labours and to those of his people, as the accomplishment of his fondest wishes. He was a man, in short, as he had already sent word to Mr. Fox, and he was far from being insensible to the charms of repose. With the powerful versatility of his mind, he was as much disposed to enjoy the sweets of peace and the glory of the useful arts as to transport himself again to fields of battle, to bivouac among his soldiers upon the snow.

Lord Yarmouth had returned from London, with a private letter from Mr. Fox, attesting that he possessed the entire confidence of that minister, and that he might be talked to without reserve. This letter added, that Lord Yarmouth should receive powers, as soon as there should be a well-founded hope of an arrangement. M. de Talleyrand had then informed him of the communications established with Russia, and had thus proved the inutility of insisting on a collective negotiation, when Russia lent herself to a separate negotiation. As for the pretension of England not to be excluded from the affairs of the continent, M. de Talleyrand offered Lord Yarmouth an official recognition of *an equal right for both powers of intervention and guarantee in continental and maritime affairs*.* Thus the question of a separate negotiation seemed to be a question no longer, and the conditions of peace themselves appeared to present no further insoluble difficulties. England wished to retain the Cape and Malta; she also showed a desire to keep our establishments in India, such as Chandernagor and Pondicherry, the French islands of Tobago and St. Lucia, and above all the Dutch colony of Surinam, situated on the American continent. Among these different possessions, Surinam alone was of any importance, Pondicherry being but a mere wreck of our ancient power in India; Tobago and St. Lucia were not of sufficient value to induce a refusal. Respecting Surinam, England did not absolutely insist. As for our continental conquests, assuredly as important as our maritime conquests, she was ready to concede all of them to us, without excepting Genoa, Venice, Dalmatia, and Naples. Sicily alone appeared to form a difficulty. Lord Yarmouth, explaining himself confidentially, said that England was tired of protecting those Bourbons of Naples, that imbecile king, that mad queen; that, nevertheless, since they possessed Sicily *de facto*, for Joseph had not yet conquered it, one would be obliged to demand it for them, but that this would be a question which would depend on the result of the military operations already undertaken. In case, however, Sicily should be taken from them, Lord Yarmouth added, that an indemnity must somewhere be found for them. It was tacitly implied that, in return for these various concessions, Hanover should be restored to England. But on both sides the matter was reserved without being formally mentioned.

* The words of the despatch.

Sicily, therefore, was the only serious difficulty, and yet the immediate conquest of the island, upon condition of an indemnity, however insignificant it might be, would be capable of arranging every thing. Passports had been sent to M. d'Oubril; it was not known what pretensions he might bring, but they could not be essentially different from the English pretensions.

Napoleon clearly perceived that, by not hurrying the negotiations and by accelerating, on the other hand, the execution of his plans, he should attain his twofold aim, that of constituting his empire as he pleased, and of obtaining the confirmation of its establishment by the general peace.

From the first, in preferring the title of emperor to that of king, he had conceived a vast system of empire, on which vassal royalties should be dependent, in imitation of the Germanic empire, an empire so enfeebled that it no longer existed but in name, and which held out a temptation to replace it in Europe. The late victories of Napoleon had heated his imagination, and he dreamt of nothing else but of reviving the empire of the West, placing its crown on his head, and thus re-establishing it for the advantage of France. The new vassal royalties were all found, and they were to be distributed among the members of the Bonaparte family. Eugene de Beauharnais, adopted as son, become the husband of a Bavarian princess, was already viceroy of Italy, and this vicerealty comprehended the more important half of the Italian peninsula, since it extended from Tuscany to the Julian Alps. Joseph, elder brother of Napoleon, was destined for king of Naples. Nothing more was required but to procure Sicily for him, in order to put him in possession of one of the finest kingdoms of the second order. Holland, which had great difficulty to govern itself as a republic, was under the absolute dependence of Napoleon; and he thought that he could include it in his system, by constituting it a kingdom in favour of his brother Louis. These made three kingdoms to be placed under the paramourship of his empire. Sometimes, when he extended the dream of his greatness further, he thought of Spain and Portugal, which were daily giving him signs, Spain of a secret hostility, Portugal of an open hostility. But this was yet placed at a great distance in the wide horizon of his imagination. It was requisite that Europe should oblige him by some new startling achievement, like that of Austerlitz, to decide upon the complete expulsion of the house of Bourbon. It is certain, however, that this expulsion began to be a systematic idea with him. Since he had been led to proclaim the dethronement of the Bourbons of Naples, he considered the family of Bonaparte as destined to replace the house of Bourbon on all the thrones of the south of Europe.

In this vast hierarchy of vassal States dependent on the French empire, he planned a second and a third rank, composed of great

and small duchies, after the model of the fiefs of the Germanic empire. He had already constituted for the benefit of his eldest sister the duchy of Lucca, which he purposed to augment by the addition of the principality of Massa, detached from the kingdom of Italy. He projected the creation of another, that of Guastalla, by detaching it also from the kingdom of Italy. These two dismemberments were very insignificant, in comparison with the magnificent accession of the Venetian States. Napoleon had just obtained from Prussia, Neufchatel, Anspach, and the remnant of the duchy of Cleves. He had given Anspach to Bavaria, in order to procure the duchy of Berg, a fine country, situated on the right of the Rhine, below Cologne, and comprehending the important fortress of Wesel.—Strasburg, Mayence, and Wesel, said Napoleon, are *the three bridles* of the Rhine.

He had still, in Upper Italy, Parma and Placentia, in the kingdom of Naples, Ponte Corvo and Benevento, fiefs disputed between Naples and the pope, who gave him at this moment the most serious causes of displeasure. Pius VII. had not carried with him from Paris the satisfactions which he expected. Flattered by the attentions of Napoleon, he had deceived himself in his hopes of a territorial compensation. Besides, the invasion of all Italy by the French, now that they had spread themselves from the Julian Alps to the Strait of Messina, had appeared to him to complete the dependence of the Roman States. He was excessively mortified at this, and showed it in all ways. He would not organise the church of Germany, which was left without prelates, without chapters, ever since the secularisations. He admitted of none of the religious arrangements adopted for Italy. On occasion of the marriage which Jerome Bonaparte had contracted in the United States with a Protestant, and which Napoleon wished to get dissolved, the pope opposed an insincere but obstinate resistance, thus employing his spiritual arms in default of temporal arms. Napoleon had sent him word that he considered himself as master of Italy, including Rome, and that he would not suffer any secret enemy there; that he should follow the example of those princes who, continuing faithful to the Church had known how to control it; that he was a real Charlemagne for the Church of Rome, for he had re-established it, and he claimed to be treated as such. Meanwhile, he expressed his displeasure by taking Ponte Corvo and Benevento. This was the deplorable commencement of a baneful misunderstanding, to which Napoleon then conceived that he could set any bounds he pleased, for the interests of religion and the empire.

Thus, besides several thrones to give away, he had Lucca, Guastalla, Benevento, Ponte Corvo, Placentia, Parma, Neufchatel, and Berg, to distribute among his sisters and his most faithful servants, with the titles of principalities or duchies. While giving kingdoms, such as Naples to Joseph, augmentations,

such as the Venetian States to Eugene, he thought of creating a score of minor duchies, destined as well for his generals as for his best servants of the civil order, to form a third rank in his imperial hierarchy, and to reward in a signal manner those men to whom he owed the throne, and to whom France owed her greatness.

While, in placing the imperial crown on his head, he had adjudged to himself the prize of the marvellous exploits performed by the contemporary generation, he had raised longings in the companions of his glory, and they, too, aspired to obtain the reward of their exertions. Unfortunately, they no longer imitated the abstinence of the generals of the Republic, and frequently took what he was in no haste to give them. In Italy, and especially in the Venetian States, had recently been committed scandalous extortions, which Napoleon made a point of repressing with the utmost rigour. He had, with incredible vigilance, sought and discovered the secret of those exactions, summoned before him the persons who had been guilty of them, wrung from them a confession of the sums appropriated, and required the immediate restitution of those amounts, beginning with the general-in-chief, who was obliged to pay a considerable sum into the chest of the army.

But he meant not to impose strict integrity on his generals, without rewarding their heroism. Tell them, he wrote to Eugene and to Joseph, about whom were employed several of the officers whose conduct he had just corrected, tell them that I will give them all much more than they could ever take themselves; that what they would take would cover them with shame, that what I shall give them will do them honour, and will be an everlasting testimony of their glory; that, in paying themselves with their own hands, they would vex my subjects, make France the object of the maledictions of the conquered, and that what I shall give them, on the contrary, accumulated by my foresight, will not be a robbery of any one. Let them wait, he added, and they shall be rich and honoured, without having to blush for any extortion.

Profound ideas were mingled, as we see, with his conceptions, apparently the most vain. He was, therefore, resolved to gratify the desire of his generals for enjoyments, but to direct it towards noble rewards legitimately acquired. Under the Consulate, when every thing still had the republican form, he had devised the Legion of Honour. Now that all about him assumed the monarchical form, and that he was perceptibly growing greater, he wished every one to grow great along with him. He meditated the creation of kings, grand-dukes, dukes, counts, &c. M. de Talleyrand, a warm advocate for creations of this kind, had, during the last campaign, assisted Napoleon much in his business, and had conversed with him on this subject as well as upon the arrangement, of Europe, which he was commissioned to negotiate at Presburg. They two had conceived an extensive system of

vassalage, comprehending dukes, grand-dukes, kings, under the paramountship of the Emperor, and possessing not empty titles but real principalities, either in territorial domains or in ample revenues.

The new kings were, for the sake of the greater conformity with the Germanic empire, to retain upon the thrones which they were about to occupy, their quality of grand dignitaries of the French empire. Joseph was to remain grand-electoral, Louis constable, Eugene archchancellor of state, Murat grand-admiral, when they should become kings or grand-dukes. Supplementary dignitaries, such as a vice-constable, a vice-grand-electoral &c., taken from among the principal personages of the State, were to perform their functions when they were absent, and would thus multiply the offices to be distributed. The kings, who continued dignitaries of the French empire, were to reside frequently in France, and to have a royal establishment in the Louvre appropriated to their use. They were to form the council of the imperial family, to perform certain special functions in it during minorities, and even to elect the Emperor, in case the male line should become extinct, which sometimes happens in reigning families.

The assimilation with the German empire was complete, and, that empire falling to ruin on all sides, liable itself to be swept away by a mere effect of the will of Napoleon, the French empire would be there, quite ready to take its place in Europe. The empire of the Franks might again become what it was under Charlemagne, the empire of the West, and even assume that title. This was the final wish of that immense ambition, the only one which it did not realise, that for which it tormented the world, for which perhaps it perished. M. de Talleyrand who, while recommending peace sometimes flattered the passions which lead to war, frequently presented this idea to Napoleon, knowing what a profound emotion it excited in his soul. Whenever he mentioned it to him, he saw all the fire of ambition flashing in his eyes, sparkling with genius. Swayed, however, by a sort of modesty, as on the day before that when he assumed the supreme power, Napoleon durst not avow the full extent of his desires. The archchancellor Cambacérès, to whom he opened himself more, because he was more sure of his absolute discretion, had been half intrusted with his secret wishes and had taken care not to encourage them, because in him attachment never silenced prudence. But it was evident that, at the summit of human greatness, having arrived at that point beyond which Alexander, Cæsar, Charlemagne had not passed, the restless and insatiable spirit of Napoleon longed for something more, and that was the title of emperor of the West, which nobody in the world had borne for a thousand years.

Between the nations of the south and the west, the French, the Italians, the Spaniards, all children of Roman civilisation,

there exists a certain conformity of genius, manners, interests, sometimes of territory, which is not found beyond the Channel, the Rhine, and the circle of the Alps, among the English and the Germans. This conformity is an indication of a natural alliance, which the house of Bourbon, by uniting under its royal sceptre Paris, Madrid, Naples, and sometimes Milan, Parma, Florence, had partly realised. If that was what Napoleon meant, if, master of France, of that which terminated at the mouths of the Meuse and of the Rhine and at the summit of the Alps, if, master of all Italy, having it in his power soon to become so of Spain, he purposed only to reconstitute that alliance of nations of Latin origin, by giving to it the symbolical form, sublime for its memorials, of the empire of the West, the nature of things, though strained, was not much outraged. The family of Bonaparte stepped into the place of the house of Bourbon, to reign in a more complete manner over the extent of the countries which that ancient house had aspired to rule, in order to attach them by a simple bond of paramountship to the head of the family, a bond which left each of the southern nations its independence, by giving greater strength to the useful bundle of their alliance. With the genius of Napoleon, by transfusing into his policy the prudence which he displayed in war, with a very long reign, it might not perhaps have been impossible to realise this conception. But that nature of things which always avenges itself severely on those who disregard it, was foolishly outraged, when, in his ambition, Napoleon ceased to respect the boundary of the Rhine, when he set about uniting the Germans to the Gauls, subjecting the nations of the north to the nations of the south, placing French princes in Germany, in spite of the invincible antipathies of manners; and he then set before all eyes the phantom of that universal monarchy which Europe dreads and detests, which it has combated, which it will do well to combat incessantly, but to which it will some day perhaps be subjected, by the nations of the north, after having refused to submit to it from the hand of the nations of the west.

A concatenation of events, unforeseen even by the vast and provident ambition of Napoleon, led at this moment to the dissolution of the Germanic empire, and was about to render vacant that noble title of emperor of Germany, which had been assumed by the successors of Charlemagne instead of the title of emperor of the West. It was a new and fatal encouragement for the projects which Napoleon cherished in his soul, without yet daring to reveal them.

When Napoleon, in his late treaties with Austria, thought of recompensing his three allies of South Germany, the princes of Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Baden, and of putting an end to all subject of collision between them and the head of the empire by the solution of certain questions left undecided in 1803, he had pronounced, but without being aware of it, the speedy dissolu-

tion of the old German empire. The providential, sometimes involuntary, almost always misconceived instrument of that French Revolution which was to change the face of the world, he had prepared, unknown to himself, one of the greatest European reforms.

It will be recollected how, in 1803, France had been called upon to interfere in the internal government of Germany; how the princes, who had lost all or part of their territories by the cession of the left bank of the Rhine, had resolved to indemnify themselves by secularising the ecclesiastical principalities. Unable to agree about the division of these principalities, they had called Napoleon to their aid, in order to effect with equity and decision that partition which otherwise was impossible. Prussia and Austria had received possessions of the Church from his own hand, with a single motive for displeasure,—that they had not received more. The suppression of the ecclesiastical principalities had led to the modification of the three colleges composing the Diet. About the college of the electors they had agreed, but not about that of the princes, in which Austria claimed a greater number of Catholic votes than had been granted to her. They had also agreed respecting the college of the cities, reducing the number to six, and almost entirely destroying their influence. Nothing had been decided respecting a new organisation of the circles charged to uphold respect for the laws in each great German province, relative to a new religious organisation, rendered necessary since the suppression of a great number of sees and indefinitely deferred through the ill-will of the pope. Lastly, the serious question respecting the immediate nobility had not been resolved, because it interested the whole German aristocracy, and particularly Austria, which had in the members of that nobility vassals dependent on the empire, independent of the territorial princes, and rendering a number of services, of which the recruiting, authorised in their possessions, was not the least.

The mediating powers of France and Russia, tired of this long mediation, occupied elsewhere by other circumstances, had no sooner withdrawn their hands, leaving Germany half remodelled, than anarchy seized that unhappy country. Austria, upon pretext of a right of waifs, had usurped the dependencies of the ecclesiastical possessions given as indemnities, and had deprived the indemnified princes of a considerable portion of what was their due. These princes, on their part, had seized the lands of the immediate nobility, and had availed themselves for this of the uncertainties of the last recess.

The war of 1805 having again brought Napoleon beyond the Rhine, he had taken advantage of the occasion to resolve the questions left undecided for the benefit of the princes, his allies, and he had thus created in the countries of Baden, Wurtemberg, and Bavaria, a sort of dissonance with the rest of Germany. But the greediness of these same allies had given rise to difficulties

which extended to the whole of Germany. The king of Wurtemberg, observing no moderation, had usurped the lands of the immediate nobility, as well those which had that quality as those which had not. He had arrogated to himself more than the rights of the territorial sovereign, and had seized many of the mansions of the nobility, as if he had been their real owner. Of all those rights of feudal origin, which Austria had insisted on exercising in Suabia, and the nature of which was dangerously arbitrary, he had declared himself the new possessor in virtue of the possession of certain feudal chief towns which the partition of Austria and Suabia had procured him, and he began to exercise them with greater vigour than the Austrian chancellery itself. The houses of Baden and Bavaria, annoyed by him, and authorised by his example, committed the like excesses in their territories. The contempt of right had been carried so far as to penetrate into the sovereign principalities enclosed in the dominions of the three princes, upon pretext of searching in them for domains of the immediate nobility, which could not in any case belong to them, for, if those domains belonged to any other than the immediate nobles themselves, it must have been to the sovereign prince on whom they were immediately dependent.

Napoleon had charged M. Otto, his minister at Munich, as umpire, and Berthier, as head of the executive power, to settle all disputes between Baden, Wurtemberg, and Bavaria, arising out of the partition of the Austrian territories in Suabia. The difficulties becoming more complicated, Napoleon had associated with them general Clarke, to assist them in reducing this chaos to order. This all of them alike despaired of accomplishing. The princes who had suffered this violence first carried their complaints to Ratisbon; but the ministers at the Diet, having neither courage nor authority since Austria no longer gave it to them, declared themselves unable to check the disorder spreading on all sides. Austria herself had almost reduced them to this impotence, of which they complained, by refusing in the preceding year to authorise any serious deliberation, so long as the college of princes was not reconstituted according to her pleasure, and the number of Catholic votes which she claimed were not added to it. And now, definitively conquered, wholly engrossed with her own welfare, she completed the annihilation of the Diet, by showing that she was no further to be relied on for any efficacious aid. The Diet, therefore, was a destroyed body, receiving at most the communications that were made to it, scarcely acknowledging the receipt of them, but not deliberating on any subject whatever.

At this sight, the petty sovereign princes, the immediate nobles, exposed to all sorts of usurpations, the free cities, reduced to six or five by the gift of Augsburg to Bavaria, the secularised ecclesiastical princes, whose pensions were not paid, hastened to Munich to claim from Messieurs Otto, Berthier, and Clarke, the protection of France. These gentlemen, indignant at the spectacle of

oppression which they witnessed; had at first formed a sort of congress to reconcile all interests, and to prevent the commission of unjust acts under the shadow of the protection of France. M. Otto had conceived a plan of arrangement, which France was to submit to the principal oppressors, the sovereigns of Bavaria, Baden, and Wurtemberg. But he had soon discovered that he had done nothing less than frame a new plan for a Germanic constitution; and, moreover, the agents of the king of Wurtemberg, when he had submitted this plan to them, had loudly cried out against it, and declared that their master would never consent to the proposed concessions. One would have said that this prince, whom France had just made a king, whose dominions she had augmented, whose sovereign prerogatives she had doubled, was robbed by her, because she required some respect for property, and some neighbourly regard for the weakest of his neighbours. Not knowing what more to do, M. Otto had sent all to Paris, both claims and claimants, and the plan of arrangement which he had devised with the intention of justice. This reference had taken place at the end of March.

Ever since that period, oppressed and oppressors were at the foot of the throne of Napoleon. It became evident that the sceptre of Charlemagne had passed from the Germans to the French.

This was what had been said and written in all forms by the prince archchancellor, the last ecclesiastical elector retained by Napoleon, and transferred by him, as it will be recollected, from Mayence to Ratisbon. This prince, whose amiable and fickle character, and whose sumptuous propensities we have elsewhere sketched, seeking force where it existed, never ceased to beseech Napoleon to take in hand the sceptre of Germany; and if any one had made the dangerous name of Charlemagne ring in Napoleon's ears, it was certainly he.—You are Charlemagne, said he to him, be then the master, the regulator, the saviour of Germany.—If that name, which was not the one that best pleased the pride of Napoleon, for he had in Alexander and Cæsar rivals more worthy of his genius, but which particularly flattered his ambition, because it established more relations with his plans relative to Europe—if that name was always blended with his own, it was less from his doing than from the doing of all those who had recourse to his protecting power. If the Church wanted something of him, You are Charlemagne, said she, give us what he gave us. When the German princes of all the States were oppressed, they said to him, You are Charlemagne, protect us as he would have done.

Thus ideas were suggested to him, which his ambition might not so soon have conceived, if it had been slow in its desires. But the wants of nations and his ambition then kept pace with one another.

In all ages, the princes of Germany, besides the Germanic con-

federation, a legal authority and recognised by them, had formed particular leagues to defend such rights or such interests as were common to certain of them. All that were left of these leagues addressed themselves to Napoleon, soliciting him to interfere in their favour, both as author and guarantee of the act of mediation of 1803, and as the signer and executor of the treaty of Presburg. Some proposed to form new leagues under his protection, others to form a new Germanic confederation under his imperial sceptre. The princes whose possessions were usurped, the immediate nobles whose lands were seized, the free cities threatened with suppression, proposed various plans, but were ready, on condition of protection, to adopt the plan that should be most generally approved.

The prince archchancellor, fearing lest his ecclesiastical electorate, the last relic of the wreck, should be swept away in this second tempest, devised a plan to save it; this was to form a new Germanic confederation, called to deliberate under his presidency, and comprehending all the German States, excepting Prussia and Austria. In order to interest Napoleon in this creation, he invented two expedients. The first consisted in creating an electorate attached to the duchy of Berg, which was known to be destined for Murat, and the second to appoint immediately a coadjutor for the archbishopric of Ratisbon, and to choose him from the imperial family. This coadjutor, being archbishop elect of Ratisbon, future archchancellor of the confederation, would, of course, place the new Diet under the control of Napoleon. The member of the Bonaparte family was plainly pointed out by his ecclesiastical profession: it was cardinal Fesch, archbishop of Lyons, ambassador at Rome.*

* We quote the curious document which was addressed to Napoleon.

“ Ratisbon, April 19, 1806.

“ Sir,

“ The genius of Napoleon is not limited to creating the happiness of France; Providence grants the superior man to the universe. The estimable German nation groans under the miseries of political and religious anarchy: be, Sir, the regenerator of its Constitution. Here are some wishes dictated by the state of things; let the duke of Cleves become elector, let him obtain the toll of the Rhine on the whole of the right bank; let cardinal Fesch be my coadjutor; let the annuities settled on twelve States of the empire out of the toll, be founded on some other basis. Your imperial and royal majesty will judge in your sublimity whether it is conducive to the general welfare to realise these ideas. If any ideologic error misleads me on this point, my heart at least attests the purity of my intentions.

“ I am with an inviolable attachment and the most profound respect, Sir, your imperial and royal majesty's most humble and most devoted admirer,

“ CHARLES, elector archchancellor.”

“ The Germanic nation needs that its Constitution should be regenerated; the greater part of its laws consist only of words devoid of meaning, since the tribunal, the circles, the diet of the empire, no longer possess the means necessary to uphold the rights of property and the personal safety of the individuals who compose the nation, and since these institutions can no longer

Without waiting for such a plan to be proposed, discussed, and accepted, the archchancellor, anxious to insure the preservation of his see by an adoption which would render its destruction impossible, unless Napoleon chose to do an injury to the interests of his family, which it would not quietly endure, and which he was not fond of doing, the archchancellor, without consulting any person, to the great astonishment of his co-estates, chose cardinal Fesch coadjutor of the archbishopric of Ratisbon, and wrote to Napoleon to acquaint him with this choice.

Napoleon had no reason to love cardinal Fesch, a vain and obstinate man, who was not the least troublesome of his relations, and he had no particular desire to place him at the head of the German empire. However, he permitted this strange appointment, without explanation. It was a striking symptom of that disposition of the oppressed German princes to put the new imperial sceptre into his hands.

Napoleon had no intention to take, in a direct manner, that sceptre from the head of the house of Austria. It was an enterprise, which seemed to him too great for the moment, though

protect the oppressed against the encroachments of arbitrary power and rapacity. Such a state is anarchical; the people bear the burdens of the civil condition, without enjoying its principal advantages—a disastrous position for a nation thoroughly estimable for its loyalty, its industry, its primitive energy. The Germanic Constitution can be regenerated only by a head of the empire of a great character, who shall restore vigour to the laws by concentrating the executive power in his hands. The States of the empire will enjoy their domains all the better, when the wishes of the people shall be expressed and discussed in the diet, the tribunals better organised and justice administered in a more efficacious manner. His Majesty the emperor of Austria, Francis the second, would be a reputable individual for his personal qualities, but in point of fact the sceptre of Germany is slipping out of his hands, because he has now the majority of the diet against him; because he has violated his capitulation by occupying Bavaria, by introducing the Russians into Germany, by dismembering portions of the empire to pay for faults committed in the private quarrels of his house. *Let him be emperor of the East to withstand the Russians, and let the empire of the West revive in the empire of Napoleon, such as it was under Charlemagne, composed of Italy, France, and Germany!* It appears not impossible that the evils of anarchy may render the majority of the electors sensible of the necessity of such a regeneration: it was thus that they chose Rodolph of Hapsburg after the troubles of a long interregnum. The means of the archchancellor are extremely limited, but it is at least with a pure intention that he reckons upon the understanding of the emperor Napoleon, particularly on matters likely to agitate the south of Germany, more especially devoted to that monarch. The regeneration of the Germanic Constitution has always been the object of the wishes of the elector archchancellor; he neither asks for nor would accept any thing for himself; he thinks that, if his Majesty, the emperor Napoleon, could for a few weeks, every year, personally meet the princes, who are attached to him, at Mayence, or some other place, the seeds of Germanic regeneration would soon be developed. M. d'Hedouville has gained the entire confidence of the elector archchancellor, who would be glad if he would be pleased to submit these ideas in all their purity to his Majesty, the emperor of the French, and to his minister M. de Talleyrand.

“CHARLES, elector archchancellor.”

there was little that would have frightened him since Austerlitz. But he was enlightened as to how far he might venture at that moment in Germany, and fixed as to what it was proper for him to do. For the present, he resolved to dislocate, to weaken, the German empire in such a manner that the French empire alone should shine in the West. He purposed then to unite the princes of South Germany, situated on the banks of the Rhine, in Franconia, Suabia, Bavaria, and to form them into a confederation under his avowed protectorship. This confederation should declare its connexion with the German empire dissolved. As for the other princes of Germany, they might either continue in the old confederation, under the authority of Austria, or, what was more probable, they would leave it and group themselves at pleasure, some about Prussia, others about Austria. Then the French Empire, having under its formal paramountship Italy, Naples, Holland, perhaps some day the Spanish peninsula, under its protectorship the south of Germany, would comprehend nearly the same States which belonged to Charlemagne, and would take the place of the Empire of the West. To give it this title was no longer a mere affair of words, but yet a serious one on account of the jealousies of Europe, but to be realised some day by victory or successful negotiation.

To accomplish such a project there was but little to do, for Bavaria, Wurtemberg, Baden, were then treating at Paris, in order to arrive at some settlement of their situation, aggrandised but uncertain. All the other princes applied to be included, no matter under what title, no matter upon what condition, in the new federative system, which was foreseen and described as inevitable. To be comprehended in it was to live, to be excluded from it was to perish. It was, therefore, unnecessary to negotiate with any others than with the sovereigns of Baden, Wurtemberg, and Bavaria, and care was taken to consult them only with a certain degree of caution, and to exclude all excepting them from the negotiation. It was proposed to present the treaty ready drawn up, to such of the princes as one was desirous to retain, and to admit them to sign purely and simply. The new confederation was to bear the title of Confederation of the Rhine, and Napoleon that of Protector.

M. de Talleyrand was charged, with a very clever first clerk, M. de Labesnaudière, to draw up the plan of the new confederation and then to submit it to the Emperor.*

Such was, as we see, the chain of events, which led France twice to intermeddle in the affairs of Germany. The first time, the inevitable partition of the ecclesiastical possessions threatening Germany with a convulsion, its princes came themselves to solicit

* It is from M. de Labesnaudière himself, the only confidant of this new creation, that we derive all these particulars, supported besides by a multitude of authentic documents.

Napoleon to make this partition himself, and to add such changes as were to result from it in the Germanic constitution. The second time, Napoleon called away from the shores of the Ocean to the banks of the Danube, by the irruption of the Austrians into Bavaria, obliged to create allies for himself in the south of Germany, to recompense them, to aggrandise them, to restrain them at the same time when they attempted to abuse his alliance, was again obliged to interfere in order to regulate the situation of the German princes who geographically interested France.

If he had any personal view in all that he did on this occasion, it was to render vacant an august title, by the dissolution of the Germanic empire, and to suffer the French empire alone to exist in the eyes of the nations. Nevertheless, the essential causes of his intervention were no other than the violence of the strong, the cries of the weak, and the twofold desire, reasonable enough, to repress injustice committed in his name, and to remodel Germany in a manner conformable to the suggestions of his good sense, since he could no longer withhold his interference.

This intervention in the affairs of Germany, carried beyond certain bounds, was none the less a grievous fault on the part of Napoleon; to pretend to exercise a predominant influence over the south of Europe, over Italy, even over Spain, was consistent with French policy in all ages; and, vast as was this ambition, signal victories might justify its magnitude. But to attempt to extend his power to the north of Europe, that is to say into Germany, was driving the despair of Austria to extremity; it was kindling in Prussia a species of jealousy which France had not yet excited in her. It was taking upon himself the difficulties which were arising from the dissensions of all those petty princes among themselves; it was passing for the supporter and accomplice of the oppressors, when he was the defender of the oppressed; it was setting against him those who were not favoured, without setting for him those who were; for these latter already expressed themselves in such a manner as to foreshow that, after they had enriched themselves by us, they would be capable of turning against us, in order to purchase the preservation of what they had acquired. And as for the assistance which he anticipated finding in their troops, it was a dangerous deception; for he might be induced to consider as auxiliaries soldiers quite ready upon occasion to turn traitors. It was a still greater fault to change the old combinations of Germany, which made Prussia an ever jealous rival of Austria, and consequently an ally of France, and all the petty princes of Germany, filled with envy of each other, thenceforward clients of our policy from which they sought support. Had France added something to the influence of Prussia, and retrenched something from that of Austria, that would have been doing enough for a century, nay it would have been all that Germany needed. Beyond is, there was nothing but an overturning of European policy,

baneful rather than beneficial. If these changes were carried so far as to render Prussia all-powerful, it would be merely removing the danger from one place to another, transferring to Berlin the enemy whom we had always had at Vienna: if they went so far as to destroy Prussia and Austria, the effect would be to rouse all Germany; and, as for the small States, all that went beyond a just protection for certain secondary princes, as Bavaria, Baden, Wurtemberg, usually allies of France, all that went beyond, given after a war for their alliance, was a dangerous interference in the affairs of others, a gratuitous acceptance of difficulties not our own, and, under an apparent violation of foreign independence, an egregious cheat. There was but one greater fault to commit, that was to found French kingdoms in Germany. Napoleon had not yet arrived at this degree of power and of error. The old Germanic constitution, modified by the recess of 1803, with some additional solutions, neglected at the time of that recess, with the former influences modified merely in their proportion, was all that was suitable for France, for Europe, and for Germany. We undertook more for the welfare of Germany, than for our own; she cherished a deep resentment for it, and awaited the moment of our final retreat to fire in rear upon our soldiers, overwhelmed by numbers. Such is the price that must be paid for faults!

Napoleon left M. de Talleyrand and M. de Labesnardière to arrange in secret the details of the new plan of Germanic confederation with the ministers of Baden, Wurtemberg, and Bavaria, before he began to proceed to the execution of his general plan, particularly relative to Italy and Holland, in order that the English and Russian negotiators, treating each on their own part, might find consummated and irrevocable resolutions relative to the new royalties which he purposed to create.

The crown of Naples had been destined for Joseph, that of Holland for Louis. The institution of these royalties was for Napoleon at once a political calculation and a gratification of feeling. He was not only great, he was good, and sensible to the affections of blood, sometimes even to weakness. He did not always reap the reward of his sentiments; for there is nothing so exigent as an upstart family. There was not one of his relations, who, though acknowledging that it was the conqueror of Rivoli, of the Pyramids, and of Austerlitz, who had founded the greatness of the Bonapartes, nevertheless fancied that he was somebody, and looked upon himself as treated unjustly, hardly, or in a manner disproportioned to his merits. His mother, incessantly repeating that she had given him birth, complained that she was not surrounded with sufficient homage and respect; and she was nevertheless the most moderate and the least intoxicated of the females of that family. Lucien Bonaparte had placed, he said, the crown upon the head of his brother, for he alone had been unshaken on the 18th of Brumaire, and for the

reward of this service he lived in exile. Joseph, the meekest and the most sensible of all, said in his turn that he was the eldest, and that the deference due to that title was not paid him. He was even somewhat disposed to believe that the treaties of Luneville, of Amiens, of the Concordat, which Napoleon had complaisantly commissioned him to sign, to the detriment of M. de Talleyrand, were the work of his personal ability, as well as the great exploits of his brother. Louis, sickly, mistrustful, filled with pride, affecting virtue, pretended that he was sacrificed to an infamous office, that of cloaking, by marrying her, the weaknesses of Hortense de Beauharnais for Napoleon—an odious calumny, invented by the emigrants, repeated in a thousand pamphlets, and by which Louis wrongfully showed himself to be so prepossessed, as to cause it to be supposed that he himself believed it. Thus each of them conceived himself to be a victim in some way, and ill paid for the part which he had taken in his brother's greatness. The sisters of Napoleon, not daring to have such pretensions, were restless around him, and by their rivalries, sometimes by their discontent, ruffled his spirit, a prey to a thousand other inquietudes. Caroline was incessantly soliciting for Murat, who, with all his levity, at least repaid the bounty of his brother-in-law with an attachment which at that time afforded no reason to augur his subsequent conduct, though, it is true, one may expect any thing from levity. Elisa, the eldest, transferred to Lucca, where she aspired to the personal glory of well managing a little State, and who really conducted it with great ability, desired an augmentation of her duchy.

In this whole family, Jerome as the youngest, Pauline as the most dissipated, were exempt from those exigences, those resentments, those jealousies, which disturbed the interior of the imperial house. Jerome, the irregularities of whose youth had frequently provoked the severity of Napoleon, considered him as a father rather than a brother, and received his bounty with a heart full of unmixed gratitude. Pauline, given up to her pleasures, like a princess of the family of the Cæsars, beautiful as an antique Venus, sought in the greatness of her brother only the means of gratifying her loose propensities, desired no higher titles than those of the Borgheses, whose name she bore, was disposed to prefer fortune, the source of pleasure, to greatness, the satisfaction of pride. She was so fond of her brother that, when he was at war, the arch-chancellor Cambacérès, commissioned to govern the reigning family and the State, was obliged to send this princess news the moment he received it, for the least delay threw her into the most painful anxiety.

It was the fear of seeing the children of the Beauharnais family preferred to themselves that had urged the Bonapartes to be enemies to Josephine. In this they paid no regard even to the heart of Napoleon, and tormented him in a thousand ways. The precocious greatness of Eugene, who had become viceroy and destined

heir to the fine kingdom of Italy, singularly eclipsed them, and yet this crown had been offered to Joseph, who had declined it because it placed him too immediately under the control of the emperor of the French. He wanted to reign, he said, in an independent manner. We shall see by and by into what difficulties this fondness for independence, common to all the members of the imperial family, combined with the tendencies of the nations over whom they were called to reign, was destined to bring the government of Napoleon, and what new causes of misfortune it added to our misfortunes.

It was among all the members of this family that he had to distribute the kingdoms and the duchies of new creation. The crown of Naples insured to Joseph a situation sufficiently independent, and was, besides, brilliant enough to be accepted. One feels some surprise to be obliged to employ such words to characterise the sentiments with which these fine kingdoms were received by princes born so far from the throne, and so far even from that greatness which individuals sometimes owe to birth and fortune. But it is one of the singularities of the fantastic spectacle exhibited by the French Revolution and by the extraordinary man whom it placed at its head, that these refusals, these hesitations, almost this disdain of anticipated satiety, should be expressed for the fairest crowns by personages who in their youth could never have expected to wear them. Napoleon, who had seen Joseph disdain at one time the presidency of the Senate, at another the viceroyalty of Italy, was not sure that he would accept the throne of Naples, and had at first conferred on him only the title of his lieutenant.* Having afterwards ascertained his acceptance of it, he had inserted his name in the decrees destined to be presented to the Senate.

* We quote the following letters, which show how Napoleon gave crowns and how they were received :

“ To the Minister of War.

“ Munich, January 6, 1806.

“ Despatch general Berthier, your brother, with the decree appointing prince Joseph to the command of the army of Italy. He will observe the most profound secrecy, and he must not deliver the decree till the prince arrives. I say he must observe the most profound secrecy, because I am not sure that prince Joseph will go thither, and on this point I desire that nothing may be known.”

“ To Prince Joseph.

“ Stuttgart, January 12, 1806.

“ My intention is that in the first days of February you should enter the kingdom of Naples, and that I should be informed in the course of February that my eagles float over that capital. You will not make any suspension of arms or capitulation. My intention is that the Bourbons should have ceased to reign in Naples, and I wish to seat on that throne a prince of my house, you in the first place, if that suits you, another if that does not suit you.

“ I repeat to you not to divide your forces; let all your army cross the

As for Holland, he had designated Louis, who has since told all Europe in a book reflecting upon his brother, how highly he was offended because he had scarcely been consulted upon this arrangement. In fact, Napoleon, without concerning himself about Louis, whose will seemed to him not to be an obstacle to foresee and to conquer, had sent word to some of the principal citizens of Holland, particularly to admiral Verhuel, the valiant and able commander of the flotilla, to dispose Holland to renounce at length its ancient republican government, and to constitute itself a monarchy. This is another trait of the picture which we are here presenting of that French revolution, setting out with endeavouring to convert all thrones into republics, and now exerting itself to convert the most ancient republics into monarchies. The republics of Venice and Genoa, become provinces of different kingdoms, the free cities of Germany absorbed into various principalities, had already demonstrated that singular tendency. The royalty of Holland was its last and most striking phenomenon. Holland, after throwing herself into the arms of France to escape the Stadtholder, was discontented to find herself doomed to an everlasting war, and was deficient in gratitude to Napoleon, who had made at Amiens and daily renewed the greatest efforts for insuring to her the restitution of her colonies. The Dutch, half English by their religion, their manners, their mercantile spirit, though enemies of England, in consequence of their maritime interests, had no sympathy with the government of Napoleon and his exclusively continental greatness. The most insignificant victory at sea would have charmed them much more than the most splendid victory on land. They showed sufficient disdain for the semi-monarchical government of a grand-pensionary, which Napoleon had induced them to adopt, when he was instituting a sort of first consul in all the countries under the influence of France. This grand-pensionary, who was M. de Schimmelpenninck, a good citizen and an honourable man, was in their eyes nothing but a French prefect, charged to commit extortions, be-

Apennines, and let your three corps-d'armée proceed direct for Naples, so as to meet in one day on the same field of battle.

“Leave a general of the dépôts, of victualling, and a few artillerymen at Ancona to defend that place. When Naples is taken, the extremities will fall of themselves; all that shall be in the Abruzzi must be taken *en revers*, and you will send a division to Tarento and one towards Sicily, to complete the conquest of the kingdom.

“My intention is to leave under your command during the year, till I have made new dispositions, 14 regiments of infantry completed to the full complement of war, and 12 of French cavalry also at the full complement.

“The country must supply you with provisions, clothing, remounts, and all that is necessary, so as not to cost me a sou. My troops of the kingdom of Italy shall remain there no longer than you shall judge necessary, after which time they shall return home.

“You will raise a Neapolitan legion, into which you will admit none but Neapolitan officers and soldiers natives of the country, willing to attach themselves to my cause.”

cause he demanded taxes and loans in order to defray the expenses of a war establishment. The dislike excited by this government of a grand-pensionary was the only facility which the situation of Holland afforded for procuring the acceptance of a king. Though overtaken by that weariness which, at the end of revolutions, renders people indifferent to every thing, the Dutch experienced a painful feeling, on finding themselves deprived of their republican system. However, the assurance that their laws, especially their municipal laws, should be left them, the favourable reports made to them of Louis Bonaparte, of the regularity of his manners, of his disposition to economy, of the independence of his character, lastly the usual resignation to things long foreseen, decided the principal representatives of Holland to accede to the institution of royalty. A treaty was to convert the new situation of Holland in regard to France into an alliance between State and State.

The Venetian provinces—which Napoleon had not immediately united to the kingdom of Italy, that he might be more at liberty to study their resources and to employ them according to his designs—the Venetian provinces, including Dalmatia, were annexed to the kingdom of Italy, upon condition of ceding the country of Massa to the princess Elisa, to augment the duchy of Lucca, and the duchy of Guastalla to the princess Pauline Borghese, who had not yet received any thing from her brother's munificence. The latter would not keep her duchy, and sold it back to the kingdom of Italy for some millions.

It was now, perhaps, the time to think of the pope and the real cause of his discontent. At the moment when Italy was a twelfth-cake, divided with the sword, it would have been easy to reserve a share for St. Peter, and to conciliate by some temporal advantages that spiritual power, which it is dangerous to quarrel with, even in our times of doubtful faith, and which is far more to be dreaded when it is oppressed than when it oppresses. These new monarchs ought to have been very glad to receive their States, even with a province the fewer; and Pius VII., indemnified, might have been induced to submit with more patience to be completely invested by the French power, as he was after the establishment of Joseph at Naples. At any rate, Napoleon had still Parma and Placentia to give away, and he could not have made a better use of them than by employing them to console the court of Rome. But Napoleon began to care much less for either physical or moral resistance since Austerlitz. He was extremely displeased with the pope for his hostile underhand proceedings against the new king of Naples, and he felt more disposed to reduce than to augment the patrimony of St. Peter. Besides, he reserved Parma and Placentia for a use which had also its merit. He thought to make them an indemnity for some of the princes protected by Russia or England, such as the sovereigns of Naples and Piedmont, old dethroned kings, to whom he meant to throw a few crumbs from the sumptuous board around which

the new kings were seated. This idea was certainly good, but there was still the fault of leaving the pope discontented, ready to break out with vehemence, and whom it would have been so easy to satisfy, without any great detriment to the recently instituted kingdoms.

It was necessary to provide for Murat, the husband of Caroline Bonaparte, and who had at least deserved by war what was about to be done for him on the score of relationship. But he, too, had his exigences, which were rather his wife's than his own. Napoleon had thought of giving them the principality of Neufchatel, which neither husband nor wife would accept. The archchancellor Cambacérès, who usually interposed between Napoleon and his family with that conciliatory patience which allays reciprocal irritations, which listens to every thing and repeats nothing but what is fit to be repeated—the archchancellor Cambacérès was informed in confidence of their violent displeasure. They thought themselves treated with a cutting inequality. Napoleon then thought of the duchy of Berg ceded to France by Bavaria in exchange for Anspach, increased by the remnant of the duchy of Cleves, a fine country, happily situated on the right of the Rhine, containing 320,000 inhabitants, producing, all costs of administration paid, a revenue of 400,000 florins, allowing two regiments to be kept on foot, and capable of conferring on its possessor a certain importance in the new confederation. The fertile imagination of Murat and of his wife failed not, in fact, to dream of some very distinguished part decorated externally by some renewed high title of the Holy Empire.

The reigning family was provided for. But the brother and sisters of Napoleon were not all that he loved. There yet remained his companions in arms and the fellow-labourers in his civil toils. His natural kindness, in accordance here with his policy, took delight in paying those for their blood, these for their vigils. He required them to be brave, laborious, upright, and for this he thought that he ought to reward them amply. To see the smile on the countenance of his servants, the smile, not of gratitude, upon which he reckoned but little in general, but of content, was one of the greatest pleasures of his noble heart.

He consulted the archchancellor Cambacérès upon the distribution of the new favours, and he, seeing how great soever might be the booty to be divided, the extent of the services and of the ambitions was still greater, guessed the embarrassment of Napoleon, and began by putting an end to that embarrassment, as far as concerned himself. He begged Napoleon not to think of him for the new duchies. No man knew so well that when one has attained a certain degree of fortune, it is better to preserve than to acquire; and an empire, having him to direct its policy, Napoleon to direct the administration and the armies, would have continued the greatest of all, after it had become so. The archchancellor desired but one thing, to retain his present

greatness; and the certainty of retaining it appeared to him preferable to the finest duchies. He had acquired this certainty on the following occasion. For a moment he had feared, when he saw Napoleon requiring that the new kings should retain their French dignities, that it was his intention to have kings exclusively for dignitaries of the Empire, and that the titles of archchancellor, which he possessed, and of archtreasurer, which prince Lebrun enjoyed, would soon be transferred to one of the monarchs newly created, or to be created. Wishing to ascertain the intention of Napoleon on this point, he said to him, "When you have a king quite ready to receive the title of archchancellor, let me know, and I will give my resignation."—"Be easy," replied Napoleon, "I must have a lawyer for that post, and you shall keep it."—In fact, among the crowned heads which formerly composed the Germanic empire, there were three places for mere prelates, the electors of Mayence, Treves, and Cologne. In like manner, amidst those kings, dignitaries of his empire, Napoleon took pleasure in reserving one place for the first, the gravest magistrate of his time, called to introduce into his councils that wisdom which could not always enter them along with kings.

Nothing more was required to give complete content to the prudent archchancellor. Thenceforward desiring, soliciting nothing for himself, he assisted Napoleon most usefully in the distribution which he had to make. They both agreed about the first personage to be largely recompensed: this was Berthier, the most assiduous, the most punctual, the most enlightened perhaps, of Napoleon's lieutenants, he who was always about him amidst the balls, and who submitted without any appearance of displeasure to a life, the perils of which were not above his great courage, but the fatigues of which he began to dislike. Napoleon felt sincere satisfaction in having it in his power to pay him for his services. He granted to him the principality of Neufchatel, which constituted him a sovereign prince.

There was one of his servants who occupied a higher rank in Europe than any other, M. de Talleyrand, who served him much more by his art in treating with foreign ministers and the elegance of his manners than by his abilities in the council, in which, however, he had the merit of always recommending a moderate policy. Napoleon was not fond of him, and he mistrusted him; but he was grieved to see him dissatisfied, and M. de Talleyrand was so because he had not been included among the grand dignitaries. Napoleon, to compensate him, conferred on him the fine principality of Benevento, one of the two which had recently been taken from the pope as districts enclosed in the kingdom of Naples.

Napoleon still had left that of Ponte Corvo, likewise enclosed in the kingdom of Naples, and, like the preceding, taken from the pope. He determined to give it to a personage who had rendered no considerable service, who had treachery in his heart,

but who was the brother-in-law of Joseph: this was marshal Bernadotte. In granting this dignity, Napoleon was obliged to do violence to himself. He made up his mind to it, influenced by expediency, family motives, and oblivion of injuries.

It would have been doing but little to reward these three or four servants, if Napoleon had not thought of others, more numerous and more deserving, Berthier excepted, whom he had about him, and who expected their share of the fruits of victory. He provided for what concerned them by means of an institution very cleverly conceived. In giving kingdoms, he granted them to the new kings on one condition, namely, to institute duchies, with ample revenues, and to give up to him a certain portion of the national domains. Thus, in adding the Venetian States to the kingdom of Italy, he reserved the creation of twelve duchies, under the following titles: duchies of Dalmatia, Istria, Friule, Cadore, Belluno, Conegliano, Treviso, Feltre, Bassano, Vicenza, Padua, and Rovigo. These duchies conferred no power, but they insured a yearly income, taken out of the reserved fifteenth of the revenues of the country. He gave the kingdom of Naples to Joseph, on condition to reserve six fiefs in it, of which, the two principalities of Benevento and Ponte Corvo already mentioned formed a part, and which were completed by the duchies of Gaeta, Otranto, Tarento, and Reggio. In adding to the principality of Massa that of Lucca, Napoleon stipulated the creation of the duchy of Massa. He instituted three others in the countries of Parma and Placentia. One of the three was granted to the archtreasurer Lebrun. Among all these titles which we have just enumerated, we find those figuring which were soon borne by the most illustrious servants of the Empire, and which are still borne by their children, the last and living memorials of our past greatness. All these duchies were instituted on the same conditions as the twelve which had been created in the Venetian States, without any power, but with a share in the fifteenth of the revenues. Napoleon designed that there should be rewards for every rank, and he required that there should be assigned to him in each of these countries national domains and annuities, in order to create endowments. Thus he secured 30 millions' worth of national domains in the State of Venice, and an inscription of *rente* to the amount of 1200 thousand francs, in the great book of the kingdom of Italy. He reserved for himself, for the same purpose, the national domains of Parma and Placentia, a *rente* of a million upon the kingdom of Naples, and four millions' worth of national domains in the principality of Lucca and Massa. The whole formed 22 duchies, 34 millions in national property, 2,400,000 francs in *rentes*, and, added to the treasure of the army, which a first war contribution had already raised to 70 millions, and which new victories were about to increase indefinitely, would serve for granting pensions to all ranks, from the common soldier to the marshal. The civil

functionaries were to have their share in these pensions. Napoleon had already discussed with M. de Talleyrand a plan for the reconstitution of the nobility, for he found that the Legion of Honour and the duchies were not sufficient. He purposed to create counts, barons, believing in the necessity of these social distinctions, and desiring that every one should grow great with him, in proportion to his merits. But he intended to correct the profound vanity of these titles in two ways, by making them the reward of great services, and by endowing them with revenues, securing a permanent provision to the families.

These various resolutions were successively presented to the Senate, to be converted into articles of the constitutions of the Empire, in the months of March, April, and June.

On the 15th of March, in this year 1806, Murat was proclaimed grand-duke of Cleves and Berg. On the 30th of March, Joseph was proclaimed king of Naples and Sicily; Pauline Borghese, duchess of Guastalla; Berthier, prince of Neufchatel. On the 5th of June only (the negotiations with Holland having occasioned some delay), Louis was proclaimed king of Holland, M. de Talleyrand prince of Benevento, Bernadotte prince of Ponte Corvo. One might have imagined one's self carried back to the times of the Roman Empire, when a mere decree of the senate took away or conferred crowns.

This series of extraordinary acts was terminated by the definitive creation of the new confederation of the Rhine. The negotiation had secretly passed between M. de Talleyrand and the ministers of Bavaria, Baden, and Wurtemberg. From the visible agitation of the German princes, every body suspected that another new constitution for Germany was preparing. Those who, from the geographical situation of their territories, could be included in the new confederation, solicited the favour of being admitted into it, in order to preserve their existence. Those who were likely to border upon it strove to fathom the secret of its constitution, in order to ascertain what would be their relations with this new power, and desired nothing better than to become members of it on condition of certain advantages. Austria, for some time past considering the empire as dissolved, and thenceforth useless for her, beheld this spectacle with apparent indifference. Prussia, on the contrary, which regarded the fall of the old Germanic confederation as an immense revolution, would fain have shared at least with France the imperial power wrested from the house of Austria, and had the patronage of the north of Germany, while France arrogated to herself that of the south—Prussia was listening to find out what was going forward. The manner in which she had just taken possession of Hanover, the despatches published in London, had so cooled Napoleon towards her that he did not even take the trouble to apprise her of things which ought not to have been done but in concert with her. Not only was she excluded from the affairs of Germany, which were her

own, a thousand rumours were circulated of changes of territory, changes by which provinces were taken from her and others given to her, but always smaller than those that were taken.

Two Germanic princes, the one as ancient as the other was new, gave rise to all these rumours by their impatient ambition. The one was the elector of Hesse-Cassel, a wily prince, avaricious, rich, from the produce of his mines and the blood of his subjects sold to foreigners, striving to keep on good terms with England, where he had large capitals deposited, with Prussia, whose neighbour he was and one of her generals, lastly with France, which at this moment was building up or throwing down the fortune of all the sovereign houses. There was no artifice that he did not employ with M. de Talleyrand to be comprehended in the new arrangements, and to gain some advantage by them. Thus he offered to join the projected confederation, and to place in consequence under our influence one of the most important portions of Germany, namely Hesse, but on one condition, that of putting him in possession of a great part of the territory of Hesse-Darmstadt, which he detested with that hatred of the direct branch for the collateral branch so frequent in German families. He insisted strongly on this point, and had submitted a very extensive and very detailed plan. At the same time, he wrote to the king of Prussia to denounce to him what was scheming at Paris, to tell him that a confederation was preparing, which would ruin the influence of Prussia as much as that of Austria, and that they were employing all sorts of means to induce him to enter into it.

The new German prince, Murat, took a different course. Not content with the fine duchy of Berg, containing, as we have said, 320,000 inhabitants, and yielding a revenue of 400,000 florins, which furnished him with the means of keeping two regiments, and put into his hands the important fortress of Wesel, he wanted to be at least the equal of the sovereign of Wurtemberg, or of Baden, and to attain this end he desired that a State with a million of inhabitants should be created for him in Westphalia. For this purpose he beset M. de Talleyrand, who was always extremely solicitous to please members of the imperial family. He framed plans upon plans for composing a territory for him. Of course Prussia furnished the materials with Münster, Osnabrück, and East Friesland. It was contemplated, it is true, to give this power in exchange the Hanseatic cities, which would form a fine compensation, if not in territory, at least in wealth and importance.

All these plans, prepared without the knowledge of Napoleon, were disapproved by him as soon as he was made acquainted with them. He had it not so much at heart to gratify the ambition of Murat as to set about fresh dismemberments in Germany: he was determined in particular not to incorporate the Hanseatic cities with any great European State. His last com-

binations had already swept away Augsburg, and were about to sweep away Nuremberg, cities through which passed the commerce of France with the centre and the south of Germany. Our commerce with the north passed through Hamburg, Bremen, Lübeck. Napoleon would take good care not to sacrifice cities whose independence interested France and Europe. French wines and stuffs penetrated into Germany and into Russia under the neutral flag of the Hanseatic cities, and under the same flag were returned naval stores, sometimes corn, when the state of the crops in France required it. To shut up these cities by the custom-houses of a great State would have been fettering their trade and ours. It was quite enough to deprive ourselves of Nuremberg and Augsburg which sent their mercery and their hardware to France, and took back our wines, our stuffs, our colonial produce, which they afterwards distributed over the whole south of Germany.

Napoleon, firmly resolved not to sacrifice the Hanseatic cities, rejected every combination that would have tended to give them to any State whatever, great or small. Of course, he approved of none of Murat's plans. As for the elector of Hesse, he detested that false, greedy prince, cloaking an implacable enemy under the exterior of a sort of indifference, and purposed on the first occasion to repay the sentiments which he cherished for France. Napoleon would not, therefore, bind himself towards him by introducing him into the confederation, which he was organising, for it would have been rendering impossible an eventual plan for bringing about the speedy and well-merited ruin of that prince. If France were induced to restore Hanover to England, it would be necessary to find a compensation for Prussia, and Napoleon was determined to offer her Hesse, which she would certainly have accepted, as she had accepted the ecclesiastical principalities and Hanover, as she would have accepted the Hanseatic cities, for which she was applying every day. This scheme, which was kept a secret from European diplomacy, and which was the price of the continual intrigues of the house of Hesse-Cassel with the enemies of France, was the cause of the refusals unexplained at the time, given to the solicitations of the elector to be admitted into the new confederation, and of the false fidelity towards Prussia which he soon made a boast of.

Every thing being agreed upon with the sovereigns of Baden, Wurtemberg, and Bavaria, the only princes who were consulted, the treaty was presented for signature to the other princes, who were comprehended at their request in the new confederation, but without taking their opinion on the nature of the act by which it was constituted. This treaty, dated the 12th of July, contained the following dispositions:—

The new confederation was to bear a restricted and well-chosen title, that of *Confederation of the Rhine*, a title which excluded the pretension of comprehending all Germany, and

applied exclusively to the States bordering on France, and having incontestable relations of interest with her. The title, then, corrected in some degree the fault of the institution. The princes who signed it formed a confederation under the presidency of the prince archchancellor, and under the protectorship of the emperor of the French. All disputes among them were to be settled in a diet meeting at Frankfort, and composed of two colleges only, one called the college of the kings, the other the college of the princes. The first corresponded with the old college of the electors, which would have had no meaning now that there was no longer an emperor to elect; the second, by the title and the thing, was the old college of the princes. There was no college answering to the former college of the cities.

The confederated princes were in a perpetual state of alliance, offensive and defensive, with France. Any war in which the confederation or France might be engaged, should be common to both. France was to furnish 200,000 men and the confederation 63,000, in these proportions: Bavaria 30,000, Wurtemberg 12, the grand-duchy of Baden 8, the grand-duchy of Berg 5, that of Hesse-Darmstadt 4; lastly, the petty States 4000 among them. On the death of the prince archchancellor, the emperor of the French had the right of nominating his successor.

The confederates declared themselves separated for ever from the German empire, and were to make an immediate and solemn declaration to that effect to the Diet of Ratisbon. They were to govern themselves in their relations with each other, and relatively to their German affairs, upon which the Diet of Frankfort would be called speedily to deliberate.

By a special article, all the German houses had the faculty of adhering in the sequel to this treaty, upon condition of a pure and simple adhesion.

For the present, the Confederation of the Rhine comprehended the kings of Bavaria and Wurtemberg, the prince archchancellor archbishop of Ratisbon, the grand-dukes of Baden, Berg, and Hesse-Darmstadt, the dukes of Nassau-Usingen, and Nassau Weilburg, the princes of Hohenzollern-Hechingen, and Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, of Salm-Salm and Salm-Kirburg, of Isenburg, Aremberg, Lichtenstein, and de la Leyen.

The Hohenzollerns and the Salms were admitted into the new confederation on account of the long residence of several of the members of those families in France, and of the attachment which they had professed to our interests. Prince Lichtenstein obtained his admission, and thus retained his quality of reigning prince, though an Austrian prince, on account of the treaty of Presburg which he had signed. To his principality and to several of those which were preserved, greedy claims had been preferred but rejected by France.

The geographical boundaries of the Confederation of the Rhine included the territories situated between the Sieg, the Lahn, the

Mayn, the Neckar, the Upper Danube, the Isar, and the Inn, that is to say the countries of Nassau and Baden, Franconia, Suabia, the Upper Palatinate, and Bavaria. Any prince, comprehended within these boundaries, if he was not named in the constitutive act, lost the quality of reigning prince. He was *mediatised*, an expression borrowed from ancient Germanic law, signifying that a prince ceased to depend immediately on the supreme head of the Empire, so as to depend on him only *mediately*, that he fell in consequence under the authority of the territorial sovereign in whose territories he was enclosed, and was thus stripped of his sovereignty.

The *mediatised* princes and counts retained certain princely rights and lost only the sovereign rights, which were transferred to the prince whose subjects they became. The transferred sovereign rights were those of legislation, of supreme jurisdiction, of high police, of taxation, and of recruiting. The lower and middle justice, the forest police, the rights of fishing, hunting, pasturage, the working of mines, and all dues of a feudal nature, without including personal property, composed the prerogatives left to the *mediatised*.

They retained the right to be tried by their peers, called *austréques* in the ancient German constitution.

The immediate nobility was definitively incorporated.

The *mediatised*, reduced from the state of reigning princes to that of privileged subjects, were very numerous, and would have been more so, but for the intervention of France. Among the number were the princes of Fürstenberg, attached to Austria, of Hohenlohe to Prussia, the prince of Tour and Taxis, who was deprived of the monopoly of the German posts, the princes of Löwenstein-Wertheim, Linange, Loos, Schwarzenberg, Solms, Wittgenstein-Perleburg, and some others. The house of Nassau-Fulda, that of the late Stadtholder, lost some portions of its domains in consequence of its contiguity of territory to the new confederation. The court of Berlin, independently of the serious uneasiness which such a confederation could not fail to excite in it, found two causes of personal mortification in the losses sustained by the two houses of Nassau-Fulda and Tour and Taxis, whose near relationship to the royal family of Prussia we have already explained.

To these fundamental dispositions, the treaty added the regulations of territory which were necessary to produce harmony between the sovereigns of Wurtemberg, Baden, and Bavaria, irreconcilable co-sharers in Austrian Suabia, in the domains of the immediate nobility, in the territories belonging to the *mediatised* princes.

The free city of Nuremberg, the condition of which one knew not how to regulate, what with a restless population of citizens which agitated it, and what with a patrician nobility which ruined it by the most expensive administration, was given to Bavaria, as well

as the city of Ratisbon, in return for some cessions made in the Tyrol to the kingdom of Italy. The prince archchancellor found an ample compensation in the city and territory of Frankfort. It was in Frankfort that the new diet was to be held.

This celebrated treaty of the Confederation of the Rhine put an end to the ancient German empire after an existence of 1006 years, from Charlemagne, crowned in 800, to Francis II., dispossessed in 1806. It furnished the new model, after which modern Germany was to be constituted: it was on this ground the social reform of it, and for the present it placed the States of the south of Germany under the temporary influence of France, leaving those of the north to wander among the protectors whom they should think fit to choose.

This treaty, published on the 12th of July with great ceremony, caused no surprise, but completed obviously to all eyes the European system of Napoleon. Holding all the south of Europe under his imperial paramountship by the family royalties, having the princes of the Rhine under his protectorship, he lacked nothing of the empire of the West but the title.

It was necessary to communicate this result to the parties interested, that is, to the Diet of Ratisbon, to the emperor of Austria, and to the king of Prussia. The declaration to the Diet was simple: it merely notified that it was no longer acknowledged by the Confederation. To the emperor of Austria was addressed a note, in which, without dictating to him the conduct which he had to pursue and which was clearly foreseen, the German empire was spoken of as an institution as completely worn out as the republic of Venice, crumbling to ruin in all its parts, no longer giving protection to weak States, influence to strong States, not corresponding either with the wants of the time or with the relative proportion of the German States to each other; lastly, conferring on the house of Austria itself but an empty title, that of emperor of Germany, which had released the court of Vienna from all dependence in regard to the electoral houses. The Confederation seemed, therefore, to hope, without demanding it, that the emperor Francis would abdicate a title which was about to cease *de facto* in a great part of Germany, in all that comprising the Confederation of the Rhine, and which would be no longer recognised by France.

As for Prussia, the French cabinet congratulated her on being delivered from the trammels of that German empire, usually under the control of Austria, and, to compensate her for having taken the south of Germany under its dependence, it recommended to her to place the north under the like dependence. "The Emperor Napoleon," wrote that cabinet, "will see without pain, nay even with pleasure, Prussia ranging under her influence all the States of the north of Germany by means of a confederation similar to that of the Rhine." The princes were not designated, consequently none of them were excluded, but the number could not

be great, and their importance not greater. They were Hesse-Cassel, Saxony, with its various branches, the two houses of Mecklenburg; lastly, the petty princes of the north whom it would be superfluous to enumerate. A promise was given not to throw any impediment in the way of a confederation of that kind.

Napoleon, however, had not ventured upon such things without taking energetic and ostensible precautions. Watching with his usual activity what was passing at Naples, at Venice, in Dalmatia, without taking off his attention from the internal administration of the Empire, he had applied himself to putting the grand army on a formidable footing. That army, scattered as we have seen, over Bavaria, Franconia, and Suabia, living in good cantonments, had rested itself, and was ready to march again, either if it was obliged to pour back through Bavaria towards Austria, or to traverse Franconia and Saxony, and fall upon Russia. Napoleon had strengthened his ranks with the two reserves formed at Strasburg and Mayence under marshals-senators Kellermann and Lefebvre. It was an increase of about 40,000 men, perfectly disciplined, trained, prepared for fatigue. Some of them even, who belonged to the reserves of the preceding years, had attained the age of full strength, that is to say, twenty-four or twenty-five years. The army, diminished in consequence of the late campaign by about 20,000 men, a fourth of whom had rejoined the ranks, found itself, thanks to this reinforcement, augmented and invigorated. Napoleon, taking advantage of the circumstance that part of his troops were subsisted abroad, had raised the total force of France to 450,000 men, 152,000 of them in the interior, (the gendarmes, veterans, invalids, and dépôts, being included in that number) 40,000 at Naples, 50,000 in Lombardy, 20,000 in Dalmatia, 6000 in Holland, 12,000 at the camp of Boulogne, and 170,000 at the grand army. These latter, collected into a single mass, on the complete war footing, numbering 30,000 horse, 10,000 artillerymen, and 130,000 foot, had arrived at the highest degree of perfection which it is possible to attain by discipline and war, and was under the direction of the greatest of captains. It should be observed that from this army general Marmont had been detached to Dalmatia, and the Dutch to Holland, and that it no longer included any Bavarians in its ranks, which explains why it was not more numerous after the junction of the reserves.

In this imposing situation Napoleon, could await the effects produced in Berlin and Vienna by the whole of his plans, and the result of the negotiations opened at Paris with England and Russia.

For the rest, he had no inclination to prolong the war, if he were not obliged to do so for the execution of his designs. He was impatient, on the contrary, to assemble his soldiers about him at the magnificent entertainment which the city of Paris was to give to the grand army. It was a happy and a fine idea to let that heroic army be feasted by that noble capital, which feels so strongly all the emotions of France, and which, if it does not feel them in a

more powerful manner, communicates them at least more rapidly and more energetically, thanks to the might of number and to the habit of taking the lead in all things, and of speaking for the country on all occasions.

Disposed to greatness by nature and also by success, which elevated his imagination, Napoleon, amidst those negotiations, so vast and so varied, those military cares, which extended from Naples to Illyria, from Illyria to Germany, from Germany to Holland, devoted himself with ardent fondness to magnificent creations of art and of public utility. Having visited, during the brief snatches of leisure left him by war, almost all the places of the capital, he had not beheld one of them without being struck at the moment by some grand, moral, or useful idea, the realisation of which we see at this day on the soil of Paris. He had been to St. Denis, and finding that ancient church in a deplorable state of dilapidation, especially since the violation of the royal tombs, he ordered by a decree the repair of that venerable edifice. He decided that four chapels should be erected; three for the kings of the first races, and one for the princes of his own dynasty. Marbles bearing the names of the kings buried there and whose sepulchres had been profaned, were to replace their dispersed relics. He instituted a chapter of ten aged bishops to pray perpetually in that funereal asylum of our royal races.

After he had visited St. Geneviève, he ordered that beautiful church to be finished and restored to public worship, but retaining the destination which the Constituent Assembly had assigned to it, that of receiving the illustrious men of France. The chapter of the cathedral, augmented, was to chant the service there every day.

A triumphal monument had been ordered by the Senate on the proposition of the Tribunate. After many rejected plans, Napoleon fixed upon the idea of erecting in the finest Place in Paris, a bronze pillar, similar in form and dimensions to Trajan's pillar, consecrated to the grand army, and displaying on a long basso relievo winding round its magnificent shaft, the exploits of the campaign of 1805. It was decided that the cannon taken from the enemy should furnish the material for it. The statue of Napoleon, in imperial costume, was to surmount the capital. It is that very column in the Place Vendôme, at the foot of which pass and will pass the present and future generations, the subject of a generous emulation for them, so long as they shall cherish the love of national glory, the subject of everlasting reproach if they were ever capable of losing that noble sentiment.

Napoleon afterwards settled the plan of a triumphal arch on the Place du Carrousel, the same that exists at this day. That arch formed part of the plan for completing the Louvre and the Tuileries. He purposed to join those two palaces, and to compose out of them but one which should be the most extensive ever seen in any country. Placing himself one day under the porch of the Louvre,

and looking towards the Hôtel de Ville, he conceived the idea of an immense street, which was to be uniformly built, wide as the Rue de la Paix, running to the Barrière du Trône, so that the eye might penetrate on one side to the Champs Elysées, on the other to the first trees of Vincennes. The name destined for this street was that of RUE IMPERIALE. A monument had long ago been decreed on the site of the ancient Bastille. Napoleon proposed that it should be a triumphal arch, spacious enough to afford a passage through the centre portal to the great projected street, and placed at the intersection of that street and the Canal of St. Martin. The architects having declared it to be impossible to erect such a structure on such a base, Napoleon determined to transfer that arch to the Place de l'Etoile, that it might face the Tuileries, and become one of the extremities of the immense line which he meant to form in the heart of his capital. Though the present generation has completed most of the monuments which Napoleon had not time to finish, it has neither completed the Louvre nor created that magnificent street which he projected.

It was not to works of mere embellishment that he limited his cares for the city of Paris. He deemed it unworthy of the prosperity of the Empire that the capital should be destitute of water, while a fine, limpid stream ran through the heart of it. The fountains were open in the day-time only: he ordered works to be executed immediately at the pumps of Notre-Dame, of the Pont-Neuf, of Chaillot, and of Gros-Chaillot, to make the water run day and night. He ordered, moreover, the erection of fifteen new fountains. That of the Château d'Eau was included in this creation. In two months, a part of these orders was executed, and the water sprang up night and day from the sixty-five ancient fountains. On the site of those which were recently decreed, temporary channels distributed the water till the fountains themselves should be erected. It was the public Treasury which furnished the funds necessary for this expense.

Napoleon prescribed the continuation of the quays of the Seine, and decided that the bridge of the Jardin des Plantes, then building, should bear the glorious name of Austerlitz. Having, lastly, perceived, when visiting the Champ de Mars, to determine the plan of the fêtes for which preparations were making, that a communication between the two banks of the Seine was indispensable at this point, he ordered the construction of a stone bridge, which was to be the finest in the capital, and has borne the name of the Bridge of Jena.

The most distant departments of the Empire shared in his munificence. He decreed this year the canal from the Rhone to the Rhine, the canal from the Scheldt to the Rhine, and ordered surveys for the canal from Nantes to Brest. He devoted funds to the continuation of the canals of the Oureq, of St. Quentin, and of Burgundy. He prescribed the construction of a high road, sixty leagues in length, from Metz to Mayence,

through the valley of the Moselle. He gave orders for commencing the road from Roanne to Lyons, where there is that fine descent of Tarare, almost worthy of the Simplon; the celebrated road of La Corniche, running from Nice to Genoa, along the flanks of the Apennines, between the sea and the summits of those mountains. He directed that of the Simplon, already nearly finished, those of Mont Cenis and Mont Genève, that along the banks of the Rhine, to be continued. Napoleon ordered, besides, new works at the arsenal of Antwerp.

It seems, as if victory had fecundated his spirit, for most of his great creations date from this memorable year, placed between the first half of his career, that so glorious half, when wisdom almost always guided his steps, and that second half, so extraordinary and so sad, when his genius, intoxicated by success, overleaped all the limits of the possible, to perish in an abyss.

The Legislative Body, which was assembled, quietly adopted the plans projected by Napoleon and discussed by the council of State. None of those stormy scenes of the Revolution were now witnessed, neither were yet the scenes of a free parliament. The assembly was seen adopting with confidence plans which it knew to be as ably conceived as they were ably explained.

A new code was presented this year, the fruit of long conferences between the tribunes and the councillors of State, under the direction of the archchancellor Cambacérès: it was the Code of civil procedure, prescribing the manner of proceeding before our tribunals, in consequence of their new form and the simplification of our laws. This code was adopted without difficulty, the questions liable to produce disputes having been settled beforehand in the preparatory discussions of the council of State and the Tribunal.

A great improvement was made in the organisation of the council of State. Hitherto that body had examined the *projets de loi*, discussed great measures of government, such as the Concordat, the coronation, the pope's journey to Paris, the grave diplomatic question of St. Julien's preliminaries not ratified by Austria. Initiated into all the affairs of State, it was rather a council of government than a council of administration. But these high questions became every day more rare in its bosom, and gave place to purely administrative questions, which the progress of time and the increasing extent of the Empire were incessantly multiplying. The councillors of State, important personages, almost the equals of the ministers, were too high in rank and too few in number to trouble themselves with all the reports. While the quantity of business increased, and they assumed the exclusively administrative character, another necessity was felt, that of training persons for the council of State, of creating a ladder for them to climb to it, and, above all, for employing young men of high rank, whom Napoleon was desirous

to draw to him by all ways at once, those of war and of civil functions. After conferring on the subject with the archchancellor, he created masters of requests, holding an intermediate rank between the auditors and the councillors of State, charged with the greater number of the reports, having the faculty of deliberating upon the questions on which they had reported, and receiving a salary proportioned to the importance of their attributions. Messieurs Portalis, junior, Molè, and Pasquier, then very young, and nominated immediately masters of requests, indicated the utility and the intention of the plan. The Emperor cherished that merit to which recollections were attached, without excluding that merit which awakened none.

To this wise innovation, which has created a nursery of able administrators, Napoleon immediately added another. There was no jurisdiction for the contractors who treated with the State, whether they executed public works, furnished supplies, or made financial engagements. It was the affair of the *United Merchants* which had revealed this deficiency; for Napoleon, not knowing to whom to consign it, had thought for a moment of sending it before the Legislative Body. This jurisdiction could not be attributed to the tribunals, as well on account of the special knowledge which it pre-supposes, as the turn of mind which it requires, and which ought to be administrative rather than judicial. It was for this reason that all the bargains made by the government were referred to the council of State. This was the principal origin of the contentious attributions. Hence there were at the same time created *advocates to the council*, charged to defend by written memorials, the interests of the parties about to be summoned before this new jurisdiction.

To all these creations, Napoleon added one more, the best perhaps of his reign, the University. We have seen what system of education he adopted in 1802, when he laid the foundations of new French society. Amidst the old generations, which the Revolution had made enemies of, some of which regretted the old system, while others were disgusted with the new without being disposed to return to the old, he purposed to form by education a young generation made for our modern institutions and by them. Instead of those central schools, which were public courses, attended by youths brought up at home or in private boarding-schools, and in which they heard professors teach, at the pleasure of their caprice, or of the caprice of the time, the physical sciences much more than letters, Napoleon instituted, as we have seen, houses where youth, lodged and fed, received from the hands of the State instruction and education, and where letters resumed the place which they ought never to have lost, and where the sciences had nevertheless not lost the place which they had gained. Napoleon, clearly foreseeing that prejudice and malevolence would assail the establishments which he was instituting, had founded six thousand exhibitions, and had thus composed by

authority (but by the authority of bounty) the population of the new colleges, called by the name of Lyceums. Some, very recently opened, others, being only old houses transformed, exhibited already in 1806 the spectacle of order, good morals, and sound studies. There were twenty-nine of them. Napoleon purposed to extend the number, and to raise it to a hundred. Three hundred and ten secondary schools established by the communes, a like number of secondary schools opened by individuals, the former restricted to follow the rules of the Lyceums, the latter to send their pupils thither, made up the whole of the new establishments. This system had completely succeeded. The masters of private schools, parents infatuated with old prejudices, priests dreaming of the conquest of the public education, calumniated the Lyceums. They said nothing was taught in them but mathematics, because the government desired to train up soldiers only, that religion was neglected, and that morals were corrupt there. Nothing was further from the truth, for government had the express intention to bring letters into credit again, and had attained the proposed end. Religion was taught there by chaplains, as seriously as the will of the author of the Concordat could cause it to be done, and with as much success as the spirit of the age permitted. Lastly, a hard, almost military life, and continual exercises preserved youth there from precocious passions; and, in regard to morals, the Lyceums were certainly preferable to private schools. For the rest, notwithstanding the slanders of the peevish partisans of the past, these establishments had made rapid progress. Youth, brought by the bounty of the exhibitions and by the confidence of parents, began to throng to them.

But, according to Napoleon, the work was scarcely begun. It was not enough to attract pupils, it was necessary to give them professors: a corps of teachers was to be created. This was a great question, on which Napoleon was fixed with the same firmness of mind that he applied himself to every thing. To resign education again to priests was inadmissible in his eyes. He had restored public worship, and had done so with a deep conviction that a religion is necessary for every society, not as an additional instrument of police, but as a satisfaction due to the noblest wants of the human soul. Nevertheless, he would not relinquish the duty of forming the new society to the clergy, who, by their obstinate prejudices, by their fondness for the past, by their hatred of the present, by their dread of the future, could only propagate in youth the sad passions of the generations that were dying off. It is requisite that youth should be formed after the model of the society in which it is destined to live; it is necessary that it should find in the college the family spirit, in the family the spirit of society, with purer morals, more regular habits, more steady diligence. It is requisite, in short, that the college should be society itself improved. If there is any difference whatever between the two, if youth hear masters and parents speaking dis-

cordantly, and hear these praise what those censure, there arises a mischievous contrast which disturbs the mind, and which causes them to despise their masters, if they have more confidence in their parents, their parents, if they have more confidence in their masters. The second part of life is in this case employed in believing nothing of what has been learned in the first. Religion itself, if it is imposed with affectation, instead of being professed with respect in the presence of youth—religion becomes nothing but a yoke, from which the young man, as soon as he is free, hastens to escape, as from all the college yokes. Such were considerations which made Napoleon averse to the idea of giving up youth to the clergy. Another reason completely decided him. Was the clergy fit to educate Jews, Protestants? Certainly not. Then one could not have Jews, Protestants, Catholics educated together, to compose with them an enlightened tolerant youth, fond of its country, fit for all careers, ONE, in short, as new France ought to be.

If, however, the clergy had not the qualities necessary for this task, it had some which were highly valuable, and which one ought to strive to borrow from it. A regular, laborious, sober, modest life was an indispensable condition for educating youth; for one ought not to be content, for such a charge, with the first comers, formed by the hazards of the times and of a dissipated society. But was it impossible to give to laymen certain qualities of the clergy? Napoleon thought not, and experience has proved that he was right. Studious life has more than one analogy with religious life; it is compatible with regularity of manners and mediocrity of fortune. Napoleon conceived that one might, by regulations, create a corps of teachers, who, without observing celibacy, would bring to the education of youth the same application, the same perseverance, the same professional constancy as the clergy. There is every year in the generations arriving at the adult state, like crops growing on the ground arriving at maturity, a portion of young minds having a fondness for study, and belonging to families without fortune. To collect these minds to subject them to preparatory trials, to a common discipline, to draw them and to retain them by the attraction of a moderate but sure provision—such was the problem to be resolved; and Napoleon did not consider it incapable of being solved. He had faith in the *esprit de corps*, and he was fond of it. One of the expressions which he most frequently repeated, because it expressed one of the ideas by which he was most frequently struck, was that *society was in the dust*. It was natural that he should feel that sentiment at the sight of a country where there existed no longer either nobility, or clergy, or parliament, or corporations. He was continually saying to the men of the revolution, Learn to constitute yourselves, if you would defend yourselves, for see how the priests and the emigrants, animated by the last breath of the great bodies destroyed, defend themselves!—He designed there-

fore to commit to a body which would live and defend itself the office of educating future generations. He has resolved it, he has done it, and he has succeeded.

Napoleon established the University on the following principles: A special education for the men destined for the professorship; preparatory examinations before becoming professors; the entry after these examinations into a vast body, by whose sentence alone their career could be either suspended or cut short, and in which they would rise in time and by their merits to the head of that corps, a superior council composed of professors, who should have distinguished themselves by their talents, applying the rules, directing the instruction; lastly, the privilege of public education attributed exclusively to the new institution, with an endowment in *rentes* on the State, which would add to the energy of the *esprit de corps* and to the energy of the spirit of property.—Such were the ideas according to which Napoleon designed the University to be organised. But he had too much experience to insert all these dispositions in a law. Availing himself with profound intelligence of the public confidence, which permitted him to present very general laws, which he afterwards completed by decrees, when experience called for them, he charged M. Fourcroy, the administrator of public instruction under the minister of the interior, to draw up a *projet de loi* which should be comprised in three articles only. By the first it was said that there should be formed, under the name of *Imperial University*, a teaching body, charged with the public education throughout the whole empire; by the second, that the members of the teaching body should contract obligations, *civil*, *special*, and *temporary*, (this word was employed to exclude the idea of monastic vows); by the third, that the organisation of the teaching corps, modified from experience, should be converted into a law in the session of 1810. It is only with this latitude of action that great things are to be accomplished.

This *projet*, presented on the 6th of May, was adopted, like all the others, with confidence and silence. We shall not advise the adoption in this manner of laws, but when there shall be such a man, such acts, and what is still more cogent, such a situation.

This brief and fertile session was terminated by the financial laws. Napoleon justly considered the finances as a foundation, quite as indispensable as the army, to the greatness of an empire. The late crisis, though past, was a serious warning to decree at length a complete system of finances, to raise the resources to the level of the necessities, and to establish a service of the Treasury, which should render it needless to resort to jobbing men of business. As for the creation of the resources necessary to defray the expenses of the war, Napoleon persisted in his determination not to make a loan. In fact, even amidst the prosperity which he caused France to enjoy, the 5 per cent. *rente* had never risen above 60. Had a loan been announced, the course would have sunk lower, perhaps to 50, and there would have been a perpetual

interest of 10 per cent. to provide for. It was necessary, however, to make up the deficit of the last budgets, and to place the resources definitively in equilibrium with the state of war, which for fifteen years past seemed to have become the usual state of France. It was a bold attempt, which has never been realised, to defray the expenses of an obstinate struggle with the permanent imposts. Napoleon had not renounced it, and he had the courage to propose to the country, or rather to impose upon it, the burdens which were to furnish the means of attaining that result.

The arrear of the last budgets might be liquidated with 60 millions, the debt to the Sinking Fund being deducted from it. This debt consisted, as it will be recollected, of securities which had been disposed of, and produce of the sale of national domains, which the Treasury had absorbed for its use, though they belonged to the Sinking Fund. It was necessary, therefore, to provide for these 60 millions, for the debt contracted with the Sinking Fund, and for an annual budget, which, from the experience of 1806, could not amount to less than 700 millions in time of war, (820 with the costs of collection).

The means devised were the following:—

It was perceived that the Sinking Fund had sold, very advantageously, the domains, the alienation of which had been entrusted to it by way of experiment. At that time, instead of selling for itself the 70 millions' worth, which the law of the year IX. attributed to it, with a view to indemnify it for the *rentes* then created, and for which it was to be paid at the rate of 10 millions per annum, those domains themselves had been given up to them. As to the securities for reimbursing it, government had decided to pay them to the same amount, that is to say in domains, on condition that it should dispose of them with the necessary precautions, which had already been so eminently successful. This same observation had led Napoleon, who was the inventor of that liquidation, to find the means of covering the 60 millions of arrear.

He had endowed the Senate, the Legion of Honour, the Public Instruction, and certain institutions with the remainder of the national domains. His intention, in acting thus, had been to save them from the waste of disadvantageous alienations. But, on the one hand, it had been perceived that the alienations could be effected in an advantageous manner, by entrusting them to the Sinking Fund; and on the other, there had been discovered in that system of endowments the vice peculiar to estates in mortmain, the condition of which is to be ill-cultivated and far from productive. Napoleon resolved to take back those domains from the Senate and the Legion of Honour, and to give them an equivalent by creating three millions of *rentes* at 5 per cent. to the capital of 60 millions. If the *rentes* delivered to the public were threatened with an immediate depreciation,

assigned as endowments to permanent bodies which would not alienate them, they would have none of the inconveniences of loans, they would occasion no fall of the course, and they would even procure an advantage for the public establishments which should receive them, that is to ensure them an income of 5, instead of an income of $2\frac{1}{2}$ or 3 per cent., which the national domains yielded. These domains, transferred afterwards to the Sinking Fund, which would dispose of them gradually, would procure the 60 millions which were needed.

It is true that the amount of these 60 millions was required immediately to pay the arrears of anterior budgets. The idea was conceived of creating temporary effects, yielding from 6 to 7 per cent., according to the period of their payment, due at a fixed term, payable to the Sinking Fund, at the rate of a million per month, from the first of July, 1806, to the first of July, 1811, mortgaged on the capital of the said Fund, which would have, with what it already possessed, and what it was going to acquire, about 130 millions' worth of national domains, and which, lastly, combined a well-established credit with this immoveable property.

These effects, bearing an advantageous but not usurious interest, and repayable at short fixed terms, could not fall like a *rente*, for their monthly and sure expiration for the period of five years, would tend to raise them by the certainty of recovering the entire capital from month to month. It is a combination, which has since succeeded several times, and which was excellent.

The process for liquidating the arrear consisted then in taking back the domains assigned to the great bodies, in giving them *rentes* instead, which gave them the advantage of an immediate increase of revenue, in causing these domains to be sold by the Sinking Fund, which it could accomplish with success in five years, and in realising their value beforehand, by means of paper due at a fixed term, which could not be depreciated, thanks to the certain and not distant reimbursement, thanks in short, to an interest of 6 or 7 per cent.

The only difficulty, and that not a very serious one, of this combination was that the sum of the *rentes* composing the public debt, was about to be increased to 51 millions, instead of 50, as prescribed by anterior laws. But the infraction was unimportant, and government satisfied the law, by establishing a more rapid extinction for that surplus million.

There was still left to provide for future budgets, by creating sufficient resources either for peace or war. Napoleon made a bold and at the same time a very wise declaration, in a financial point of view, to the Legislative Body and to Europe. He was desirous of peace, for he proudly said that he had *exhausted military glory*; he was desirous of peace, for he had given it to Austria. He was ready at this moment to conclude it with Russia, and he was engaged in negotiations with England. But the powers had become accustomed to consider treaties as truces,

which they could break at the first signal from London. It was requisite, till they could be brought to respect their engagements and to endure with resignation the greatness of France—it was requisite to be ready to bear the charges of war, so long as it should be necessary. Great Britain pretended to defray them by loans: let her do so, while she continued to hold that resource in her hands. It behoved France to provide for them in a different manner, with means which were her own, that is to say, with the taxes, a resource far otherwise durable, and which left no burden behind it. In consequence he declared that the sum of 600 millions was required for peace, 700 millions for war (720 and 820 millions, including the costs of collection). The budget of the most peaceful year of the present government, that of 1802, had confined itself to an expenditure of 500 millions. But, since 1802, the increase of the debt, the extension given to works of public utility, the endowment of the clergy consequent on the Concordat, the re-establishment of the monarchy which had led to the creation of a civil list, augmented to 600 millions the fixed expenses of a state of peace. The ordinary resources far exceeded that sum. As for the expenses of a state of war, which Napoleon was determined to keep up as long as it should be necessary, they raised the budget to 700 millions. At this rate 130 millions could be devoted annually to the navy, about 300 millions to the army, 50 armed ships kept, and 450,000 men always ready to march. France, on this footing, was able to face all dangers. Now, she could, without injuring herself, impose this burden, for her ordinary revenues already supplied above 600 millions. The kingdom of Italy furnished 30 millions of that sum for the French army which attended to its safety, and it would be easy to obtain 60 or 70 millions more by the ordinary taxes.

After this bold declaration, Napoleon had the courage to develop the great resource of the indirect contributions, which he had already restored to the country, and to create a new resource, not less useful, not less abundant, and which had no other inconvenience but that of affecting the generality of the people, but affecting them slightly, the tax on salt. In consequence, he proposed, besides the duty on liquors, called *droit d'inventaire* (a duty levied at the proprietor's at the moment of their being taken away), another duty on the wholesale trade, and on the retail sale, and for that purpose the exercise, that is to say, the superintendence, over liquors upon the roads, and the admission of agents of the excise into the cellars of the dealers in wine. The indirect taxes, which already produced 25 millions were expected to produce more than 50 in consequence of this extension.

As for the tax on salt, its re-establishment was occasioned by the suppression of another tax which had become insupportable, the turnpike toll on the roads. This tax was so incongruous with our habits, and so annoying to agriculture, that all the coun-

cils-general had solicited its abolition. It brought in but 15 millions, which was insufficient for the maintenance of the roads of the Empire, which cost the State an additional 10 millions a year, and still the roads were not brought into a desirable condition: for the sum necessary for keeping them in a proper state was estimated at 35 millions at least. By imposing a very light tax, two decimes per kilogramme (two sous per pound) on salt, to be levied at the salt-marshes by the custom-house officers surrounding those marshes, almost all of them situated on the frontier, one might hope for a produce of 35 millions, that is to say sufficient to keep the roads in a real state of repair, and to ease the Treasury of an expense of 10 millions. This tax was of a totally different nature from the ancient *gabelles*, unequally assessed, aggravated by the collection, and sometimes raising salt to 14 sous per pound; a price which for the lower class of people was exorbitant.

With the annually increasing produce of these new taxes, and with some accidental resources, which enabled the government to wait for their complete development, France would find herself capable of supporting a state of war, so long as it should last, and as soon as it was over, to bestow on the people of the Empire the blessings of peace, by the diminution of the land-tax, the only one that was really burdensome.

By this creation Napoleon completed the re-establishment of our finances, which the suppression of the indirect taxes had ruined in 1789; and he exhibited to Europe a picture discouraging to our enemies, that is to say, 50 ships, 450,000 men, maintained without loan, and for the whole time that the war should last.

The budget of 1806 was, therefore, fixed at 700 millions for expenditure and receipts (820 with the expenses of collection). An accidental circumstance, the restoration of the Gregorian calendar, raised it to 15 months instead of 12, and to 900 millions instead of 700. In fact, the preceding budget, that of the year XIII. stopping at the 21st of September, 1805, it was necessary, in order to comprehend the time to January 1st, 1806, to add about three months, which must of course raise the budget of 1806 to fifteen months and to 900 millions.

There was yet left a task to be performed, that was to organise the Treasury and the Bank of France. Enlightened by recent events, Napoleon resolved to reform both.

We have already repeated several times in this history that the amount of the taxes was sent to the Treasury, in the form of obligations at a certain date, or bills at sight, signed by the receivers-general, and payable month by month at their office. The discount of this paper procured cash, when there was a necessity to anticipate its falling due. To leave this discount to a company had proved an unsafe course. It had been intrusted anew to an agency of the receivers-general which acted in Paris for the whole body. Ever since the return of credit, capitals were plentiful, and the

receivers-general could procure for the State, by discounting their own engagements, all the funds that it needed. Nevertheless, a long discussion took place before Napoleon, in the council of finances, whether this service ought not to be assigned to the Bank, more powerful than the agency of the receivers-general ever could be. Napoleon was at first of opinion that for this and for other services the Bank was not constituted strongly enough. He resolved therefore to double its capital by raising the number of shares from 45,000 to 90,000, which, at 1000 francs per share, would form a capital of 90 millions. He resolved, moreover, to render its organisation monarchical, by converting the elected president who was at his head into a governor nominated by the Emperor, who would direct it for the two-fold interest of commerce and of the Treasury, to place three receivers-general in its council, to connect it more closely with the government; lastly, to suppress the regulation according to which the discounts were proportioned to the number of shares held by the presenters of effects, and to adopt in its stead a much more judicious arrangement, consisting in proportioning these discounts to the known credit of the mercantile men who applied for them. These changes, proposed in a law, were adopted by the Legislative Body, and, under this strong and excellent constitution, the Bank of France is become one of the most solid establishments in the world, for it has been seen in our days assisting the Bank of England itself, and getting over, without flinching, the greatest political catastrophes.

Even after he had thus enlarged it, Napoleon would not consign, in a constant and definitive manner, the service of the Treasury to the Bank of France. He intended, in case of need, and accidentally, to make use of the new power which he had insured to himself for discounting this or that sum, in *obligations of the receivers-general* or *bills at sight*, but he could not decide to deliver up to it definitively the portfolio of the Treasury. It was a company of commercial men, deliberating, it is true, under a president appointed by him, but placed out of his government, and he would not, he said, commit to them the secret of his military operations, in committing to them the secret of his financial operations. "I will have it in my power," he added, "to move a body of troops, without the Bank knowing it, and it would know it, if it were acquainted with my pecuniary wants."

However, he had a trial made, but only a trial, of a new system for payment of funds by accountable persons. Though the system of *obligations* had rendered great services, it was not the last term of perfection in the way of recovery. It frequently happened that the receivers-general had considerable funds in hand, of which they made a profit, till their obligations became due. These obligations, moreover, gave rise to a very active jobbing. A mere account current kept between the State and the accountable persons, by means of which, every amount that entered their

chests should belong to the State, should bear interest for its profit, and every amount that came out of the chest should bear interest for the profit of the accountable person who had paid it. An account current so regulated, was a much more simple, more true system, which did not prevent granting to the receivers-general the advantages which it had been deemed necessary to allow them to enjoy. But there was required, in the first place, a system of entry which admitted not of error; there was required in the accounts of the Treasury the introduction of double-entry, which is employed by commerce. M. Mollien proposed the account current and the double entry. Napoleon readily assented to it, but he wished this system to be tried with some of the receivers-general, in order to judge of its merit from experience.

Such were the civil labours of Napoleon in that memorable year 1806, the most glorious of the Empire, as 1802 was the most glorious of the Consulate: years fecundated the one by the other; in which France was constituted a dictatorial republic in 1802, and a vast federative empire in 1806. In this latter year, Napoleon founded at once vassal royalties for his brothers, duchies for his generals and his servants, rich endowments for his soldiers, suppressed the German empire, and left the French Empire to fill the West by itself. He continued the roads, the bridges, the canals, the works, already begun, and commenced still more important ones, the canals from the Rhone to the Rhine, from the Rhine to the Scheldt, the roads of La Corniche and Tarare, and from Metz to Mayence. He projected the great monuments of the capital, the column of the Place Vendôme, the arch of l'Etoile, the completion of the Louvre, the street to be called Rue Imperiale, and the principal fountains of Paris. He commenced the restoration of St. Denis, he ordered the finishing of the Pantheon; he promulgated the Code of civil proceeding, improved the organisation of the council of State, created the University, liquidated definitively the financial arrears, completed the system of the taxes, reorganised the Bank of France, and prepared the new system of the French treasury. All this, undertaken in January 1806, was finished in July the same year. What mind ever conceived more things, more vast, more profound, and ever realised them in less time? It is true that we approach the acme of this prodigious reign, a height of elevation that has not been equalled, and of which one may say, while surveying the entire catalogue of human greatness, that none surpasses, if there be any that come up to it.

Unfortunately, this incomparable year, instead of concluding amidst peace, as one might have hoped, concluded amidst war, half through the fault of Europe, half through that of Napoleon, and also through a cruel stroke of Death, which carried off Mr. Fox, in this very same year that he had already carried off Mr. Pitt.

The negotiations opened with Russia and England had been

continued during the labours of all kinds, of which we have just given a sketch. Lord Yarmouth, the conferences with whom had been purposely prolonged, adhered to the first proposals. England purposed to keep most of her maritime conquests, gave up to us our continental conquests, Hanover always excepted, and confined herself to inquiring what we should do to indemnify the king of Naples. As for the new royalties, as for the Confederation of the Rhine, she appeared not to care about them. Napoleon, who no longer had reason to defer the term of the negotiations, his principal projects being accomplished, pressed Lord Yarmouth to procure powers, in order to come to a conclusion. Lord Yarmouth had at length received them, but with orders not to produce them till he should perceive a possibility of arranging with France, and after he had come to an understanding with the Russian negotiator.

M. d'Oubril had arrived in June, with powers in due form, and with double instructions, first to gain time for the mouths of the Cattaro, and thus to spare Austria the military execution with which she was threatened; secondly, to put an end to all existing differences by a treaty of peace, if France acceded to conditions which would save the dignity of the Russian empire. One circumstance had confirmed M. d'Oubril in the idea of settling matters by a treaty of peace. While he was on the way, the Russian ministry had been changed. Prince Czartoryski and his friends, being desirous that Russia should connect herself more closely with England, not precisely to continue the war, but to treat with greater advantage, Alexander, weary of their remonstrances, dreading too strict engagements with the British cabinet, had at length accepted the resignations so frequently offered, and replaced prince Czartoryski by general Budberg. The latter had formerly been the governor of the emperor, a friend of the empress-mother's, and had neither energy nor humour to resist his master. M. d'Oubril, having found the emperor more inclined to peace than his ministers, could not but deem himself authorised by this change to incline more towards a pacific conclusion.

M. de Talleyrand had no difficulty to persuade M. d'Oubril, when he maintained that there was no serious interest to discuss between the two empires, at most only a question of influence to consider, on account of two or three petty powers, which Russia had taken under her protection. But, as for these latter, Russia, beaten at Austerlitz, and not disposed to begin again, since Austria had surrendered her sword, since Prussia was dependent, and since England appeared wearied out—Russia could not be very exigent. She desired merely to save her pride from too rude a shock. She was ready, therefore, to take no notice of the new arrangements made in Germany, and those relative to the annexation of Genoa and the Venetian States; she was even determined to be silent respecting the conquest of Naples, for the arming of the Neapolitans after a convention of neutrality justified all the

severity of Napoleon. Still, in regard to Piedmont and the Bourbons of Naples, Russia had written engagements, and she could do no less than demand something for them, were it ever so little. The engagements in regard to Piedmont, began to be antiquated, but those which had been contracted with queen Caroline and pushed her into the abyss, were too recent and too authentic for Russia not to interfere in her favour.

Hence this was the essential and difficult question to resolve between M. de Talleyrand and M. d' Oubril. The latter would have wished to obtain some compensation, however small, for the king of Piedmont, to insure Sicily to the Bourbons of Naples, and to introduce into the treaty certain expressions, which should give Russia an appearance of useful and honourable intervention in the affairs of Europe. Though Napoleon had at first purposed to have a dry and empty treaty, which should purely and simply re-establish peace between the two empires, in order to demonstrate that he did not recognise the influence which Russia pretended to arrogate to herself, this rigorous intention could not but give way before the possibility of an immediate peace, which by its reaction would bring England per force to treat on reasonable conditions. Napoleon, therefore, permitted M. de Talleyrand to grant all the semblances of influence which could save the dignity of the Russian cabinet. Accordingly, that minister was authorised in the patent treaty to guarantee the evacuation of Germany, the integrity of the Ottoman empire, the independence of the republic of Ragusa, to promise the good offices of France for reconciling Prussia and Sweden, and lastly, to accept the good offices of Russia for the re-establishment of peace between France and England. Here was sufficient to form a treaty less insignificant than that which Napoleon had at first contemplated, and consequently, more flattering for the pride of Russia. But some compensation or other was required for the kings of Piedmont and Naples. With respect to the king of Piedmont, Napoleon gave a positive refusal, and Russia was obliged to renounce that. As for Naples, he would never consent to cede Sicily, and he required that island to be restored to Naples, now possessed by Joseph. By dint of seeking a combination to reconcile the opposite pretensions, a middle term was hit upon, which consisted in giving the Balearic Islands to the prince-royal of Naples, and a pecuniary indemnity to the dethroned king and queen. The Balearic Islands belonged, it is true to Spain, but Napoleon had wherewithal to furnish an equivalent for the latter, by aggrandising the little kingdom of Etruria with some fragments of the duchies of Parma and Placentia. He had, moreover, an excellent and highly moral lesson to impress upon the court of Madrid, namely, that the prince-royal of Naples had become the son-in-law of Charles IV., on the same day that a princess of Naples had married the prince of the Asturias. To crown his excellent reasons, Napoleon possessed power. He

could therefore venture to contract a serious engagement respecting the Balearic Islands.

This combination devised, it was requisite to bring the affair to a conclusion. M. d'Oubril had placed himself in communication with Lord Yarmouth, who, though professing very friendly sentiments towards France, nevertheless thought that there was weakness in conceding every thing that M. de Talleyrand demanded. Like a good Englishman as he was, he would have had Sicily left to queen Caroline, for to preserve it for that queen was giving it to England. Accordingly, he did not fail to urge M. d'Oubril to prolong the resistance of Russia.

But M. de Talleyrand had an expedient, which Napoleon had suggested to him, and of which he skilfully availed himself, namely, to threaten Austria to act immediately unless the mouths of the Cattaro were given up. Napoleon as we have said, set a great value on these mouths of the Cattaro, for their happy situation in the Adriatic, and above all for their vicinity to the Turkish frontiers. He was therefore fully determined to require their restitution, and it was the easier for him to threaten because he had the resolution to act. For this purpose, moreover, he had but a step to go, for his troops were still on the Inn and occupied Braunau. In consequence, M. de Talleyrand declared to M. d'Oubril that he must conclude the business and sign the treaty which would lead to the surrender of the mouths of the Cattaro, or leave Paris, after which Austria would be attacked, unless she united her efforts with those of France to retake the position so dishonourably delivered up to the Russians.

M. d'Oubril, intimidated by this peremptory declaration, communicated his embarrassment to Lord Yarmouth, saying that his instructions enjoined him to save Austria from immediate constraint, and that he was obliged to conform to them; that, for the rest, nothing would be gained by delay with such a character as that of Napoleon, for every day he committed some fresh act, which was afterwards to be considered as a decided thing, if one did not choose to break with him; that if one had treated before the month of April, Joseph Bonaparte would not have been proclaimed king of Naples; if one had treated before the month of June, Louis Bonaparte would not have become king of Holland; that, lastly, if one had treated before the month of July, the German empire would not have been dissolved. M. d'Oubril therefore made up his mind, and signed on the 20th of July, notwithstanding the solicitations of Lord Yarmouth, a treaty of peace with France.

In the patent, articles were stipulated, as we have already shown, the evacuation of Germany, the independence of the republic of Ragusa, the integrity of the Turkish empire. In these same articles were promised the good offices of the two contracting powers for putting an end to the difference which had arisen between Prussia and Sweden; and France formally accepted the

good offices of Russia for the re-establishment of peace with England, all of them things which gave Russia an appearance of influence which she was desirous not to lose. The independence of the Seven Islands and the immediate evacuation of the mouths of the Cattaro were promised anew. In the secret articles the Balearic Islands were given to the prince-royal of Naples; but upon condition of not admitting the English into them in time of war; a pension was insured to his mother and father; and there was a stipulation that Swedish Pomerania should be assured to Sweden in the engagements which were to be negotiated between Sweden and Prussia.

This treaty, in the situation of Europe, was acceptable on the part of Russia, unless, for the sake of the queen of Naples, she preferred war, which could bring her nothing but disasters.

M. d'Oubril, after concluding it, set out immediately for St. Petersburg in order to obtain the ratifications of his government. He imagined that he had cleverly performed his task; for, if the peace which he had concluded were rejected by his cabinet, he had at least delayed for six weeks the execution with which Austria was threatened. On this point, there is ground for asserting that the peace was not signed with perfect sincerity.

M. de Talleyrand had now to deal with Lord Yarmouth only, who was much weakened since the return of M. d'Oubril. The French minister understood how to follow up his advantages, and to make the most of the treaty with Russia, in order to oblige Yarmouth to produce his powers which he had always refused to do. M. de Talleyrand told him that it was impossible to prolong this kind of comedy of an accredited negotiator, who would not show his powers; that if he deferred producing them much longer, one would be authorised to believe that he had none, and that his presence in Paris had but a delusive object, that of gaining the bad season, in order to prevent France from acting either against England or against her other enemies. Those enemies were not specified, but some movements of troops towards Bayonne might excite apprehension that Portugal was one of them. M. de Talleyrand added that he must come to an immediate decision, quit Paris, or give a serious character to the negotiation by producing his powers, for they had at last awakened the suspicions of Prussia, who required a satisfactory declaration in regard to Hanover; that, unwilling to lose such an ally, the French cabinet was ready to make the declaration demanded, and that, once made, it would not be possible to recede from it; that the war then would be everlasting, or that peace must be concluded without the restitution of Hanover; that, for the rest, nothing would be gained by fresh delays, and that two or three months later England would be obliged to consent perhaps to the conquest of Portugal, as she had consented to the conquest of Naples.

Overcome by these reasons, by the signature given by M. d'Oubril, by the love of peace, and also by the very natural am-

bition of writing his name at the foot of such a treaty, Lord Yarmouth at length determined to exhibit his powers. It was the first advantage that M. de Talleyrand desired to gain, and he hastened to make it irrevocable, by getting a French plenipotentiary nominated to negotiate publicly with Lord Yarmouth. Napoleon chose general Clarke, and conferred on him formal and patent powers. From that moment, the 22nd of July, the negotiation was officially opened.

General Clarke and Lord Yarmouth conferred, and, with the exception of Sicily, the two negotiators were agreed. France granted Malta, the Cape, and the conquest of India; she insisted on the restitution of the factories of Pondicherry and Chandernagor, consenting to limit the number of troops that she should keep there; she demanded also that St. Lucia and Tobago should be restored to her, but she made an especial point only of the restitution of Surinam, a point on which the instructions of the English negotiator were not peremptory. The only serious difficulty still consisted in Sicily, which Lord Yarmouth was not formally authorised to cede, especially for so insignificant an indemnity as the Balearic Islands. Napoleon was desirous to obtain Sicily for his brother Joseph, for very weighty reasons. According to him, so long as queen Caroline should reside at Palermo, Joseph would not be firmly established in Naples; there would be everlasting war between those two portions of the late kingdom of the Two Sicilies; the Calabrias would always be exposed to underhand excitement, and, what was still worse, queen Caroline, confined at Palermo, unable to stand her ground in her island without the support of the English, would give it up entirely to them. It would therefore be securing the enjoyment of Sicily to the English to leave it to the Bourbons, an infinitely disastrous consequence for the Mediterranean.

Lord Yarmouth, on his part, notwithstanding his desire to conclude, durst not venture. But a new obstacle soon intervened to fetter his good will.

The British cabinet, when apprised of the conduct of M. d'Oubril, was extremely irritated, and hastened to send couriers to St. Petersburg, to complain of the Russian negotiator for having deserted the English negotiator. It did not stop there, but blamed Lord Yarmouth, its own negotiator, for having so soon produced his powers. Fearful even of the influences to which he might be exposed by his personal intimacy with the French diplomatists, it made choice of a Whig, Lord Lauderdale, a personage very hard to please, to associate him in the negotiation. This second plenipotentiary was immediately despatched, with precise instructions, but which nevertheless left certain facilities relative to Sicily with which Lord Yarmouth was not furnished. Lord Lauderdale was an exact and formal diplomatist. He had orders to require the fixing of a basis of negotiation, the *uti possidetis*, which covered the maritime conquests of the English, and particularly Sicily,

which had not yet been conquered by Joseph Bonaparte. It is true that this same basis excluded the restitution of Hanover, but that kingdom was out of the discussion, the English having always declared that they would not even allow any debate on that point. The basis being admitted, Lord Lauderdale was to agree that the *uti possidetis* should be applied in an absolute manner, especially in regard to Sicily, and that this island might be relinquished for a compensation. Thus a sacrifice in Dalmatia, added to the cession of the Balearic Islands, might furnish a medium of accommodation.

Lord Lauderdale proceeded without delay to Paris. He was a Whig, consequently a friend, rather than a foe, to peace. But he had been warned to be on his guard against the seductions of M. de Talleyrand, which, it was feared, Lord Yarmouth was not capable of resisting.

Lord Lauderdale was received politely and coldly, for it had been guessed that he was sent over to serve as a corrective of Lord Yarmouth's too easy temper, as it was judged to be. Napoleon, in reply to the mission of Lord Lauderdale, appointed M. de Champagny second French negotiator. From that moment they were two against two. Messieurs Clarke and Champagny against Lord Yarmouth and Lord Lauderdale.

No sooner had Lord Lauderdale entered this congress than he set out with a long, absolute note, in which he recapitulated the confidential and official negotiation, and required, before proceeding any further, that the principle of the *uti possidetis* should be admitted. Napoleon was frankly desirous of peace, and imagined that he had it in his grasp ever since he had guided the hand of M. d'Oubril so far as to sign the treaty of the 20th of July. But it was wrong, nevertheless, to provoke his susceptible and by no means patient temper. He caused the answer to be deferred as the first sign of dissatisfaction. Lord Lauderdale did not consider himself beaten, and repeated his declaration. He was then answered in an energetic and dignified despatch, in which he was told that so far the negotiation had proceeded with frankness and cordiality, and without those pedantic forms which the new negotiator desired to introduce into it; that, if the intentions were changed, if all this diplomatic parade disguised a secret intention of breaking off, after procuring a few papers to produce to parliament, the sooner Lord Lauderdale was gone the better, for the French cabinet was not disposed to lend itself to the parliamentary calculations of the British cabinet. Lord Lauderdale had no desire to produce a rupture; he was awkward, that was all. Explanations ensued. It was understood that the production of Lord Lauderdale's note was an affair of mere formality, which, at bottom, excluded none of the conditions previously admitted by Lord Yarmouth; that even the relinquishment of Sicily on condition of a more extensive indemnity than the Balearic Islands, had become more explicit since the arrival of Lord Lauderdale, and the nego-

tiators then began to confer on the subject of Pondicherry, Surinam, Tobago, and St. Lucia.

The English negotiators seemed persuaded that Russia, touched by the representations of the British cabinet, would not ratify d'Oubril's treaty. Napoleon, on the contrary, could not believe that M. d'Oubril would have gone so far as to conclude such a treaty, if his instructions had not authorised him to do so; still less did he believe that Russia dared cancel an act which she had authorised her representative to sign. He thought, therefore, that it would be advantageous to wait for the new Russian ratifications, which to him appeared certain, and that England would then be obliged to submit to the conditions which he had it so much at heart to see her accept. In consequence, he ordered the two French negotiators to continue to gain time, till the day when the answer from St. Petersburg should reach Paris. M. d'Oubril had set out on the 22nd of July: that answer must arrive by the end of August.

Napoleon was mistaken, and this was one of the very rare occasions on which he had not divined the thoughts of his adversaries. Nothing, in fact, was more doubtful than the Russian ratifications, and, besides, the then failing health of Mr. Fox was a new peril for the negotiation. If this generous friend of humanity were to sink under the cares of government, to which he had long been unaccustomed, the war party might get the better of the peace party in the British cabinet.

But, at the moment, a serious circumstance put peace in much greater jeopardy than the temporising enjoined by Napoleon. Prussia had fallen into a melancholy state of despondency. Since her occupation of Hanover, and the publication in London of her communications with England, Napoleon, as we have said, had taken no account of her, and treated her as an ally from whom there was nothing to hope for. Thus every creature in Europe knew that he was engaged in the organisation of the new Germanic body, and Prussia was as uninformed on this subject as the petty German powers. Every body knew that France was negotiating with England, that consequently the question of Hanover must come under discussion, and she had not received a single communication on this subject capable of rendering her easy. King Frederick William was obliged to appear informed of that which he was ignorant of, that he might not make the state of neglect in which he was left too evident. Though keeping up secret and not very honourable relations with Russia, he was treated by the latter without much consideration, and he could perceive that she prized him less every day, in proportion as she became more reconciled with France. In coldness with Austria, who did not forgive him for having deserted her on the eve of Austerlitz, at war with England, which had just seized three hundred Prussian merchantmen, he found himself alone in Europe, and so little respected that even the king of Sweden him-

self had not been afraid to offer him the most grievous of affronts. When the Prussian troops had appeared to occupy the dependencies of Hanover bordering on Swedish Pomerania, the king of Sweden, who held them, as he said, on behalf of the king of England, his ally, had defended himself there, and fired upon the troops that were sent. It was the last degree of humiliation to be thus treated by a prince who had no other strength but his insanity, protected by his alliances.

This situation produced in the Prussian cabinet reflections equally painful and alarming. Russia, England herself, were, at this moment taking steps towards France. The coalition must soon find itself dissolved, and, as Prussia had been courted only because she formed the necessary complement of that coalition, what would become of her at the time of the general disarming? Would she not be delivered up defenceless to Napoleon, who, highly dissatisfied with her conduct, would treat her as he pleased, either in order to purchase peace with England and Russia, or to aggrandise the States that he should think fit to found? and, whatever he might do, he was sure not to have one disapprover in Europe, for nobody now felt the slightest interest for Prussia.

The strangest reports confirmed these cutting reflections. The idea of restoring Hanover to England, in order to have a maritime peace, was so natural and so simple that it sprang up in all minds at once. So little was Prussia esteemed that, notwithstanding the virtues of her king, it was not taken amiss that Napoleon should act thus towards a court which knew not how to be either friend or enemy to any one. The allies of France, Spain in particular, who suffered cruelly by the war, said aloud that Prussia did not deserve to have the calamities of war prolonged a single day on her account. General Pardo, ambassador of Spain in Berlin, repeated this so publicly, that people everywhere inquired the cause of such bold language. Thus, without being informed on the subject, every one related circumstances as they were passing in Paris between Lord Yarmouth and M. de Talleyrand.

Then came the malevolent, who, adding the improbable to the probable, took delight in the most mischievous inventions. Some pretended that France was about to reconcile herself with Russia by reconstituting the kingdom of Poland in behalf of the grand-duke Constantine, and that for this purpose the Polish provinces, ceded to Prussia at the time of the last partition, would be taken from her. Others maintained that Murat was about to be proclaimed king of Westphalia, and that it was in contemplation to give him Münster, Osnabrück, and East Friesland.

It is a mixture of falsehood and truth of which all rumours are usually composed, and there is always sufficient of the latter mingled with them to gain belief for the lie. This may be per-

ceived in the present instance, when accurate but distorted facts had served for a foundation to the falsest reports. Napoleon was, in fact, thinking of restoring Hanover to England, since Prussia no longer seemed to him an ally that could be relied on, but securing an indemnity for the latter or restoring to her all that he had received from her. The plan for taking the Polish provinces from her had been entertained for a moment, but by the Russians and not by the French. Lastly, Murat's pretended kingdom was an invention of M. de Talleyrand's clerks, for the purpose of flattering the imperial family; and as yet Napoleon had thought of this only on condition of giving Prussia the Hanseatic cities, which she eagerly coveted. At any rate, he had never wished to hear such a scheme talked of.

But it is not with this scrupulous accuracy that newsmongers construct their inventions. To ridicule those whom they suppose to be deceived, to affect indignation against those whom they suppose to be deceivers, is sufficient for their malevolent idleness, and this is a species of persons not more rare in the diplomatic circles than in the curious and ignorant public of great capitals.

Soldierly imprudences gave a certain probability to these rumours. Murat kept in his duchy of Berg a military court, where the most extraordinary language was used.

His was, observed his comrades in war, who had become his courtiers—his was a very small State for a brother-in-law of the Emperor's. By and by, no doubt, he would be king of Westphalia, and a fine kingdom would be composed for him, at the expense of that scurvy court of Prussia, which betrayed every body. It was not only those about Murat who talked thus. The French troops, brought back into the country of Darmstadt, into Franconia and Suabia, had but a step to take to overrun Saxony and Prussia. All these military men, who had a desire to continue the war, and who attributed the same desire to their master, flattered themselves that they should soon begin it again, and enter Berlin as they had entered Vienna. The new Prince of Ponte Corvo, Bernadotte, established at Anspach, devised plans, ridiculous enough, which he showed publicly, and which he ascribed to Napoleon. Augereau, caring still less what he said, drank at table with his staff, to the success of the approaching war with Prussia.

These extravagances of idle soldiers, reported in Berlin, naturally produced the most unpleasant sensation. Related at court, they were then transmitted to the entire population, and excited the pride, always ready to take fire, of the Prussian nation. The king was more especially affected by them, on account of the effect which they could not fail to produce on the public opinion. The queen, distressed about what had befallen her sister, the princess of Tour and Taxis, who had been included in the recent *mediatisation*, said nothing, having for some time made up her mind to be silent, and quite aware that she had no claim upon

Napoleon, to induce him to favour the princes of her family. But her silence was significant. M. de Haugwitz was more disheartened than he chose to confess to his master. The faults committed during his absence, and contrary to his advice, at length produced their irresistible consequences. He was nevertheless blamed for all events, as though he had been their real cause. The seizure of three hundred vessels, so injurious to Prussian commerce, was imputed to him as one of his works. The minister of the finances had reproached him with it in full council, and with the greatest asperity. A general of renown in the army, general Ruchel, had carried rudeness towards him to the length of insult. Public opinion in Prussia rose from hour to hour against M. de Haugwitz, who, however, had done nothing wrong but in returning to business at the solicitation of the king, when his system of alliance with France was so compromised that it was rendered impossible. The sentiment of German patriotism combined with all the rest to hasten a crisis. Some booksellers of Nuremberg, having circulated pamphlets against France, Napoleon had ordered them to be apprehended, and, applying to one of them the severity of the military laws, which treat as an enemy any one who endeavours to excite a country against the army that occupies it, had caused him to be shot. This deplorable act had inflamed the public opinion against the French and their partisans.

King Frederick William, and M. de Haugwitz, had reckoned upon a success for calming the public mind: they hoped that a confederation of the German powers of the north under the protectorship of Prussia, would form a counterpoise to the confederation of the Rhine, Napoleon himself had suggested the idea of it. An aide-de-camp of the king had been sent to Dresden, to decide Saxony to enter into this confederation, and the chief minister of the elector of Hesse Cassel had come himself to Berlin to confer on the subject. But these two courts manifested extreme coldness towards the proposal. Saxony, the most honest of the German powers, had a natural mistrust of Prussia, and, if she had resolved to join any new confederacy, she would rather have inclined to Austria, which had never coveted her States, than Prussia, which, surrounding them on all sides, was evidently longing for them. She was, therefore, not disposed to do what was asked of her, and regulated her conduct by that of the other powers of the north of Germany. Hesse, dissatisfied with Prussia, which, in 1803, had caused the country of Fulda to be given to the house of Nassau-Orange, dissatisfied with France, which had refused to include her in the confederation of the Rhine, and at the same time to aggrandise her, deceiving, besides, all those with whom she treated, would not decide in favour of Prussia any more than of France, for to her the danger appeared equal. To excuse herself to Prussia, to whom she owed an at least apparent attachment, she had invented an

odious lie, and pretended that France had thrown out violent underhand threats if she joined the confederation of the north. This was not the case; the most secret despatches of the French government,* enjoined its agents on the contrary not to oppose any obstacle to the formation of this confederation, to be silent on the subject, and, if consulted, to declare that France would see it without displeasure. It was the Hanseatic cities only to which France resolved to forbid that accession, for purely commercial reasons; and this she had not concealed.

The Hessian minister, then, carried to Berlin the falsest assertions; and, all that his sovereign had demanded of France, when offering to join the confederation of the Rhine, he pretended that France had offered him to draw him away from the confederation of the north. He even accused M. Bignon, our minister at Cassel, of language which the latter had not used, and which he contradicted most energetically. It is possible that M. Bignon, before the confederation of the north was contemplated, and when all the German diplomatists were talking of the confederation of the Rhine, had extolled in general terms the advantages to be derived from the French alliance, that in his language he had even gone beyond his instructions, but this was from indiscreet zeal; and a proof that he acted without orders is that Napoleon had enjoined M. de Talleyrand by a letter to refuse the junction of the elector of Hesse.† Nevertheless, the minister of the elector of Hesse, sent extraordinarily to Berlin, with a view to justify an unexpected refusal, came to report in the falsest manner the pretended threats and the pretended offers between which France had placed the petty court of Hesse.

On this utterly false representation, the king of Prussia conceived that he discovered the blackest treachery in the conduct of Napoleon, thought himself tricked, oppressed, and gave way to a violent irritation. While these reports were reaching him from the court of Cassel, a despatch from M. de Lucchesini arrived from France. That ambassador, a man of talent, but unsteady, insincere, living in Paris with all the enemies of the government, and being nevertheless one of the most assiduous courtiers of M. de Talleyrand, had picked up, some days before, the reports circulated respecting the lot reserved for Prussia. A confidential intimation obtained from the English negotiators relative to Hanover, the restitution of which had been tacitly promised, appeared to him to crown all the threatening circumstances of the moment, and as, in his ambiguous conduct, alternately the adversary or the

* I have read all these despatches with the greatest attention; and, as I tell the truth in regard to all the courts, great and small, I should tell it in regard to Hesse, were that truth favourable to it, and unfavourable to France.

† This letter exists in the dépôt of the Secretary of State's office in the Louvre.

partisan of the system of M. de Haugwitz, he had very recently supported the treaty of the 15th of February, as he had even carried it to Berlin, he considered his responsibility as deeply involved, if the last attempt at an alliance with France turned out ill. He therefore exaggerated in his reports in the most imprudent manner. An agent ought to conceal nothing from his government, but he ought to weigh his assertions, to add nothing to the truth, to retrench nothing from it, especially when baneful resolutions may be the consequence.

The courier who left Paris on the 29th of July, arrived at Berlin on the 5th or the 6th of August. He caused an extraordinary sensation there. A second, bringing the despatches of the 2nd of August, who arrived on the 9th, only added to the effect produced by the first. The explosion was instantaneous. As a heart, full of long-repressed sentiments, suddenly breaks forth, if a last impression comes to aggravate what it has felt, the king and his ministers burst into sudden passions against France. Both of them equalled in their external demonstrations the most violent members of the party which desired war. M. de Haugwitz, usually so calm, certainly could, in reviewing the past, call to mind the faults of the court of Berlin, explain to himself the consequences of those faults on the irritable mind of Napoleon, comprehend from that time the neglect with which the latter repaid an unfaithful alliance, reduce thus to their true value the alleged plans with which Prussia was threatened, and wait for more accurate reports, before the Prussian cabinet proceeded to form an opinion and to decide upon a line of conduct. Here commence the real faults of M. de Haugwitz. Believing only a part of what was told him, but desiring to cover his responsibility, and above all flattering himself that he could control the violent party by putting himself at the head of the military demonstrations, he assented to all that was proposed in this moment of agitation. His system being thus overthrown, he ought to have retired and left to others the chances of a rupture with France, which he foresaw must be disastrous. But he gave way to the general movement of minds, and all the partisans he had about the king, M. Lombard in particular, studiously imitated him. We shall discover that there is no need of a free government, for nations to furnish the spectacle of the most inconceivable popular excitements.

A council was called at Potsdam. The old generals, such as the duke of Brunswick and marshal de Mollendorf formed part of it. When these men, who till then had shown such discretion, saw the king and M. de Haugwitz himself consider the treachery attributed to France as possible and even as true, they hesitated no longer, and the resolution to replace the whole Prussian army on the war footing, as it had been six months before, was unanimously adopted. The majority of the council, the king included, regarded this as a measure of safety, M. de

Haugwitz as an answer to all those who alleged that Prussia was given up to Napoleon.

All at once, a report was circulated in Berlin, on the 10th of August, that the king had decided to arm, that great difficulties had arisen between Prussia and France, that hidden dangers had even been discovered, a sort of meditated treachery, which accounted for the stay of the French troops in Suabia, Franconia, and Westphalia. The opinion frequently agitated, but always repressed by the example of the king, in which people had confidence, was violently expressed. The hearts of the subjects overflowed like that of the princes. We may well say, was the cry on all sides, that France would not spare Prussia any more than Austria; that she is determined to overrun and ravage all Germany; that the partisans of French alliance were either dupes or traitors; that it was not M. de Hardenberg who was sold to England, but M. de Haugwitz to France; that it was well to find him out at last, only it was finding him out too late; that it was not to-day, but six months ago, on the eve or the morrow of Austerlitz, that Prussia ought to have armed; that, besides, it was of little consequence, if they must, though late, defend themselves or perish; that England and Russia would no doubt hasten to the assistance of any one who would resist Napoleon; that, after all, the French had vanquished the Austrians without energy, the Russians without instruction, but that they would find it a more difficult task to beat the soldiers of the great Frederick.

Persons who saw Berlin at this period say, that there never was an instance of such fermentation and excitement. M. de Haugwitz already perceived with dread that he had been urged far beyond the goal which he meant to reach, for he had contemplated mere demonstrations, and the nation demanded war. The army, in particular, called aloud for it. The queen, prince Louis, the court, recently controlled by the express will of the king, now broke out without restraint. According to them, they were not German, they were not Prussian, till that day; people listened at last to the voice of interest and honour; they were throwing off the illusions of a perfidious and disgraceful alliance; they were worthy of themselves, of the founder of the Prussian monarchy, of the great Frederick. Never has such infatuation been witnessed, but where the multitude leads the wise, where courts lead weak kings.

Yet, what had happened to justify this outburst? Prussia, on the point of signing in 1805 a treaty of close alliance with France, had, under the false pretext of the violation of the territory of Anspach, yielded to the solicitations of the European coalition, to the cries of the German aristocracy, to the caresses of Alexander, which was a sort of treachery. Finding France victorious at Austerlitz, she had abruptly changed sides, and accepted Hanover from Napoleon, after accepting it from

Alexander a few days before. Napoleon had sincerely desired to attach her to himself by such a gift, and he waited for this last trial to see whether she could be trusted. But this gift, accepted with confusion, Prussia had not dared to avow to the world; she had almost excused herself to the English for the occupation of Hanover; she had not taken that frank position between Napoleon and his enemies which she ought to have taken to inspire confidence. Disgusted with such relations, Napoleon had formed the secret design to take back Hanover, in order to obtain from England a peace, which he had no longer any hope of imposing on her by the alliance of Prussia. But he had thought of a compensation, he had prepared it in his mind, but he had said nothing, fearful of opening himself to a court for which he no longer felt any esteem. Was this a proceeding to be compared to the conduct of Prussia, continuing in secret connexion with Russia, through M. de Hardenberg, notwithstanding the formal treaty of alliance signed at Schönbrunn, and renewed at Paris on the 15th of February? Certainly not. The faults of Napoleon are confined to want of respect, which he ought not to have shown, but which the equivocal conduct of Prussia excused, if it did not justify.

In reality, Prussia felt humbled by the part which she had acted, alarmed at the lonely situation in which she would find herself, if England and Russia should reconcile themselves with France, confusedly troubled about the treatment which she should then be liable to experience from Napoleon, without having a person to complain to; and in this state she was ready to take the falsest, the most improbable rumours for real. In all that was passing in Berlin, one thing only was true and honourable, that was German patriotism humiliated by the successes of France, bursting out on the first pretext, founded or not. But this sentiment burst forth unseasonably. In 1805, when Napoleon left Boulogne, Prussia ought either to have declared herself loudly for France, stating her motives for acting thus, and pledging Prussian honour in this sense, or declared herself against France from that time, and struggle against her, while Austria and Russia were in arms. Now she was rushing into ruin by a way that was not even honourable.

The despatches of M. de Lucchesini had been intercepted by Napoleon's police, and he was acquainted with their contents. Incensed at them, he had immediately ordered a letter to be written to M. de Laforest, to apprise him of the sending of these despatches, to charge him to contradict all the allegations of the Prussian minister, and to require his recall. Unfortunately, it was too late, for already the impulsion given to the public opinion in Prussia was not to be controlled. M. de Haugwitz, moreover, embarrassed by the so different parts which he had been forced to act for a year past, had no longer the courage of good resolutions. He durst neither see the minister of France, nor declare to the fools whose folly he had flattered, that he should leave them

once more to join the wise, who were then extremely rare in Berlin.

M. de Laforest found him reserved and shunning explanations. However, after several attempts, he obtained an interview, and asked how he could be deficient to such a degree of his usual presence of mind; how he could believe the lying tales invented by Hesse, the giddy expressions picked up by M. de Lucchesini; why he had not waited, or sought for more accurate information, before he took such serious resolutions as were publicly announced. M. de Haugwitz, distressed in proportion as the light, obscured for a moment in his mind, began to shine forth again, appeared grieved at the conduct which he had pursued, acknowledged candidly the impetuosity of the current which had carried away the king, the court, and himself; and, lastly, declared that, unless they received assistance, they should run perhaps to perish upon the rock of war; that nothing was yet lost, if Napoleon would take any step whatever that would be a satisfaction for the pride of the multitude, for the prudence of the cabinet a reason to take courage; that the removal of the French army, accumulated for some time on the roads leading to Prussia, would fulfil this twofold object; that the armaments might then be countermanded, the government alleging as a reason for having armed the assemblage of French troops, and as a reason for disarming their retirement beyond the Rhine. M. de Haugwitz added that, to facilitate the explanations, M. de Lucchesini should be recalled, and a discreet and safe man, M. de Knobelsdorf, sent to Paris.

Napoleon could have consented to the proposed step without compromising his glory, for he had never thought of invading Prussia. He had merely taken some precautions on the refusal to ratify the treaty of Schönbrunn. But, since then, he had thought only of Austria and the mouths of the Cattaro; he thought only of obtaining restitution of them by some threat, and, since the treaty signed with M. d'Oubril, he was even strongly disposed to bring his troops back to France. He had given orders for a vast camp at Meudon, with the intention of assembling the grand army there, and holding magnificent *fêtes* in September. The order for this purpose was already despatched. But a serious and unforeseen event intervened, to render this conduct difficult on his part. Contrary to his expectation, the emperor Alexander had refused to ratify the treaty of peace signed by M. d'Oubril. He had adopted this resolution at the urgent representations of England, which had laid stress on her fidelity, referred to her recent refusal to treat without Russia, and desired, in return for this fidelity, that he should reject a treaty too hastily concluded, and on evidently disadvantageous conditions. The emperor Alexander, though greatly dreading the consequences of war with Napoleon, dreaded them rather less on seeing England more backward than he had imagined to throw herself into the arms of France. It would even appear,

that something had already transpired respecting the agitations of the court of Prussia, and the possibility of drawing that court into a war. Lastly, the recently acquired knowledge of the dissolution of the Germanic empire, adding to the jealousies of Russia, as to those of all the powers, and producing an expectation of redoubled hatred against Napoleon, Alexander had decided not to ratify M. d'Oubril's treaty. He replied, however, that he was ready to resume the negotiations, but in concert with England, that he even charged the latter with his powers for treating, on condition that not only Sicily should be left to the royal family of Naples, but the whole of Dalmatia, and that the Balearic Islands should be given to the king of Piedmont.

The courier, who brought this communication, arrived at Paris on the 3rd of September, at the very moment when the armaments of Prussia were engaging the attention of all Europe, and when Napoleon was desired to extricate M. de Haugwitz, and king Frederick William, from embarrassment, by ordering the French troops to fall back. Napoleon, in his turn, conceived a most profound mistrust, and imagined that he was betrayed. The recollection of the conduct of Austria, in the preceding year, the recollection of her armaments, so frequently and so obstinately denied, even when her troops were marching, this recollection recurring to his mind, persuaded him that the same would be the case this time, that the sudden armaments of Prussia were but a perfidy, and that he was in danger of being surprised in September, 1806, as he had well nigh been in September, 1805. He was, therefore, not at all disposed to withdraw his troops from Franconia, a very important military position, as we shall soon see, for a war against Prussia. Another circumstance led him to believe in a coalition. Mr. Fox, after an illness of two months, was just dead. Thus, in the same year, the fatigues of long power had killed Mr. Pitt, and the first trials of a power which had become new to him had hastened the end of Mr. Fox. Mr. Fox carried with him the peace of the world, and the possibility of a fertile alliance between France and England. If England had sustained a great loss in Mr. Pitt, Europe and humanity suffered an immense loss in Mr. Fox. He being dead, the war party was about to triumph over the peace party in the bosom of the British cabinet.

That cabinet, however, durst not make any considerable change in the conditions of peace previously sent to Paris. Lord Yarmouth had relinquished the negotiation in disgust. Lord Lauderdale was left alone. He received orders from London to present the demands of Russia, consisting in the claim of Sicily and Dalmatia for the court of Naples, and the Balearic Islands for the king of Piedmont. Lord Lauderdale, in presenting these new conditions, acted in the name of both courts, and as having the powers of both. Thus, by waiting for the effect of the ratifications

of St. Petersburg, Napoleon had missed the decisive occasion for having peace. The greatest minds are liable to these mistakes in the field of politics, as in the field of war.'

Napoleon felt on this account a sort of irritation, which induced him still more to suppose the existence of a European conspiracy. He was, therefore, much more inclined to appeal to arms than to give way. He received about this time M. de Knobelsdorf, who had come in the utmost haste to supply the place of M. de Lucchesini. He gave him personally an obliging reception, affirmed positively that he had no design against Prussia, that he could not comprehend what she wanted of him, for he wanted nothing of her but the execution of treaties; that he had no thoughts of taking any thing from her, and that all that had been published on this subject was false; and he alluded in these words to the reports of M. de Lucchesini, who had on the same day delivered his letters of recall. Then, with a candour worthy of his greatness, he added that, in the false rumours which were circulated, one thing was true, namely, what was said about Hanover; that, in fact, he had heard England on that subject; that, seeing the peace of the world involved in that question, he had purposed to address himself to Prussia, to explain his situation in its naked truth, to give her the choice of a general peace purchased by the restitution of Hanover, on condition of a compensation, or the continuance of the war against England, but war to the last extremity, and after an explanation, indeed, of the degree of energy which king Frederick William intended to exert in it. He affirmed, moreover, that, at any rate, he should not have taken any resolution without opening his mind frankly and completely to Prussia.

An explanation so candid ought to have banished all doubts. But Prussia wanted more; she wanted an act of deference, which should save her pride. Napoleon might, perhaps, have complied, if he had not been at this moment full of mistrust, and if he had not believed that there was a new coalition, which had as yet no existence, though it was not long before it did exist. But, in that excitement of mind which events occasion, we cannot always judge correctly what is passing among our adversaries. In consequence, he ordered M. de Laforest to conduct himself with reserve, to tell M. de Haugwitz that Prussia should have no other explanations than what he had given to Messieurs de Knobelsdorf and de Lucchesini; that, as for the demand relative to the armies, he replied by a demand exactly similar, and that, if Prussia countermanded her armaments, he would engage to give immediate orders to his troops to repossess the Rhine. He enjoined M. de Laforest to be silent afterwards, and to watch events. "In such a situation," he wrote, "one ought not to believe protestations, how sincere soever they may appear. We have been deceived too often. We must have facts; let Prussia disarm, and the French shall repossess the Rhine, not before."

M. de Laforest punctually obeyed the injunctions of his sove-

reign, had no difficulty to convince M. de Haugwitz who was previously convinced, but overruled by events; and then he was silent. It was not enough for the Prussian cabinet to be enlightened respecting the intentions of Napoleon; it wanted a palpable explanation to give to the public opinion, and for itself also facts, but clear and positive facts, such as the retirement of the French. Even then, the excited imaginations would scarcely have been pacified even by a soothing act. Prussian pride claimed a satisfaction. One has as much, even more need of satisfaction, when one is in the wrong, than when one is in the right.

The king and M. de Haugwitz suffered a few more days to elapse, to see if Napoleon would communicate any thing more explicit, more satisfactory. This silence ruins every thing, said M. de Haugwitz to M. de Laforest. But the die was cast: Prussia, by tergiversations, which had alienated from her the confidence of Napoleon, France by too slighting conduct, were both to be led into a destructive war, the more to be regretted, as, in the state of the world, they were the only two powers, whose interests were reconcilable. The silence enjoined by M. de Laforest, was invariably maintained by him; but the grief in his countenance, an expressive grief and sufficiently significant, if the court of Prussia had chosen to comprehend it, and to guide itself by what it had comprehended. But such was no longer the case, either with king Frederick William or with his ministers. Regiments passed every day through Berlin singing patriotic songs, which were repeated by the crowds collected in the streets. People were everywhere inquiring when the king would set out for the army, and if it was true that he would remain at Potsdam, with the intention of changing his first determination. So great became the outcry that it was necessary to satisfy the public opinion. The unfortunate Frederick William set out on the 21st of September for Magdeburg. This was the signal for war, which was expected in Germany, and which Napoleon was waiting for in Paris. We shall see in the next book the terrible vicissitudes, the disastrous consequences for Prussia and the glorious results for Napoleon, results which would excite unmixed satisfaction, if policy had harmonised with victory.

END OF VOL. VI.



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